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This thesis considers the typical structure and requirements of a traditional 
securitisation scheme in South Africa. The models used in other jurisdictions cannot 
be applied unchanged in South Africa. South African securitisation structures make 
use of a security special purpose vehicle (SPV), because of uncertainties about the 
provisions of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 relating to the trustee for debenture-
holders. An evaluation of the functioning of a security SPV leads to the conclusion 
that a trustee for debenture-holders should still be appointed within the security SPV 
structure to represent the interests of the investors. The trust for debenture-holders can 
be a true trust. The use of general notarial bonds over claims, pledges of claims and 
fiduciary security cession is examined to determine the effectiveness of each one 
during securitisation. 
 Aspects of several Acts, Notices and other regulatory measures are considered 
where they are relevant to securitisation. Of specific importance is the Exemption 
Notice Relating to Securitisation Schemes, 2008. The Notice requires that both rights 
and obligations of the originator must be transferred to the SPV. The requirement that 
the obligations of the originator must be transferred leads to the conclusion that the 
Notice requires a transfer of claims by means of cession and a transfer of duties by 
means of delegation. For several reasons, delegation is not a suitable method of 
transfer during securitisation. Foremost among these reasons is that delegation is a 
form of novation, which means that the claims cease to exist and are replaced with 
new claims between the debtors and the SPV. Security rights that were accessory to 
these claims will then also cease to exist. The amendment to the Notice is 
recommended so that transfer of claims by means of cession will suffice for 
compliance with the Notice. 
 The South African courts‘ approach to simulated transactions is evaluated to 
determine the possibility that the sale of the assets to the SPV may be viewed as a 
simulated transaction. This thesis evaluates the provisions in insolvency law that 
could be raised to impeach the sale of the assets in the event of the originator‘s 





Cession; cession for collecting purposes; debenture trust; disposition; fiduciary 
security cession; general notarial bond; insolvency-remoteness; originator; pledge of 
claims; rating agency; simulated transaction; special purpose vehicle; traditional 
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Traditional securitisation is the pooling of a homogenous group of income-producing 
assets, the sale of these assets by the original holder (originator) to an insolvency-
remote third party (a special purpose vehicle or SPV)1 and the issue by the SPV of 
marketable securities (typically debt instruments such as debentures) to finance the 
purchase of the assets. The transferred assets serve as security for the securities 
issued.2 Traditional securitisation is further categorised as either asset-backed 
(property and claims) or revenue stream-backed (intellectual property and whole 
businesses) securitisation. This categorisation is based on the character of the 
transferred assets. The description of this category may be confusing at first glance – 
all assets transferred during the securitisation process must be able to generate the 
cash flows necessary to service the principal debt and interest of the securities issued. 
Traditional securitisation must be distinguished from synthetic securitisation. In a 
synthetic securitisation the assets are not transferred to the SPV. Instead, the 
originator uses a credit derivative instrument to transfer the risk associated with the 
specified pool of assets to the SPV.3 The SPV issues securities to finance the 
transaction. The principal debt and interest on the securities must be paid from the 
cash flow arising from the assets that serve as collateral and from the fees or premium 
paid by the originator to the SPV for accepting the risk.4  
 The main objective of securitisation is for the originator to obtain financing. An 
originator will opt to use securitisation rather than issuing debt securities if the 
benefits of securitisation outweigh its disadvantages, such as the high cost of the 
                                                 
1
 The abbreviation ‗SPV‘ will be used throughout this thesis. 
2
 For further definitions of traditional securitisation see GN 2, GG 30628 (1 January 2008) Notice on 
Banks Act 94 of 1990 – Designation of an Activity not Falling within the Meaning of ‗The Business 
of a Bank‘ (Securitisation Schemes), hereinafter referred to as ‗Securitisation Notice, 2008‘, par 1 of 
the Schedule; Angela Itzikowitz & FR Malan ―Asset Securitisation in South Africa‖ (1996) 8 SA 
Merc LJ 175; Standard & Poor‟s Asset Securitization Report: Glossary at 22, available at 
http://www.asreport.com/glossary.cfm (accessed 9 May 2005).  
3
 ‗Risk‘ may refer to, among other things, the possibility of default (in the case of claims) or the 
possibility of the loss of profitability (in the case of intellectual property or whole businesses). 
4
 Schedule, par 1 of Securitisation Notice, 2008. 
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transaction. The benefits of securitisation as opposed to other forms of financing are 
discussed in chapter 2. 
 Securitisation has not had a long history. The first securitisation was carried out in 
1977 in the United States of America. It was an issue by the Bank of America, 
underwritten by Salomon Smith Barney. The first securitisations were aimed at 
improving the home loan market by increasing the funds available for loans to 
mortgage borrowers by United States thrifts, which are similar to building societies. 5 
The first securitisation scheme in South Africa was carried out in 1989 by the United 
Building Society as the originator. The pooled assets were mortgage loans and they 
were sold to Mortgage Securities 101 (Pty) Ltd, the SPV created for the scheme. The 
securities issued to finance the transaction were floating-rate debentures.6 
 Legal opinion will usually be acquired during the structuring phase of a 
securitisation scheme as to whether the sale of the assets to the SPV will be a ‗true 
sale‘. The procurement of such a legal opinion is a requirement of Securitisation 
Notice, 2008 when the originator of the scheme is a bank or a company within a 
banking group.7 The requirements of Securitisation Notice, 2008 must be met by both 
bank and non-bank originators for the SPV to be exempted from falling under the 
definition of ‗the business of a bank‘ in the Banks Act,8 when the SPV offers its 
securities to the public. 
 However, even if the SPV does not intend to offer its securities to the public and 
therefore does not need to comply with Securitisation Notice, 2008, it is important 
that the transfer of the assets constitutes a true sale. A true sale will permanently 
remove the assets from the estate of the originator so that they will not be available to 
the originator‘s creditors for attachment or to its liquidator if declared insolvent. The 
investors in the SPV depend on this insulation from the originator when they invest in 
the SPV, because they are not compensated for the business risks of the originator by 
way of interest. 
                                                 
5
 Natasha Higman Securitisation Clarified (2004) at 6. 
6
 See Itzikowitz & Malan 1996 SA Merc LJ at 183–185. 
7
 Schedule, par 4(2)(b)(i). 
8
 94 of 1990. 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
17 
 Despite the importance of legal opinion during the structuring of the scheme, there 
has been almost no research in South African law on traditional securitisation.9  
1.2  METHODOLOGY 
Traditional securitisation is considered by examining three inter-related aspects, 
namely (1) the structuring of the securitisation scheme, (2) relevant legislative aspects 
and lastly, (3) the true sale requirement and insolvency-remoteness of the SPV. These 
aspects are also considered in the comparative chapters of the thesis. 
 Almost any asset of an originator can be securitised,10 but the type of assets most 
often used is claims. This thesis will therefore only discuss the securitisation of 
claims. 
1.2.1 Comparative perspectives 
The law relating to securitisation in the United States of America11 and in England is 
examined.12 These are countries in which securitisation is used often, and in which 
potential problems in structuring, legislation and in achieving a true sale have been 
well explored and discussed in academic circles. 
South African company law was to a great extent derived from English legislation13 
and, consequently, South African courts have introduced into law much of the English 
                                                 
9
 Only two articles have been published on the topic in accredited South African law journals, namely 
Itzikowitz & Malan 1996 SA Merc LJ at 175 and Susan Scott ―An Introduction to the Securitisation 
of Claims Incorporating a Collective Security Arrangement‖ (2006) 18 SA Merc LJ  397. 
10
 See par 2.4 for a brief outlay of the types of assets that may be securitised. 
11
 Chapter 4. 
12
 Chapter 3. 
13
 The first company legislation in South Africa was the Cape Joint Stock Companies Limited Liability 
Act 23 of 1861. This Act was almost identical to the English Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 (7 
& 8 Vict c 110) and the Limited Liability Act of 1855 (18 & 19 Vict c 133). The colony of Natal 
followed the Cape legislation (Joint Stock Companies‘ Limited Liability Law 10 of 1864) and so did 
the Republic of Transvaal (De Akte van Maatschappijen met Beperkte Verantwoordelijkheid, Wet 5 
van 1874). Company legislation only followed much later in the Republic of the Orange Free State 
but its first attempt was also similar to the English model (De Wet over Beperkte 
Verantwoordelijkheid van Naamlooze Venootschappen, Hoofstuk C van de Wetboek van die 
Oranjevrijstaat van 1891). The first consolidated companies legislation of the Union of South Africa 
was the Companies Act 46 of 1926 which was largely based on the English Companies 
(Consolidation) Act of 1908 (8 Edw 7 c 69). For a more detailed discussion of the development of 
company legislation in South Africa and the adoption of the English common law on companies see 
HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning, JJ du Plessis, PA Delport, L de Koker & JT Pretorius 
Corporate Law 3 ed (2000) at 18–28. 
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company law.14 However, South African private law, which governs the transfer of 
rights and the creation of security rights, does not share such historical similarities 
with English law. Furthermore, English trust law was not received in South African 
law and forms no part of South African law. These distinctions must be kept in mind 
when the English model of securitisation is used locally.  
In the chapter on English law the floating charge is discussed as English law‘s 
prime example of security over claims. The floating charge developed in conjunction 
with the debenture, a form of corporate debt, and the two are closely associated.15 The 
system of creating security interests in property in the United States of America 
differs radically from that used in England and is discussed in detail. Although these 
jurisdictions both fall in the Anglo-American legal family, the differences in their law 
of personal property security lead to marked differences in their approach to 
securitisation. This is especially true for assignment of receivables. In English law the 
assignment of receivables during securitisation is done by way of equitable 
assignment in terms of the common law, while assignment of claims in American law 
resorts under the provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Both comparative chapters in this thesis start with a discussion of the system of 
security over movable property used in that jurisdiction, focusing on security by 
means of claims. This is followed by regulatory considerations that have emerged 
from those jurisdictions. Lastly, the method used to transfer claims is examined. 
Possible remedies that may be used to hold that the transfer of the claims was not a 
sale are considered. So too whether bankruptcy law could be used to impeach the sale 
of the assets to the SPV. 
Securitisation is available as a form of financing in the Netherlands and in 
Germany, but has not been met with as much enthusiasm there as in England and the 
                                                 
14
 South African insolvency legislation also shows a strong English law influence. The Cape Ordinance 
6 of 1843 may be described as the foundation of the law of insolvency in South Africa, since the 
insolvency provisions of Natal (Ordinance 24 of 1846), the Republic of the Orange Free State 
(Ordinance 9 of 1879) and the Republic of Transvaal (Ordinance 21 of 1880, later repealed and 
replaced with Wet 13 van 1895) were all largely based on it. The first uniform insolvency legislation 
of the Union of South Africa was the Insolvency Act 32 of 1916. It followed the structure of the 
Transvaal Act 13 of 1895, the latter being an adaptation of the Cape Ordinance. The common law of 
insolvency in South Africa is the Roman-Dutch law, but the courts do refer to the English law for 
guidance where Roman-Dutch law does not provide authority. For a detailed discussion of the 
historical development of insolvency law in South Africa see Eberhard Bertelsmann, Roger G 
Evans, Adam Harris, Michelle Kelly-Louw, Anneli Loubser, Melanie Roestoff, Alastair Smith, 
Leonie Stander & Lee Steyn Mars The Law of Insolvency in South Africa 9ed (2008) at 6–14. 
15
 In re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200. 
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United States of America. The reasons for the slow rate of implementation of 
securitisation in the Netherlands are mostly economic.16 However, there are certain 
provisions in Dutch law that make securitisation more difficult than in the Anglo-
American jurisdictions. Foremost among these difficulties used to be the requirement 
in Dutch law that the debtor must be informed of a cession for the cession to take 
legal effect.17 For several reasons the originator does not want to inform the debtors of 
the cession of claims to the SPV during securitisation.18  
However, section 3.94 BW has been amended to include a provision that claims 
may also be transferred by means of an authentic or registered underhand deed 
without notifying the person against whom the right may be enforced of the transfer, 
provided that the claims exist at the time of the transfer or will be acquired directly 
from an existing legal relationship. Such a transfer cannot be relied upon against the 
person against whom the claims are enforceable, unless that person was notified of the 
transfer.19 
South African law does not require notice to debtors for the validity of a cession of 
claims.20 Furthermore, Dutch law is unfamiliar with the concept of a trust as it appears 
in the common law. In their exploration of the possibility of introducing something 
similar to a trust in Dutch law, academics have actually considered the South African 
example of the Trust Property Control Act.21 Dutch law is therefore not helpful to a 
                                                 
16
 According to David G Glennie, Eduard C de Bouter & Radnall D Luke Securitization (1998) at 188 
the lack of government credit enhancement of the kind provided in the United States of America 
(see par 4.1.1) and the strong financial position of Dutch banks are the main reasons for the 
unpopularity of securitisation in the Netherlands. 
17
 Section 3:94 lid 1 BW; MHE Rongen ―Securitisation en Vermogenafzondering van 
Vorderingsrechten op Naam‖ in SCJJ Kortmann, WAK Rank, MHE Rongen, G van Solinge & HLE 
Verhagen Onderneming en Effecten (1998) at 427 et seq; Gerard van Solinge ―Afsplitsing van 
Vorderingen‖ in Kortmann et al Onderneming en Effecten at 468 et seq; WAK Rank De 
(On)Hanteerbaarheid van het Nederlandse Recht voor de Moderne Financiële Praktijk: 
Beschouwingen over Sale and Lease Back, Leveraged Leasing, Repo‟s en Securitisation (1998) at 
39–41; Glennie et al Securitization at 121–122. 
18
 Notice to debtors is time-consuming, administratively burdensome and expensive. Furthermore, 
notice may be confusing to debtors and might give a negative signal to the market about the 
originator‘s creditworthiness. See Van Solinge in Kortmann et al Onderneming en Effecten at 470. 
19
 Scott 2006 SA Merc LJ at 399. 
20
 See par 7.2.2.2.3. 
21
 57 of 1988. See HLE Verhagen ―Trusts in the Civil Law: Making Use of the Experience of ‗Mixed‘ 
Jurisdictions‖ (2000) 3 European Review of Private Law 477; Donovan WM Walters ―The Trust 
Civil Law Jurisdictions: The Dutch Experience‖ (1999) 7 J of Int Trust and Corporate Planning at 
153–155. On the lack of the trust in Dutch law generally, see BJMA Meester ―De Trustee als 
Houder van Zekerheidsrechten‖ in DJ Hayton, SCJJ Kortmann, AJM Nuytinck, AVM Struycken & 
NED Faber Vertrouwd met de Trust: Trust and Trust-Like Arrangements (1996) at 395; SCJJ 
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
20 
study of trusts, which forms part of this thesis. I have therefore not included a separate 
comparative chapter on Dutch law. 
The slow development of securitisation in German law is mainly attributed to the 
well-developed German mortgage bond market (Pfandbriefmarkt)22 and the 
reservations of the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority about securitisation where 
the originator is a bank.23 The Federal Banking Supervisory Authority finally 
announced in its Circular on the Sale of Customer Receivables in Connection with 
Asset-Backed Securities by German Credit Institutions24 that it would not in future 
raise any objections to securitisations in which credit institutions were the originators, 
as long as the requirements of the Circular were met. The requirements of the Circular 
are very similar to the South African Securitisation Notices.25  
There are similarities between the German law position in relation to securitisation 
and the position in South Africa. As in South African law, German law follows an 
abstract system of the transfer of rights, which means that it distinguishes between an 
obligationary agreement and a transfer agreement.26 German law also does not require 
notice to the debtor for a valid cession. However, owing to the slow progress of 
securitisation for the reasons stated above, German law finds itself in the same 
exploratory phase of the law of securitisation as does South Africa.27 It was therefore 
decided to focus in this thesis on jurisdictions where securitisation has evolved fully 
and is now well established. 
                                                                                                                                            
Kortmann ―Past ‗de Trust‘ in het Nederlandse Recht?‖ in Hayton et al Vertrouwd met de Trust at 
169; David Hayton ―The Development of the Trust Concept in Civil Law Jurisdictions‖ (2000) 8 J 
of Int Trust can Corporate Planning at 159. 
22
 German mortgage bonds (Pfandbriefe) are fixed interest-bearing bonds secured by a pool of 
mortgages on German real estate. The Pfandbriefe are issued by specialised mortgage banks. See 
Glennie et al Securitization at 75. 
23
 Glennie et al Securitization at 75. 
24
 Issued by the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen, 19 March 1997. See Glennie et al 
Securitization at 85–87; Alexander H Stopp ―Asset-Backed Financing in Germany: Legal Concepts 
Affecting the Securitization of German Receivables‖ (1997) 4 The Financier 27. 
25
 See pars 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.4 and 6.2.5. 
26
 See par 7.2 for the position in South African law. 
27
 German literature on securitisation also looks at the American example before examining aspects 
specific to German law. See, for instance, Andreas Willburger Asset Backed Securities in Zivil- und 
Steuerrecht (1997) at 14 et seq; Theodor Baums Asset-Backed Finanzierungen im deutchen 
Wirtschaftsrecht (1992). 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
21 
1.2.2 Structuring of securitisation scheme 
The form and function of a traditional securitisation scheme is more or less uniform 
worldwide. This thesis starts by setting out a typical structure.28 The structure of a 
typical South African traditional securitisation scheme has never been researched in 
an academic contribution. While American and English models are used in South 
Africa to structure a typical scheme, the differences between the law in those 
jurisdictions and South African law must be kept in mind. 
 The use of debt to finance a business generally, and debentures as the specific 
instrument regulated by the Companies Act29 for the purpose of acquiring debt 
financing, are discussed in a separate chapter.30 Thereafter the forms of security 
available in South African law where the security objects are claims is discussed. 
These are general notarial bonds, pledge of claims and fiduciary security cession. 
Specific attention is paid to which of these forms can be used most effectively as 
security during the securitisation process. 
1.2.3 Regulatory considerations 
While there is no single piece of legislation that regulates securitisation in South 
Africa, several Acts and other legislative instruments have an impact on securitisation 
generally and on the structure of the scheme particularly. A discussion of traditional 
securitisation in South African law will not be complete without a consideration of 
these aspects.31 
1.2.4 True sale and insolvency-remoteness 
Owing to the abstract system of the transfer of rights, two agreements between the 
originator and the SPV are necessary when the claims are transferred.32 The first is the 
obligationary agreement which, in the case of securitisation, will be a contract of sale. 
The second is the transfer agreement. Both delegation and cession as possible transfer 
methods are considered. 
                                                 
28
 Chapter 2. 
29
 61 of 1973. 
30
 Chapter 5. 
31
 Chapter 6. 
32
 Chapter 7. 
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 The transfer of security rights to the SPV when the principal debt is transferred 
during securitisation is explained. Owing to the abstract system of the transfer of 
rights, accessory real security rights do not automatically follow the secured claim to 
the cessionary. 
 The legal relationship between the servicer and the SPV is considered, because 
often the originator will continue to act as servicer in the collection of the securitised 
claims. It is therefore essential that the servicing agreement be well separated from the 
sale agreement, so that the continued involvement of the originator will not be 
considered as an indication that the transfer of the claims were not meant as a true 
sale. 
 Simulated transactions in South African law are discussed with a view to 
determining the likelihood that a sale of claims could be recharacterised by a South 
African court as a secured loan. Since there is no case law in South African law 
directly in point, particular attention is paid to the arguments that have emerged with 
regard to factoring. 
 Lastly, the provisions of South African insolvency law that could possibly be 
raised by a liquidator of an originator to impeach the sale of the claims to the SPV are 
set out.33 These provisions are applied to securitisation in order to decide the 
likelihood of success of an application to impeach. 
1.2.5 Aspects that fall outside study 
Apart from a brief discussion of the evolution of the government-sponsored 
enterprises in the United States of America,34 and the few remarks in this introduction, 
this thesis does not contain a historical background as is the case with most law 
theses.  
The potential cross-border nature of securitisation is very interesting and a factor 
that complicates the already-complicated nature of securitisation even more. This is a 
study on its own and therefore the assumption was made that the entire transaction 
occurs in South Africa.  
                                                 
33
 Chapter 8. 
34
 Paragraph 4.1.1. 
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 Securitisation has implications for corporate taxation, but a discussion of these tax 
implications falls outside the scope of this thesis. However, the conclusions drawn 
from this thesis may assist future studies in the area of tax law. 
 Small and medium enterprises can make use of securitisation as a financing tool, 
with minor variations to the basic form discussed here.35 I assumed that the originator 
was a large enterprise in order to narrow the scope of the discussion. Most 
conclusions would, however, also be applicable to the securitisation of the assets of 
small and medium enterprises. 
 The capital requirements of banks and the influence of securitisation on these 
requirements are not considered.36 The focus is on aspects of traditional securitisation 
that are applicable to both bank and non-bank originators. 
1.3 TERMINOLOGY 
The following terms are frequently encountered when dealing with the topic of 
securitisation: 
 The originator transfers the assets to the SPV. The originator need not be a 
company, but may also be a different business form or a natural person. The 
assumption is made that the originator is a company. 
 The special purpose vehicle (SPV) is a company or a trust that purchases the 
assets from the originator and pays for the transaction through the issue of 
securities, usually debt instruments. Apart from outlining the main structures in 
which a trust SPV is used in other jurisdictions,37 the trust as an SPV falls outside 
the scope of this discussion. In this thesis the SPV is a company. 
 A credit rating is a formal evaluation of the credit quality of a debt instrument (a 
bond or a debenture) undertaken by an independent rating agency and usually 
expressed with a symbol such as AAA or Aaa. The most active rating agencies in 
securitisations are Moody‘s, Standard & Poor‘s and Fitch. 
 Credit enhancement refers to various methods employed to divert some of the risk 
associated with the transferred assets away from the investors, thereby making the 
                                                 
35
 See The Task Group of the Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation Access to Finance in 
South Africa: A Supply-Side Regulatory Review (2001) at ch 5 for a discussion of the use of 
securitisation as a means of obtaining finance for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
36
 See in this regard Bank for International Settlements‘ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Consultative Document: Asset Securitisation (2001). 
37
 Paragraph 2.3. 
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securities issued by the SPV more attractive to investors. The various credit 
enhancement tools are interesting enough to be the topic of a thesis on their own, 
but I only give a brief overview of the methods used most frequently.38 
 A trustee acts on behalf of the investors in the securities issued by the SPV 
(essentially a trustee for debenture-holders). 
 The servicer is responsible for the collection of principal debt and interest 
payments derived from the pooled assets and the transfer of these amounts to the 
SPV.  
 A conduit is an SPV that purchases pooled assets from several originators and 
issues securities on those assets. 
‗Securitisation‘, ‗securities‘ and ‗security for a claim‘ are very similar terms that are 
used often in this thesis and must be distinguished. ‗Securitisation‘ is the process of 
financing explained above. ‗Securities‘ as defined in section 1 of the Securities 
Services Act39 are typically shares, stocks and depository receipts in public 
companies, debentures, bonds, notes and derivative instruments. ‗Security for a claim‘ 
is granted to a creditor in order to strengthen the creditor‘s right of recourse in the 
event of default by the debtor. The security objects in this thesis are the claims 
transferred to the SPV and they serve to secure the claims of the investors of the SPV. 
1.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
For many years only banks and building societies made use of securitisation schemes. 
Increasingly, other companies are becoming aware of the possible advantages that 
securitisation may offer compared to the use of traditional debt instruments. Very 
little research has been done in South African law on the use of loans to fulfil the 
                                                 
38
 Paragraph 2.5. 
39
 36 of 2004: ―„Securities‟: (a) means – (i) shares, stocks and depository receipts in public companies 
and other equivalent equities, other than shares in a share block company as defined in the Share 
Blocks Control Act, 1980 (Act No. 45 of 2002); (ii) notes; (iii) derivative instruments; (iv) bonds; 
(v) debentures; (vi) participatory interests in a collective investment scheme as defined in the 
Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, 2002 (Act No. 45 of 2002), and units or any other form 
of participation in a foreign collective investment scheme approved by the Registrar of Collective 
Investments Schemes in terms of section 65 of that Act; (vii) units or any other form of participation 
in a collective investment scheme licenced or registered in a foreign country; (viii) instruments 
based on an index; (ix) the securities contemplated in subparagraphs (i) to (viii) that are listed on an 
external exchange; and (x) an instrument similar to one or more of the securities contemplated in 
subparagraphs (i) to (ix) declared by the registrar by notice in the Gazette to be a security for the 
purposes of this Act; (xi) rights in the securities referred to in subparagraphs (i) to (x); (b) excludes – 
(i) money market instruments except for the purposes of Chapter IV; and (ii) any security 
contemplated in paragraph (a) specified by the registrar by notice in the Gazette.‖ 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
25 
capital requirements of companies. As far as I could ascertain, no research has as yet 
been done on the use of securitisation by companies other than banks in South African 
law. I trust that this work will be the first step in the further exploration of these 
topics. 
The law is stated as it was on 30 September 2008. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SECURITISATION: GENERAL FORM AND FUNCTION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Certain definitions relating to securitisation were briefly explained in the 
introduction.1 This chapter investigates the process of securitisation. A thorough 
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Figure 1: Simplified securitisation scheme 
 
 
Securitisation is the pooling of a homogenous group of income-producing assets, the 
sale of these assets by the original holder (originator) to an insolvency-remote third 
party (a special purpose vehicle (SPV)) and the issue by the SPV of marketable 
securities (commercial paper or other debt instruments)2 to finance the purchase of the 
                                                 
1
 See par 1.3. 
2
 See par 1 of the Schedule of Securitisation Notice, 2008: ―‗commercial paper‘ means – (a) any 
written acknowledgement of debt, irrespective of whether the maturity thereof is fixed or based on a 
notice period, and irrespective of whether the rate at which interest is payable in respect of the debt 
in question is a fixed or floating rate; or (b) debentures or any interest-bearing written 
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assets.3 The transferred assets provide the cash flow to service the obligations under 
the issued securities. The transferred assets, which in this discussion will be claims, 
are collected by a servicer at a fee. This function is often retained by the originator. 
The transferred assets further serve as security for the obligations of the SPV towards 
its investors. Usually a trustee holds this security on behalf of the investors. The 
transferred assets and the structure of the securitisation scheme are rated by a rating 
agency at a fee. Depending on the rating that is aimed for, the rating agency may 
recommend certain credit enhancements. These credit enhancements may be internal, 
that is, from the originator, or external from third parties. There may further be an 
underwriter for the issued securities. There will always be specialist opinions from 
accountants and lawyers. If the securities are offered to the public, there may be 
prospectus requirements and if the securities are to be traded on an exchange, the 
listing requirements of the particular exchange will apply. Securitisation is therefore 
an expensive and complicated undertaking. 
2.2 ADVANTAGES OF SECURITISATION 
It is possible in South African law for companies to raise loan capital directly in the 
form of debentures and to use their assets as security for the issued debentures.4 
Alternatively, South African companies have the option to use securitisation. A 
company will prefer securitisation if the benefits of securitisation outweigh those of 
traditional loan financing.5 The most important advantages of securitisation are 
improved liquidity, a diversification of funding sources, the achievement of better 
interest rates, better risk management and certain accountancy-related advantages.6 
                                                                                                                                            
acknowledgement of debt issued for a fixed term in accordance with the provisions of the 
Companies Act; or (c) preference shares, but does not include bankers‘ acceptances.‖ The SPV may 
only issue commercial paper in denominations equal to or greater than an initial principal value of 
R1 million, unless it is listed on a licenced financial exchange, endorsed by a bank, issued for longer 
than five years or backed by government guarantees. See par 14(1)(b)(i) of the Schedule of 
Securitisation Notice, 2008. The SPV must be authorised in writing by the Registrar of Banks to 
issue commercial paper. See par 14(1)(b) (ii) of the Schedule of Securitisation Notice, 2008.  
3
 See the definition of ‗traditional securitisation scheme‘ in par 1 of the Schedule of Securitisation 
Notice, 2008. See further Figure 1. 
4
 See ch 5. 
5
 According to Steven L Schwarcz ―The Alchemy of Asset Securitization‖ (1994) 1 Stanford Journal of 
Law, Business and Finance at 137–138 a company considering securitisation should determine (a) 
the difference between interest payable on non-securitised financing and interest payable on the 
securities issued by the SPV, and (b) the expected difference in financing costs between traditional 
financing and financing through securitization.  
6
 Tax benefits are not considered in this thesis. 
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However, from the outset it must be emphasised that these advantages are dependent 
on the success of the securitisation scheme, in terms of obtaining a good rating and 
guarding against the insolvency of the SPV. I also briefly discuss some non-rational 
reasons why some companies opt for securitisation. 
2.2.1 Improved liquidity 
Securitisation, by its nature, turns claims into cash.7 The cash can be used by the 
company for a variety of purposes, including research and development, new projects 
and to meet its normal supplier obligations. 
2.2.2 Diversification of funding sources  
Investors who may ordinarily be reluctant to invest in the originator may be willing to 
invest in the securities issued by the SPV, because of the higher credit rating that 
securities issued by the SPV will achieve.8 For instance, pension fund managers that 
might be willing to purchase the highly rated securities issued by the SPV, could be 
unwilling to purchase conventional debt securities of the originator.9 
 It may also be that previous financing arrangements between the originator and its 
creditors contained restrictions on further issues of long-term debt and that 
securitisation has become the only option.10 
 Diversification of funding sources may improve the originator‘s own credit rating, 
making it possible after securitisation to return to more traditional forms of 
financing.11 
                                                 
7
 Lupica ―Asset Securitisation: The Unsecured Creditor‘s Perspectiv‖ (1998) 76 Texas LR at 609–610, 
Itzikowitz & Malan 1996 SA Merc LJ at 185; Phillip Wood Project Finance, Securitisations, 
Subordinated Debt 2 ed (2007) at 118; Glennie et al Securitization at 210; D Barbour, J Norton & T 
Slover Asset Securitization in Emerging Market Economies: Fundamental Considerations (1998) at 
9. 
8
 Schwarcz 1994 Stanford J of Law, Business & Finance at 143; Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 610; Joseph 
J Norton, Mitchell S Dupler & Paul R Spellman International Asset Securitization (1995) at 11; 
Fidelis Oditah The Future for the Global Securities Market: Legal and Regulatory Aspects (1996) at 
92; Wood Project Finance at 118; Standard & Poors Corporate Ratings Criteria (2006) at 119. See 
also the discussion of rating agencies in par 2.6. 
9
 Barbour et al Securitization in Emerging Market at 8–9. 
10
 Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 610. 
11
 Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 611; Wood Project Finance at 118. 
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2.2.3 Better interest rates 
Rating agencies usually give securities issued by the SPV a higher credit rating than 
to securities issued directly by the originator.12 The higher rating translates into a 
better interest rate.13  
 Smaller, less-established or financially weaker companies may be able to fund 
themselves through securitisation on similar terms to those offered to larger, better 
established and financially sound companies.14 The savings generated by the lower 
interest rates obtained through securitisation can then be used by smaller companies to 
build their enterprises.15 
2.2.4 Improved risk management 
In traditional lending the lender bears the full burden of the risks associated with the 
business of the borrower. Lenders try to assess this risk with reference to the 
borrower‘s likelihood to default, the borrower‘s repayment capacity, credit record and 
its business prospects for the full term of the loan. This assessment may include 
ongoing monitoring of the business and practices of the borrower, which may be 
inconvenient for the borrower and lender alike.16 
 During securitisation the investor does not need to gauge the quality of the 
originator‘s business, but only needs to assess the quality of the assets backing the 
transaction.17 Usually an originator will try to securitise its highest quality claims.18 
                                                 
12
 See pars 2.2.4 and 2.6. 
13
 Schwarcz 1994 Stanford J of Law, Business & Finance at 137; Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 614; 
Itzikowitz & Malan 1996 SA Merc LJ at 186; Wood Title Finance at 45; Glennie et al Securitization 
at 209; Barbour et al Securitization in Emerging Market at 9. 
14
 According to Oditah Global Securities Market at 89, there will usually be a net saving even taking 
into account the high transaction costs involved in securitisation. Thomas J Gordon ―Securitization 
of Executory Future Flows as Bankruptcy-Remote True Sales‖ (2000) 67 University of Chicago LR 
1317 at 1321–1322 refers to the same advantage as a ―lower discount rate‖. It amounts to this: the 
originator can get more for its assets through the medium of securitisation than it could via 
traditional lending. He sees this as the main reason why securitisation is an attractive financing 
option. 
15
 On the use of securitisation to obtain funding for small and medium enterprises see The Task Group 
of the Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation Access to Finance in South Africa – A 
Supply-Side Regulatory Review (2001). 
16
 Schwarcz 1994 Stanford J of Law, Business & Finance at 150–151; Oditah Global Securities Market 
at 92–93. 
17
 Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 611–612; Norton et al Asset Securitization at 11 and 13; Barbour et al 
Securitization in Emerging Market at 9. 
18
 See par 2.4. 
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The securitisation will further contain risk-reducing measures, such as credit 
enhancement, where a third party undertakes to bear a part of the risk of default in 
exchange for a fee.19 The originator‘s business behaviour and the risks associated with 
the business of the originator will not influence the quality of the securitised assets. 
2.2.5 Accountancy-related advantages 
The transfer of assets to the SPV will usually be considered a sale for accounting 
purposes if the transfer is made without recourse.20 In other words, the sale must be 
made without undertakings from the originator to step in if the debtors default on the 
transferred claims or in other specified events.21 This may benefit the originator in 
various respects. For instance, it may aid the originator in maintaining its capital 
adequacy requirements22 or in maintaining the debt–equity ratios specified in previous 
loan agreements.23 In South Africa the transfer must be without recourse to qualify for 
the exemption under the Banks Act.24 This limitation does not exclude the giving of 
warranties by the originator in respect of the transferred assets, provided that those 
warranties relate neither to the creditworthiness of the originator nor to matters that 
fall outside the control of the originator.25 
                                                 
19
 See par 2.5. 
20
 Norton et al Asset Securitization at 11. 
21
 Steven L Schwarcz ―Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate 
Structures‖ (2002) 70 University of Cincinnati LR  at 1315 shows that this was the main reason why 
the SPVs used in the Enron debacle failed; there was no real transfer of risk from the originator to 
the SPV.  
22
 This is especially important in the financial (banking) sector and falls outside the scope of our 
discussion. See Itzikowitz & Malan 1996 SA Merc LJ at 186–187; Wood Project Finance at 117; 
Barbour et al Securitization in Emerging Market at 10. Paragraph 4(1)(d) of the Schedule of 
Securitisation Notice, 2004 states that ―a bank that sells assets to a special purpose institution in 
terms of a traditional securitisation scheme may be allowed to exclude from the calculation of its 
required capital and reserve funds the assets so sold when the transfer constitutes, amongst other 
things, a ‗true sale‘. Reducing the capital requirements of banks will become a less important 
motivation for securitisation after implementation of Basel II in 2008, since the revised guidelines 
set by Basel II mean that most securitisations will still have to be reflected in the capital 
requirements of banks, albeit as a reduced risk exposure. However, securitisation will remain 
important to banks as an alternative funding source. 
23
 See also Wood Project Finance at 117; Glennie et al Securitization at 210. 
24
 94 of 1990. See par 4(2)(c) of the Schedule of Securitisation Notice, 2008. 
25
 Paragraph 4(2)(d) of the Schedule of Securitisation Notice, 2008. 
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2.2.6 Non-rational and illegal motivations 
Theoretically, a company should opt for securitisation rather than conventional debt 
financing when the benefits of the former outweigh those of the latter. However, 
decisions are not always taken rationally. Opting for securitisation because it has 
become fashionable or to judgment-proof the company‘s operations is, in my opinion, 
not a rational motivation, unless some of the advantages discussed above also apply. 
Criminals could use the complicated nature of a securitisation scheme to commit 
fraud or money laundering.  
2.2.6.1 Trends 
Companies usually seek expert opinion from advisors such as law firms, investment 
banks and rating agencies on the best alternative to raise finance. In many cases 
advisors recommend the option with which they are most familiar and which may be 
most lucrative for them.26  
 Securitisation is a time-consuming and complex endeavour. This has caused many 
advisors who have successfully completed one securitisation utilising the expertise 
they have acquired in follow-up transactions.27 It has also led originators to engage in 
repeat securitisations.28 
2.2.6.2 Judgment-proofing 
Some authors have explored the use of securitisation as a method of ‗judgment-
proofing‘ a company from its creditors.29 A debtor is judgment-proof when the debtor 
                                                 
26
 Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 606. 
27
 Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 607. 
28
 The European Securitisation Forum has an annual forecast of the volume of securities issued via 
securitisation schemes. The forecast for 2007 was an issuance volume of € 531 billion. The issuance 
volume for 2006 was € 456 billion, which means that an increase of 16, 4 per cent was expected for 
2007. See European Securitisation Forum Securitisation Market Outlook 2007, available at 
www.eauropeansecuritisation.com (accessed 24 October 2007). This shows the immense popularity 
of securitisation as a financing tool. It remains to be seen whether this popularity will endure after 
the current economic downturn. 
29
 See Lynn M LoPucki ―The Death of Liability‖ (1996) 106 Yale LJ 1 at 23–30; Lynn M LoPucki 
―The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing‖ (1998) 51 Stanford LR 147 at 159; Steven L 
Schwarcz ―The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing‖ (1999) 52 Stanford LR 1 at 13–15 and 
17–28; Lynn M LoPucki ―The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing: A Reply to Professor 
Schwarcz‖ (1999) 52 Stanford LR 55 et seq; Steven L Schwarcz ―Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder‖ 
(1999) 52 Stanford LR at 77–79. 
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has no wealth or when its wealth is held in forms that make it unavailable to its 
creditors for attachment.30  
 Judgment-proofing generally is achieved by splitting a business into an asset-
owning company and an operating company. The two companies are linked by 
contractual arrangements so that they function as one business. The judgment 
creditors of the operating company are not legally entitled to recover their judgments 
from the owning company. So while the operating company incurs all the risks 
associated with the business, all the assets are vested in the owning company. The 
former is merely an empty shell.31 
 It is possible to securitise almost any asset of a company.32 Consequently, 
securitisation may be a means to effect such a judgment-proof structure.33 However, 
even in economies where securitisation is much more common than in South Africa, 
securitisation is not often used as a means to judgment-proof a company.34 It is 
therefore safe to assume that this will not often be the main motivation for 
securitisation in South Africa.  
 Though the scope of this discussion does not allow me to explore this question 
further, I would suggest that large South African companies that aim to dilute their 
liability would rather opt to use holding-subsidiary structures in order to effect 
judgment-proofing.35 South African courts have consistently been reluctant to 
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 LoPucki 1996 Yale LJ at 4. 
31
 See LoPucki 1998 Stanford LR at 152–153 for the various methods in which this may be achieved.  
32
 See par 2.4 below. 
33
 LoPucki 1996 Yale LJ at 30 puts it as follows: ―Asset securitization may be the silver bullet capable 
of killing liability.‖ In a later article he makes the valid point that, even if the ultimate purpose of a 
specific securitisation transaction was not to effect judgment-proofing, it is a result that will follow 
automatically (LoPucki 1999 Stanford LR at 59 and 61). See also Peterson 2007 Cardozo LR at 
2269–2273 for a discussion of how the securitisation structure can shield the perpetrators of poor 
consumer credit practices from liability from consumers‘ claims. 
34
 LoPucki 1996 Yale LJ at 40 for the position in the United States of America. The author cites 
transaction costs, public relations considerations and social norms as the main reasons for the 
reluctance to judgment-proof a company (at 43–47; 51–54). See further Schwarcz 1999 Stanford LR 
at 48–50. The author does not agree that securitisation does or will play a great role in judgment-
proofing (at 51). See further LoPucki 1999 Stanford LR 55 et seq for an answer to Schwarcz‘s 
assertions and Schwarcz‘s rejoinder at 77 et seq. 
35
 See LoPucki 1996 Yale LJ at 20–23 for an explanation of this method of judgment-proofing. 
Schwarcz 1999 Stanford LR at 28–32 would classify this as non-arm‘s length business transactions, 
where the different companies are fellow-subsidiaries and their financial statements will be 
consolidated. Under these circumstances he expects a greater likelihood of judgment-proofing, than 
in arm‘s length transactions such as securitisation. 
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disregard the separate legal personality of a company,36 which means that the courts 
will generally uphold the separateness of a holding company and its subsidiaries. 
2.2.6.3 Money laundering and fraud 
There are criminal groups with enough money to set up paperwork so that a scheme 
of securitisation may seem legitimate, when, in fact, it serves to turn an illegal stream 
of income into legal funding. All that is needed is to set up an originator that appears 
to be legitimate.37 
 It is also possible to use securitisation and other forms of structured finance for 
other fraudulent purposes.38 However, it would be incorrect to suggest that 
securitisation is synonymous with such practices.39 Although some of the fraudulent 
practices involving SPVs, as in the case of Enron, have received much publicity, they 
make up a very small percentage of securitisation transactions. These instances do 
show, however, that the complexity of securitisation may necessitate better disclosure 
to the investors in the originators and the SPVs, as well as measures to avoid conflicts 
of interests.40  
                                                 
36
 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22; Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 
530. In Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 790 (A) the Court 
held that the previous criterion set in Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 (3) SA 513 (W) that the conduct 
must lead to some ―unconscionable injustice‖ was too narrow a view. The Court held that each case 
must be considered on its own. The need to preserve the separate corporate identity of the company 
will then be balanced against the policy considerations in favour of piercing the veil (at 803H).  In 
Hülse-Reuter v Gödde 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA) at 1346A–D the Court held that: ―the separate legal 
personality of a company is to be recognised and upheld except in the most unusual circumstances‖.  
The courts do not have a general discretion to disregard the separate legal personality of the 
company. There must be some misuse or abuse of the separate legal personality of the company 
from its controllers that must lead to the latter receiving some unfair advantage. See further JB 
Cilliers & SM Luiz ―The Corporate Veil: An Unnecessary Confining Corset? (1996) 59 THRHR at 
527. 
37
 Andrew Haynes ―Legal Developments in Debt Securitisation‖ (2000) European Business LR 39 at 
41–42. 
38
 See for instance Schwarcz 2002 University of Cincinnati LR at 1309. In Enron‘s case, some of the 
SPVs were owned by Enron‘s chief financial officer, who used the complicated nature of the 
schemes to hide the fact, first, that he was pocketing some money and, second, that the projected 
incomes securitised to the SPV‘s never actually materialised. 
39
 Schwarcz 1999 Stanford LR at 78: ―The possible misuse of a beneficial tool should not undermine its 
legitimacy.‖ 
40
 Schwarcz 2002 University of Cincinnati LR at 1316–1318. See further Steven L Schwarcz 
―Securitization Post-Enron‖ (2004) 25 Cardozo LR at 1551–1553 for a description of how the 
special purpose vehicles were misused by the Enron group as opposed to the legitimate use of such 
vehicles during securitisation. 
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2.3 SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE (SPV) 
A trust could act as the SPV in securitisations.41 In the United States of America and 
in England the trust SPV is used, although the corporation SPV is used more often.42 
The main reason for this is that the trust SPV cannot provide the accounting, tax and 
insolvency benefits that a corporation SPV could.43 I shall briefly explain the main 
forms in which a trust is used as an SPV in the United States of America and in 
England and then I shall indicate why I prefer the use of the SPV in the form of a 
company.  
The following schemes make use of a trust SPV:44  
 The SPV could take the form of a non-taxable grantor trust.45 This structure is 
referred to as a ‗pass-through transaction‘.46 The grantor trust SPV grants 
certificates to its investors and the investors receive an interest in the pool of 
assets held by the trust. The powers of the trustee are limited and he is not 
typically allowed to purchase new assets or substitute them, or to reinvest money 
held by the trust. This usually means that money received from the income on the 
assets will be distributed to the investors immediately. A grantor trust may only 
issue one class of beneficial interest, otherwise it will lose its grantor trust status. 
It may, however, issue two classes of beneficial interest if the only distinction is 
that the second class is subordinate to payments from the first.  
 A pay-through transaction refers to the private or public issuance of asset-backed 
bonds from a special purpose corporation or from an owner trust. The trustee in 
this trust must manage the cash flow generated by the assets to match it with the 
obligations on the securities issued. It will therefore not qualify as a grantor trust 
and will be taxable. To avoid the separate taxability of the SPV, it usually remains 
under the control of the originator. The SPV and the originator will file 
consolidated tax returns so that the originator may offset any losses in its business 
                                                 
41
 See, for instance, Phillip Wood Title Finance, Derivatives, Securitisations, Set-off and Netting 
(1995) at 46–47. Securitisation Notice, 2008 makes express provision for an SPV in the form of a 
company or a trust. 
42
 See Patrick D Dolan & C Vanleer Davis Securitizations: Legal and Regulatory Issues (2002) at 2-8. 
43
 Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 20-16. 
44
 Norton et al Asset Securitization at 8–10. 
45
 See also Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 2-8.  
46
 According to Norton et al Asset Securitization, at 60, the pass-through structure would be considered 
a collective investment scheme under English law, which makes it a less suitable form for the SPV. 
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against the tax liability of the SPV. The originator and the SPV will further issue 
consolidated financial statements. This structure does not have limitations in terms 
of issuance as does the pass-through structure, but the business of the originator 
and the SPV will not be at arm‘s length, which could pose a risk to the 
insolvency-remoteness of the SPV. 
 In a master trust transaction the originator sells the assets to a trust. The trust 
could access several investor markets and does so by the issuance of different 
series of securities. Since the trustee must manage cash flow to match the dates of 
maturity of the different series, it will not qualify as a grantor trust and will be 
taxable. It is therefore structured so that the securities issued by the SPV are 
considered debt of the originator for tax purposes. This structure is therefore also 
not beneficial for the insolvency-remoteness of the SPV. 
 
South African law has never received the English law of trusts.47 It is possible to be 
appointed as a trustee by the Master of the High Court in terms of the Trust Property 
Control Act.48 Appointment under the provisions of the Act will ensure that the trust 
property is not considered part of the trustee‘s personal estate. The Act further 
provides a measure of protection to the beneficiaries under the trust.49  
 It must be borne in mind that South African law does not benefit from centuries of 
precedent and evolution of the trust concept as does English law. I therefore consider 
the SPV in the form of a company to be a more certain method of achieving the goals 
of securitisation in South African law. As my brief discussion above shows, the 
special purpose company is better suited to achieve insolvency-remoteness in terms of 
creating a definite divide between the originator and the SPV. The SPV in the form of 
a company is the only type of SPV that has issued asset-backed securities on the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa,50 which shows that it is preferred when the securities are 
issued to the public. The rest of my discussion will therefore focus on the use of a 
company as an SPV.51  
                                                 
47
 See n 296 below. 
48
 57 of 1988. 
49
 See the discussion in par 2.8.2.1.2 
50
 See the bond history available at www.bondexchange.co.za (accessed 26 October 2007). 
51
 Securitisation Notice, 2008 makes express provision for both forms of SPV. 
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2.3.1 Capitalisation 
An SPV may be a subsidiary of the originator formed for the exclusive purpose of the 
securitisation.52 This method is usually followed in the United States of America. 
Alternatively, the shares in the SPV can be held by a third party, for instance a trust,53 
which eliminates the need to include the SPV in the consolidated balance sheet of the 
originator.54 This is the preferred method in England.55 
 In South Africa the SPV will not be exempt from compliance with the Banks Act56 
if the originator, acting on its own or in collaboration with associated companies, 
directly or indirectly, holds more than 20 per cent of the nominal value of the share 
capital of the SPV.57 The originator must further not have the right to determine the 
outcome of voting at a general meeting of the SPV. This means that the SPV may not 
be a subsidiary of the originator in South African law.58 
Another option is to use a multi-seller vehicle, sometimes referred to as a 
‗conduit‘.59 A conduit is created to purchase and fund claims portfolios from several 
originators. Conduits are not subsidiaries of the originators, which enhances their 
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 Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 605; Glennie et al Securitization at 207. 
53
 This is the method preferred by the rating agencies. It is not clear for whose benefit the trustees will 
hold the shares in the SPV. It cannot be for the benefit of the originator, since the scheme will then 
not comply with the terms of Securitisation Notice, 2008. Section 1(3)(c) of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973 provides that ―a body corporate or other undertaking which would have been a subsidiary of 
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is the major beneficiary under the trust deed or when the originator may appoint most of the trustees 
of the owner trust. If the trust is a subsidiary of the originator the SPV will also be a subsidiary, 
because the trust will hold all the shares in the SPV. Furthermore, even if the trust has beneficiaries, 
there will be little or no benefits accruing to those beneficiaries, since the SPV is not aimed at 
making a profit for its shareholders but solely at performing on its issued debt securities. It seems to 
me that this is not really a trust within the South African legal context, but rather a nominee 
shareholder with a level of independence from the originator, so that it cannot be said that the 
originator controls the decisions of the nominee. 
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 Wood Title Finance at 41, 46; Glennie et al Securitization at 194. 
55
 This is sometimes referred to as an ‗orphaned‘ SPV, because the beneficial ownership of the SPV is 
vested in a management company that specialises in this business or by a charitable trust. Such a 
structure increases the remoteness from the originator and will attain a better rating. See Report by 
Fitch Ratings ―Structured Finance Criteria Report: Special-Purpose Vehicles in Structured Finance 
Transactions‖ 13 June 2006 at 2 available at www.fitchratings.com. 
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 94 of 1990. 
57
 Paragraph 4(2)(p)(i) of the Schedule of Securitisation Notice, 2008. In terms of par 2(1) the 
securitisation scheme will not be seen as an activity that falls within the meaning of ‗the business of 
a bank‘ if these and other requirements discussed below are met. 
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 For the definition of ‗subsidiary‘, see s 1(3)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
59
 See Barbour et al Securitization in Emerging Market at 14; Schwarcz 1994 Stanford J of Law, 
Business & Finance at 140–141. 
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insolvency-remote status. Since the structure of a conduit is already in place, a smaller 
company could securitise some of its assets more cheaply and with greater ease 
through a conduit than to set up a securitisation scheme of its own. Often such 
conduits are subsidiaries of the investment bank or underwriter involved in the 
scheme.60 However, multi-seller vehicles must ensure that the different asset pools 
and cash flow from these pools are legally separated from each other.61 Otherwise 
there may be the danger that the liabilities flowing from one issuance of securities 
backed by a certain pool of assets may attach to another pool of assets. The 
effectiveness of this segregation will be considered by the rating agency. The rating 
agency will further evaluate whether the structure of the conduit provides for the 
separate enforcement of the security provided for the issued securities of the different 
asset pools. Apart from this distinction, conduits function more or less in the same 
manner as an SPV set up for a single transaction. 
Generally, the SPV will be thinly capitalised to ensure that there is zero taxable 
income for tax purposes.62 The SPV does not rely on share capital for the fulfilment of 
its goals, but on the income generated from the transferred claims and on the loan 
capital acquired through the issued securities.  
The SPV may be a public or a private company. The SPV in the form of a private 
company will work well for most securitisations, since the SPV typically does not 
have many shareholders. Private companies are also subject to fewer reporting 
requirements.63 
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 Securities issued by conduits are seldom listed on an exchange, because an investment bank in 
control of a conduit usually has the expertise and client base to match borrowers and lenders. It 
follows that such securities are often privately placed. 
61
 Report by Fitch Ratings Special-Purpose Vehicles at 3. 
62
 In other words, there will be no substantial share capital. See Michael S Gambro & Michael A 
McCormack ―Legal Considerations in Structuring Asset-Backed Securities in the US Market‖ 
Global Securitisation and Structured Finance (2005) at 4, Oditah Global Securities Market at 85; 
Wood Title Finance at 41. 
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 Private companies do not need to draw up half-yearly interim reports on the business and operations 
of the company (s 303 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973) and do not need to provide a copy of their 
annual financial statements to the Registrar of Companies, unless they are subsidiaries of a public 
company (s 302(4) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973). In terms of clause 30(1)(b)(ii) of the 
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private company is not required to comply with the extended accountability requirements set out in 
chapter 3 of the Bill. These requirements include the appointment of company secretaries and more 
involvement by the company auditors and the audit committee of the board of directors. 
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2.3.2 Corporate governance 
Securitisation Notice, 2008 provides that the board of directors of the SPV must be 
independent from the originator if it wants to be exempted from falling within the 
meaning of ‗the business of a bank‘.64 The originator may validly appoint one director 
of the SPV as long as a minimum of three directors have been appointed on the 
board.65  
 Whatever the composition of the board, its powers should be restricted to the 
management of the securitisation scheme. Any transaction outside the collection of 
cash flow from the asset pool, distribution of payments to investors and the payment 
of fees to third parties involved in the scheme should only be possible with consent 
from the investors. In view of such restrictions, the appointment of a trustee for 
debenture-holders will greatly assist the management of the SPV.66  
The traditional view is that directors owe their duties to the company.67 The 
directors are not obligated to act in the best interests of individual members or 
creditors.68 However, since the company is a metaphysical entity,69 it has been held 
that ―the company as a whole‖ refers to the body of shareholders.70 This position does 
not hold true for the SPV during securitisation.71 
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 Paragraph 4(2)(q) of the Schedule of Securitisation Notice, 2008.  
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 Paragraph 4(2)(m)(i) of the Schedule of Securitisation Notice, 2008. 
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 See par 2.8.3 below. 
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 Lombard Duties to Creditors at 293. 
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 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] 1 Ch 286. See Cilliers et al Corporate Law at 149; LS 
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 See also Michael J Cohn ―Asset Securitization: How Remote is Bankruptcy Remote?‖ (1998) 26 
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 The shareholders of an SPV will never receive dividends, because all income 
generated from the collection of the claims is used to pay the interest and capital on 
the issued securities. Any excess is usually diverted to a reserve fund for future 
payments in terms of the debt securities. At the dissolution of the SPV, the remaining 
assets will either revert to the originator or will be passed on to some charitable 
purpose, in terms of the transaction agreements. It cannot be said that the shareholders 
are the end beneficiaries of the duties of the SPV‘s directors. During the existence of 
the SPV the investors, who are usually creditors, are the only beneficiaries of the 
business of the SPV. 
 Managing the affairs of a company in favour of its creditors is not the norm in 
South African law.72 In other jurisdictions where the courts have tried to introduce a 
duty towards creditors under certain circumstances,73 these attempts have been met 
with mixed reaction.74 I do not foresee such an interpretation of directors‘ duties in the 
                                                                                                                                            
is in the members‘ best interests, which by current standards would be the more important concern, 
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case of an SPV implemented by South African courts without legislative 
intervention.75 
2.3.3 Insulating SPV against insolvency 
The SPV must be set up in such a manner that it will be most unlikely that it would 
become insolvent.76 This is also referred to as ‗making the SPV insolvency-remote‘. 
The constitutive documents of the company play an important role in this regard. 
 The capacity of a company is set out in the objects clause of its memorandum of 
association. In an SPV set up for use in a securitisation scheme, these objects must be 
strictly limited to activities related to the transaction.77 In terms of paragraph 2(1)(c) 
of Securitisation Notice, 2008, the exemption of the SPV of engaging in the business 
of a bank is dependent on its not entering into any transactions outside the 
securitisation scheme. Put differently: if the SPV engages in business outside the 
securitisation scheme, it will be regarded as a bank and would have to comply with 
the provisions of the Banks Act.78  
The capacity of the SPV must at least include the ability to purchase claims from 
the originator. The objectives of the SPV must further be wide enough so that it will 
have the legal capacity to issue securities, pay the servicer and the providers of credit 
enhancement facilities and create security in favour of the trustee for debenture-
holders.  
 The constitutive documents must also prohibit the merger of the SPV with a 
company that does not adopt similar limitations in its constitutive documents.79 This 
implies that the SPV may only merge with a conduit.80 
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 See also the concluding remarks of Lombard Duties to Creditors at 395–408 and Natania Locke 
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 The amendment of the constitutive documents should not be possible without a 
sizeable proportion of the investors‘ consent. It should not be possible for the 
members of the SPV to amend the restriction on the capacity of the SPV without such 
consent.81 
 The securitisation scheme will receive a better rating if the SPV is newly formed 
for the purpose of the securitisation, because there will be no prior creditors that may 
increase its chances of insolvency.82 If the SPV is not newly formed, the rating agency 
will require extensive information on the past liabilities of the SPV, its business 
transactions and any factors that may convince the agency not to lower the rating of 
the securities. 
 Since all the parties involved in the securitisation scheme are known, it is possible 
to require that they all contractually agree not to lodge an application for the winding-
up of the SPV because it is unable to pay its debts.83 Usually the servicer, liquidity 
provider and the providers of credit enhancement agree not to institute an application 
for winding-up until two years after final payment of the securities issued by the 
SPV.84 The risk of such an application will be further limited if a trustee is appointed 
for the debenture-holders, so that only he may institute action on their behalf. This 
reduces the risk that any individual investor may apply for winding-up when it will 
not be in the interests of the majority of the investors.85  
 In the United States there is a risk that a court may invalidate agreements not to 
launch bankruptcy proceedings, because of public policy against bankruptcy 
waivers.86 However, the aim of the typical restrictions on filing for bankruptcy 
contained in the setting up of an SPV is not to prevent the bankruptcy of the SPV in 
all instances, but only where such filing will not serve the interests of the investors.87 
                                                 
81
 Report by Fitch Ratings Special-Purpose Vehicles at 4. 
82
 Report by Fitch Ratings Special-Purpose Vehicles at 2. 
83
 Report by Fitch Ratings Special-Purpose Vehicles at 4–5. Fitch analysts expect such agreements and 
require detailed explanations if it cannot be validly concluded in the relevant jurisdiction. In South 
African law an agreement not to institute proceedings before a specified date is referred to as a 
pactum de non petendo. See Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Bekker NO 1992 (2) SA 617 (A) at 
626F–G; AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract (2002) at 653. 
84
 Norton et al Asset Securitization at 15. In South Africa the inclusion of non-petition clauses has led 
to the insistence of the transaction creditors of the issuer SPV to be secured. This, in turn, has led to 
the use of a security SPV as discussed in par 2.8.2.1. 
85
 See par 2.8.3 below. 
86
 Cohn 1998 Hofstra LR at 950; Ellis 1999 J of Corporation Law at 307. 
87
 Cohn 1998 Hofstra LR at 951; Ellis 1999 J of Corporation Law at 307–308. 
CHAPTER 2 SECURITISATION: GENERAL FORM AND FUNCTION 
45 
The board of directors of the SPVs in the United States are usually made up of at least 
one independent director, who is obliged to act in the interests of the investors rather 
than in the interests of the shareholders of the SPV.88 The constitutive documents of 
the SPV then provide that a voluntary petition for bankruptcy may only be made by 
the SPV after the unanimous consent of the directors has been obtained. 
The only risk that the investors in the securities must bear in relation to the 
transaction is that the debtors may default on their claims. This risk is quantified for 
investors in the form of a credit rating provided by a credit rating agency.89  
2.4 IDENTIFICATION AND TRANSFER OF APPROPRIATE 
ASSETS TO SPV 
It is possible to securitise any kind of asset, as long as that asset provides a steady 
flow of income that can be used to fulfil the obligations arising from the debt 
securities issued by the SPV. The following are the securities issued against the 
different asset types most commonly securitised: 90 
 Residential mortgage-backed securities: these are securities that are backed by 
mortgages granted by financial institutions to consumers. Securitisation had its 
origin in the need for greater liquidity in the residential housing market in the 
United States of America.91 This asset type is therefore the one longest in use for 
securitisation. 
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities: these are securities backed by mortgages 
granted by financial institutions to property developers and companies for the 
development of properties that will be used for commercial purposes, such as 
shopping malls and business blocks. The debtor is usually a company or another 
business entity, which distinguishes this asset type from residential mortgages. 
 Asset-backed securities: these are securities backed by claims that are not secured 
by mortgages. There is a further distinction between ‗consumer asset-backed 
securities‘ and ‗commercial asset-backed securities‘: 
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o Consumer asset-backed securities are backed by pools of claims where the 
debtors are general consumers. Examples are: personals loans, credit card 
claims, vehicle finance, television rentals, health care claims and telephone 
charges. This form of asset-backed security has seen remarkable growth 
during the last decade. 
o Commercial asset-backed securities are backed by pools of claims where 
the debtors are businesses, in other words, one business grants credit to 
another business. The most typical examples are equipment leases and 30 
to 90–day trade obligations. 
 Collateralised debt obligations: simply put, these are securitisations of securities 
issued through other securitisations or of debt securities issued by companies. 
Securities issued to several investors are purchased from those investors by an 
SPV, which pools the securities and issues securities backed by that pool. The 
debtors are the SPVs of the original securitisation transactions or the companies 
that issued the debt securities.92 
 Whole business securitisations: securities may also be backed by an entire 
business. An originator will identify a part of its business to transfer to the SPV, 
or may choose to securitise its entire current business portfolio. Typical examples 
of whole business securitisations are: film revenue securitisations, music royalty 
securitisations, pharmaceutical patent securitisations and trademark licensing 
revenue securitisations. The continued success of the originator typically remains 
important for a successful whole business securitisation. Consequently, rating 
agencies keep the corporate business risk of the originator in mind when rating 
these securities. Of particular importance is the ability of a third party to continue 
collection of the income generated by the transferred business in the event of the 
originator‘s liquidation. The continued relationship between the 
originator/servicer and the SPV after securitisation might put stress on the true 
sale test of the assets in the event of the originator‘s insolvency. It is important 
that the transaction be structured in such a manner that the originator will retain 
the ability to generate income outside the securitised business. In such a case the 
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recharacterisation of the transaction as a secured loan will be less likely.93 There 
has not as yet been a whole business securitisation in South Africa. 
 
All of the above asset types consist of claims in one form or another, although whole 
business securitisation will usually include a few other asset types, especially 
intellectual property rights. In order to limit the scope of my discussion, I shall not 
discuss whole business securitisations in any further detail, although many of my later 
comments may be of use to such transactions. My focus is on a securitisation of a 
pool of claims and their accessory rights. 
 One needs to bear the following in mind when deciding on which claims to transfer 
to the SPV:94 
 Collectibility: what are the chances that the debtor will default? An extensive 
payment history with regard to the particular type of asset may be helpful.95 
 The standardisation of the documentation of the claims: the transferability of the 
claims may depend on the terms of the agreement between the originator and the 
debtor. Claims that result from standardised agreements are cheaper and safer to 
securitise. 
 The life of the claim: here one should not only consider the dates of maturity of the 
claims, but also the tendency among debtors of that particular kind of claim to 
prepay the debt. Trade receivables usually have a life of 30 days, whereas motor 
vehicle loans are usually repaid over five years. It is preferable that the principal 
debt will be fully paid at maturity of the claim.96 
 Simplicity: if the claim is the result of a very complicated transaction between the 
originator and the debtor, it is probably not suitable for securitisation.  
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 Geographic and demographic diversity: it is preferable that the assets do not all 
originate from the same area; otherwise an economic slump may affect the 
collection of the claims. If geographic diversity is impossible, which is often the 
case in small countries, the emphasis should be on demographic diversity. 
 
Usually only claims that require no further performance from the originator will be 
transferred to the SPV.97 In terms of paragraph 4(2)(a) of Securitisation Notice, 200898 
a ‗true sale‘ will follow if all rights and obligations originating from the underlying 
transactions are transferred to the SPV. I discuss the transfer of the assets  in detail in 
Chapter 7.  
2.5 CREDIT ENHANCEMENT 
The claims transferred to the SPV must be sufficient to cover all payments due to the 
investors. Any potential shortfalls or mismatches in dates of maturity are usually 
covered by various credit enhancement mechanisms.99 If a third party provides the 
credit enhancement, the third party must have a high credit rating; at least as high as 
the rating of the securities of the SPV.100 
 The claims may be sold at a discount to absorb the risk that some of the claims 
may remain uncollected. This will already enhance the credit rating of the SPV.101 
Alternatively, the originator may sell more claims to the SPV than is needed to 
service the issued securities. This is referred to as ‗overcollateralisation‘.102 The 
originator may also stipulate a deferred sale price, for example, 80 per cent of the 
purchase price is paid immediately and the other 20 per cent when the claims are 
collected. Overcollateralisation may assist the SPV in paying for the start-up fees of 
the securitisation scheme103 and it may also serve purely as a credit enhancement. 
                                                 
97
 Calvin Reis-Roy ―Rating Securitisation Structures‖ (1998) 13 Journal of International Banking Law 
at 299.  
98
 GN 2, GG 30628 (1 January 2008).  
99
 On credit enhancement in general see Barbour et al Securitization in Emerging Market at 16–17. 
100
 Wood Title Finance at 58; Glennie et al Securitization at 196. 
101
 Wood Title Finance at 51. 
102
 Wood Project Finance at 153; Schwarcz 1994 Stanford J of Law, Business & Finance at 141–142. 
103
 For instance, servicing fees, fees for the rating agency, lawyers, accountants, credit enhancers, 
insurance premiums etc. 
CHAPTER 2 SECURITISATION: GENERAL FORM AND FUNCTION 
49 
 Investors also carry the risk of prepayment, in other words, that the debtors of the 
transferred claims pay the debt before maturity. The interest obtainable from investing 
such income until the maturity of the issued securities will probably be lower than the 
interest that the debtor would have had to pay if he did not repay the debt earlier.104 
Credit enhancement might aim to remedy such a situation, especially by way of 
overcollaterisation.105 
 Usually the transferred claims will bear a higher interest rate than the debt 
securities issued to finance the transaction. However, it might be that the claims have 
a fixed interest rate, whereas the securities have a floating interest rate, or the other 
way round. In such a situation the SPV may enter into an interest swap with a third 
party so that the third party pays any shortfall that may arise.106 
 Some of the credit risk may be spread through a two-tier issue of securities. Here 
class B securities are subordinated to class A securities. If there is a larger default rate 
than expected, or poor liquidity due to late payments or large-scale prepayments, the 
class A securities will be paid first and the class B securities will only receive 
payment from any remaining funds. The holder of the class B securities, which may 
be either the originator or a third party, agrees to bear the greater risk in return for a 
higher yield.107 
 The SPV may create a reserve account where any surplus amount originating from 
the difference between the interest on the securities and the interest payable on the 
debts are kept.108 The money may then be applied towards any of the risk events 
discussed. 
 Lastly, guarantees such as letters-of-credit may be provided by third parties in the 
event of the non-performance by the debtors of the claims.109 Insurance resorts under 
this form of credit enhancement.  
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There may also be a liquidity support agreement between the SPV and a third 
party, usually a bank. This provides for the situation where the timetable of the 
collection of the claims transferred to the SPV is disrupted, which results in the 
inability of the SPV to honour one of its payments to the investors.110 This 
arrangement will only cater for short-term mismatches and is not considered a credit 
enhancement.111  
The investors ultimately carry the risk of non-collection, which is the risk 
estimated by the rating agency. 
2.6 RATING AGENCIES 
Rating agencies are private companies that have gained widespread acceptance in the 
investment community.112 The largest three rating agencies worldwide are Standard 
and Poor‘s Ratings Group, Moody‘s Investor‘s Service and Fitch Investor Service. 113 
Their role in the success of the securitisation scheme is extremely important, since 
investors rely on the rating provided when deciding to invest in a particular scheme. 
One author refers to rating agencies as ―the universally feared gatekeepers for the 
issuance and trading of debt securities‖.114 
 A credit rating is an opinion on the ability of an entity or of a securities issue to 
meet its financial commitments on a timely basis.115 A credit rating is also an 
indication to investors of the extent of the risk of their investment.116 The investment 
mandates of most fund managers in South Africa require the use of credit ratings.117 A 
rating must usually be of a prescribed investment grade before the fund manager will 
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be allowed to invest.118 This means that in the opinion of a rating agency there is only 
a small risk of default on the issued securities. 
2.6.1 Factors considered when rating securitisation 
Rating agencies set stringent requirements for a high rating which, in turn, affects the 
structure of the scheme.119 Most of the credit enhancements discussed in the previous 
paragraph will be employed in order to achieve a better rating. 
 A rating will be done both initially and periodically.120 Agencies further aim to 
provide a rating that is internationally consistent, regardless of differences in the 
law.121 
 A rating agency will investigate and test the risks associated with two aspects of 
the securitisation scheme, namely (1) the risks associated with the assets and (2) the 
risks associated with the structure of the scheme.122  
The quality of the assets (claims) is determined by the likelihood of default by the 
debtors.123 This will, in turn, determine the level of credit enhancement needed to 
achieve the rating envisioned. During this analysis the ingredients of the asset pool 
and the risks associated with them are identified.124 They are then subjected to testing 
scenarios. Risks may include the insolvency of the debtor, default by the debtor, 
prepayment of the debt and fluctuations in interest rates. Historical data will help 
analysts determine the performance pattern of the asset pool under normal economic 
conditions. For instance, historical data may show that five per cent of debtors of the 
particular asset pool default. Depending on the rating aimed for, the analysts may 
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multiply that five per cent by several factors. If the asset pool will still manage to 
service the obligations under the issued securities, it shows that the rating is accurate. 
The structural analysis is shaped to suit the asset pool.125 A rating agency will 
determine the insolvency-remoteness of the SPV, the insolvency insulation of the 
SPV, the quality of the credit enhancement126 and of the systems for administration of 
the servicer.127 If the securitisation scheme runs across borders, a rating agency will 
also take into account the sovereign ratings of the countries involved, as well as, for 
example, the ratings of the holding bank if it works through a branch in the issuing 
country.128  
The scheme will only receive a credit rating if the rating agency is satisfied that the 
transaction will be considered a true sale of the claims and that the claims cannot be 
construed as part of the originator‘s estate on the latter‘s insolvency.129 
 The process of obtaining a credit rating is both time-consuming and costly.130  
2.6.2 Regulation of rating agencies 
Rating agencies play such an important role in securitisation and in the issuance of 
debt securities in general that one may consider regulating them.131 In the United 
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States of America rating agencies are regulated by securities law, because the rating 
agencies serve the same purpose as securities regulation, namely to minimise the 
potential harm that information asymmetry may cause in the markets.132 In other 
words, the objective of both ratings and securities regulation is to ensure that the 
investor has access to sufficient information to make informed decisions.  
Regulation should only be considered if it can make the system more efficient.133 
The intrinsic costs associated with regulation must be offset by this efficiency gain.134 
Several factors are important when considering whether it is necessary to regulate 
rating agencies. Some commentators argue that the business of rating agencies ought 
to be open for public scrutiny before they will be truly accountable.135 However, the 
agencies have a strong incentive to provide accurate ratings, because their business is 
dependent on their good reputation.136 If an agency consistently provides inaccurate 
ratings, lenders will cease to pay any attention to the rating and the business of the 
agency will suffer.  
The cost of rating is high, but not necessarily excessive.137 The agencies require a 
large number of highly skilled staff members to make informed assessments. The 
costs are further determined by the size of the transaction and its complexity. In the 
case of securitisation, each transaction requires a fresh investigation into the quality of 
the securitised assets and the transaction is by its nature complicated. There may also 
be fees for continued monitoring. Even if regulation could decrease these fees, such 
savings might be offset by the costs of the regulation itself.138 
Then there is a potential conflict of interest arising from the fact that the issuer of 
the securities usually pays the rating fee, while a third party relies on the 
information.139 This may be an incentive for a rating agency to give a higher rating. 
However, the rating fee is usually negotiated before the service is rendered and the 
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reputational incentive discussed above still applies. The rating agencies further 
separate that division of their business that negotiates the fees from the one that is 
involved in the analysis during the rating process, to try and guard against conflict of 
interests. Furthermore, there are few alternatives to letting the issuer pay for the 
rating.140 It is very difficult to get investors to pay for this service before they invest. 
There have been cases were ratings where done without the consent of the issuer. 
Such ratings are referred to as ‗unsolicited ratings‘ or ‗ratings without request‘.141 In 
response to some negative sentiment expressed to this practice, rating agencies now 
clearly indicate when an opinion on a securities issue was expressed without a request 
from the issuer.142 It seems that the risk to the rating agencies‘ reputation was enough 
to rectify this behaviour. 
2.6.3 Liability towards third parties 
A last question is to whom a rating agency owes its duty not to make 
misrepresentations in its rating. A rating agency is in a similar situation with respect 
to the SPV and the investors as the auditor of a company. An auditor is paid by the 
client company, but third parties regularly rely on the auditor‘s opinion in their 
dealings with the company.143 An auditor‘s liability towards such third parties is based 
on delict.144 Auditors are regulated by the Companies Act145 and by the Auditing 
Profession Act.146  
I suggest that, despite the above-mentioned similarity between rating agencies and 
auditors, extensive regulation of rating agencies is unnecessary. Liability towards 
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third parties, which will normally be the investors, will follow under the appropriate 
circumstances in accordance with the principles of the law of delict. All the elements 
of a delict, namely conduct, wrongfulness, fault, factual and legal causality, and 
damage will have to be proved by the third party.147  
Conduct can be either an act or an omission. A third party must prove that the 
rating agency misrepresented the risk of default of the securities issued by the SPV. 
Usually by the time legal action is taken by a third party, it will be certain that the 
rating awarded by the rating agency was inaccurate or misleading. 
Wrongfulness will be more difficult to prove. The third party must prove that the 
rating agency‘s conduct was unreasonable ―according to the legal convictions or 
feelings of the community‖.148 Since a third party‘s claim will be one for damages for 
pure economic loss, it will have to be established that the rating agency was under a 
legal duty to guard against the third party‘s loss. The court will consider whether such 
a duty exists under the particular circumstances. The third party will probably raise 
the fact that, even though the SPV pays for the services of the rating agency, a rating 
is specifically aimed at aiding investors in their decision whether to invest in the 
securities issued by the SPV. In fact, certain institutional investors are obliged by their 
investment mandates only to purchase securities of a specific rating.  
In contrast, it is a standard practice for rating agencies to qualify their rating by 
adding a disclaimer that a rating is an expression of a rating agency‘s opinion rather 
than a fact.149 Oditah150 argues that rating agencies represent themselves as being 
experts and that their opinion should indeed be held as fact. I agree with this view and 
I am further of the opinion that most investors rely on the opinion of rating agencies 
as if it were a fact. Rating agencies must foresee that the investors will rely on their 
opinion. Consequently, I believe that a legal duty does rest with rating agencies to 
provide an accurate rating to investors, thereby protecting them against loss.  
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To my mind the elements that will probably be the most difficult to prove are fault 
and legal causality. Fault can be either intent or negligence, but it is highly unlikely 
that a rating agency will intentionally award an inaccurate rating. I foresee that a third 
party will mostly try to prove that the rating agency was negligent when it awarded 
the particular rating. Evidence will be led on whether the rating agency followed its 
standard procedures and methods during its consideration of the scheme. A substantial 
divergence from these methods and procedures may lead to a conclusion of 
negligence. However, no obligation rests on a rating agency to verify information 
supplied to it by the issuer SPV.151 The rating agencies mostly rely on information 
given to them by issuers.152 If the inaccurate rating followed because of incorrect 
information supplied by the SPV, there will not be a finding of negligence. 
Factual causality will be relatively easy to prove. A third-party investor will have 
to prove that he relied on a rating provided by an agency in his decision to invest. In 
most cases the rating will be a factor that an investor considers when taking an 
investment decision. However, it will be very difficult for a third party to prove legal 
causality. Legal causality is determined by asking whether ―the wrongful act is linked 
sufficiently closely or directly to the loss for legal liability to ensue or whether, as it is 
said, the loss is too remote‖.153 The investors in securitisation schemes are usually 
sophisticated, wealthy private investors or institutional investors. Consequently, it will 
be hard to prove that they were misled by a misrepresentation, regardless of whether 
the misrepresentation came from a reputable rating agency. Most investors of this 
type do not deal in securities solely based on ratings, but use internal analysis to reach 
their investment decisions. 
Lastly, if the third party succeeded in proving all of the above elements, it will 
have to show that it suffered damage. Assuming that the third party can prove its 
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damage, I suggest that it will often be possible for a rating agency to prove 
contributory negligence on the part of a third party investor when that investor is a 
sophisticated or an institutional investor. Damages will then be apportioned 
accordingly.154 
The short analysis above shows that liability towards third parties is a possibility. 
However, I do not think such action will be instituted often. Rating agencies tend to 
give conservative ratings because of concerns over liability and loss to reputation if 
they prove to be wrong.155 They are further hesitant to downgrade a rating, for fear 
that it might give a negative signal that would cause a self-fulfilling prophecy: the 
downgrading of the rating causes the market to react negatively and the value of the 
securities drops.  
2.7 SERVICER 
The servicer is responsible for the collection of the principal debt and interest 
payments deriving from the pooled assets and the transfer of these amounts to the 
trustee, or to the SPV, depending on the structure of the scheme. The servicer may 
also be entrusted with the enforcement of the claims.156 The originator often acts as the 
servicer. 
 The transaction agreements usually provide that the servicer must report regularly 
on the state of its collection of the claims to the SPV and to the trustee. Unless the 
transaction agreements specifically state otherwise, the trustee will have no duty to 
ensure the reliability of these reports.157 
 The servicer must clearly separate the income collected from the assets of the SPV 
from the collections in its own business. Failure by the servicer to keep to this 
obligation and the mingling of the SPV income with its own has jeopardised 
securitisations in the past.158 
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 In the event that the servicer defaults and is removed, the transaction agreements 
usually provide that the trustee is responsible for finding and appointing a successor 
servicer or that the trustee must provide these services.159 Sometimes the trustee will 
be sophisticated and capable enough to take over such functions, but usually the 
administrative and skills burden will be so great that it would not be practical. If this 
is the case, an independent back-up servicer may be appointed.160  
 The back-up servicer will receive a fee to remain available to take over the 
servicing duties.161 This will raise the costs of the transaction, but will provide 
certainty that the claims will still be collected in the event of the servicer‘s default.162 
However, it may be difficult to find a back-up servicer that will be able to service 
the transferred assets at the same cost as the originator/servicer, especially if those 
assets are closely associated with the business of the originator. The risk of default of 
the servicer will further be accentuated if the transaction has a revolving character; in 
other words, new claims are continually transferred to the SPV. Under such 
circumstances the rating agency will have to evaluate the financial stability and 
history of the originator/servicer very carefully.163 
2.8 SECURITY IN FAVOUR OF TRUSTEE FOR DEBENTURE-
HOLDERS 
In a debenture trust, security is held for the benefit of a number of lenders. This is 
sometimes referred to as a ‗collective security arrangement‘,164 but I shall refer to it 
throughout as a ‗trust for debenture-holders‘. The latter term is used in the Companies 
Act165 and it also excludes consideration of the position relating to syndicated loans. 
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The use of a trust for debenture-holders during an issue of debt securities is 
beneficial for a number of reasons:  
 When there are many debenture-holders it may be difficult for the SPV to effect 
any changes to the terms of the debentures or to modify or dispose of some of the 
security without the consent of all the debenture-holders. The trust for debenture-
holders aims to ease these difficulties.166  
 A trust for debenture-holders removes the need for each debenture-holder to 
monitor the security, but instead, places this duty on the trustee, who is usually a 
professional person or institution and better equipped to judge the safety of the 
investment.  
 Where the type of security must be registered, as in the case of a general notarial 
bond, the use of a trust for debenture-holders saves costs and administrative 
burden. The security is registered in the name of the trust or in the name of the 
trustees for the time being.167 There is no need to re-register the security in the 
names of the new debenture-holders when debentures are sold.168 
  A trust for debenture-holders saves costs for both the debenture-holders and the 
SPV when the security has to be realised, because proceedings are taken in one 
action.  
 Depending on the legal form of the trust,169 the trustee may be in a stronger 
bargaining position than individual debenture-holders. When the trustee also has 
the right to enforce the claims of the collective debenture-holders, he is in a 
powerful position to address any failure by the SPV and of the servicer to comply 
with their contractual obligations.  
 The trustee can continuously monitor the issuer SPV and the value of the security, 
whereas the debenture-holders will often fluctuate.  
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 Lastly, the debenture trust can be a mechanism by means of which it is ensured 
that the security is only enforced when it is in the best interests of all of the 
debenture-holders.170 
 
The legal form of the trust for debenture-holders in South African law is uncertain. I 
approach the legal form of a trust for debenture-holders from the point of view that 
the best form will be the one that delivers most of the above-mentioned benefits, 
while complying with the legal requirements for the creation of a trust. A further 
important consideration in deciding what legal form a trust for debenture-holders 
takes is that there must be compliance with the accessory nature of the security 
granted in favour of the trustee.   
2.8.1 Form of security 
Securities are issued by the SPV to finance the purchase of the assets, in this case, 
claims from the originator. Usually these securities will be debt instruments such as 
debentures. These debentures are, in turn, secured by assets of the SPV.  
 The assets available for the SPV to serve as security are the transferred claims, as 
well as any claims in terms of the credit enhancement agreements, the servicing 
agreement and the shares in the SPV.171 Under current South African law there are two 
possibilities to secure the claims of the debentures-holders, namely (1) a general 
notarial bond or (2) a cession in securitatem debiti.172 Cession in securitatem debiti 
can either take the form of a pledge of claims or of a fiduciary security cession.173 The 
form of security will influence the rating of the scheme by the rating agency.174 
 It must be remembered that the whole aim of the securitisation scheme is to 
insulate the claims from the potential insolvency of the originator and to guard, as far 
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as possible, against the insolvency of the SPV. Security in favour of the debenture-
holders is only one aspect of this greater goal.  
2.8.2 Security structures 
In the United States of America and in England a trust for debenture-holders is used 
to achieve the goals listed in paragraph 2.8. South African securitisation transactions 
have not made use of a trust, but have opted for the use of a security SPV. The 
security SPV is usually a company. 
The practice of using a security SPV arose from the opinion of the rating agencies 
that the trust for debenture-holders as described in the Companies Act175 cannot secure 
the claims of creditors other than the debenture-holders.176 Section 117 of the 
Companies Act provides that security for debentures may be granted in favour of a 
trustee for debenture-holders.177 No mention is made of the possibility that such 
security may also secure the claims of creditors other than the debenture-holders. 
I am of the opinion that sections 117–121 of the Companies Act, which deal with 
security granted to a trustee for debenture-holders and the priority of the claims of 
such debenture-holders, are unnecessary. If the trust is founded in the manner 
described below,178 it will fall under the provisions of the Trust Property Control 
Act.179 Further regulation in the Companies Act is then unnecessary and only leads to 
confusion as to the legal form of a trust for debenture-holders.180 The registration of 
security in favour of a trustee for debenture-holders and of registration of debentures 
should be regulated in the Deeds Registries Act.181 At present the provisions in 
sections 117–121 of the Companies Act are not consistently enabled in the Deeds 
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Registries Act.182 It is therefore to be welcomed that the Companies Bill183 does away 
with all these provisions, apart from stating that a trustee for the holders of debt 
instruments may be appointed.184 
When one views the trust for debenture-holders not as a creation of the Companies 
Act, but as a trust in terms of the Trust Property Control Act, transaction creditors 
other than debenture-holders can be secured through the same trust. The order in 
which the creditors as the beneficiaries under the trust will share in the proceeds of 
realised security can be determined in the trust deed. 
The uncertainty about the use of trusts for debenture-holders is further due to the 
lack of research pertaining to their legal form, as well as a lack of case law in this 
area. I shall therefore start my discussion with the security SPV currently preferred in 
practice in South African securitisations, and shall then continue with a thorough 
consideration of the legal form of a trust that holds security on behalf of specified 
beneficiaries, such as debenture-holders. 
2.8.2.1  Security SPV 
In paragraph 2.3.3 I discussed how the insolvency-remoteness of the issuer SPV is 
enhanced by the inclusion of non-petition clauses in the transaction documentation. 
Transaction creditors, such as the rating agency, servicer and credit enhancers 
undertake not to institute an application for the winding-up of the issuer SPV before 
two years after the claims of the holders of the securities of the issuer SPV have been 
paid in full. However, in return for this undertaking, the transaction creditors require 
that their claims be secured by the assets of the issuer SPV. 
In order to secure the claims of both the transaction creditors and the holders of the 
securities issued by the issuer SPV, the rating agencies recommend the use of a 
second SPV, to which I shall refer as the ‗security SPV‘.185 It is important to note that 
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the security SPVs used during securitisation in South Africa have thus far only been 
companies.  
The security scheme works as follows:186 the security SPV binds itself towards all 
the transaction creditors and the holders of the securities as guarantor of the 
obligations of the issuer SPV.187 When the issuer SPV defaults in respect of its 
obligations, the security SPV will be liable to fulfil those obligations. The issuer SPV 
indemnifies the security SPV in the event that the guarantee becomes effective. The 
obligation in terms of the indemnity is secured by a pledge of the shares in the issuer 
SPV in favour of the security SPV by the shareholders (in the example an owner trust 
created specifically to hold the shares in the issuer SPV). It is further secured by way 
of a fiduciary security cession of the assets of the issuer SPV. The extent of the 
liability of the security SPV towards the creditors in terms of the guarantee is limited 










Pledge and cession 
of shares






Figure 2: Security scheme using security SPV 
 
 
The guarantee sets out the priority according to which the transaction creditors and 
the holders of the securities will share in the proceeds of the realised security. Usually 
the Revenue Service is paid first, followed by specified transaction creditors who 
provided services during the structuring of the scheme, such as the rating agency and 
law firms. Payment in terms of these claims is usually capped. Next, the holders of the 
securities in the issuer SPV are paid in the order determined by the terms of issue of 
the securities. For instance, if class B securities are subordinated to class A securities, 
the holders of the class B securities will receive payment in terms of the guarantee 
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after the holders of the class A securities. The provider of any liquidity facility to the 
scheme ranks pari passu with the holders of the securities, because payments made in 
terms of the liquidity facility go directly towards timeous payment of the obligations 
of the issuer towards the holders of the securities. Last in line are the credit 
enhancement providers. Their role during the securitisation scheme is to minimise the 
risk that the holders of the securities will not receive full payment. It makes sense that 
they should therefore only receive any benefits from the security after the claims of 
the holders of the securities have been fully settled.  
The investors and the other transaction creditors will all be unsecured creditors of 
the security SPV when the guarantee is called up. Furthermore, it is unclear what the 
rights of the third party credit enhancers will be with regard to set-off under this 
scheme. The assets transferred to the security SPV will include the claims of the 
issuer SPV in terms of its credit enhancement agreements. In other words, it is very 
possible that a provider of credit enhancement could be both a creditor and a debtor of 
the security SPV. Presumably the providers of credit enhancement will abandon any 
rights to set-off. 
The amount available to the creditors will immediately be reduced according to the 
size of the indemnity that the issuer SPV can provide. The security SPV will be a 
creditor of the issuer SPV and will therefore be able to institute action in terms of 
section 424 of the Companies Act188 if it turns out that the issuer SPV was managed 
fraudulently or recklessly.189 However, the security SPV will not have any duty 
towards the transaction creditors and the investors outside of its contractual 
obligations in terms of the guarantee. The extent of this guarantee is adjusted 
according to what the issuer SPV can provide. There is no incentive for the security 
SPV to increase the extent of its guarantee, especially since the security SPV will 
have no other assets to fall back on if the litigation is unsuccessful. Surely it will try to 
limit such liability. It has no incentive to enlarge the pool of funds available to the 
transaction creditors and the investors outside of that made available by the issuer 
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SPV, by looking at the management of the issuer SPV or at the non-fulfilment of the 
servicer‘s obligations. 
Since the security SPV is usually a company, the directors of the security SPV do 
not have a fiduciary duty towards its creditors.190 The directors of the security SPV are 
usually independent of both the issuer SPV and the parties to be secured by the 
security SPV. This function is often undertaken by professional trust companies.191 
The security SPV performs the monitoring functions typically undertaken by a trustee 
for debenture-holders. 
 However, the security SPV will never be a representative of the debenture-holders 
in the sense that a trustee for debenture-holders is. The security SPV has no 
discretionary powers such as those usually available to a trustee for debenture-
holders.192 It will not have the power to make minor adjustments to the security 
agreements on behalf of the debenture-holders. Furthermore, regardless of its own 
monitoring of the issuer SPV, the security SPV does not primarily serve the interests 
of the debenture-holders or of the other transaction creditors, but is a separate legal 
person, and potentially itself a debtor of the debenture-holders and of the transaction 
creditors. 
 This security scheme has never been put to the test in circumstances when the 
originator or the issuer SPV is under insolvent liquidation. If the originator is under 
insolvent liquidation, its liquidator may argue that the sale of the assets to the issuer 
SPV was not a true sale, but merely a secured loan. If this argument is accepted by a 
court, the debenture-holders will be unsecured creditors of the SPV and the SPV‘s 
only asset will be a loan made to an insolvent originator. The debenture-holders stand 
to lose most under such a situation. 
I submit that if the true sale of the assets of the originator to the issuer SPV is ever 
under dispute in a South African court, the security SPV will not have standing to act 
on behalf of the debenture-holders to prove that those assets, in fact, belong to the 
issuer SPV. The security SPV will have to call a meeting of the debenture-holders to 
try and get a mandate to act on their behalf in such proceedings. Even then, every 
individual debenture-holder would be able to refuse to give a mandate and opt to 
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oppose the application of the liquidator independently. Calling a meeting of 
debenture-holders will be time-consuming, whereas one of the main benefits of the 
trustee for debenture-holders is that the trustee can act swiftly on behalf of the 
debenture-holders to protect their interests. 
If the issuer SPV is insolvent, the guarantee of the security SPV must be called up. 
Thereafter the security SPV becomes the debtor of the debenture-holders and the 
other transaction creditors. I have two concerns regarding the absence of a trustee for 
debenture-holders under these circumstances. First, the security SPV serves not only 
as guarantor but also as monitor of the issuer SPV. There is no independent party that 
can insist on the activation of the guarantee if need be. Second, after the security SPV 
has become liable under the guarantee there will be no person to guard over the 
interests of the debenture-holders collectively. At this stage there will be no one to 
monitor the security SPV‘s obligations under the guarantee for the debenture-holders. 
I am therefore of the opinion that even when the security SPV is used, it will be 
beneficial to have a separate trustee for debenture-holders. The trust for debenture-
holders must be founded under the true trust construction discussed below, so that the 
trustee will be the holder of the claims against both the security SPV and the issuer 
SPV, and will be able to institute proceedings if necessary. The claims of the 
debenture-holders will still not be directly secured by the assets of the SPV, but only 
by the guarantee provided by the security SPV. However, at least the trustee will be 
an independent party to serve the interests of the debenture-holders and to call up the 
guarantee if necessary. 
2.8.2.2 Legal form of trust for debenture-holders 
I now consider what legal form a trust for debenture-holders could take in South 
African law. The discussion is relevant to all issues of corporate debt and not only to 
securitisation transactions. As a matter of convenience I shall refer throughout to a 
‗trust for debenture-holders‘, although, in my opinion, the beneficiaries under at least 
three of these constructions need not only be debenture-holders. 
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2.8.2.2.1 Agency construction 
The terms ‗trust‘ and ‗trustee‘ are generally used in a wide sense or in a narrow 
sense.193 If applied in a wide sense, the term ‗trust‘ may refer to any situation where 
someone is bound to hold or administer property on behalf of another or for some 
impersonal object and not for his own benefit.194 Various persons may be referred to 
in this sense, for instance, guardians of children, the curators of mental patients, 
executors of deceased estates and agents who hold money or property for their 
principals.  
A ‗trust‘ in the strict or narrow sense exists when a founder has transferred 
ownership of trust property to a trustee, who is to administer or dispose of the 
property and/or the proceeds of the property for the benefit of some person other than 
the trustee, as beneficiary, or for some impersonal object.195 The separation of control 
and benefit of the trust property is also a feature of the trust in the wide sense, but the 
difference is that a trustee in the narrow sense holds an office and falls under the 
control of the Master of the High Court.196 This definition of ‗trust‘ is the one that 
corresponds with the definition provided in section 1 of the Trust Property Control 
Act.197 
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 To date only one reported decision has considered the nature of a trust for 
debenture-holders. In Conze v Masterbond Participation Bond Trust Managers (Pty) 
Ltd198 the Court held on the facts that the trust for debenture-holders was only a trust 
in the wide sense, namely an agency, and that consequently the provisions of the Trust 
Property Control Act199 did not apply.200  
The facts were briefly as follows:201 The Masterbond group invited members of the 
public to invest money with it. It would then act as an agent for those investors and 
place the money with third parties for project finance purposes. The third parties 
issued debentures to the investors and secured them by means of a mortgage bond in 
favour of Masterbond as the trustee for the debenture-holders.   
One project financed in this manner was with a company called Fancourt (Pty) Ltd, 
which was the scheme considered by the Court in its judgment. After Masterbond had 
been placed under curatorship in terms of section 6 of the Financial Institutions 
(Investment of Funds) Act,202 some of the Fancourt debenture-holders tried to oust 
Masterbond as the trustee for debenture-holders. However, they could not obtain the 
two-thirds majority required by the trust deed for the removal of Masterbond as 
trustee. Subsequently the applicant, one of the debenture-holders, sought an order 
declaring that Masterbond was bound by the provisions of the Trust Property Control 
Act.203 If so declared, Masterbond would not have complied with the requirements of 
the Act in terms of authorisation by the Master and in providing security for the due 
and faithful performance of its duties. This could mean that all the actions of 
Masterbond, including those of its curators, could be invalid because they did not 
comply with the Act. 
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 The central issue for consideration was therefore whether Masterbond as trustee 
was subject to the Trust Property Control Act. The Court found that the description of 
Masterbond as ‗trustee‘ in the trust deed was not helpful in determining the nature of 
the relationship.204 This description was contradicted by the application form signed 
by investors in Masterbond in which they confirmed that Masterbond would ―only act 
as an agent‖ on behalf of the investors for the purpose of investing funds in 
debentures.205 
The Court held that the vesting of the security in Masterbond did not constitute 
ownership of property as required by the Trust Property Control Act, but that it 
constituted jura in re aliena.206 It held that sections 117 and 118 of the Companies 
Act,207 which provide for the creation of security in favour of a trustee for debenture-
holders, constituted an exception to section 54 of the Deeds Registries Act.208    
Section 54 prohibits the registration of a mortgage in favour of an agent.209 The 
debenture-holders remained entitled to claim payment of the amounts owed to them.210 
The entitlement to enforce the claims of the debenture-holders was never transferred 
to Masterbond. The debenture certificates provided that Fancourt would pay capital 
debt and interest to the debenture-holders.211 The fact that Masterbond received and 
distributed these payments to the debenture-holders did not have any bearing. 
Consequently, ownership had not been transferred to Masterbond by virtue of the 
trust instrument, which meant that the Trust Property Control Act did not apply to the 
purported trust for debenture-holders.212 The true relationship between the ‗trustee‘ 
and the debenture-holders in that case was one of agency.213  
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Throughout its judgment, the Court was careful to restrict the application of its 
judgment to the particular facts of the case.214 It further held that determining whether 
the Trust Property Control Act applied would be academic, because in the Court‘s 
opinion the curatorship order was cast in the widest possible terms and could not be 
defeated in the manner envisaged by the applicant.215  
The decision leaves open the possibility of distinguishing future cases on their 
facts in order to hold that a trust for debenture-holders may also be a trust in the strict 
sense. Accordingly, determining the nature of the trust for debenture-holders will be 
factual, and one must make a clear distinction between trusteeship and agency. The 
main points of distinction between trusteeship and agency are as follows:216 
 Trusteeship is an office and a trust is an institution of public concern. This is 
reflected in the fact that the Master and the courts have the authority to take the 
necessary steps to ensure that the trust is properly administered.217 It further means 
that the trustee has a certain independence from the founder and the 
beneficiaries.218 If the founder may revoke the trust unilaterally or if the trustee is 
bound to follow the instructions of the founder or of the beneficiaries, this may be 
an indication of agency rather than trusteeship.219 The principal of an agent is 
entitled to revoke the mandate, thereby terminating the agency agreement.220 An 
agent is in the service of his principal: he does what the principal finds 
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impracticable, inconvenient or difficult to do himself.221 Since agency is a form of 
service, the agent must do what he is instructed to do.222 
 There is always transfer of ownership in a trust.223 Ownership of the trust property 
is either transferred to the trustee or to the beneficiaries.224 If there is no cession of 
the debenture-holders‘ claims to the trustee, this will be an indication of agency,225 
especially if the security rights were also granted in the debenture-holders‘ favour 
and the entitlement to exercise those rights still vests in them. 
 Agency is usually revocable at the will of the principal,226 whereas the trustee‘s 
office is independent. 
 
With these characteristics in mind, a typical trust for debenture-holders under the 
agency construction will be arranged as follows:227 each debenture-holder is a creditor 
of the company,228 and may personally sue for payment of the principal debt and 
interest. The rights to the security are vested in the debenture-holders,229 but the 
trustee, who is really only an agent, is mandated to monitor compliance by the issuer 
with the transaction agreements and, if necessary, to enforce the security on their 
behalf.230  
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The trust deed, which is really a mandate, authorises the trustee to call meetings of 
the lenders if, in his opinion, it becomes necessary to enforce the security or if the 
security arrangements must be amended. The trustee never becomes entitled to the 
principal debt, but acts as an agent for the debenture-holders with regard to the 
enforcement of the security. By implication, each new debenture-holder must consent 
to the mandate given to the trustee to control the security.231 Such consent could be 




Claims and security 
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Figure 3: Agency construction of a debenture trust 
 
However, as South African law currently stands, it is not possible to register security 
in the name of the trustee for debenture-holders as their agent. The authors of 
Blackman232 argue that if the debenture trust arrangement is truly one of agency, it 
would not be possible to register security in the name of the trustee as agent for 
debenture-holders. The authors do not agree with the view of the Court in Masterbond 
that section 117(3) of the Companies Act233 creates an exception to the prohibition in 
section 54 of the Deeds Registries Act.234 I agree with these authors that section 
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117(3) makes no mention of such an exception.235 Nor can I find any other provision 
in the Companies Act that would lead to such a conclusion. The prohibition in section 
54 of the Deeds Registries Act contains no exceptions. The Court in Masterbond was 
therefore, in my view, incorrect in finding that section 117(3) creates the possibility of 
registering security in the name of a trustee for debenture-holders as their agent. 
Consequently, the security will have to be registered in the names of the individual 
debenture-holders.236 Priority is determined by the date of registration in the case of 
mortgages and special notarial bonds. It will therefore be impossible to give the 
debenture-holders equal priority. Registration of security rights for potentially 
thousands of debenture-holders is impractical from a financial and administrative 
point of view. Registration in the names of the individual debenture-holders further 
implies that each transfer of the debenture would mean that the cession of the security 
must be registered. This may severely restrict the transferability of the debentures. 
The agency construction will therefore only work if there are relatively few 
debenture-holders who do not foresee the transfer of the debentures. This will 
obviously not be advantageous for a securitisation scheme.  
The agency construction of a trust for debenture-holders is therefore not 
functionally the best option. However, the construction is used in other jurisdictions 
and may be acceptable where there are only a few debenture-holders.237 In the context 
of securitisation, as well as for large issues of corporate debt, I prefer the trust 
construction. 
2.8.2.2.2 Trust construction 
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Under the trust construction of the debenture trust, compliance with the Trust 
Property Control Act is necessary.238 This means that the trust document must be 
lodged with the Master of the High Court239 and the trustee must be authorised in 
writing to act as such by the Master.240 The applicability of the Act further means that 
the Master can fill a vacancy in the position of trustee if the trust instrument does not 
provide for it or if the position cannot be filled in accordance with the trust 
instrument.241 This will happen in consultation with the interested parties who will, for 
purposes of this discussion, be the debenture-holders and the management of the SPV. 
The Master may also appoint a co-trustee when he deems it desirable, notwithstanding 
the provisions of the trust instrument.242 
 Together with these procedural aspects, the Act brings a measure of protection to 
the beneficiaries, which makes the trust construction preferable to the agency 
construction. The most important consequence of the Act is that it separates the trust 
property from the personal estate of the trustee.243 It also requires proper bookkeeping 
and requires that trust property be clearly registered as such.244 It makes the trustee 
accountable to the Master when called upon to do so.245 
The Act grants the court the power to vary provisions of the trust instrument which 
the founder of the trust did not in the court‘s opinion contemplate or foresee.246 The 
court will vary the trust instrument if it hampers the achievement of the object of the 
trust or prejudices the beneficiaries or is in conflict with the public interest. The 
trustee or any person who in the court‘s opinion has a sufficient interest in the trust 
property, may apply for such a variation. In a securitisation scheme the trustee, the 
debenture-holders, and even the SPV under certain circumstances, may qualify to 
bring such an application. 
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The court may order the removal of a trustee on application by the Master or by 
any person with an interest in the trust property, if the court is satisfied that the 
removal of the trustee will be in the interests of the trusts and its beneficiaries.247 
Under certain prescribed circumstances, the Master may also remove a trustee without 
intervention of the court.248 
2.8.2.2.2.1 Aspects of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
Section 121(1) of the Companies Act249 provides that despite the appointment of a 
trustee, and unless specifically limited in the trust deed, each debenture-holder is 
entitled to enforce his rights in terms of the debenture as if he were himself the holder 
of the security.250 Blackman251 argues that section 121(1) means that each debenture-
holder remains entitled to enforce his right to claim payment of the principal debt and 
interest, even though the security rights are vested in the trustee. In other words, the 
authors argue that the debenture-holders could enforce the right to claim the principal 
debt and interest owed to them, but not to enforce the security rights granted in favour 
of the debenture-holders.  
I do not agree with this interpretation.252 The section reads that the debenture-
holder remains entitled to enforce ―his rights under such debenture … in the same 
manner as if he were himself the pledgee or holder of such bond.‖ Owing to the 
accessory nature of real security rights,253 these rights cease to exist when the 
underlying debt is terminated. It is therefore not possible that the underlying debt 
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vests with the debenture-holders, but the security for that debt with the trustee. I 
understand this section to mean that unless the security agreement or trust deed 
provides otherwise, each debenture-holder will be able to enforce the security rights 
accessory to the debenture individually, even if the security was granted in the name 
of a trustee.  However, if the security agreement or trust deed vests the entitlement to 
enforce the security in the trustee, the individual debenture-holders will not be entitled 
to enforce the security individually. 
The entitlement to enforce the security, along with the entitlement to enforce 
payment of the principal debt and interest, is almost always curtailed in the security 
agreement and in the trust deed. In my opinion, this reflects the usefulness of the trust 
for debenture-holders, namely that debenture-holders elect to let the trustee enforce 
payment of the principal debt and interest and if necessary the security on their behalf. 
The use of the expression ―as if‖ in section 121(1) of the Companies Act is 
unfortunate, because it creates the impression that the debenture-holders could not be 
the holders of the security rights. It is, in my view, possible for a debenture-holder to 
be the security right holder, but that the entitlement to enforce the security right is 
transferred to the trustee.254 
In view of the purpose of the trust for debenture-holders, and with the protections 
afforded by the Trust Property Control Act255 in mind, one must ask whether the aim 
of section 121(1) is still valid. I do not think that section 121(1) serves any useful 
purpose, nor could I find contrary evidence from any South African author. It is not in 
accordance with modern finance practice to allow individual debenture-holders to 
institute proceedings against the company.256 
In terms of section 120 of the Companies Act,257 debenture-holders who hold 
debentures issued in serie, which are secured by security in favour of a trustee for 
debenture-holders, might rank equal as regards the security, irrespective of when they 
acquired the debentures.258 The security agreement must make specific provision for 
this to take effect.  
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This provision is an exception to the accessory nature of security rights. Usually 
the creation of real security is dependent on the existence of a principal debt. 
Alternatively, there must be compliance with the provisions of section 51 of the 
Deeds Registries Act.259 Section 51 provides for the registration of bonds to secure 
future debts. Such a bond must expressly stipulate that it is intended to secure future 
debts generally or a particular future debt described,260 and must stipulate a maximum 
amount beyond which future debts shall not be secured by the bond.261  
Section 51 was not amended after section 120 of the Companies Act had come into 
existence and one should therefore assume that the registration of a security in terms 
of section 120 of the Companies Act will still have to comply with section 51 in order 
to secure the future debts incurred towards the debenture-holders. Section 51 is 
peremptory: compliance is necessary for the validity of the security.262  
My conclusion is that section 51 remains applicable and is strengthened by section 
124 of the Companies Act, which provides that debentures redeemed by the company 
may be reissued at a later stage, unless the articles of association or by the terms of 
issue of the debentures prohibit this.263 In other words, it is possible that no debentures 
are issued at a specific time, but that they may be reissued in future. Owing to their 
accessory nature, real security rights cease to exist automatically when the underlying 
claims are satisfied. In my opinion, the security for such debentures would have to 
comply with section 51 to remain valid under such circumstances, otherwise the 
security rights will cease to exist automatically in the event of the redemption of the 
debentures.264 
In terms of section 87 of the Insolvency Act,265 priority under a mortgage bond to 
secure future debts depends on the date of registration of the bond and not on the date 
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that the debts come into existence. This provision is, of course, dependent on 
compliance with section 51 of the Deeds Registries Act;266 otherwise no valid 
mortgage or notarial bond would have been created.267 
Section 120 of the Companies Act is only relevant under the bewind trust 
construction of the trust for debenture-holders.268 If the trustee was really the holder of 
the security rights and not the individual debenture-holders, and there was compliance 
with section 51 of the Deeds Registries Act, section 120 will be superfluous. This is 
so because the security rights would remain with the trustee and the debenture-holders 
would simply be beneficiaries of the trust. The holders of each class of debentures 
will rank concurrently as beneficiaries under the trust. 
2.8.2.2.2.2 Transfer of ownership 
The definition of ‗trust‘ in the Act requires that there has to be a transfer of ownership 
of the trust property to either the trustee or to the beneficiaries.269 ‗Trust property‘ in 
terms of the Act means ―movable or immovable property, and includes contingent 
interests in property, which in accordance with the provisions of a trust instrument are 
to be administered or disposed of by the trustee‖.270  
Although not defined by the Act, it seems that a transfer of ownership means that 
the trustee, or the beneficiary, must become the holder of the transferred right.271 Real 
security rights will only vest in a person if that person is also the holder of the claims 
which the real security right aims to secure. This is because real security rights are 
accessory in nature, which means that they are dependent on the existence of a claim 
for their creation and continued existence.272 The trust for debenture-holders will be a 
trust in the strict sense, and the provisions of the Act will apply, if both the claims and 
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the security vest in the trustee.273 Otherwise, the claims and the security must both vest 
in the debenture-holders. However, the trust for debenture-holders may still be a 
bewind trust under these circumstances if the trust deed is drafted in such a manner 
that the debenture-holders are not entitled to control the enforcement of their security 
rights and their rights in terms of the debentures.274 
2.8.2.2.2.3 Trust for debenture-holders as bewind trust 
In Masterbond the Court held that it was unnecessary to consider the bewind trust. 275 
A bewind trust is a trust where the ownership of the trust property vests in the 
beneficiaries but control over the property vests in the trustee.276 In Masterbond the 
applicant contended that both the security and the principal debt vested in the trustee, 
but the Court held that this had not been proved. 
 Olivier277 makes the valid observation that if the real security rights in Masterbond 
did not vest in the trustee, as the Court found,278 it must have vested in the debenture-
holders. She argues that the difference between a bewind trust and agency is that in 
the former some transfer of ownership occurs to the beneficiaries, while control is 
vested in the trustee. There is no transfer of ownership under an agency. 
In Masterbond it could not be convincingly argued that the principal debt had ever 
been transferred to the debenture-holders, since they were the creditors from the start. 
A cession of claims to the debenture-holders as beneficiaries under a trust is therefore 
necessary before a trust for debenture-holders is a bewind trust.  
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Figure 4: Bewind trust construction of trust for debenture-holders 
 
 
It is possible to create a valid bewind trust for debenture-holders by introducing a 
second SPV into the structure to take up all the issued secured debentures.279 The 
second SPV must then act as founder and transfer the debentures to the trust by 
vesting the debentures and their accessory security rights in the debenture-holders. 
Control over the debentures and the security rights vests in the trustee.280 However, in 
order to comply with the accessory nature of the security rights, security will have to 
be in favour of the debenture-holders for registration purposes.281 This means that the 
registration and transferability of the security is a problem under this construction, 
just as it was under the agency construction.282  
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This construction will have additional cost implications, because the securities 
must be transferred twice and the security rights might need to be registered twice. It 
will also not be possible to secure other transaction creditors during a securitisation 
scheme in this manner, which is possible with the use of a security SPV. Therefore, 
although this construction is possible, I do not recommend it and prefer the trust for 
debenture-holders as a true trust. 
However, the use of the bewind trust construction for trusts for debentures-holders 
is preferable to the agency construction. The trustee will fall under the operation of 
the Trust Property Control Act, which will immediately provide additional protection 
for the debenture-holders. At the same time, although both the principal debt and the 
security vest in the debenture-holders, the control over the claims and over the 
security rights will vest in the trustee. 
2.8.2.2.2.4 Trust for debenture-holders as true trust 
The founder of a trust may be a beneficiary of the trust, even the sole beneficiary.283 I 
submit that the debenture-holders can cede their claims to the trustee for debenture-
holders as founders immediately after acquiring the debentures, as a condition of the 
debenture.284 This will qualify as a transfer of ownership in terms of the Trust 
Property Control Act.285 The SPV may then grant security directly in favour of the 
trustee for debenture-holders, because the trustee will then also be creditor of the 
SPV. The debenture-holders will be beneficiaries. The debenture-holders‘ rights as 
beneficiaries vest immediately,286 which means that those rights are transferable.287 
These rights are claims to payment of the principal debt and interest as determined by 
the conditions of issue of the debentures and strengthened by the terms of the trust 
deed. Furthermore, if the trust deed provides for this, it will be possible for other 
transaction creditors during a securitisation scheme also to cede their claims to the 
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trustee. The security granted to the trustee will cover these claims too and priority will 
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Figure 5: True trust construction of trust for debenture-holders 
 
 
The true trust construction of the trust for debenture-holders is, in my opinion, the 
soundest. It provides the beneficiaries with the protection of the Trust Property 
Control Act. It does not involve elaborate schemes, such as the introduction of a 
second SPV and the separation of ownership and control. Security can be registered in 
the name of the trustee, which means that the potentially revolving nature of the 
beneficiaries will have no effect on their ranking nor will there be the burden of 
repeated registrations of security rights. There is no risk of revoked mandates, as is 
the case under the agency construction. Lastly, the trustee will be both the holder of 
the claims against the SPV and the holder of the security right, which conforms to the 
potential accessory nature of the security rights. 
I would therefore strongly argue that in a normal issuance of corporate debt this 
construction of the trust for debenture-holders should be aimed for in the structuring 
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of the issuance of the debentures.288 It is further my opinion that the same trust can be 
used to secure the claims of creditors other than the debenture-holders, as long as the 
trust deed provides for the transfer of their claims to the trustee and for the order in 
which the beneficiaries are entitled to payment. 
2.8.2.2.3 Trust for debenture-stockholders 
The trust for debenture-stockholders is the normal construction in English law289 and 
is also possible in South African law. 
In terms of this construction, the company, which will be the SPV, enters into a 
loan agreement with the trustee, which includes the terms of the payment of principal 
debt and interest.290 Instead of debentures in serie, an issue of debenture stock is made 
and the debenture-stockholders receive debenture stock certificates to evidence their 
proportion of the loan amount. The trustee for debenture-holders is the creditor of the 
company and not the individual debenture-stockholders. This is so, even if the 
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 Thiele Collective Security Arrangements at 19–25 identifies seven characteristics which, in her 
opinion, an effective collective security arrangement ought to have. The principles are (1) the 
possibility to create security without having to name or register the individual lenders that are to 
benefit from the security. This is possible in South Africa. See the discussion under pars 2.8.2.2.1 
and 5.5.1 for the position at the Deeds Office. (2) The possibility to put one person in charge of 
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only an agent of the debenture-holders and the security is registered in his name, this requirement 
will not be satisfied. (7) The arrangement should be as simple and as straightforward as possible. 
The agency construction only satisfies the third requirement, but fails on the rest of the criteria. The 
bewind trust construction satisfies the second, third and sixth requirement. The true trust 
construction fulfils all of the criteria. The trust for debenture-stockholders satisfies all of the criteria, 
except possibly the third one. Some protection can be afforded to the debenture-stockholders in the 
agreements between the trustee and the debenture-stockholders, but the Trust Property Control Act 
57 of 1988 does not apply to this construction. This means that the claims against the SPV and the 
security fall in the estate of the trustee. 
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 See Paul L Davies Gower and Davies‟ Principles of Modern Company Law 7 ed (2003) at 809–811; 
Thiele Collective Security Arrangements at 159 et seq; Fuller Corporate Borrowing at 117. It should 
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Rawlings 2007 JBL at 47. 
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arrangement is that the company will make payments to the debenture-stockholders 
directly and not via the trustee for debenture-stockholders.291 The debenture-
stockholders have remedies against the trustee, but rarely against the company. 
This construction achieves the same benefits as the true trust construction. The 
trustee is the holder of the claims and of the security rights. The trustee holds the 
security in his own right and consequently section 54 of the Deeds Registries Act292 
becomes irrelevant. It becomes unnecessary to look to legislative means to effect 
equal ranking between the debenture-holders, because they are all equal beneficiaries 
under the trust according to the size of their stock, regardless of when they acquired 
it.293 The provisions of section 121(1) of the Companies Act294 are also irrelevant to 
this construction. In terms of the trust deed, the debenture-holders will have no rights 
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Figure 6: Trust for debenture-stockholders 
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However, it is very important to note that the trust for debenture-stockholders is not a 
trust in the strict sense in terms of current South African law.296 The reason for this is 
that there is no transfer of ownership to the trustee, which is essential for the creation 
of a trust in terms of the Trust Property Control Act.297 The loan agreement is between 
the trustee and the company (SPV), and the security is granted to him directly. The 
role of the debenture-stockholders is closer to that of sub-participants in a syndicated 
loan. They share the burden of the loan by virtue of an agreement with the trustee, but 
they have no agreement directly with the borrower (SPV). 
 If the Trust Property Control Act does not apply to this relationship, some of the 
protective measures as discussed above would not be available automatically. Some 
aspects, such as proper bookkeeping and accountability may be included in the 
agreement between the parties. However, the relationship will still fall outside the 
power of the Master of the High Court. Most importantly, the trust property will not 
be legally separated from the personal estate of the trustee. This will make the claims 
vulnerable to attachment by the creditors of the trustee‘s personal estate. The claims 
will also be available to the trustee‘s creditors in the event of his insolvency.  
2.8.3 Trustee for debenture-holders298 
The trustee for debenture-holders should preferably be independent of the company, 
which will be the SPV. The company‘s directors and officers are prohibited from 
                                                 
296
 English trust law was not received in South African law and forms no part of our law. See Estate 
Kemp v MacDonald‟s Trustee 1915 AD 491 at 499; Braun v Blann and Botha 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 
at 859E–F. English trust law is premised on the basis of dual or divided ownership, where the legal 
estate in the trust property vests with the trustee and the equitable estate vests in the trust 
beneficiary. This duality was the result of the historical development of the trust, whereby courts 
have over centuries made concessions on behalf of the beneficiary of a trust to act against the trustee 
for breaches, even though the beneficiary had no proprietary interest in the trust property. The 
Chancellor awarded a remedy to such a party, especially if the absence of a remedy in common law 
brought about unjust or inequitable consequences. In time these concessions took the nature of 
proprietary interests rather than claims against the trustee. For more information on the historical 
development of trusts, see Du Toit Trust Law at 15–21; Cameron et al Honoré‟s at 24–29. This 
duality does not form part of our law (Braun v Blann and Botha 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) at 859E–F), 
but most of the benefits of that system have been introduced in the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 
1988. An example is the separation of the trust property from the private estate of the trustee (s 12). 
However, some arrangements that would be considered trusts in English law might not comply with 
the statutory definition of trusts in South Africa. I would argue that the trust for debenture-
stockholders is such a case. 
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 57 of 1988. 
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 The aspects discussed in this paragraph apply to all trustees of debenture-holders, unless otherwise 
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being trustees for debenture-holders.299 It is further preferable that the trustee should 
not be a creditor of the company, as this may lead to a conflict of interests.300 
 The trustee owes a duty of care, diligence and skill to the debenture-holders as 
beneficiaries of the trust.301 This is also the position when the trustee is an agent of the 
debenture-holders in terms of the agency construction.302 
 The standard of care that a trustee for debenture-holders must observe is not that 
which an ordinary person generally observes in the management of his own affairs, 
but rather that of the prudent and careful person.303 Added to that, trustees for 
debenture-holders are usually professional persons or specialised institutions, which 
further increases the standard of care expected of them.304 
The trust deed usually sets out the following duties and discretions of the trustee:305 
 A specification of circumstances under which the security will become 
enforceable, such as default on the principal debt or interest payments. It is 
usually specified that only a default that will materially prejudice the debenture-
holders will lead to enforceability. It is left to the trustee‘s discretion when a 
default is materially prejudicial.306 Although the trustee does not have a duty to 
verify all reports made to him, he will have a duty to investigate a breach in order 
to determine its effect on the rights of the debenture-holders.307 
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 Section 122 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
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 A provision that permits the company (SPV) and the trustee to alter or amend the 
terms of the deed without the consent of the beneficiaries (debenture-holders) 
where the trustee considers that such an amendment will not materially prejudice 
the interests of the debenture-holders, and where the alteration is to correct a 
manifest error, or if the alteration is of a minor or technical nature. 
 An agreement that the company (SPV) will provide the trustee with specified 
information regarding the company‘s financial condition. This information need 
not necessarily be disclosed to the debenture-holders, thereby protecting the 
confidentiality of the company.308 The transaction agreements might contain 
provisions that require the servicer to furnish the trustee with information 
regarding the state of collections and defaults.309 The trustee is entitled to rely on 
the financial information provided to him, unless it appears that something 
requires further inquiry.310 However, the examination of the accounts must be done 
with the standard of care set out above. The trustee must be allowed to use an 
independent auditor to inspect transactions that seem irregular.311 
 Provisions that permit the trustee to give permission to the company (SPV) to deal 
with the secured property, as long as the trustee is satisfied that the debenture-
holders will not be materially prejudiced. 
 Provisions of the circumstances under which a meeting of debenture-holders will 
be called and rules regarding such meetings. 
 
When the construction of the debenture trust is truly one of trust, the trustee does not 
need to consult with the debenture-holders before exercising any of the discretions 
given to him in the trust deed.312 He need not follow their wishes nor provide them 
with reasons for his actions, unless the trust deed provides otherwise. However, in 
practice he will usually consult them if the matter is serious and if practicality allows 
for such a consultation. If the construction of the debenture trust is one of agency, the 
trustee will have no power to act outside the express mandate given to him by the 
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debenture-holders and this will be reflected in the document that appoints the trustee 
as representative. 
 The independence of the trustee from the debenture-holders is especially important 
upon a default. It is here where the agency construction proves to be unworkable in 
the context of securitisation. After default the trustee‘s duties increase and he must 
immediately consider certain actions to protect the interests of the debenture-holders. 
Such action may include313 
 increased monitoring and a review of servicing and collections; 
 reviewing and enforcing credit enhancement; 
 preparing for negotiations and possible insolvency; and/or 
 if the originator is declared insolvent, three further tasks, namely 
1 ensuring that the claims are collected and that the SPV receives the proceeds; 
2 ensuring that the originator does not attempt to pass off the assets of the SPV 
as its own in an effort to gain new financing while in distress; and 
3 defending the nature of the transfer of the assets to the SPV as a true sale, in 
the event that the originator‘s liquidators claim that the assets belong to the 
estate of the originator. 
 
Any provision in the trust deed or in the contract with the debenture-holders to the 
effect that the trustee shall not be liable for breach of trust or for failing to show the 
degree of care and diligence required of him as a trustee is void.314 This means that a 
blanket approval of such breaches is not allowed. However, three-quarters in value of 
the debenture-holders may consent to a release from liability of a trustee with 
reference to specific acts or omissions.315  
 The trustee will be entitled to remuneration, which will be regulated by the trust 
deed,316 or otherwise to a reasonable remuneration that may be determined by the 
Master of the High Court in case of a dispute.317 The fee will depend on the scale of 
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the monitoring functions expected of him, which may be more in securitisation than 
those expected from a debenture trustee generally.318 
2.9 DISTINCTION BETWEEN SECURITISATION AND 
OTHER FORMS OF STRUCTURED FINANCE 
The structure I discussed in this chapter is the basis of a traditional asset-backed 
securitisation scheme. It involves the transfer of assets to an SPV and the financing of 
the transaction by way of the issuance of securities backed by those assets. In    
Chapter 1 I also briefly explained synthetic securitisation.319 
 However, the term ‗securitisation‘ has different meanings for different people. The 
sale of participations or sub-participations in syndicated loans is sometimes referred 
to as ‗securitisation‘.320 Syndicated loans do not, however, involve an issue of 
securities as in a securitisation, although it may share some of the advantages of a 
securitisation.  
 Factoring is a financing method by means of which a company enters into an 
agreement with a third party (the factor) in terms of which the factor will administer 
the collection of the company‘s debts.321 The company invoices the client in the 
normal manner, but the invoice indicates that the claim was transferred to the factor 
and that only payment to the factor will discharge the claim. The factor pays a 
percentage of the value of the uncollected claims to the company on cession. When 
the claim is discharged, the remainder of the value of the claim is transferred back to 
the company. In return, the company pays the factor an administration fee, usually the 
equivalent of bank interest on the funds advanced by the factor.322 There is a 
distinction between factoring with recourse and factoring without recourse. During 
factoring with recourse the client bears the risk that the debtor will default on the 
claims, whereas in factoring without recourse the factor bears this risk.323 
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 A number of differences between securitisation and factoring emerge from this 
brief description. The purpose of a factoring arrangement is to better the 
administration of the company‘s debt collection.324 The company and the factor 
operate closely together. The company remains exposed to the risk of default by the 
debtors in recourse factoring. Even during non-recourse factoring the company still 
carries some of the loss in the event of default. More importantly, there remains a 
dependency between the factor and the client, because the continued use of a factor 
depends on the business prosperity of the client. During securitisation the aim is to 
insulate the SPV from the commercial risks of the originator. Factoring is 
considerably less complicated than securitisation and lends itself better to use by 
small and medium-sized enterprises.325 However, the continued link with the business 
risks of the company means that the company will not achieve financing at a lower 
cost than it would if it had used bank loans. Securitisation, however, leads to 
financing at a lower cost. 
 After successful securitisation the originator should be totally divested of the risk 
associated with the transferred assets. The originator is no longer the owner of the 
transferred assets. There are other methods of transferring or diluting the risk 
associated with a particular group of assets, but they do not involve the transfer of 
assets to another person. The credit derivative is an example of such a transaction, 
whereby one party agrees to pay another or to receive from another the difference 
between the financial performance expected of a particular investment and its actual 
performance.326  
 Some authors refer to bond or commercial paper issues as securitisation.327 
However, a direct issue of debt does not achieve the central objective of 
securitisation, namely to insulate a specific pool of assets from the rest of the estate of 
the originator in order to achieve a better credit rating and, consequently, better 
interest rates. Consequently, in a normal bonds issue the investor is exposed to the 
business risks of the everyday operations of the company, while in securitisation the 
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investor need only look at the risks associated with the performance by the debtors of 
the transferred claims.328  
2.10 CONCLUSION 
Securitisation offers many potential advantages, all of which follow from the structure 
of the scheme.329 In this chapter I analysed the components of a typical traditional 
securitisation scheme as used in South Africa. Every component of the scheme is 
there to reduce the risk of default by the issuer SPV of its obligations towards the 
investors in the scheme.  
The rating agency plays a particularly important role from the start of the 
transaction in evaluating every component and providing opinions on how to 
maximise the potential of the scheme to give optimal safeguards to the investors. At 
least one aspect of securitisation schemes in South Africa, namely the use of a 
security SPV rather than a trustee for debenture-holders, has been due to the influence 
of rating agencies. Even though rating agencies play such a significant role, I submit 
that regulation of rating agencies is unnecessary. South African common law is, in my 
opinion, resilient enough to ensure liability of rating agencies if they provide an 
inaccurate rating due to the negligent performance of their duties.330  
However, I recommend that rating agencies could be certified as institutions that 
conform to sound methodology in their rating process. Such certification must not aim 
to prescribe the methods and procedures followed by rating agencies, but must 
evaluate the methods and procedures already in use against specified criteria. The 
publication of methods and procedures to an independent certification authority, 
which may be an exchange that regularly deals with debt instruments, for instance, the 
Bond Exchange of South Africa, would also encourage rating agencies to keep to 
those procedures and not to deviate from them without proper cause. This, in my 
opinion, will lead to greater investor confidence in the ratings provided by less-
established rating agencies. 
The structure of securitisation schemes in South Africa is similar to those used in 
the United States of America and in England, with the exception of the use of a trust 
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for debenture-holders to secure the claims of the debenture-holders and other 
transaction creditors in the scheme. I therefore paid particular attention to this aspect 
of the structuring of a securitisation scheme.331 
 The use of a security SPV in South African securitisation schemes is a 
consequence of the insistence by rating agencies that transaction creditors involved in 
the securitisation scheme must agree not to apply for the winding-up of the SPV 
before two years after the final claims of the holders of the securities have been paid. 
These non-petition clauses reduce the risk of the insolvency of the SPV. However, 
transaction creditors are not willing to enter into such agreements, unless the SPV 
grants security in their favour over the assets of the SPV. 
 There is uncertainty in South African law whether a trust for debenture-holders as 
provided for in section 117 of the Companies Act332 can hold security on behalf of 
creditors other than debenture-holders. South African securitisation schemes therefore 
avoid the trust structure altogether and opt for the security SPV in the form of a 
company.  
 I am of the opinion that the provisions in the Companies Act that deal with security 
for debentures are superfluous, and only lead to uncertainty and inefficiency.333 The 
uncertainty lies in the fact that only debenture-holders are mentioned, when it ought to 
be possible to grant security in favour of a trustee for any creditor of a company. The 
inefficiency lies in the fact that neither the Deeds Registries Act334 nor the Trust 
Property Control Act335 mentions any of the provisions of the Companies Act that deal 
with trusts for debenture-holders. I submit that the provisions regarding security 
granted to a trustee for debenture-holders must be removed from the Companies Act 
and should only be regulated by the Trust Property Control Act. 
 I evaluated the security SPV currently in use in South African securitisations.336 To 
date the guarantees provided by such security SPV have never been called up, which 
means that this security scheme has not yet been tested. Furthermore, as far as I am 
aware, the true sale of the assets by the originator to the issuer SPV has never been 
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put to the test in South African courts during the insolvency of an originator. I submit 
that even if this scheme is used, it will be beneficial to the interests of debenture-
holders to make use of a trust for debenture-holders. The trustee for debenture-holders 
could then monitor the security SPV when the issuer SPV defaults on its obligations 
and the guarantee of the security SPV is called up in favour of the debenture-holders. 
The trustee can institute proceedings on behalf of the debenture-holders before the 
guarantee is called up or when the true sale of the assets is argued before a court 
during a liquidation of the originator.  
 I further considered what legal forms the trust for debenture-holders may take and 
which form provides most of the benefits of a trust for debenture-holders. My 
conclusion is that a true trust construction of a trust for debenture-holders is possible 
in South African law and would be most beneficial to the interests of the debenture-
holders.337  
In terms of the agency construction, the debenture-holders will not enjoy the 
protection that the provisions of the Trust Property Control Act afford.338 The security 
will have to be registered in the names of the individual debenture-holders, which is 
not only inconvenient and impractical, but will restrict the transferability of the 
debentures. Furthermore, the debenture-holders as principals will have the power to 
revoke the mandate of the trustee to act on their behalf. 
Owing to the requirement of the Trust Property Control Act that a transfer of 
ownership is necessary to constitute a trust, a trust for debenture-holders can only be a 
bewind trust if the debentures are created, and security for the debentures granted, in 
favour of an intermediary first.339 The debentures and the security rights are then 
transferred to the debenture-holders, but the entitlement to enforce the debentures and 
the security is vested in the trustee. However, as was the position under the agency 
construction, registration of the security rights will then have to be in the names of the 
individual debenture-holders. 
In terms of the true trust construction, the debenture-holders act as founders of the 
trust by transferring the debentures to the trustee immediately after acquiring them. 
Security for the claims is granted directly to the trustee. The disadvantages set out 
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above in relation to the other possible forms of the trust for debenture-holders are 
thereby avoided. 



















I briefly indicated the historical connection between English law and South African 
mercantile law in Chapter 1.1 Owing to the fact that South African company law was 
originally based on English legislation, the development of English company law is 
important to consider when South Africa considers its own future company law 
development. Furthermore, the United Kingdom has the largest securitisation market 
in the European Union and the second largest securitisation market worldwide after 
the United States.  
 I start by providing an overview of the methods by which security can be granted 
over claims in English law. Of particular importance is the difficulty experienced in 
characterising a charge over book debts as a floating charge or as a fixed charge. I 
then discuss aspects of legislation that are particularly important for securitisation in 
England. Then I discuss assignment and the risk of recharacterisation of the 
securitisation transaction in English law. Finally, I evaluate the risk of a successful 
application by a liquidator of an insolvent originator to avoid the securitisation 
transaction in terms of current insolvency legislation. 
3.2 LEGAL AND EQUITABLE CHARGES 
English law draws a distinction between legal and equitable security.2 It follows that 
there is a distinction between a legal mortgage and an equitable mortgage (security 
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explanation of equity: ―Equity is the body of rules which evolved to mitigate the severity of the rules 
of the common law. Its origin was the exercise by the Chancellor of the residual discretionary power 
of the King to do justice among his subjects in circumstances in which, for one reason or another, 
justice could not be obtained in a common law court.‖ After the enactment of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Acts, the High Court has jurisdiction in matters arising from common law and in equity 
(see s 18(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo c 49), 
which consolidated the previous legislation dealing with these matters). 
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over land and buildings). Charges are security over tangible movable assets, also 
called ‗chattels‘, and all charges are enforceable only in equity.3 
 A legal mortgage is created by the transfer of an existing asset to a creditor in 
accordance with any statutory formalities.4 The transferor‘s title to the asset must be a 
legal and not an equitable title.5 The security grantor may redeem or recover the legal 
title upon repayment of the debt. Although in form a legal mortgage is an absolute 
transfer subject to an equitable right of legal redemption on discharge of the secured 
obligation, in reality the substance of the ownership still remains with the security 
grantor, in other words, under English law a legal mortgage is a transfer of ownership 
as security.6 A legal mortgage gives priority over subsequent real interests in the asset, 
whereas equitable mortgages and charges may be vulnerable to a subsequent 
disposition of the asset to a bona fide purchaser for value who had no notice of the 
equitable security interest. 
 It follows from these characteristics of a legal mortgage that equitable security may 
be created under the following circumstances:7 
 Where the security relates to future property. 
 Where there is no transfer of title nor an agreement to transfer, but merely a 
charge. 
 Where there is no immediate transfer, but only an agreement to transfer in the 
future. 
 Where the transfer is not made according to the formal requirements for the 
transfer of legal title (such as registration).8 
                                                 
3
 WJ Gough Company Charges 2 ed (1996) at 18; Roy Goode Legal Problems of Credit and Security 3 
ed (2003) at 8. As a result all charges are equitable security. 
4
 For instance, for a legal assignment of receivables s 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (15 & 16 
Geo 5 c 20) requires that the assignment must be in writing and that the debtor must be notified in 
writing of the assignment. However, notice to the debtor does not need to include a direction that the 
debtor must pay the assignee. For criticism of this situation, see Goode Legal Problems at 95. 
5 
Goode Legal Problems at 8; Gough Company Charges at 16. 
6 
See also Goode Legal Problems at 7 and 35. The existence of the equitable right to regain the asset in 
future would seem to preserve the company‘s ownership of the asset. See Simon Goulding 
Principles of Company Law (1996) at 262. 
7 
Goode Legal Problems at 8.
 
8 
These requirements vary according to the kind of asset given as security. For a full discussion of the 
requirements for the creation of legal mortgages on different kinds of assets, see Goode Legal 
Problems at 9–10. 
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 Where the transfer is not made to the creditor, but to a third party as trustee for the 
creditor.9 
 Where the transferor‘s title to the asset is equitable, not legal. 
 
A charge is an encumbrance over an asset (chattel) created by agreement and is 
enforceable only in equity.10 A charge does not lead to a transfer of ownership nor 
does it confer an entitlement to possession and therefore it does not confer a right of 
foreclosure.11 The chargee has the right of realisation through a judicial process, 
whether it is through an order of sale or through the appointment of a receiver.12 There 
are no specific formalities for the creation of a charge. However, most charges in 
English law must be registered, thereby giving constructive notice of the existence of 
the charge.13 
A further distinction is drawn between fixed and floating charges. A fixed charge 
is a charge over specified property and prevents the company from disposing of the 
property without the consent of the chargee.14 This means that the company is not free 
to deal with the assets without the consent of the chargee.15 This renders a fixed 
charge over objects such as stock-in-trade and book debts virtually impossible, 
because the company cannot survive if it cannot create cash flows from these assets. 
However, in theory it is possible to grant a fixed charge over a company‘s book 
debts.16 
A floating charge is an equitable charge over some or all of the company‘s present 
and future assets where the company is free to deal with the assets in the ordinary 
                                                 
9 
As would be the case if a security is created in favour of a trustee for debenture-holders.
 
10 




Goode Legal Problems at 7 describes a charge as an encumbrance. Foreclosure is a remedy limited to 
mortgagees. See Goode Legal Problems at 152. 
12 
Gough Company Charges at 19.
 
13 
Section 395 of the Companies Act 1985 c 6, ss 860 and 870(1) of the Companies Act 2006 c 46. 
14 
Geoffrey Morse, Stephen Girvin, Richard Morris, Sandra Frisby & Alastair Hudson Charlesworth 
Company Law 17 ed (2005) at 504. 
15
 In Smith (Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd) v Bridgend County Borough Council [2002] 1 
AC 336 (HL) at 353D this was considered the most prominent difference between a floating charge 
and a fixed charge. In this case the charge was a floating charge regardless of the size and character 
of the security object, because the chargor could remove the security object from the charge without 
the consent of the chargee.  
16
 See the discussion of Gerhard McCormack Secured Credit Under English and American Law (2004) 
at 211–217. 
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course of business.17 Floating charges are by their very nature equitable security.18 No 
legal title in the property is vested in the chargee. However, from the very moment of 
the creation of the charge a security exists and the chargee is capable of enforcing its 
remedies, regardless of whether the principal debt has become payable.19  
The floating charge gradually evolved from the 1870s through judicial 
pronouncements on the nature of a charge over ‗the undertaking‘. Its main aim is to 
safeguard the company from the paralysis caused by a fixed charge over its cash-
generating assets.20 
                                                 
17
 Before the introduction of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the position in the USA was 
that floating charges were not recognised as valid security. Freedom to deal with the charged assets 
in the ordinary course of business was seen as incompatible with the creation of a true security 
interest. Such a charge was seen as a fraud on the creditors of the company and void. See Geilfuss v 
Corrigan, 95 Wis. 651; 70 NW 306 (1897); Benedict v Ratner, 268 US 353; 45 SCt 566; 69 LEd 
991 (1925). Revised Article 9 (1999) of the Uniform Commercial Code has been accepted by all the 
States, including Louisiana (see https://www. incspot. com/ pdfs/ 
RA9QuickReferenceGuide2_04.pdf (accessed 29 November 2005). Section 9-205 of the Code 
provides as follows: ―(a) A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors solely 
because: (1) the debtor has the right or ability to: (A) use, commingle, or dispose of all or part of the 
collateral, including returned or repossessed goods; (B) collect, compromise, enforce, or otherwise 
deal with collateral; (C) accept the return of collateral or make repossessions; or (D) use, 
commingle, or dispose of proceeds; or (2) the secured party fails to require the debtor to account for 
proceeds or replace collateral.‖ The official comment to this section states that the ―Article expressly 
validates the ‗floating lien‘ on shifting collateral … this section repeals the rule in Benedict v 
Ratner, 268 US 353 (1925), and other cases which held such arrangements void as a matter of law 
because the debtor was given unfettered dominium or control over collateral.‖ This implies that 
although Article 9 draws no distinction between fixed and floating security interests, the concept of 
the floating charge is acknowledged. See also par 4.2.1. 
18 
In other words the opposite of the definition of legal security as set out above. Re Standard 
Manufacturing Co [1891] 1 Ch 627(CA) at 645. This decision was followed in In re Opera Ltd 
[1891] 3 Ch 260 (CA). See also Gough Company Charges at 97. 
19
 Brunton v Electrical Engineering Corporation [1892] 1 Ch 434 at 440; Norton v Yates [1906] 1 KB 
112 at 122; Gough Company Charges at 98–99; Gavin Lightman, Gabriel Moss, Hamish Anderson, 
Ian F Fletcher & Richard Snowden The Law of Administrators and Receivers of Companies 4 ed 
(2007) at 55–56. Goode Legal Problems at 116–117 lists the following consequences of the fact that 
a floating charge is a present security: (1) Crystallisation causes the charge to attach without the 
need for any further act by the chargor (crystallisation is the process of conversion of the security 
from being floating in character to being specific or fixed, see pars 3.2.2.3 and 3.2.3); (2) On 
crystallisation the chargee may follow assets to third parties who received the assets beyond the 
ordinary course of business; (3) Restrictions on dealings with the charged assets (negative pledges) 
bind third parties taking with notice; (4) Crystallisation will lead to the chargee‘s priority over an 
execution creditor who already obtained a writ of execution, but where the execution has not been 
completed; (5) The chargee may apply to court for the appointment of a receiver when his security is 
in danger, even when not seeking crystallisation and even if there has been no default. 
20
 The earliest decisions that set out the general form of a floating charge were Re Panama, New 
Zealand, and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318; Re Florence Land and Public Works 
Co, ex parte Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530; Re Colonial Trusts Corporation, ex parte Bradshaw (1879) 
15 Ch D 465 at 472; Re General South American Co (1876) 2 Ch D 337 at 344; Re Hamilton‟s 
Windsor Ironworks, ex parte Pitman and Edwards (1879) 12 Ch D 707. The case most often cited 
for its definition of a floating charge is Re Yorkshire Woolcombers‟ Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 284 
(CA) at 295: ―I certainly think that if a charge has the three characteristics that I am about to 
mention it is a floating charge. (1) If it is a charge on a class of assets of a company present and 
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In practice a floating charge most commonly arises as security for a debenture, 
whether for a single debenture or for debentures issued in series under a trust.21  
3.2.1 Characteristic elements of floating charges 
Three characteristic elements of floating charges can be distinguished:22 
1 The charge floats over the present and future property of the company so that it 
does not attach to any specific assets. 
2 The company can assign the property as it pleases to third parties giving them 
good legal title, whether it is through sale or by way of security.23 
3 The charge may ‗crystallise‘ under certain circumstances, whereby it is converted 
from a floating charge into a specific or fixed charge. 
 
These characteristic elements are used by the courts to determine whether a particular 
security is a fixed or a floating charge.24  
                                                                                                                                            
future; (2) if that class is one which, in the ordinary course of business of a company, would be 
changing from time to time; and (3) if you find that by the charge it is contemplated that until some 
further step is taken by or on behalf of those interested in the charge, the company may carry on its 
business in the ordinary way as far as concerns the particular class of assets I am dealing with.‖ 
These decisions are collectively referred to as ‗the old authorities‘ from here on. See also Robert R 
Pennington ―The Genesis of the Floating Charge‖ (1960) 23 Modern Law Review 630; Gough 
Company Charges at 102; Goode Legal Problems at 112–113. See further Agnew v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 (PC) at 717–721 for a synopsis of the evolution of the floating 
charge. For a very interesting alternative opinion on the reasons for the development of the floating 
charge, see Roger Gregory & Peter Walton ―Book Debt Charges: Following Yorkshire 
Woolcombers: Are We Sheep Gone Astray?‖ (2000) 4 Insolvency Lawyer 157 at 167. The authors 
regard the ban on future property security in the Bills of Sale Act 1882 coupled with the surge in 
company registrations as the true reason for the popularity of the floating charge - not a fear of trade 
paralysis. 
21 
See Gough Company Charges at 88; In re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200.  
22 
Governments Stock and Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Manila Railway Co Ltd [1897] AC 81 
at 86 per Lord MacNaghten in the House of Lords; Illingworth v Houldsworth [1904] AC 355 at 358 
in the House of Lords by the same judge; Re Yorkshire Woolcombers‟ Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 
284 (CA) at 295, where Lord MacNaghten made it clear that he did not intend to provide a 
definition in the Manila case, but merely intended a description. Also see Gough Company Charges 
at 85–86; Goulding Principles at 266; Morse et al Charlesworth at 505. These characteristics are 
accepted by most commentators and are therefore applied. However, Gregory & Walton 2000 
Insolvency Lawyer at 163–165 are of the opinion that these characteristics were shared by what they 
refer to as a future personalty mortgage. This form of security granted fixed equitable security, 
characterised by the transfer of title and a right to possession (foreclosure). The authors also provide 
a list of precedents as examples of this form of security. 
23
 This is referred to by some authors as the ‗business-dealing licence‘. 
24
 Owing to the high volume of registrations, it is impossible for the English Registrar of Companies to 
ascertain during the registration process whether a charge is truly fixed or floating in nature. The 
charge is therefore registered on the face of it, as long as the documentation is sound. It then remains 
for the receiver to convince the liquidator, creditors or the court that the charge is what it appears to 
be. See Nicholas Grier UK Company Law (1988) at 460.  
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A floating charge is not distinguished from a fixed charge because it encumbers 
future property, since it is also possible to encumber future property by way of a fixed 
charge. The distinguishing feature is rather that there is a ‗business-dealing licence‘ 
between the chargor and the chargee.25 If new property comes into the possession of 
the chargor, and it was the intention of the parties that such acquisition becomes a 
final and irrevocable appropriation of the property to the charge, so that the chargor 
cannot by a unilateral act decide that the property must be dealt with in a way that is 
inconsistent with the charge, it is a fixed charge and not a floating charge.26  If the 
chargor can decide how to deal with the property, it is a floating charge. 
A floating charge does not create a proprietary interest in any specific property of 
the company until it is crystallised. It does not fix or attach to any specific asset,27 but 
rather ‗floats‘ over a particular class of asset. The charge may be over all the assets of 
the company or its ‗undertaking‘ or it may be over a nominated class of assets of the 
company, such as its machinery or book debts. 
The nature of the charge is not determined by the frequency with which the assets 
move in and out of the estate of the chargor. Some of the assets that fall under the 
floating charge may pass through the estate swiftly (e.g. book debts) while others may 
ordinarily not be disposed of at all (e.g. machinery).28  
                                                 
25 
Gough Company Charges at 93; Stein v Saywell (1969) 121 CLR 529 (HC of Australia) at 556 (these 
comments were obiter dicta as they were not essential to the reasoning of the Court); Siebe Gorman 
& Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 142 (Ch) at 159; Agnew v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 (PC) at 719; Goode Legal Problems at 12 defines the difference 
between fixed and floating security in the following manner; ―[a floating security] relates not to a 
specific asset but to an identifiable fund of assets, the debtor being authorised by the terms of the 
security agreement to dispose of all or any of the assets comprising the fund free from the security 
agreement.‖ In Re Armagh Shoes Ltd [1984] BCLC 405(Ch) at 408G–H the security was held to be 
a floating charge, even though it was called a fixed charge in the agreement. 
26 
However, it was held in Re Cimex Tissues Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 409 (Ch) at 420G–421A that a licence 
to deal with charged property to a limited extent (such as the replacement of outdated machinery) 
does not necessarily change the nature of the charge from a fixed to a floating charge. It will depend 
to a large extent on the wording of the charge agreement. Stephen Atherton & Rizwaan Jameel 
Mokal ―Charges over Chattels: Issues in the Fixed/ Floating Jurisprudence‖ (2005) 26 The Company 
Lawyer 10 at 11–12 identify two considerations when a limited power to deal with the assets will 
still be in the nature of a fixed charge, namely (1) where the power is limited to where the assets are 
to be repaired or improved; and (2) where the power is one of substitution – the substituted assets 
will still fall under the fixed charge. See also
 




 Goulding Principles at 265. 
28 
Gough Company Charges at 111. See for instance Smith (Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) 
Ltd) v Bridgend County Borough Council [2002] 1 AC 336 (HL), where some of the assets held to 
be subject to a floating charge were huge washing plants used in the coal mining industry. 
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3.2.1.1 Charges over book debts 
One specific area where the distinction between fixed and floating charges has 
received prominent attention is charges over the book debts of a company. The 
possibility of creating a fixed charge over the book debts of a company was affirmed 
in Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd.29 However, in many cases a charge 
over the book debts of a company was held to be a floating charge, despite the 
contrary wording of the agreement.30 The most common method of determining 
whether a charge over book debts is a fixed or a floating charge is to determine what 
would happen to the proceeds of the book debts after such proceeds have been 
received.31 If the proceeds must be deposited into an account over which only the 
chargee has control, the charge is construed as fixed, because the chargor cannot deal 
with the assets freely. However, if there is no restriction on the use of the proceeds of 
the book debts by the chargor, the whole of the charge before and after the realisation 
of the book debts is considered to be floating.32  
                                                 
29
 Siebe Gorman & Co v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyds Rep 142 (Ch) at 159. Alan Berg ―Charges 
over Book Debts: A Reply‖ (1995) J of Business Law 433 at 442–449 criticised the Siebe Gorman 
decision as at odds with the principle enunciated in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers‟ Association Ltd 
[1903] 2 Ch 284 (CA) that a specific charge gives the chargee possession and the entitlement to 
receive the book debts at once. This, in turn, may lead to business paralysis. Second, he argues that 
the main authority for the Court‘s decision, a British Columbia Court of Appeal decision Evans, 
Coleman & Evans Ltd v RA Nelson Construction Ltd (1958) 16 DLR (2d) 123 did not pay proper 
regard of the parties‘ subsequent conduct in the interpretation of the charge agreement, but only paid 
attention to the wording of the agreement itself. Berg‘s views have found approval in Re Spectrum 
Plus Ltd National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2004] 1 BCLC 335 (Ch D) at 351, 
after the Court decided to follow the implied criticism of the Siebe Gorman decision as enunciated 
in Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 (PC). The Court of Appeal 
overturned this decision as being contrary to the doctrine of precedent, because it was bound by the 
Court of Appeal‘s decision in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 485 (CA); see National 
Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2004] EWCA 670 at [43] and Alan Berg ―Charges over 
Book Debts: The Spectrum Case in the Court of Appeal‖ (2004) J of Business Law 581. The House 
of Lords in Spectrum Plus Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc [2005] UKHL 41 overturned the 
Siebe Gorman decision and unanimously held that the charge created in that case was in fact a 
floating charge. However, the possibility of creating a fixed charge over book debts was reaffirmed 
(at [80]).  
30
 Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200; Re Permanent House (Holdings) Ltd [1988] BCLC 563 (Ch); Re 
GE Tunbridge Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 34 (Ch). 
31
 Morse et al Charlesworth at 508–509. See also In re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200 at 209H: ―Once in 
the account, they [the proceeds] would be outside the charge over debts and at the free disposal of 
the company. In my judgment a right to deal in this way with the charged assets for its own account 
is a badge of a floating charge and is inconsistent with a fixed charge.‖ 
32
 This was the method used in Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 142 
(Ch), now held by the House of Lords to have been a floating charge (Spectrum Plus Ltd v National 
Westminster Bank plc [2005] UKHL 41). See also Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 
2 AC 710 (PC) at 722 and Re Spectrum Plus Ltd National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus 
Ltd [2004] 1 BCLC 335 (Ch). The emphasis is on whether the company is free to deal with the 
proceeds in the ordinary course of its business. 
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Re New Bullas Trading Ltd33 considered the possibility of creating a fixed charge 
over the book debts of a company, but a floating charge over the proceeds of the 
charged book debts. The agreement between the parties in this case was that the 
proceeds had to be paid into a predetermined bank account. It further stated that if the 
chargee gave instructions to the company on the use of the account, the proceeds 
would remain under the fixed charge. In the absence of such instructions the proceeds 
would become subject to a separate floating charge. The chargee never gave 
instructions to the company on the use of the account. The Court a quo interpreted the 
whole charge as a floating charge using the argument explained in the previous 
paragraph. The Court of Appeal decided that effect should be given to the charge as it 
was described. This meant that the unrealised book debts remained subject to a fixed 
charge, but the proceeds were only subject to a floating charge.  
The Court based its decision on a passage from Re Yorkshire Woolcombers‟ 
Association Ltd,34 relied upon by the respondent, which reads as follows:  
 
What you do require to make a specific security is that the security whenever it has once come into 
existence, and been identified or appropriated as security, shall never thereafter at the will of the 
mortgagor cease to be a security. 
 
The Court then concluded that it was warranted to give effect to the agreement 
between the parties, because the proceeds did not cease to be subject to the fixed 
charge at the will of the company alone, but by mutual agreement between the 
company and the lender.35  
The formulation of the security agreement in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd was 
intended to confuse the issue of priority. The parties intended to secure the best of two 
worlds: that the company could continue dealing with the assets, while the chargee 
fixes priority at the time of the registration of the fixed charge rather than at the 
crystallisation of the floating charge.36 The decision was severely criticised by English 
and other Commonwealth commentators.37  
                                                 
33
 Re New Bullas Trading Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 485 (CA). 
34
 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers‟ Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 284 (CA). 
35
 At 429 C–D. In Re Cimex Tissues Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 409 (Ch) at 426D–H the Court considered this 
to be the crucial point of the Re New Bullas Trading Ltd decision. Here the Court held (although in 
an obiter dictum) that the agreement may not be shaped so freely that the result is a charge unknown 
to law, by implication criticising the Re New Bullas Trading Ltd decision.  
36
 Many commentators mentioned this consequence; see Roy Goode ―Charges over Book Debts: A 
Missed Opportunity‖ (1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review at 602; Gerard McCormack ―The Nature of 
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The Privy Council expressly overruled Re New Bullas Trading Ltd in a case 
hereafter referred to as the Brumark decision.38  
In Brumark the facts were substantially the same as in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd. 
The debenture deed showed so much similarity to that in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd 
that both the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council observed that it must have been 
                                                                                                                                            
Security Over Receivables‖ (2002) 23 The Company Lawyer at 90, although the latter author seems 
to accept this consequence provided that it is done by way of legislation, for instance, by limiting the 
priority of all security on circulating assets; Sarah Worthington ―Fixed Charges over Book Debts 
and other Receivables‖ (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review at 568. Referring to this effect of the 
charge, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe says the following in Spectrum Plus Ltd v National 
Westminster Bank plc [2005] UKHL 41 at [141]: ―Whether or not it is appropriate to describe this 
by some disparaging term such as camouflage, it is the court‘s duty to characterise the document 
according to the true legal effect of its terms … In each case there is a public interest which 
overrides unrestrained freedom of contract.‖ 
37
 Goode 1994 LQR 592 at 604 criticises the judgment for a lack of understanding of the nature of a 
charge over future property. The nature of the charge remains constant and future property falls into 
the realm of that charge as it comes into the estate of the debtor. To treat the nature of the charge 
over the proceeds of the claim as distinct from the claim would mean that the security agreement 
over the proceeds will be contingent until the proceeds are collected. It follows that when the 
proceeds are collected a new security agreement will come into existence together with a freshly 
executed consideration. Priority will rank from the time that these requirements are met and not 
from the time of the original security agreement over the claim. The registration requirements of                                
s 395 of the Companies Act 1985 (ss 860 and 870(1) of the Companies Act, 2006) will only be 
triggered after the new charge has been created which will mean that third parties will have no 
notice of it. Lastly, since no new value is given for the new charge it may be construed as a voidable 
preference under s 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986 c 45. For all these and other reasons, Goode 
argues that security over claims should rather be seen as continuous security over both the claim and 
its proceeds. See also Worthington 1997 LQR at 567–568; Lightman et al Administrators at 66–71. 
Berg 1995 J of Business Law at 449–462 supports Re New Bullas Trading Ltd. The author disagrees 
with Goode‘s single continuous security construction. In his opinion, it is possible to create different 
charges on the book debt and its proceeds, because the two are different assets in the estate of the 
chargor. If the charge agreement states that the proceeds will fall under a previously created floating 
charge, a new charge will not be created, as Goode argues, but will simply fall under the existing 
floating charge. Berg would thus give effect to the agreement as it stood. He does agree, however, 
that a general charge over a company‘s present and future book debts that does not prohibit a 
company from dealing with the proceeds of the book debts will seldom be held to be a fixed charge. 
To hold otherwise will lead to the paralysis of the company (see par 3.2.2.1), which is in Berg‘s 
view the main mischief that a floating charge seeks to avoid on a proper reading of Re Yorkshire 
Woolcombers‟ Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 284 (CA). Also in support of Re New Bullas Trading 
Ltd is McCormack Secured Credit at 218–219. He argues that there is value in book debts, apart 
from their collection, in the possibility to sell them on. Second, there have been a number of 
contexts where English courts have considered book debts and their proceeds as separate assets. 
Last, if debts are assigned in contravention of a contractual prohibition on the assignment of the 
debts it does not prevent an assignee from having to account to the assignor for the proceeds of the 
debt. This suggests that the Court views the book debts and the proceeds separately.  Elsewhere 
Goode has acknowledged the possibility of creating a floating charge over book debts and a fixed 
charge over their proceeds, but not the other way round (Goode Legal Problems at 127). See also Re 
CCG International Enterprises Ltd [1993] BCLC 1428 (Ch) at 1435 where the insurance money 
paid out in respect of a fire that destroyed the assets under a floating charge was held to fall under a 
fixed charge. 
38
 The matter was referred to the Privy Council from New Zealand; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v 
Agnew (1999) 19 NZTC 15, 159; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Agnew (2000) 1 NZLR 223 
(CA); Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 (PC). 
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drafted with a view to taking advantage of that decision.39 In the Court of Appeal the 
Court held that this mode of drafting attempted to provide the lender with the greater 
security of a fixed charge, while affording the borrower the freedom of a floating 
charge.40 Without coming to a definite conclusion as to whether it is possible to 
separate the uncollected book debts from their proceeds for the purposes of security, 
the Court held that the arrangement led to the conclusion that the book debts were not 
under the control of the chargee and therefore not in the nature of a fixed charge, but 
rather in the nature of a floating charge.41 This decision was confirmed on appeal by 
the Privy Council. 
The Privy Council held that it made no difference that in Brumark the proceeds of 
the book debts ceased to fall under the fixed charge when collected, while in Re New 
Bullas Trading Ltd the funds were not released until they were actually received in the 
company‘s bank account. The claims in both cases ceased to exist.42 The Court drew a 
comparison between book debts and stock-in-trade. Both are part of the company‘s 
circulating assets. Neither falls in the owner‘s estate for his own enjoyment. They 
provide their owner with cash flow through realisation and, as such, form obvious 
objects for a floating charge. 
The Court rejected the argument raised in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd that the 
parties were free to form whatever agreement they preferred and that the 
characterisation of the charge was therefore only a matter of construction. The Court 
held that the classification of a charge as fixed or floating is a two-stage enquiry. 
First, the charge agreement is examined to determine what rights and duties the 
parties intended to confer on each other. Thereafter, the categorisation of the charge is 
a matter of law, untouched by the intention of the parties. During this second stage the 
Privy Council regarded control of the charged assets as the pivotal aspect to be 
evaluated to determine the nature of the charge.43 
                                                 
39
 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Agnew (2000) 1 NZLR 223 (CA) at 224; Agnew v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 (PC) at 716. 
40
 At 230. 
41
 At 232. 
42
 At 725. 
43
 At 726. This two-staged approach in the characterisation of charges has since been applied in Re 
Spectrum Plus Ltd National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2004] 1 BCLC 335 (Ch D) 
and in Ashborder BV v Green Gas Power Ltd [2004] EWHC 1517 (Ch). It is also encouraged by 
Goode Legal Problems at 116. 
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The chargee does not by merely prohibiting assignment, factoring and further 
charges gain sufficient control over the charged assets to create a fixed charge. The 
Court held that alienation and collection were merely different ways of realising the 
debts, collection being the ordinary method. It then criticised as unsound the examples 
used in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd of fixed charges that were defeasible at the will of 
the chargor.44  
The Privy Council examined questions raised by academic commentators on 
whether a book debt can be separated from its proceeds, whether a book debt and its 
proceeds represent one security interest or two, and whether a charge on a book debt 
necessarily creates an indivisible charge, regardless of the drafting of the agreement. 
A book debt and its proceeds represent different assets in the estate of the 
company. However, the value of a book debt can only be exploited if the right is 
exercised (i.e., if it is collected), or if it is assigned for value to a third party. An 
assignment of a book debt that does not carry with it the right to receive the proceeds 
is valueless. It will also be worthless as security. The Court held that even if it was 
conceptually possible to separate the ownership of the book debts from the ownership 
of the proceeds, this would make no commercial sense.45 But it appears that the Court 
saw the possibility of creating separate charges on the book debts and on the 
proceeds. If the company is at liberty to remove the assets under the fixed charge 
when it pleases, in this case by collecting the book debts, the charge on the book debts 
will still be categorised as a floating charge.46 
                                                 
44
 At 727–728. Although Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc [1992] Ch 505 and Re Atlantic Medical Ltd 
[1993] BCLC 386 (Ch) held that it was possible to create a fixed charge over receivables while the 
chargor could continue to collect and use the proceeds in the ordinary course of its business, these 
decisions have been criticised. The Court in Royal Trust Bank v National Westminster Bank plc 
[1996] 2 BLCL 682 (Ch) at 696 followed these decisions, but the Court of Appeal in an obiter 
dictum considered such a power inconsistent with the nature of a fixed charge. See Royal Trust Bank 
v National Westminster Bank plc [1996] 2 BLCL 699 (CA) at 706. Goode 1994 LQR 592 at 598–
599 argues that the character of the charge as fixed or floating cannot be divorced from the 
contractual provisions of the application of the proceeds of the claims. McCormack 2002 The 
Company Lawyer 84 at 89 further argues that these cases are unsound on the basis that they do not 
comply with the conditions stated in Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd‘s 
Rep 142 (Ch) before a fixed charge over book debts can be upheld. See also Worthington 1997 LQR 
at 566–567; Berg 1995 JBL at 463–465; Lightman et al Administrators at 70. 
45
 At 729. 
46
 McCormack 2002 The Company Lawyer 84 at 88 praises Brumark as a proper consideration of the 
legal and policy considerations surrounding the characterisation of charges. See also David Milman 
―Company Charges: A Return to Harsh Reality‖ (2001) 4 Insolvency Lawyer 135 who warns that in 
future the security agreement will have to contain restrictions upon collection of the claims if the 
charge is to be viewed as fixed. 
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
108 
The judgment of the House of Lords in Spectrum Plus Ltd v National Westminster 
Bank plc47 affirmed Brumark and brought some certainty to the characterisation of 
charges. The charge before the Court was in the same form as the one created in Siebe 
Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd48 and was indeed modelled on that charge. 
The Siebe Gorman charge agreement determined that the proceeds of the charged 
book debts had to be paid into the company‘s current account with the chargee bank. 
However, the company had unrestricted access to the current account and its linked 
overdraft facility. That charge was nevertheless held to be a fixed charge. Since then 
banks have used the Siebe Gorman precedent in the creation of their fixed charges, 
although it was only a decision by a lower court. 
The Court a quo in Spectrum Plus decided not to follow the Siebe Gorman 
decision in the light of the Privy Council‘s decision in Brumark.49 This was 
overturned by the Court of Appeal, which found that it was bound by its decision in 
Re New Bullas Trading Ltd.50  
In the House of Lords the most in-depth consideration of the topic of 
characterisation of the charge was given by Lord Scott of Foscote, with whom all the 
other Lords concurred.51 His lordship considered Re New Bullas Trading Ltd as a 
direct consequence and elaboration of the Siebe Gorman decision.52 His criticism of 
the one decision should then also be seen as levied against the other. The other two 
judgments on this issue lent their support to Brumark and should also be seen as 
dissenting from the views in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd.53  
The account in which the proceeds of the book debts had to be paid was held to be 
a normal current account coupled with an overdraft facility. The first important 
finding is that the bank acted as the client‘s agent in the latter‘s drawing of cheques 
                                                 
47
 Spectrum Plus Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc [2005] UKHL 41. 
48
 Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 142 (Ch). 
49
 Re Spectrum Plus Ltd National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2004] 1 BCLC 335 (Ch). 
50
 National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2004] EWCA 670. For criticism of this 
decision see Berg 2004 JBL at 590–595 and 598–605; Sarah Worthington ―An ‗Unsatisfactory Area 
of Law‘: Fixed and Floating Charges Yet Again‖ (2004) 1 International Corporate Rescue 175. 
51
 The other main legal question was whether the House of Lords could overrule a previous decision 
with only prospective effect. 
52
 At [86]. This approach may have been in response to that of the Court of Appeal, where it found 
itself bound to Re New Bullas Trading Ltd;  National Westminster Bank plc v Spectrum Plus Ltd 
[2004] EWCA 670 at [58]. 
53
 Lord Hope of Craighead at [56] and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe at [151]. 
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against that account.54 The bank was bound to honour its client‘s cheques for as long 
as the account was in credit or until the overdraft limit was reached. The bank could 
not refuse to honour such cheques before its relationship with its client was 
terminated. It made no difference whether the account was in debit or in credit as long 
as the client could draw on the account.55 
Lord Scott continued with a brief description of the evolution of the floating charge 
and of the statutory provisions that attempted to limit its far-reaching consequences.56 
None of these statutes defines ‗floating charge‘ and the term must therefore be 
developed through judicial process. However, in so doing the courts must have regard 
to the aims of these limiting statutory provisions, specifically that the preferential 
creditors of the company should, in winding-up, be paid from the floating charge 
assets in priority to the floating chargee.57 
His lordship proceeded with an overview of the development of the 
characterisation of charges. He agreed with the Privy Council in Brumark that the 
third of the characteristics set out in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers‟ Association Ltd,58 
namely that until some further step is taken by the chargee, the chargor is free to 
conduct its business in the ordinary manner as regards the class of assets falling under 
the charge, lends a floating charge its distinctive character.59 In the light of this 
finding, his lordship agreed that the charge created in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd was 
a floating charge. He described the distinction between the book debts and their 
proceeds where the proceeds were only subject to a floating charge as ―an internal 
contradiction in the formulation of the charge‖.60 His lordship held that the essential 
value of a book debt as security lay in the money that might be obtained in realisation. 
                                                 
54
 At [59] and [82]. At [158] the Court stated that in normal bank charges there will be at least three 
documents that may need to be interpreted in order to ascertain the true commercial reality of the 
relationship between the bank and the client, namely(1) the debenture creating the charge, (2) the 
bank‘s facility letter offering a term loan or an overdraft and (3) the bank‘s general terms and 
conditions. 
55
 At [116]. 
56
 At [95] – [98]. 
57
 Section 175(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
58
 Re Yorkshire Woolcombers‟ Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 284 (CA) at 295. 
59
 At [107] and [111]. The House of Lords thereby lended its approval to the obiter dictum in Royal 
Trust Bank v National Westminster Bank plc [1996] 2 BLCL 699 (CA) at 706 and disapproved of 
the line of reasoning followed in cases such as Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc [1992] Ch 505 and 
in Re Atlantic Medical Ltd [1993] BCLC 386 (Ch) that the ambulatory nature of the encumbered 
assets are paramount and that dealing with those assets is not inconsistent with a floating charge. 
60
 At [110]. 
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Therefore, a charge over book debts would only be characterised as a fixed charge if 
the chargee gains effective control over the proceeds. Where the chargee was a bank 
and the payments must be deposited in an account of that bank, it would only be a 
fixed charge if restrictions were imposed on the chargor‘s use of that account.61 In the 
absence of such measures, as was the position in the present case, the charge would 
only be a floating charge.62 
It seems then that the use of fixed charges over book debts will rarely occur.63 A 
charge that provides for the proceeds of the book debts to be paid into a blocked 
account would not be very attractive to the company, which usually needs the cash 
from the proceeds of book debts to operate its business.64 Nor would a floating charge 
over book debts be an attractive option for lenders, since charges over book debts will 
mostly provide the chargee with only weak priority over the claims of other creditors 
in insolvency and will be subordinated to preferential creditors before insolvency.65 
This makes the use of book debts as security objects for charges an unattractive 
option. This disadvantage is amplified if book debts constitute the majority of the 
company‘s assets potentially available as security. 
3.2.2 Implied terms of floating charge agreements 
Freedom of contract is a fundamental principle of English common law underlying its 
commercial law.66 Parties‘ freedom to bind themselves as they choose is only curtailed 
                                                 
61
 At [140] Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe puts it as follows: ―But if the terms of the debenture were 
such as to require the trader to pay all its collected debts into the bank and to prohibit the trader from 
drawing on the account (so that the account is blocked), a charge on debts, described as a fixed or 
specific charge, would indeed take effect as such.‖ It is also not enough for the debenture to provide 
for such a blocked account if it is not in fact operated as such. See also at [159]. 
62
 At [116]. 
63
 This view is shared by Worthington 2004 Int Corporate Rescue at 182–183. 
64
 Berg 2004 JBL at 611–612 makes a suggestion for overcoming the effect of paralysis of the company 
through the use of a fixed charge. He suggests the use of the blocked account method, but to include 
a provision where the company may, after 45 days of commencement of the debenture and ending 
90 days thereafter, request the bank to waive compliance with the covenant to pay the proceeds into 
the blocked account and that the proceeds will henceforth only fall under a floating charge. Keeping 
in mind the reasoning employed by the House of Lords, I cannot see such a charge avoiding 
characterisation as a floating charge. 
65
 See par 3.2.6 below. 
66 
Gough Company Charges at 35–36. See Roy Goode Commercial Law 3 ed (2004) at 8: ―Commercial 
law is the branch of law which is concerned with rights and duties arising from the supply of goods 
and services in the way of trade.‖ The author continues at 10: ―the foundation on which commercial 
law rests is the law of contract.‖ See further Robert Bradgate Commercial Law 3 ed (2000) at 6, who 
describes party autonomy as an underlying feature of commercial law. See further at 35–37, where 
the author explains that the essential principles of contract law were developed in the eighteenth and 
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to the extent that legislative measures for the protection of the public restricts the 
terms on which parties may agree. The task of the courts is to interpret the intention of 
the contracting parties. This is specifically true with regard to the determination of the 
point at which the proprietary interest in the goods is assigned and becomes vested in 
the assignee.  
 There is no prescribed manner in which to create a floating charge. Agreement 
between the parties to create a charge over the business of the debtor or of the 
company as a going concern is enough to create a floating charge.67 It must also be the 
intention of the parties that the chargee will not interfere with the carrying on of the 
business of the chargor as long as the charge remains floating.68 This must be their true 
intention and the court will not only look at the use of specific words in the 
document.69
 
The earliest cases essentially interpreted business continuance, business-dealing 
licence and certain crystallisation terms as implied terms of a contract creating a 
charge.70 This was done for ‗business efficacy‘, so as to make the contract 
‗workable‘.71 The aspects discussed below are therefore implied terms of a floating 
charge agreement. This means that in the absence of any express provisions to the 
contrary in the charge agreement, the following would be the norm: 
                                                                                                                                            
early nineteenth centuries, and were to a great extent influenced by the belief that parties were free 
to promote their own economic self-interest. Courts did not lightly interfere in contracts.
 
67 
Re Panama, New Zealand, and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318 at 322; Wallace v 
Universal Automatic Machines Co [1894] 2 Ch 547 (CA) at 554 per Lord Kay; Re Florence Land 
and Public Works Co, ex p Moor (1878) 10 Ch D530 at 540–541, 546. The Wallace decision also 
held that debentures become immediately payable and the floating charge immediately enforceable 
at the winding-up of the company (at 554), even if no provision was made for this in the agreement, 
since the possibility of the company continuing as a going concern ceases to exist. The earlier case 
of Hodson v Tea Company 14 Ch D 859 was approved and followed. See also Gough Company 
Charges at 88; Davies Gower and Davies‟ Principles at 819. 
68 
Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979 at 987, 993; Re Florence Land and Public 
Works (1878) 10 Ch D 530 at 540–541, 547; Wheatley v Silkstone and Haigh Moor Coal Co (1885) 
29 Ch D 715 at 718–719 as approved in Evans; Hubbuck v Helms (1887) 56 LJ Ch 536 at 537. The 
charge is either fixed or floating. It cannot be both at the same time. The last-mentioned two cases 
considered the granting of security over assets of the company before the charge became fixed. This 
is possible, because it falls within the normal business operations of the company. In Helms the 
security was not given in the ordinary course of business (at 538), but was rather a disguised sale of 
the business and as such was disallowed in favour of the debenture-holders.   
69 
See Gough Company Charges at 89. 
70 
Gough Company Charges at 176. More recent authority for this view can be found in Re Woodroffes 
(Musical Instruments) Ltd [1986] Ch 366 at 375. 
71 
Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200 at 212–213. 
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3.2.2.1 Business continuance 
The courts have interpreted a ‗floating charge‘ as leaving the chargor with the ability 
to carry on freely with its business, because the opposite would lead to the paralysis of 
the business.72 The business would stop for two related reasons:  
1 Cash constraints: the company would be unable to access its cash funds to use in 
the ordinary course of business. Even the money advanced under the charge 
would fall under the charge and become worthless for the company. Furthermore, 
it would become impossible for the company to take loans from other sources, 
because the money so advanced would also fall under the charge. Any person who 
receives money from the company with notice of the charge would be liable to 
repay it to the chargee.73  The availability of cash or the possibility of attaining 
short-term finance is necessary for the purchase of stock, payment of ordinary 
business liabilities and payment of wages. Without it a business cannot continue.74 
2 If the charge were treated as fixed rather than floating, the consent of the chargee 
– often the debenture-holders – would have to be acquired before the company 
could deal with its assets. Suppose the assets encumbered by the fixed charge 
were the stock-in-trade of the company. The company would require the consent 
of the chargee to sell the stock-in-trade to customers, effectively paralysing the 
business of the company.75 If new stock-in-trade came into the possession of the 
chargor, a new fixed charge would have to be registered. Consent to deal with its 
stock-in-trade or to collect the book debts owed to it would administratively be so 
burdensome that the company would collapse.76  
                                                 
72 
Gough Company Charges at 90. 
73 
Gough Company Charges at 91.
 
74 Re Hamilton‟s Windsor Ironworks, ex p Pitman and Edwards (1879) 12 Ch  707 at 712. 
75 Biggerstaff v Rowatt‟s Wharf Ltd [1896] 2 Ch 93 (CA) at 101; Re Yorkshire Woolcombers‟ 
Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 284 (CA) at 296; Re Benjamin Cope & Sons Ltd [1914] 1 Ch 800 at 
805–806; Re Lin Securities Pte (1988) 2 MLJ 137 at 142; Re Florence Land and Public Works Co, 
ex p Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530 at 541. See also Geoffrey Morse Palmer‟s Company Law (1992) at § 
13.123.1: ―The utility of a floating charge is that it removes the need for an endless series of deeds 
of substitution and release.‖ 
76 
Gough Company Charges at 92. 
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3.2.2.2 Business-dealing licence 
The business-dealing licence entails that the chargee, during the floating phase of the 
charge, has no right to interfere or intervene in any particular dealing by the chargor.77 
A classic example of a statement by the court that led to the acceptance of this as an 
implied term of a floating charge agreement reads as follows:78 
 
[The floating charge] shall be a security on the property of the company as a going concern, subject 
to the powers of the directors to dispose of the property of the company while carrying on its 
business in the ordinary course (my emphasis). 
 
Gough79 shows that the phrase ‗in the ordinary scope of business‘ was not interpreted 
by the earliest cases as being a limitation on the right of the company to deal with its 
property freely. The courts used this phrase and ‗do with the property as the chargor 
thinks fit‘ interchangeably, often together in one paragraph,80 in other words, the 
company may deal with its assets in any manner that the powers of the company 
allow.  The only limitation on transactions by a company during the existence of a 
floating charge is that the company must be able to carry on as a going concern after 
the particular transaction. 
The scope of the transactions that a chargor may enter into under this implied 
licence, or under an express licence with no more restrictive effect than an implied 
licence, is very wide. It includes the following types of transactions:81 
 The application of cash balances and moneys received from trade for business 
purposes other than for the satisfaction of the charge debt. 
 The payment of debts, even when made under threat of legal action, and the 
discharge of other liabilities. 
                                                 
77 
Gough Company Charges at 180. 
78 
Re Florence Land and Public Works Co, ex parte Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530 at 540–541. 
79 
Company Charges at 188; Morse et al Charlesworth at 507. For instance, a company is allowed to 
sell all or any of its assets in return for shares and debentures in another company as long as the 
company remains a going concern. See Re Borax Co, Foster v Borax Co [1901] 1 Ch 326. A 
company with three businesses is allowed to sell one of the three. See Re HH Vivian & Co Ltd 
[1900] 2 Ch 654. 
80 
On the interpretation of ‗ordinary course of business‘, see Re Florence Land and Public Works Co, 
ex parte Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530 at 540–541; Re Hamilton‟s Windsor Ironworks, ex parte Pitman 
and Edwards (1879) 12 Ch D 707 at 713–714; Wheatley v Silkstone and Haigh Moor Coal Co 
(1885) 29 Ch D 715 at 724. On ‗as they think fit‘, see Re Florence Land and Public Works Co, ex 
parte Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530 at 541; Re Colonial Trusts Corporation, ex parte Bradshaw (1879) 
15 Ch D 465 at 469. 
81 
Gough Company Charges at 195. 
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 Mutual transactions that confer the right of set-off. 
 The sale, disposition or exchange of assets. 
 Leasing of assets or the disposal of assets on hire-purchase terms. 
 The sale and lease back of assets.82 
 The granting of other forms of security over the assets, including fixed mortgages 
or charges, contractual liens and pledges.83 
 Transactions creating contractual rights over the charged assets, for example, 
contractual rights to take possession. 
 The sale of the whole or a substantial part of the undertaking with a view to 
carrying on the same or a different business, which falls within the capacity of the 
chargor.84 
 
It is therefore clear that even unprecedented or extraordinary transactions, such as the 
sale of the undertaking, would be allowed if they were effected for the purpose of 
maintaining the business as a going concern.85  
Transactions that are viewed as falling outside the scope of the business-dealing 
licence include the following:86  
 The sale of the whole or a substantial part of the undertaking with a view to 
terminating the company‘s business.87 
                                                 
82 
There is no English law precedent for this view, but there is support for this position in Australian 
law. See Reynolds Bros (Motors) Pty Ltd v Esanda Ltd (1984) 8 ACLR 422 (SC NSW–CA). In this 
particular case the Court held that the transaction was in the ordinary course of business because the 
sale and lease back was not granted with the aim of ending its business, but as a last minute attempt 
by the dealer to extend its business life. The finding of the Court was reliant on the particular 
circumstances of that case and the decision may be distinguishable from other cases on that basis. 
83 
Initial scepticism expressed about this view in Re Panama, New Zealand, and Australian Royal Mail 
Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318 at 322 was dismissed in all the subsequent cases. See for instance Re 
Florence Land and Public Works Co, ex parte Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530 at 541; Re Colonial Trusts 
Corporation, ex parte Bradshaw (1879) 15 Ch D 465 at 472; Wheatley v Silkstone and Haigh Moor 
Coal Co (1885) 29 Ch D 715 at 719. It is now settled law that a floating charge cannot gain priority 
over subsequent fixed charges as this will be inconsistent with the intention of the floating charge, 
namely that the chargor will be free to deal with its assets in the continuation of its business. 
84 
Re Borax Co, Foster v Borax Co [1901] 1 Ch 326 (the sale of all the assets of the company to another 
in exchange for shares and debentures in the other company is valid, because the company did not 
cease to trade); Re HH Vivian & Co Ltd [1900] 2 Ch 654 (the sale of all the assets held at a specific 
branch of the company); Hubbuck v Helms (1887) 56 LJ Ch 536 (the sale of all the assets of the 
company with a view to change the nature or the location of the business). On the capacity of a 
company, see n 88. 
85 
Reynolds Bros (Motors) Pty Ltd v Esanda Ltd (1984) 8 ACLR 422 (SC NSW – CA) at 424, 428. 
86 
Gough Company Charges at 196. 
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 Ultra vires transactions.88 
 Fraudulent transactions.89 
 
Ultra vires transactions and fraudulent transactions will not lead to the crystallisation 
of the floating charge, unless the business ceased to be a going concern. The remedy 
available to the chargee in these circumstances is an injunction to restrain the ultra 
vires transaction on the grounds of jeopardy to the security.90  
In Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd 91 the Court held that a business-dealing 
licence would only come to an end after an act of crystallisation has taken place, 
resulting in the chargee‘s right to intervene, coupled with an act of intervention by the 
chargee. The mere right to intervene alone will not suffice to vest a fixed charge in the 
property in priority over the other creditors.92 Citing Robson v Smith,93 the Court held 
                                                                                                                                            
87 
Hubbuck v Helms (1887) 56 LJ Ch 536. In recent times this question has only arisen in Australian 
courts. The following Australian decisions will provide guidance to English law: Hamilton v Hunter 
(1983) 2 ACLR 295 (SC NSW); Torzillu Pty Ltd v Brynac Pty Ltd (1983) 8 ACLR 52 (SC NSW); 
Fire Nymph Products Ltd v Heating Centre Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (1992) 7 ACSR 365 (SC NSW–
CA). The intention or result that the going concern will cease, is paramount to this being a 
transaction outside the scope of the business-dealing licence. The cessation of the going concern will 
lead to the crystallisation of the floating charge. Legal purchasers without notice of the 
crystallisation circumstances will take priority over the crystallised charge. See Gough Company 
Charges at 208 and 211–214. 
88 
The objects clause in the memorandum of association of the company determines the scope of its 
powers (capacity). A transaction that falls outside these objects and ancillary objects is outside the 
ordinary scope of business of a company. However, s 3A of the Companies Act 1985 provides that a 
company may state as its object ―to carry on business as a general commercial company‖, which 
grants it almost limitless capacity as a legal person. Furthermore, s 35 of the Companies Act 1985 
provides that no act of the company shall be invalid by reason of a lack of capacity as stated in the 
company‘s memorandum and s 35B states that a party to a transaction is not bound to enquire 
whether it is allowed by the memorandum of the company. As a result, very few transactions will 
fall outside the capacity of an English company and if so, the transaction will usually not be void. 
Under the Companies Act 2006 the objects of a company will be unrestricted, unless specifically 
restricted in its articles of association (ss 28 and 31(1), which becomes operational on                       
1 October 2008). When the objects of a company are restricted, third parties dealing with the 
company in good faith may assume that the company‘s directors are able to deal on the company‘s 
behalf free of restrictions (s 40). On the position under the Companies Act 2006 see Derek French, 
Stephen W Mayson & Christopher L Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law (2007) at 97–
104; Davis, Paul L; Worthington, Sarah & Micheler, Eva Gower and Davies‟ Principles of Modern 
Company Law 8 ed (2008) at 152–165. 
89 
The only precedent directly in point is the New Zealand decision Julius Harper Ltd v FW Hagedorn 
& Sons Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 530 (CA) where the company transferred goods to a related company 
with the aim to defraud creditors. This was held not to fall within the scope of the express business-
dealing licence provided in this case. The position under an implied licence will be similar.  
90 
Re Borax Co, Foster v Borax Co [1901] 1 Ch 326 at 341–342. 
91
 Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979. 
92
 Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979 at 1002. 
93
 Robson v Smith [1895] 2 Ch 118. 
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that under such circumstances the debenture-holder would not be allowed to prevent 
payment to a judgment creditor of the company.94  
It will not be possible for the chargee to intervene when specific assets under the 
charge come under threat of being sold in execution or sold in the ordinary course of 
business. It is only possible for the chargee to crystallise the charge over a specific 
class of assets, for instance, all the book debts, but not over a specific asset.95 
After the initial spate of cases in which a business-dealing licence was interpreted 
as an implied term of the floating charge agreement, draftsmen started to include 
express business-dealing licences in their floating charge agreements. An express 
licence given in a charge agreement may be narrower than the implied licence given 
to floating charges by the courts. This will depend largely on the wording of the 
licence clause.96 These clauses should be interpreted in the same way, and given the 
same consequences, as restrictive clauses in contracts generally. It is quite common 
for an express clause to limit its period of operation until the occurrence of a specified 
act or event of default.  
                                                 
94
 Lord Fletcher Moulton criticises the use of the word ‗licence‘ in this context (at 997). Lord Buckley 
also rejects the contention of an implied licence to deal with the goods (at 999). Pennington 1960 
MLR 630 at 645–646 explains why it is important to determine whether it is appropriate to use the 
term ‗licence‘. First, if there is an implied licence, it must have limits. If there is a licence and the 
company wants to act in an ultra vires manner or dispose of the assets contrary to the security 
agreement, the debenture-holders will have the right to intervene, restricting the company‘s right to 
deal. If there is no such licence, the debenture-holders will only have the right to intervene when a 
receiver is appointed. Second, if there is an implied licence, the licence will terminate on the 
winding-up of the company, even if it is due to amalgamation or restructuring, and a receiver will be 
appointed by the court. On the other hand, if there is no such licence the parties are free to regulate 
by agreement the circumstances under which a receiver will be appointed. Finally, if there is an 
implied licence, dispositions of assets made to judgment creditors will fall outside the ordinary 
scope of the business of the company and will be deferred to the claims of the debenture-holders. If 
there is no such licence, judgment creditors paid before the floating charge has crystallised will have 
priority, because at the date of the execution the debenture-holders could not interfere.  It seems then 
that there is not truly a ‗licence‘ to deal with the property while the charge is floating. Gough 
Company Charges at 180 argues that the term ‗licence‘ should not be taken literally, but that the 
courts have described the power of the company to deal with its goods by different names including 
licence, freedom, power, liberty, right, authority, permission and mandate.  
95 
Crystallisation over a particular class of assets will also have to be provided for expressly in the 
charge agreement, otherwise it will only be possible to crystallise the charge over all of the charged 
assets. See Goode Legal Problems at 143; Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979 at 
1000; Robson v Smith [1895] 2 Ch 118 at 126. Re Griffen Hotel Co Ltd, Joshua Tetley and Son Ltd v 
Griffen Hotel Co Ltd [1941] Ch 129 provides an example of where crystallisation only occurred 
over a particular class of assets. The outcome of the case would be different today, since the coming 
into operation of s 175(1) and (2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 which state that preferential creditors 
will be paid in priority to the floating charge holder if the charge was created as a floating charge. 
See also Gough Company Charges at 171 and 1009–1010. 
96 
Gough Company Charges at 194. 
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3.2.2.3 Crystallisation terms 
In the absence of a crystallisation clause in the security agreement, crystallisation will 
occur by reason of winding-up, cessation of business and enforcement of the charge 
(receivership). This is seen as an implied term of a floating charge agreement.97  
3.2.3 Crystallisation 
As was stated above,98 crystallisation is the process of converting the security from 
being floating in character to being specific or fixed.99 A floating charge crystallises in 
the following circumstances: 
 Where the company is wound up or otherwise ceases to do business. Under these 
circumstances the reason why the parties intend the charge to float, namely to 
circumvent paralysis of the company, becomes irrelevant.100 The following three 
situations fall in this category: 
1 Winding-up:101 This includes winding-up due to amalgamation or 
reconstruction.102 
2 Cessation of trading without being wound up.103  
3 When the company disposes of its whole undertaking with a view to ceasing 
to be a going concern.104   
                                                 
97 
Gough Company Charges at 172–178; Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200 at 212–213. See also 
National Westminster Bank plc v Jones [2002] 1 BCLC 55 (CA) at 62H–63C. 
98
 See n 19. 
99 
Gough Company Charges at 135; Goulding Principles at 267; Grier Company Law at 458; Davies 
Gower and Davies‟ Principles at 823. 
100 
Gough Company Charges at 139; Re Panama, New Zealand, and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 
5 Ch App 318; Re Florence Land and Public Works Co, ex parte Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530; Re 
General South American Company (1876) 2 Ch D 337. 
101 
Gough Company Charges at 139–143. 
102 
See Re Crompton & Co Ltd, Player v Crompton & Co Ltd [1914] 1 Ch 954. In this decision 
amalgamation and reconstruction of the company were expressly excluded in the charge agreement 
as events that would lead to the crystallisation of the floating charge. However, the Court refused to 
enforce these clauses (at 964–965), because the business-dealing licence was given to the old 
company and not to the newly formed company. Therefore winding-up for reconstruction would 
lead to the immediate crystallisation of the floating charge. There will be no new business-dealing 
licence for the new company, unless this is specifically provided for in a new agreement between the 
chargee and the new company.  
103 
Gough Company Charges at 136; 143–144; Davey & Co v Williamson & Sons Ltd [1898] 2 QB 194; 
In re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd [1986] Ch 366 at 376–378; William Gaskell Group Ltd 
v Highley (Nos 1, 2, 3) [1994] 1 BCLC 197 (Ch) at 206; National Westminster Bank plc v Jones 
[2001] 1 BCLC 98 (Ch) at 134E; National Westminster Bank plc v Jones [2002] 1 BCLC 55 (CA) at 
62H–63C. 
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 Where the chargee enforces the floating charge.105 The following situations fall in 
this category: 
o When the chargee takes possession of the charged assets through seizure 
under power or licence.106 
o Appointment of a receiver by, or on behalf of, the chargee.107 
o When the chargee obtains or utilises some other remedy for the enforcement 
of the security or for the protection of the charged assets.108  
                                                                                                                                            
104 
In re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd [1986] Ch 366 at 376. According to Gough Company 
Charges at 147–148, Hubbuck v Helms (1887) 56 LJ Ch 536 gave express authority for the view that 
business cessation leads to crystallisation (although the term ‗crystallisation‘ did not yet exist at that 
time). So did Robson v Smith [1895] 2 Ch 118, although on the facts of that specific case it was 
found that the business had not ceased. See Hamilton v Hunter (1983) 7 ACLR 295 (SC NSW); 
Torzillu Pty Ltd v Brynac Pty Ltd (1983) 8 ACLR 52 (SC NSW); Fire Nymph Products Ltd v 
Heating Centre Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (1992) 7 ACSR 365 (SC NSW – CA). These last-mentioned 
cases relate to the sale of the whole or substantially the whole of the business undertaking, which 
has in recent times only been considered in Australia. Gough Company Charges at 159 raises an 
interesting point when he asks whether the inquiry as to whether the business has ceased to be a 
going concern should be based on the intention of the company when selling these assets or whether 
the sale itself should constitute a presumption that the business will cease to be a going concern. The 
latter approach deals with an objective inquiry – if certain aspects regarding the sale are present the 
court will find that the company has ceased to be a going concern and therefore the floating charge 
will crystallise. The former approach deals with a subjective inquiry into the minds of the people 
behind the company veil, namely whether they intend to continue the business as a going concern or 
whether  they are entering into an informal liquidation of the company‘s assets. It seems that Gough 
prefers the subjective approach, namely that if the intention to cease the business is present the 
extent of the assets sold becomes irrelevant – the charge will crystallise. Even if substantially the 
whole of the undertaking is sold, but the intention to cease the going concern is absent, the charge 
may not crystallise. However, an extraordinary transaction may lead to the conclusion that the 
necessary intention was present. 
105
 According to Goode Legal Problems at 140, the chargee‘s intervention must comply with three 
criteria before it will crystallise the charge: (1) It must be done with the intention of converting the 
floating charge into a fixed charge. (2) It must be authorised by the express or implied terms of the 
floating charge agreement. (3) It must divest the company of its de jure control of the asset. 
106 Re Hamilton‟s Windsor Ironworks, ex parte Pitman and Edwards (1879) 12 Ch D 707 at 710; Re 
General South American Company (1876) 2 Ch D 337 at 342;  Biggerstaff v Rowatt‟s Wharf Ltd 
[1896] 2 Ch 93 at 105–106; Re Christonette International Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 225 (Ch) at 230.  
107 
Re Florence Land and Public Works Co, ex parte Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530 at 541; Re Colonial 
Trusts Corporation, ex parte Bradshaw (1879) 15 Ch D 465 at 472. The appointment of a receiver 
does not necessarily mean that the company has ceased to carry on business. See Goulding 
Principles at 267; In re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd [1986] Ch 366 at 376. 
108 
 In re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd [1986] Ch 366 at 376. Obtaining an injunction will 
resort under this heading, but an injunction relating to a particular part of the assets will fix the 
charge only over those assets and the charge will remain floating over the rest. This is similar to the 
situation where a receiver is appointed for only a specific class of charged assets. The security then 
becomes fixed with regard to that particular group of assets, but not with regard to the rest. For 
example, the company has several clearly distinguishable enterprises that all fall under the floating 
charge, but the receiver is only appointed over one of them. This may be done, because there is no 
uncertainty over which part of the assets of the company the free dealing by the management of the 
company has been suspended; Gough Company Charges at 171. A chargee may not, however, try to 
crystallise the charge on a specific asset of the chargor. If such crystallisation were allowed, it would 
lead to uncertainty about the extent of the remaining floating charge. Furthermore, such 
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 Where crystallisation arises due to an express contractual term.109 
 When the chargee notifies the chargor that in accordance with their agreement the 
charge shall crystallise with regard to the assets listed in the notice.110 
 The occurrence of an event described in the charge as an event that shall lead to 
crystallisation.111 
 
Unless stated otherwise in the charge agreement, the following events will not lead to 
crystallisation:112  
                                                                                                                                            
crystallisation is contradictory to the character of a floating charge, namely that the company 
remains free to deal with its property in the ordinary course of business. Crystallisation leads to the 
encumbrance of all the assets under the floating charge and the total suspension of the business-
dealing licence; Gough Company Charges at 137. 
109
 Automatic crystallisation following the occurrence of events specified in the charge agreement has 
been accepted by both Australian and New Zealand courts.  Gough Company Charges at 233 prefers 
to call this form of crystallisation ‗express contractual crystallisation‘. In Fire Nymph Products Ltd v 
Heating Centre Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (1992) 7 ACSR 365 (SC NSW – CA) Chief Justice Gleeson 
approved the use of the automatic crystallisation clause used in the agreement. The security 
agreement provided certain circumstances that would be considered not to be in the ordinary course 
of business and would give rise to crystallisation. This crystallisation would then work 
retrospectively to before the transaction took place. This retroactive crystallisation of the charge was 
also approved by Chief Justice Gleeson (at 373). Judge Sheller, with whom Judge Handley 
concurred, also approved automatic crystallisation, but rejected the possibility of the retrospective 
crystallisation of the floating charge (at 379).  In my opinion, the decision of Judge Sheller is 
preferable: the assets belonging to the chargor prior to the crystallisation and disposed of before the 
crystallisation of the charge may not retrospectively be considered to fall under the fixed charge. 
This is so because the business-dealing licence is incidental to a floating charge, which means that 
before crystallisation the chargor must be free to deal with its assets in the ordinary scope of 
business. See also Stein v Saywell (1969) 121 CLR 529 (HC of Australia); Re Manurewa Transport 
Ltd [1971] NZLR 909; Re Permanent House (Holdings) Ltd [1988] BCLC 563 (Ch) at 567; 
Goulding Principles at 268–269. Although automatic crystallisation has not been approved by the 
English courts, In re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200 at 215E–F approved Re Manurewa Transport Ltd 
[1971] NZLR 909 at 917: ―a floating charge is not a word of art, it is a description for a type of 
security contained in a document which may provide a variety of circumstances whereupon 
crystallisation takes place.‖ It must be noted that this approval formed part of an obiter dictum. The 
danger with automatic crystallisation clauses is that third parties will have no notice of the fact that 
the floating charge is about to change in character to a fixed charge; see AJ Boyle ―The Validity of 
Automatic Crystallisation Clauses‖ (1979) J of Business Law 231 at 236–237; Lightman et al 
Administrators at 84–90. Goode Legal Problems at 145–148, who in principle supports automatic 
crystallisation, draws the valid distinction between the validity of such clauses inter se and their 
validity when it comes to priority to third parties. The parties are free to regulate between them 
when the charge will crystallise, but the law will determine the priority of the crystallised charge 
against third parties. The Companies Act 1989 c 40 Part IV proposed a system whereby the events 
that would lead to automatic crystallisation would have to be registered with the charge. However, 
this part of the Companies Act was never brought into force; see Grier Company Law at 459. For a 
detailed discussion of automatic or express contractual crystallisation, see Gough Company Charges 
at 232–268. 
110 
Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200.  
111 
Stein v Saywell (1969) 121 CLR 529 (HC of Australia); Re Manurewa Transport Ltd [1971] NZLR 
909; Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200; Re Permanent Houses (Holdings) Ltd [1988] BCLC 563 (Ch); 
Fire Nymph Products Ltd v Heating Centre Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (1992) 7 ACSR 365 (SC NSW – 
CA). See also the discussion in n 109. 
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 The presentation of a winding-up petition.113 
 The appointment of a provisional liquidator. The reason for this is that the 
provisional liquidator must seek the preservation of the status quo and the express 
continuation of the company‘s business at least to a limited extent. Since the going 
concern does not cease entirely, the floating charge does not crystallise.114 
 The appointment of an administrator for purposes of an administration order. 
There is no direct authority for this view, but Gough115 argues convincingly that 
due to the objectives of company survival and reconstruction contained in the 
Insolvency Act,116 coupled with the extensive powers available to the administrator 
in terms of the Insolvency Act,117 the charge will not crystallise automatically. 
 The enforcement of a security held by another creditor.118 
 The mere commencement of a debenture-holder‘s action seeking the appointment 
of a receiver.119 
 
After crystallisation the intention is no longer that the chargor may deal with the 
property as he pleases and any property coming into the hands of the chargor will 
immediately and irrevocably be appropriated to the chargee.120   
                                                                                                                                            
112 
Gough Company Charges at 137–139. 
113 
Re Victoria Steamboats Ltd, Smith v Wilkinson [1897] 1 Ch 158 at 161; Stein v Saywell (1969) 121 
CLR 529 (HC of Australia) at 552, 556 and 561.
 
114 
The only authority for this view is the Australian decision Re Obie Pty Ltd (No 2) (1984) 8 ACLR 
574 (SC of Queensland) at 581. 
115 
Company Charges at 138 fn 3. See also Goode Legal Problems at 139. 
116 
Insolvency Act 1986, s 8. These objectives are reiterated by the Enterprises Act 2002 c 40. See 
Department of Trade and Industry Explanatory Notes: Enterprise Act 2002, available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2002/02en40-k.htm (accessed 20 October 2005). 
 
117 
Insolvency Act 1986, s 14 and Sch 1. These powers include the power to carry on the business of the 
company. 
118 
In Re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd [1986] Ch 366 at 375 the Court held that the 
crystallisation of a second floating charge did not necessarily lead to the crystallisation of the first 
floating charge, unless the agreement expressly made provision for this. In the Court‘s opinion (at 
379–380), the fixed nature of the second charge did not lead to a conclusion that the business of the 
company ceased, even though its business now mainly entailed selling its current stock-in-trade.   
119
 Re Hubbard & Co Ltd, Hubbard v Hubbard & Co Ltd (1898) 68 LJ Ch 54.
 
120 
Gough Company Charges at 100. The charge will take the form of a fixed charge on crystallisation 
if the security agreement did not grant the chargee the right to foreclose or to take possession of the 
assets after crystallisation. The rights to foreclose and to take possession of the assets are not 
incidental to charges, but rather to mortgage. See Gough Company Charges at 101. 
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 Unless the charge agreement expressly provides otherwise, the chargee will not be 
able to crystallise the charge over only a part of the assets, while leaving it floating 
over the rest. The security must be asserted over all the assets.121 
3.2.4 Receivership 
The chargee may intervene and prevent the company from continuing with its 
business through the appointment of a receiver.122  A receiver appointed under a 
floating charge over all (or substantially all) the assets of the company is called an 
‗administrative receiver‘.123 The power to appoint an administrative receiver was 
previously seen as one of the greatest advantages of the floating charge.124 This 
position has now changed. The Enterprise Act 2002125 introduced section 72A into the 
Insolvency Act 1986. Section 72A prohibits the appointment of an administrative 
receiver by the holder of a floating charge, except if the debt falls under one of the 
exceptions.126 However, the exceptions only affect very large issues of debt127 and 
                                                 
121
 Goode Legal Problems at 143; Lightman et al Administrators at 81–82; Davies Gower and Davies‟ 
Principles at 824; Davies et al Modern Company Law at 1196 et seq. 
122 
Re Florence Land and Public Works Co, ex parte Moor (1878) 10 Ch D 530 at 541; Re Colonial 
Trusts Corporation, ex parte Bradshaw (1879) 15 Ch D 465 at 472; Hubbuck v Helms (1887) 56 LJ 
Ch 536 at 537–538; Robson v Smith [1895] 2 Ch 118 at 124, among others. On receivers generally, 
see Lightman et al Administrators at 4–7; Davies Gower and Davies‟ Principles at 842–848; Davies 
et al Modern Company Law at 1199–1207. 
123
 Insolvency Act 1986, s 29 (2). The receiver must be an insolvency practitioner.  
124
 See Goode Legal Problems at 1–2; Lightman & Moss Receivers at 31 comment: ―A fixed charge 
will have advantages for the chargee over a floating charge in terms of priorities but the floating 
charge may give greater flexibility to the debenture-holder in terms of remedies and enforcement.‖ 
In view of the recent amendments, discussed below, these advantages have now been removed. See 
Lightman et al Administrators at 8–9. See also par 3.2.5. 
125
 c 40. 
126
 These provisions apply to all floating charges created on or after the date that the amendments came 
into force. Charges created before this date will therefore retain the power to appoint an 
administrative receiver. The Enterprise Act 2002 in s 248 and sch 16 as reflected in sch B1 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 attempts to encourage floating charge holders to go the administration route by 
making it easier for them to apply for administration. Pars 14–21 of the schedule allows floating 
charge holders to appoint an administrator out-of-court when the charge is enforceable, notice has 
been given to any floating charge holders who may have priority over their charge, the company is 
not in liquidation and neither an administrative receiver nor an administrator is already in office. 
Notice must be given to the floating charge holders when the company or the board of directors 
appoint an administrator and the floating charge holders then have the right to appoint their own 
administrator instead (par 14). However, the appointment of an administrator does not hold the same 
benefits for the floating charge holder as the appointment of an administrative receiver. The latter 
owes his duties primarily to his appointor rather than to the general body of creditors and his 
primary function is to recover the debt owed to the appointor (see DTI Explanatory Notes par 642). 
An administrator is an officer of the court and an agent of the company (DTI Explanatory Notes par  
646) and as such will not seek to protect the interests of the appointor foremost. 
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certain debts typically incurred in the public interest.128 It follows that this power has 
been removed for most future floating charges and therefore the rest of this paragraph 
only relates to receivers appointed by the chargee over a part of the assets of the 
company129 and to receivers appointed under floating charges created before 
commencement of the Enterprises Act. 
The receiver is usually appointed out of court.130 It is a condition of crystallisation 
that the receiver must have accepted his appointment.131 Legal commentators are 
divided on the question of whether possession of the assets, or at least an attempt by 
the receiver to gain such possession, is a prerequisite for crystallising the charge. 
Gough132 makes out a good case for the proposition that possession, or an attempt to 
take possession, may be necessary, since the old authorities emphasised the need for 
the chargee to intervene actively before crystallisation may occur. A requirement of 
possession by the receiver will lead to more certainty as to which assets fall under the 
now fixed charge and which could still be dealt with under the business-dealing 
licence under the floating charge. Possession will protect the chargee against possible 
defences based on estoppel and will provide third parties with notice of the changed 
                                                                                                                                            
127
 A receiver may still be appointed where the company issues secured debentures and where the 
security is held by a trustee on behalf of debenture-holders, the issue is for ₤50 million or larger, and 
the debentures are to be listed or traded on a regulated market. Many securitisation transactions will 
be large enough to fall under this exception. See Insolvency Act 1986, ss 72B; 72E; 72F. See also 
Davies Gower and Davies‟ Principles at 841; Davies et al Modern Company Law at 1198. 
128
 Insolvency Act 1986, s 72C (public-private partnerships); 72D (utilities); 72DA (urban regeneration 
projects); 72G (registered social landlord) and s 72GA (companies appointed under the Water 
Industry Act 1991, protected railway companies in terms of the Railways Act 1993 and licenced 
companies under the Transport Act 2000). 
129
 The entitlement to crystallise the floating charge over a part of the assets will have to be expressly 
included in the charge agreement, since partial crystallisation is otherwise not possible. See par 3.2.3 
above. 
130
 The receiver may be appointed by court order, but this is more costly and takes longer. See Goode 
Legal Problems at 141. 
131
 Insolvency Act 1986, s 33 states that the appointment of a receiver is only effective after it has been 
accepted by the appointed person. See also Re Gabriel Controls Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager 
Appointed) 6 ACLR 684 SC (SA) where the Court held that crystallisation was postponed until the 
appointed receiver accepted his appointment. 
132 
Company Charges at 166
.
 Goode Legal Problems at 141 takes the opposite view. He cites cases 
where the cases of execution creditors on whose behalf the sheriff has levied execution on goods 
subject to a floating charge are postponed if a receiver is appointed before the goods are sold (Re 
Standard Manufacturing Co [1891] 1 Ch 627(CA); Re Opera Ltd [1891] 3 Ch 260). Obviously a 
receiver could not take possession of those goods in order to vest appointment. According to him, 
the receiver‘s appointment is immediately effective because the company, when it agreed to it in the 
charge agreement, has accepted that it will lose its powers of management on the appointment of the 
receiver. 
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nature of the charge. In practice, however, the receiver will attempt to take possession 
of the tangible assets and will give notice to trade debtors of his appointment.133 
3.2.5 Advantages of floating charges 
The main advantage from the company‘s point of view is that it can provide security 
for a loan by charging assets that are revolving in nature and over which it would have 
been impracticable to give a fixed charge. Increasingly, the only assets that a 
company has available to offer as security, namely stock-in-trade, book debts and 
licences over various intellectual property rights, fall into this category. Furthermore, 
the company can carry on its business in the ordinary way until the charge has been 
crystallised.134 However, this advantage is off-set by the weak priority that the floating 
charge provides against other creditors of the company.135   
One other advantage of the floating charge has now almost been abolished.136 Only 
a floating chargee had the power to appoint an administrative receiver to manage the 
entire business of the company.137 However, administrative receivership was believed 
to hamper the prospects of reorganisation.138 Section 9(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 
required a court to dismiss an application for an administration order where there was 
an administrative receiver, unless the administrator consented. This led to banks 
insisting on receiving a floating charge over and above any fixed charges, even where 
the amount secured was negligible.139  
                                                 
133 
Gough Company Charges at 166–167. The Insolvency Act 1986, s 46(1) requires notice of the 
appointment to be sent to the company and, within 28 days after the appointment, to all the creditors 
of the company. Furthermore, every official document of the company must contain a statement that 
a receiver has been appointed (s 39). 
134
 Morse et al Charlesworth at 507. Grier Company Law at 457–458 describes the virtue of the 
floating charge as striking a balance between the lender‘s need for security and the company‘s need 
to continue trade with the charged assets. 
135
 See par 3.2.6 below for the priority rules of floating charges. 
136
 See n 126. 
137
 Insolvency Act 1986, s 29(2). 
138
 Insolvency Act 1986, s 72A(1) inserted by the Enterprise Act 2002, s 250(1). See also the discussion 
in par 3.2.4 above. 
139
 Richard Smerdon Palmer‟s Company Law Manuel (2000) at 295. An administration order would 
necessitate an application by a fixed chargee to court before he may enforce his security (Insolvency 
Act 1986, s 11). The possibility of barring an administration order therefore strengthens the position 
of the fixed chargee. Goode Legal Problems at 119 argues that repealing s 9(3) would have been a 
more elegant way of removing this problem, rather than more or less abolishing administrative 
receivership. 
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 The floating charge agreement can be shaped largely according to the will of the 
parties. This makes the floating charge a very flexible form of security. 
3.2.6 Disadvantages of floating charges 
The essential disadvantage of accepting a floating charge rather than a fixed charge is 
the weak priority it provides the chargee.140 It ranks in priority after all other fixed 
charges on the asset, regardless of whether the fixed charge was created after the 
floating charge.141 Execution creditors who had goods sold in execution by the sheriff 
will have preference to the floating chargee before crystallisation.142 The floating 
chargee will have to wait until the landlord‘s lien and contractual liens have been 
settled. If a receiver is appointed, the preferential debts of the company must be paid 
before the floating charge.143 If the chargee takes possession of the assets rather than 
to appoint a receiver, the preferential debts take priority over the floating charge.144 
Later floating charges will not have priority over, or rank pari passu with, a floating 
charge, regardless of whether the later charge agreements provided for it, where they 
are in respect of the same assets.145 
 Furthermore, the fact that the charge started off as a floating charge may lead to the 
ostensible authority of the company to deal with its assets in the ordinary course of 
business after crystallisation.146 No official method of publicising the crystallisation of 
the charge exists. Such ostensible authority to deal with the assets may affect 
priorities in subsequent dealings, because a third party purchaser or a subsequent 
chargee that takes without notice of the crystallisation will obtain priority over the 
                                                 
140
 On the disadvantages of floating charges generally, see also Davies Gower and Davies‟ Principles 
at 821–823. 
141
 Lightman et al Administrators at 78–79. 
142
 Re Opera Ltd [1891] 3 Ch 260; Robson v Smith [1895] 2 Ch 118; Evans v Rival Granite Quarries 
Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979. 
143
 Insolvency Act 1986, s 40. 
144
 Companies Act 1985, ss 196(1) and (2). Judicial opinion differs on whether the appointment of a 
receiver on behalf of one floating charge holder will automatically lead to all other floating charges 
being subordinated to the claims of the preferential creditors. In Griffiths v Yorkshire Bank plc 
[1994] 1 WLR 1427 (Ch) at 1433–1434 the Court held that crystallisation by other means than 
through possession or receivership will not lead to the priority of the preferential creditors, but in Re 
H & K Medway Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1422 (Ch) the Court held that all the floating charges became 
subordinated to the claims of the preferential creditors. Goode Legal Problems at 196 agrees with 
the latter position. 
145
 Re Benjamin Cope & Sons Ltd [1914] 1 Ch 800. 
146
 Goode Legal Problems at 118, 134–135; Lightman et al Administrators at 87–90. 
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floating chargee.147 When the charge is in respect of book debts and has crystallised, 
purchasers or chargees that take without notice after crystallisation of the charge may 
still enjoy priority by virtue of the rule in Dearle v Hall.148 This rule states that if a 
second or subsequent assignee has no notice of the prior assignment, he can gain 
priority by being the first to notify the debtor of the assignment. 
 When the company goes into insolvent liquidation, the costs of winding-up (e.g., 
liquidator‘s fees) and the preferential creditors must be paid before the floating charge 
holders, if the charge was created as a floating charge,149 in other words, the costs of 
winding-up and the claims of the preferential creditors will have priority over the 
floating charge, even if it has crystallised before commencement of the winding-up. In 
the event of an agreement between a prior fixed chargee and a floating chargee that 
the latter will have priority above the former, both the fixed charge and the floating 
charge will rank after the costs of winding-up and the claims of the preferential 
creditors.150 
                                                 
147
 English & Scottish Mercantile Investment Co v Brunton [1892] 2 QB 700; Goode Legal Problems at 
177, 181. 
148
 Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1. See also Goode Legal Problems at 182. 
149
 Insolvency Act 1986, s 175(2)(b). In Agnew v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 
(PC) at 718 the reason for this rule is explained, namely to prevent the company from having no 
assets left with which the liquidator can pay the preferential creditors. This is always a possibility in 
the case of a floating charge over the undertaking, because if the charge crystallises before winding-
up all of the movable assets of the company will fall under the charge to the exclusion of the 
preferential creditors. See also Goode Legal Problems at 118. Note that the Crown‘s preference 
(meaning the preferential payment of claims for taxes against the insolvent estate) was abolished by 
ss 251 and 252 of the Enterprise Act 2002. Preferential debts now consist of contributions to 
occupational pension schemes (Insolvency Act 1986, sch 6 category 4), remuneration of employees 
for the relevant period (Insolvency Act 1986, sch 6 category 5) and levies on coal and steel 
production under the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (Insolvency Act 1986, sch 6 
category 6). However, the Crown‘s preference was abolished with the aim to benefit the unsecured 
creditors (DTI Explanatory Notes par 721). Section 252 inserted s 176A into the Insolvency Act 
1986 to further this aim by allocating a percentage (to be prescribed) of the company‘s net assets 
under a floating charge to the unsecured creditors. The abolition of the Crown‘s preference should 
therefore not be seen as a benefit to the floating charge holders. In the light of s 176A it is rather 
another way to lessen the fund available to the floating charge holder and should be seen as a 
disadvantage. See also Davies Gower and Davies‟ Principles at 826–828. 
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 Re Portbase Clothing Ltd [1993] BCLC 796 (Ch) at 802D–E. In this decision the Court 
acknowledged the possibility of a trust construction whereby the fixed chargee holds the amount of 
the floating charge in trust for payment to the latter (at 811G–812D). However, this is then not 
linked to the floating charge itself and payment will be due by the fixed chargee even if the floating 
charge turns out to be invalid. It is therefore not a priority arrangement (or subordination 
agreement), but rather an independent undertaking by the fixed chargee to pay the floating chargee 
from the proceeds of realisation. If this is the intention of the parties, it has to be expressed clearly in 
the agreement in order to avoid the consequence of the fixed charge losing priority to the costs of 
winding-up and the claims of the preferential creditors.  
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 The weak priority provided by the floating charge is most disadvantageous when 
coupled with the situation where the floating charge is the only viable option as 
security; as in the case of charges over book debts.151 Assets associated most closely 
with the cash flow of the company, such as the book debts and the stock-in-trade, 
traditionally form the objects of floating charges. Providing fixed charges over such 
assets will lead to the economic paralysis of the company. This leaves only the 
floating charge and the weak priority it provides. The disadvantage is even greater if 
these assets form the majority of the assets available to offer as security. 
 Usually the charge agreement will contain a negative pledge clause that precludes 
the creation of a second charge with priority over the floating charge. The 
effectiveness of negative pledge clauses is open to doubt. Although they will certainly 
be binding on the contracting parties, their effect on third parties is less certain. Courts 
have upheld negative pledge clauses only if the third party had actual knowledge of 
them.152 Registration only gives notice of the existence of a charge and not of its 
terms.153  
 Most charges must be registered with the Registrar of Companies within 21 days of 
the charge‘s creation.154 All charges to secure an issue of debentures, charges on book 
debts, floating charges and charges on intellectual property must be registered.155 On 
registration the Registrar issues a certificate that is conclusive evidence that the 
registration requirements have been complied with even if this is not the case.156 
Failure to register the charge in time will make the charge void against the liquidator, 
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 See par 3.2.1.1 above. 
152
 English & Scottish Mercantile Investment Co v Brunton [1892] 2 QB 700 at 707. Also see Goode 
Legal Problems at 176–177; Lightman et al Administrators at 79–81.  
153
Wilson v Kelland [1910] 2 Ch 306; Ian Chisholm Textiles Ltd v Griffiths [1994] BCLC 537 (CA); 
Goulding Principles at 270, 276. 
154
 Companies Act 1985, s 398, Companies Act 2006 s 870(1)(a). See also McCormack Secured Credit 
at 221–223; Davies Gower and Davies‟ Principles at 831–837. The aim of this requirement is to 
inform trade creditors of the existence of such charges. See Agnew v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 (PC) at 718; Smith (Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd) v 
Bridgend County Borough Council [2002] 1 AC 336 (HL) at 347H. For the position under the 
Companies Act 2006 generally, see French et al Company Law at 311–317; Davies et al Modern 
Company Law at 1182–1187. The registration requirements have for the most part remained 
unchanged in the new Act. See also Andrew McKnight ―A Review of Developments in English Law 
During 2006: Part 1‖ (2007) J of Int  Banking Law and Regulation 127 at 132. 
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 Section 396 of the Companies Act 1985 (s 860 of the Companies Act 2006) provides the full list of 
charges that must be registered. 
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 Companies Act 1985, s 401(2), Companies Act 2006, ss 869(5) and (6); Re CL Nye Ltd [1971] Ch 
442 (CA); Morse et al Charlesworth at 524; Lightman et al Administrators at 113. 
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an administrator or any other creditor.157 This means that if the registration 
requirement is not met, the lender will be an unsecured creditor of the company. If a 
registrable charge is not registered in time, the loan is immediately repayable.158  
While the registration requirement seems simple enough, compliance is often not 
achieved.159 The only way to rectify such a situation is by order of court. If the 
company‘s liquidation is imminent or has already occurred, the court is unlikely to 
grant the order unless special circumstances are present.160 Even if the late registration 
is granted, it will not prejudice the rights of creditors who registered charges against 
the company‘s property before registration of the charge.161 Such secured creditors 
will retain their priority, even if their agreements were entered into after the initial 
charge had been negotiated. 
 Lastly, some authors argue that the floating charge has become overly 
complicated.162 This is partly due to its origins as a judge-made creation of law and 
partly due to legislative interventions to curb its applicability and scope. Despite this, 
several recommendations to adopt personal property security legislation similar to that 
found in the United States have gone unheeded.163 It remains to be seen if the latest 
recommendations to this effect will lead to a different outcome.164  
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 Companies Act 1985, s 395, Companies Act 2006, s 874(1); Lightman et al Administrators at 109. 
See also Smith (Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd) v Bridgend County Borough Council 
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discussion of this case see Karen Yeung ―The Cosslett Saga: Implications for the Law of Security 
over Personal Property‖ (2002) 20 Company and Securities Law Journal 177.  
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 Companies Act 1985, s 395(2), Companies Act 2006, s 874(3). 
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 Morse et al Charlesworth & Morse at 464 lays the blame for much of the non-compliance with the 
registration requirements at the door of an overburdened Registrar‘s office and with solicitors who 
procrastinate in the timeous fulfilment of their duties. 
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 Such as the fact that the non-registration was due to the solicitor‘s negligence and that the chargee 
acted promptly on the discovery of the non-registration; In re Braemar Investments Ltd [1989] 1 Ch 
54; Lightman et al Administrators at 111–112. 
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 Re Monolithic Building Co [1915] 1 Ch 643 (CA). 
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 See Goode Legal Problems at 153. 
163
 These recommendations relate to personal property security as a whole and not only to the future of 
the floating charge. The Crowther Committee on Consumer Credit was the first to make 
recommendations (Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit (Cmnd 4506, 1971). The Crowther 
Report recommended the uniform treatment of all security interests, including that the extension of 
credit in sale or hire purchase transactions be treated as a purchase-money loan, that reservation of 
ownership, hire purchase, conditional sale and financial lease be treated as chattel mortgage 
(mortgage of movables) and that the outright sale of book debts under a factoring agreement be 
treated as a charge over the book debts. In the end the consumer credit provisions of the Report were 
accepted, but not the proposals for the restructuring of security. The Insolvency Law Review 
Committee Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982) and AL Diamond A Review of Security 
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3.3 SECURITISATION: SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS 
The general form and functioning of a securitisation scheme is discussed in Chapter 2. 
The form of securitisation schemes in South Africa is largely based on those found in 
England and the United States of America. I therefore do not repeat it here, but only 
focus on legal aspects that differ from the law in South Africa. 
                                                                                                                                            
Interests in Property (1989) both supported the recommendations. The latter proposed ‗security 
interest‘ as a term denoting two types of interests in property: (1) Where the owner or another 
person with some interests in property transfers full legal ownership or creates some lesser right in 
favour of the creditor to secure the debtor‘s obligations, for instance mortgage, lien, charge, pledge. 
(2) Where rights in property are created or retained to secure the performance of the obligation, such 
as hire purchase, retention of title under a conditional sale agreement, retention of title clause or 
financial lease. None of these recommendations was implemented. 
164
 The Company Law Review Steering Group Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Final Report (2001) recommended that the notice-filing concept of revised Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code used in the United States be adopted in England. The Law Commission has since 
issued a consultation paper that elaborates on this recommendation (Registration of Security 
Interests: Company Charges and Property other than Land (Consultation Paper No 164, July 2002). 
The recommendation is that a financing statement be filed for registration, which contains brief 
details of the transaction or series of transactions that secure payment or performance of an 
obligation (at 61). The date of filing will largely determine the priorities between different holders of 
security (at 97–101). The nature of the charge as fixed or floating will not be registered, but 
automatic crystallisation will have to be registered to have effect (at 103). Both the Steering Group 
Final Report at par 12.59 and the Law Commission Company Charges at 132 state that charges are 
no longer in practice given to secure issues of debentures and that it is therefore unnecessary to 
make provision for its registration. The Law Commission states that if certain charges are not used 
very often, they see no reason why they should nonetheless make provision for them. See also 
Goode Legal Problems at 3–4. The Consultation Paper was followed by a Consultative Report, 
Company Security Interests (Consultative Report No 176, September 2004). This document was 
largely based on the Consultation Paper, with minor amendments to address certain criticism of the 
Consultation Paper. See Gerard McCormack ―The Law Commission Consultative Report on 
Company Security Interests: An Irreverent Riposte‖ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 286. The Final 
Report followed (Law Commission Company Security Interests: Final Report (Report No 296, 
August 2005), available at www.lawcom.gov.uk (accessed 28 January 2008), which included draft 
regulations to the future Companies Bill. The Final Report did not go as far as the previous 
recommendations of the Law Commission. For instance, it retained the distinction between fixed 
and floating charges. For a detailed discussion of the recommendations of the Final Report, see 
Andrew McKnight ―The Reform of English Law Concerning Secured Transactions: Part 2‖ (2006) 
21 J of Int Banking Law and Regulation 587. I discuss the Final Report‘s recommendations with 
specific importance for securitisation in the relevant paragraphs below. It would perhaps be more 
practical for England to wait for the European Union‘s recommendations on a Unified Private Law 
before they commence to implement a system of personal property security that is very foreign to 
the system known on the continent. Notice-filing does not enjoy much support in Europe and even 
Scotland rejected proposals to adopt a notice-filing system. See McCormack 2005 MLR at 290–291, 
307–308. See, however, the Law Commission‘s Final Report at 30. It should further be mentioned 
that not all commentators share the view that a system similar to Article 9 is preferable. See for 
instance Gerard McCormack ―Personal Property Security Law Reform in England and Canada‖ 
(2002) Journal for Business Law 113; McCormack 2005 MLR at 289–295. For an overview of the 
adoption of personal property security legislation in jurisdictions other than the United Kingdom, 
see Dugald McWilliams ―The Floating Charge and its Place Within Article 9, PPSA Security 
Regimes and Australian Law‖ (2004) 22 Company & Securities Law Journal 481. 
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3.3.1 Regulatory considerations 
 
Securitisation in England is not regulated by a single piece of legislation, but is 
structured according to the common law principles of an assignment of claims. 
However, the following aspects from legislation are important when structuring a 
securitisation scheme in England: 
3.3.1.1 Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 
The Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000165 repealed the Financial Services 
Act of 1986.166 It provides for the regulation of financial services and markets, which 
includes the regulation of securities exchanges and clearing houses, market abuse and 
collective investment schemes. 
 Compliance with the provisions of the Act is required if the securities issued by the 
SPV are to be listed on the London Stock Exchange.167 The disclosure requirements  
generally aim to inform investors and their professional advisors about the risks and 
benefits of the potential investment.168 The general duty of disclosure is tempered by 
having regard to the nature of the securities to be traded, the nature of the trader and 
the nature of the persons most likely to acquire the securities.169 The fact that the 
issuer of the securities is an SPV with no business operations outside of the 
securitisation will therefore limit the necessary disclosure. Furthermore, the typical 
investors in these securities are professional and experienced, and have access to 
professional advisors and other resources. 
 It is possible that a securitisation scheme may be considered a collective 
investment scheme under the definition of the Financial Services and Markets Act of 
2000.170 Section 235 defines collective investment schemes as: 
 
(1) any arrangements with respect to property of any description, including money, the purpose or 
effect of which is to enable persons taking part in the arrangements (whether by becoming 
owners of the property or any part of it or otherwise) to participate in or receive profits or 
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income arising from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of the property or sums 
paid out of such profits or income. 
(2) The arrangements must be such that the persons who are to participate (―participants‖) do not 
have day-to-day control over the management of the property, whether or not they have the 
right to be consulted or to give directions. 
(3) The arrangements must also have either or both of the following characteristics—  
(a) the contributions of the participants and the profits or income out of which payments 
are to be made to them are pooled;  
(b)  the property is managed as a whole by or on behalf of the operator of the scheme.  
 
Treasury may order that an arrangement does not amount to a collective investment 
scheme in specified circumstances or if the arrangement falls under a certain category 
of arrangement.171 If the SPV cannot obtain an exemption from the provisions relating 
to collective investment schemes from Treasury, it will have to comply with Part 
XVII of the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000, which regulates collective 
investment schemes.  
Under the previous Act, an exemption was granted to schemes where the rights or 
interests of participants were represented by debt instruments issued by a single body 
corporate.172 In the current Act, this exemption is retained and extended so that an 
issuer that is not a body corporate, but is guaranteed by the government, will 
qualify.173 Many securitisation schemes could benefit from this exemption. 
3.3.1.2 Companies Act 1985174 
The Companies Act 1985 is relevant to a securitisation scheme if the SPV is a 
company. 
Of specific importance is the duty expressed in section 258 that a parent company 
must prepare group accounts for itself and its ―subsidiary undertakings‖.175 If it is 
important for the originator not to incorporate the transferred assets on its balance 
sheet, the originator must ensure that neither the issuer SPV, nor its parent company, 
is a subsidiary of either the originator or the originator‘s parent company.  
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 Section 235(5). 
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 Schedule 1 par 35(b)(i) of the Financial Services Act of 1986. See further Norton et al Asset 
Securitisation at 61. 
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 Schedule par 5(1)(a) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Collective Investment 
Schemes) Order 2001 (Statutory Instruments 2001 No 1062). 
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 While writing this thesis the applicable provisions of the Companies Act 2006 had not as yet 
commenced. The provisions of the Companies Act 1985 are therefore discussed, with reference to 
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 Section 1162 of the Companies Act 2006. For the position under the Companies Act 2006 generally, 
see French et al Company Law at 255–257; Davies et al Modern Company Law at 718–721. 
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This can be achieved by ensuring that the originator does not hold or control a 
majority of the voting rights in the issuer SPV and does not control the board 
meetings of the SPV. The issuer SPV will further be considered a subsidiary 
undertaking of the originator if its articles of association contain a provision that the 
originator has the right to give directions with respect to the operating and financial 
policies of the issuer with which its directors are obliged to comply whether or not for 
the benefit of the issuer.176 Under these circumstances the originator will be 
considered the parent company of the issuer SPV, even if the originator is not a 
shareholder of the SPV. It is further not necessary to show that the originator actually 
makes use of its right to control the SPV. The existence of the right suffices.177 
If the originator holds shares in the SPV and is shown to have a dominant 
influence over the SPV or that the originator and the SPV are managed on a unified 
basis, the SPV will be considered a subsidiary undertaking of the originator. De facto 
control is the indicating factor here and not any rights to exercise control. However, 
this provision will only apply if the originator holds shares in the SPV and is therefore 
easily avoidable.178 
3.3.2 Transfer of rights and „true sale‟ requirement 
The assets must be legally isolated from the estate of the originator by way of a true 
sale to the SPV. A true sale has the following characteristics:179 
 The seller must not retain any liabilities in respect of the assets, except for typical 
warranties for defects. The seller must not guarantee the recoverability of the 
claim, have a duty to repurchase the claim or have a moral duty to compensate for 
any shortfalls. The seller must not carry any further risk associated with the asset 
after the transfer to the buyer. It must not retain a right to repurchase the 
transferred assets. 
 The buyer acquires exclusive control and ownership over the asset. The buyer can 
sell the asset or give it as security and receives all profit gained from it. There is 
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no obligation on the buyer to account to the seller for any extra amounts realised 
from the assets. 
 The transfer of the assets must not be vulnerable to be set aside by the liquidator 
of the seller in the event of the latter‘s insolvency. I discuss this requirement 
separately in paragraph 3.3.3. 
3.3.2.1 Equitable assignment 
A transfer of claims in English law is made by way of assignment. Assignment is a 
transaction between a person entitled to the benefit of a contract, called the ‗assignor‘, 
and a third party, called the ‗assignee‘, as a result of which the third party becomes 
entitled to sue the person liable under the contract. The debtor is not a party to the 
transaction and his consent is not required.180  
In English law claims are usually transferred to the SPV by means of an equitable 
assignment.181 The SPV only acquires an equitable right to the claims, because no 
notice of the assignment is given to the debtors. A further reason why an equitable 
assignment may be the only option available for transfer of the claims to the SPV is 
that the legal assignment of a future claim is not allowed in English law.182 A legal 
assignment requires notice of the assignment to debtors and there must be compliance 
with any further formal requirements, such as registration in the Land Registry in the 
case of mortgages. Registration presents a financial and administrative burden that 
can be avoided by an equitable assignment.183  
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 Edwin Peel The Law of Contract 12 ed (2007) at 714. ‗Assignment‘ therefore has a different 
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The SPV is given a power of attorney to enforce the claims and to register the 
transferred assets when it becomes necessary.184 If there is any physical paper to 
evidence rights in the transferred assets, the SPV usually takes custody and control of 
that paper.185 
Notice to debtors is avoided because of its expense and inconvenience.186 
Furthermore, the originator usually wishes to maintain a relationship with the debtors 
and continues with collection of the claims. The originator will also have the systems 
in place and the data available to administer the collection of the claims effectively. 
 In English law effect is given to an equitable assignment on the insolvency of the 
seller,187 in this case the originator, without notice to debtors provided that 
consideration has been given in return for the transfer and that the intention to assign 
is clear.188 However, assignments without notice to debtors have certain 
implications:189 
 The SPV may lose priority if the originator resells or charges the same claims to a 
third party. This is due to the application of the rule in Dearle v Hall.190 The rule 
in Dearle v Hall states that when a second assignee has no notice of the previous 
assignment at the time of the second assignment, the second assignee can gain 
priority over the first assignee by being the first to give the debtors notice of the 
assignment.191 Further assignments of, or charges over, the claims by the 
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financing. See for instance McCormack Secured Credit at 244. Fidelis Oditah Legal Aspects of 
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originator are prohibited by the transaction documentation. Investors and the 
rating agencies rely on compliance with the prohibition by the originator. 
 The debtors continue to pay the originator if it acts as servicer, which could lead 
to the mingling of payments in the servicer‘s accounts. This risk is managed 
relatively easily by either directing payments directly to the SPV‘s account or by 
setting up an account where the originator/servicer may deposit payments, but 
does not have the power to withdraw any money without the SPV‘s consent. The 
account is then emptied after the close of day into the SPV‘s account. 
The position becomes more complicated if the originator/assignor does not 
continue to collect the debts as servicer. During an equitable assignment a debtor 
that has not received notice of the assignment will get a good discharge for the debt 
when paying the original creditor, in other words, the originator.192 This suggests 
that notice has to be given to debtors when a person other than the originator will 
act as servicer of the uncollected debts. After receiving notice of the assignment, a 
debtor can only discharge the debt by paying the assignee.193 
                                                                                                                                            
to debtors who end up paying the wrong person. (2) There is no duty on the second assignee to 
enquire whether previous assignments were made. This operates especially harshly in the situation 
where the first assignment was for future claims and the first assignee could not give notice to the 
debtors before the claims came into existence. (3) The rule requires no specific attributes in the 
notice to the debtor. For instance, the notice need not state that the debtor can now only validly 
discharge the debt by paying the assignee. Should the debtor not realise that this is the position, he 
may become liable twice for the same debt. (4) The rule does not require that the notice must be in 
writing, which could prejudice the debtor who forgets about the notice and pays the wrong person. 
(5) The rule is illogical, because if a debtor receives notice by chance of an earlier assignment it will 
be enough to ensure the priority of the earlier assignment. However, if the debtor receives notice by 
chance of a later assignment, this will not provide the later assignment priority over the earlier 
assignment. (6) The rule is harsh when applied to assignments of future claims. Notice can only be 
given to debtors of future claims when they come into existence. This is so because the principle at 
the root of Dearle v Hall is that notice to debtors is equivalent to possession. Possession cannot be 
taken before the expectancy has materialised. (7) When there is an assignment of claims from many 
debtors, compliance with the rule in Dearle v Hall becomes difficult and costly. See also Fidelis 
Oditah ―Priorities: Equitable versus Legal Assignments of Book Debts‖ (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 513 at 525–527. The UK Law Commission Registration of Security Interests at 194 
suggested that the assignment of book debts in the course of a securitisation scheme should be 
registrable in order to give third parties notice of the transfer. This would effectively disable the rule 
in Dearle v Hall, which was seen by the Law Commission as an obstacle to certain securitisations 
(at 175–176). Although these recommendations were retained in the Law Commission‘s Final 
Report at 31 and 109 (par 4.18), no further progress has been made in this regard. 
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 Debtors without notice can continue to acquire new defences and to rely on       
set-offs.194  
 The originator and the debtors can agree to vary the terms of their original 
agreement. Again, this will be prohibited by the transaction agreements and 
reliance is placed on compliance by the originator.  
 It may be necessary to join the originator in any legal action taken against the 
debtor.195  
3.3.2.2 Charge in favour of debenture trustee 
In paragraph 3.2 I explained the distinction between legal and equitable security. 
When the security grantor only holds an equitable right in the property that is offered 
as security, only an equitable security may be granted over such assets. Since the SPV 
obtains the claims by way of an equitable assignment, it cannot provide legal security 
over the claims but only equitable security, in other words, a charge.  
Security over the assets of the SPV is granted as far as possible by way of a fixed 
charge.196 All proceeds of the collection of the claims transferred to the SPV will be 
required to be deposited into a designated bank account. The benefits arising from the 
credit enhancement agreements will also be subject to a fixed charge in favour of the 
investors in the SPV. There may, however, also be floating charges, for instance, a 
charge provided over the bank account of the SPV.197 However, many of the problems 
encountered in connection with the floating charge will be of lesser significance 
during a securitisation transaction, since the SPV will have no, or very few, other 
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creditors apart from the investors.198 Even if there is a fixed charge over the bank 
account, it should be easy for an SPV to acquire the consent of the trustee for 
debenture-holders to make limited withdrawals for pre-determined expenses. 
3.3.2.3 Recharacterisation of sale as security 
There is virtually no risk in English law that a properly documented sale of claims 
will be recharacterised as a security for a loan. This is the case even if the SPV has 
recourse against the originator for unpaid claims,199 and even though the economic 
effect of the transaction is similar to a loan secured by claims. It makes no difference 
that the originator may repurchase assets from the SPV, that the originator is paid a 
fee to service collection or that it acts as an agent for the SPV to collect the claims. 
 If it is argued that a written document does not represent the agreement between 
the parties, in other words, that it is a sham, the court will have regard to all evidence 
that show that the parties had a common intention to enter into a different transaction 
than the one described in the document.200 However, usually it is not contended that 
the written document is a sham, but only that the inconsistencies in the document 
show that the document had a different objective to that which the parties described. 
In the absence of an allegation that the agreement was a sham, the court will only 
have regard to the written document. The court will consider the written agreement as 
a whole to determine the true nature of its provisions.201 Consequently, if the 
transaction agreements convey an intention to sell the claims to the SPV, the courts 
will give effect to this intention. Put somewhat differently: even if the objective of a 
transaction is financing, the court will pay attention to the method in which the 
finance is provided. If the method is by way of a sale of claims, the fact that the 
purpose of the transaction is to advance money will not convert the character of the 
transaction into a loan.202 
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 In a very interesting article on the subject of recharacterisation, Berg203 argues that 
the decisions in Brumark204 and Coslett205 show a shift in the approach of English 
courts in categorising a transaction.206 These decisions held that categorisation is done 
in two stages. In the first stage the court determines the intention of the parties as it 
appears from the transaction documents. During the second stage the court categorises 
this intention as a matter of law.207 The second stage of the enquiry restricts the 
autonomy of the parties to the agreement. Berg further shows that English courts have 
included a policy element in their categorisation of transactions.208 He then questions 
whether the courts will still follow the approach of neutrality towards off-balance 
sheet transactions as followed in Welsh Development Agency.209 He argues that 
corporate collapses such as Enron, as well as other cases that showed the risks 
associated with these kinds of transactions, might lead English courts to take a more 
conservative policy approach when categorising the assignment of book debts as 
either charges or sales.210 
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 However, in my opinion there are also important policy considerations in favour of 
finding a sale of book debts during a securitisation transaction as a true sale rather 
than a charge. Securitisation has become an important method of financing in 
England.211 The London Stock Exchange is an important forum for the issue of asset-
backed securities for issuers world-wide.212 Investors have confidence in investing in 
asset-backed securities issued via this forum, because they believe that their interests 
are protected by the structure of the scheme, their security over the assets of the SPV 
and, finally, by the law. 
If the courts should fail them and hold that the sale of assets by the originator to 
the SPV was not a true sale but only an attempt at granting security for a loan, it 
would have disastrous consequences for these investors. The assignment of the assets 
to the SPV would only be an unregistered charge, which would mean that the debt 
securities issued to investors in the SPV will be unsecured. It will further leave the 
securities issued by the SPV vulnerable to the insolvency of the originator. The 
investors would have accepted lower interest rates on the securities in the SPV, 
because of their reliance on the fact that the risk of default of the SPV is separated 
from the business risks of the originator.213 The securities would have received a better 
rating on the strength of the legal opinion that the SPV is insolvency-remote from the 
originator.  If the sale of the assets to the SPV is recharacterised as a loan, the 
investors will be under-compensated in terms of interest. 
The investors in these securities will often be institutional investors. Institutional 
investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, represent a large 
proportion of the general public. In other words, when the institutional investors stand 
to lose their investment, it is really the general public who stand to lose their savings. 
This ought to be an important consideration when the characterisation of 
securitisation transactions comes before the courts. 
 As a result, I do not think that the shift in the approach of the courts in categorising 
transactions will lead to a different outcome for the characterisation of a sale and 
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assignment of book debts to an SPV during a securitisation scheme. In most cases 
these transactions should be characterised as true sales. 
3.3.2.4 Non-assignment clauses 
Non-assignment clauses, meaning agreements between debtors and creditors that the 
latter will not assign the debt arising from the agreements, are allowed by English 
law.214 Such clauses are not considered contrary to public policy, because the debtor 
can have several legitimate commercial reasons for inserting such a clause in the first 
place.215 
Goode216 voiced the opinion that an assignment in contravention of a non-
assignment clause could, however, still have effect between the assignor and the 
assignee. The implication of this is that the debtor will not deal with anyone but his 
original creditor, but that the assignor will be obliged to account to the assignee for 
anything he receives from the debtor. In Goode‘s opinion a provision in an agreement 
that aims to prevent this consequence will be void. Although accepting large parts of 
Goode‘s other arguments on the issue of non-assignment clauses,217 the House of 
Lords in Linden Gardens did not express a view on this argument.218 If Goode‘s 
argument is accepted, non-assignment clauses in the agreement between the debtor 
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and the originator should not have a significant practical effect, since the originator 
mostly acts as the agent of the SPV in collecting the debts.219  
There are also other views on non-assignment clauses that would leave a purported 
assignment totally void. According to McKnight, 220 it is possible for a non-assignment 
clause to prohibit the transfer of any proprietary interest in the claim and of its fruits, 
in other words, payment in terms of the claim, which would leave a purported 
assignment worthless between the assignor and the assignee too. The author sees such 
a restriction as changing the nature and character of the claim as an asset of the 
creditor, so that it becomes impossible to assign the claim:221  
 
The restriction actually forms an integral part of the definition of that property. In other words, the 
nature and character of the creditor‘s property is the benefit or rights, the chose in action, that it has 
under the contract and the restriction goes to defining and limiting the scope of the chose. 
 
According to McKnight, the interpretation of the non-assignment clause will depend 
on the terms of the clause and a purported assignment will not be void in all 
circumstances. However, if a claim that is subject to a restriction as envisaged by 
McKnight in the quotation above is purportedly assigned to the SPV during a 
securitisation scheme, the assignment will be void. If only a few of the assignments 
were void by reason of such non-assignment clauses, the securitisation scheme will 
probably be able to withstand the loss of those assets. However, it could have 
devastating consequences for the scheme if such clauses were standard to the security 
agreements that gave rise to the claims transferred to the SPV. Consequently, the 
underlying agreements to the claims to be assigned must be carefully examined at the 
beginning of the securitisation transaction to avoid the use of claims that might fall 
under this category of restriction. 
 The Law Commission‘s Final Report on Company Security Interests 
recommended that prohibitions on the assignment of receivables should not be 
effective against the assignee, thereby accepting Goode‘s suggestion.222 However, 
‗receivable‘ is defined narrowly and does not include loan agreements, but only 
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claims arising from the supply of goods and services by a company to a third party.223 
In other words, non-assignment clauses in mortgage agreements will remain 
unaffected by the proposals of the Law Commission. If the recommendations of the 
Law Commission ever become law, this provision will benefit securitisation where 
the asset type is the trade receivables of the company. 
 The interpretation of non-assignment clauses is therefore not settled in English law 
and holds some risks for securitisation. The best option remains to use claims of 
which the underlying agreements are standardised and do not contain non-assignment 
clauses. 
3.3.3 Bankruptcy-remoteness from originator 
The SPV must be insulated from the insolvency of the originator. Otherwise the 
investors in the securities issued by the SPV will not only be exposed to the risk 
associated with the assets that back those securities, but also to the risks associated 
with the business of the originator. There are four requirements that must be met 
before an SPV will be bankruptcy-remote from the originator:224  
1 The assignment must be effective on the insolvency of the originator, regardless 
of a lack of notice to the debtors. An equitable assignment does not require notice 
to debtors and this requirement is therefore not an obstacle in English law to a 
finding of bankruptcy-remoteness.225 
2 The SPV must not be consolidated with the originator on the latter‘s insolvency so 
that all the assets and liabilities of the SPV are merged with that of the originator. 
This is not a real risk in English law. English courts will also not easily 
recharacterise the sale of the assets as a non-registered secured loan.226 
3 There should be no material loss or delay in the recovery of the funds collected by 
the originator as servicer if it becomes insolvent. This risk is easily curbed by 
requiring frequent turnover of received funds to the SPV. 
4 Transfers or payments by the originator to the SPV must not be set aside during 
the insolvent liquidation of the originator as preferences or as transactions at an 
undervalue. If set aside, the creditors of the originator will have a claim against 
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the transferred assets. However, as shown in the discussion below I do not regard 
this as a real threat in English law. A sale of assets for which full market value is 
received in consideration will not usually be held to be preferential. If the sale of 
the assets were at a discount, or if there was a deferred amount of the sale price 
which never materialised, this might be an indication of preference or undervalue. 
3.3.3.1 Transactions at an undervalue 
Section 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986227 provides for the avoidance of transactions 
at an undervalue. The section is only applicable after the company enters 
administration or liquidation.228 Where a company has at the relevant time229 entered 
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into a transaction at an undervalue, the administrator or liquidator may apply to court 
for an order.230 The court may make an order that it deems fit for restoring the position 
to what it would have been if the company did not enter into the transaction.231  
 A transaction is considered to be at an undervalue if the company232 
 makes a gift to that person or receives no consideration for what they give or 
transfer to that person; and 
 enters into a transaction with that person for a consideration, the value of which, 
in money or money‘s worth, is significantly less than the value of the 
consideration provided by the company. 
 
In the context of a securitisation scheme, the originator will always be compensated 
by the SPV for the transfer of the assets. Therefore, the transfer will not be considered 
a gift. Only the second of the situations listed above need therefore be considered. 
 ‗Transaction‘ is defined broadly and will include the purchase of the assets by the 
SPV.233 The more difficult aspect to prove will be whether the transaction was at an 
undervalue. The office holder, who is either the administrator or the liquidator, must 
prove the values of the respective considerations and that which was received was 
significantly less than what was provided.234  
The adequacy of the consideration is therefore under scrutiny.235 The valuation of 
the consideration is of great importance in order to determine its adequacy.236 In 
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securitisation it will usually be possible to place a monetary value on the 
consideration provided by the SPV and to ascertain a market value for the transferred 
assets. The court will consider all aspects of the transaction to determine whether 
there was equality of benefit.237 For instance, if the terms of the agreement stipulated a 
deferred payment in respect of a part of the sale, for which no interest is charged, this 
might be an indication of undervalue.238 Furthermore, assets are often sold to the SPV 
at a discount in order to effect over-collaterisation or to create a reserve fund, both of 
which serve as credit enhancement.239 
 Even if the transaction is found to be at an undervalue, in my opinion avoidance of 
a securitisation transaction in terms of section 238 will still fail for two possible 
reasons. First, reliance on section 238 might fail because the difference in value is not 
significant.240 Second, the exception in section 238(5) will apply to most securitisation 
schemes. 
In terms of section 238(5), the court will not make an order if it is satisfied that the 
company entered into the transaction in good faith and for the purpose of carrying on 
its business, and that at the time there were reasonable grounds for believing that the 
transaction would benefit the company. The first part of this exception is very difficult 
for an administrator or liquidator to disprove, because it is concerned with the 
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subjective state of mind of the officers of the company when they entered into the 
transaction. Consequently, most administrators or liquidators will seek to show that 
there were no reasonable grounds to believe that the transaction would be to the 
benefit of the company, which is an objective test.241 
I believe that an SPV will be able to rely on this exception, except in the most 
extraordinary of circumstances. Even if the originator was in a doubtful financial 
position at the time of the securitisation transaction, the benefits of a successful 
securitisation scheme as set out in Chapter 2 would satisfy the second leg of the 
exception.242 The enhancement of the liquidity of the originator, which is one of the 
advantages discussed in Chapter 2, might be one of the key considerations for an 
originator in financial difficulty and will also show that the originator entered into the 
transaction with a view of carrying on its business. 
Despite the fact that section 238 provides that a court shall make an order when the 
requirements of the section are met, there is case law that suggests that the court 
retains a discretion not to make an order if the company in liquidation would be in a 
worse situation after restoration in terms of the section.243 It will be very difficult to 
put the originator in the same position as before the transaction. The court will try to 
reverse the transactions, in other words, the originator will have to return any 
consideration received for the sale of the assets and the SPV will have to return the 
assets to the originator.  
A reversal of a securitisation transaction will be very hard to achieve.           
Section 241(2) protects third parties who acquired interests in property from a person 
other than the company in good faith and for value from prejudice by the court‘s 
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order.244 The court may further not order that such a person must return any benefit 
received from such an interest to the office holder. The investors in the SPV will be in 
this position: they received interests in the transferred assets by way of security over 
those assets, for value and while acting in good faith. It follows that the court will not 
order that they be divested of their security rights in those assets or that they return 
any payment already received on their investment. Even if the assets are returned to 
the estate of the originator, the investors will retain their security over the assets. 
Depending on the time that lapsed between the transfer of the assets and a successful 
application in terms of section 238, it might well be that the value of the assets has 
reduced substantially since the transfer and that the originator does not have the 
consideration received in return for the transfer readily available. Considering all 
these factors, and in the unlikely event that all the other requirements of section 238 
are met, I think that the court may well decide to exercise its discretion against an 
order, because it will leave the insolvent originator in a worse situation than before. 
3.3.3.2 Preferences 
Where a company has at a relevant time given a preference to any person, the office 
holder may apply to court to make an order in terms of section 239 of the Act.245 The 
court shall make an order it thinks fit for restoring the position to what it would have 
been if the company had not given the preference. 
 A company gives a preference to a person if:246 
 
(a) that person is one of the company‘s creditors or a surety or a guarantor for any of the 
company‘s debts or other liabilities; and 
(b) the company does anything or suffers anything to be done which, after the company goes into 
insolvent liquidation, has the effect of putting that person in a better position than he would 
have been in if that thing had not been done. In other words, the creditor was paid more than he 
would have been paid during the winding-up of the company. 
 
The court will only make an order in terms of section 239 if the company acted with 
the desire to put the person in a better position than he would have been in, if it were 
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 See Doyle & Keay Insolvency Legislation at 282; Fletcher Insolvency at 693–694; Goode Principles 
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not for the action by the company.247 If the person was connected with the company, 
the company is presumed to have had this intention.248 
 In my opinion, the SPV will not qualify as a creditor for purposes of this section. 
The word ‗creditor‘ is not defined, but most authors argue that it carries the same 
meaning as in the rest of the Act, namely someone who can prove a debt in the 
winding-up of the company.249 Walters250 argues that the person to whom the payment 
is made must be the creditor of the debtor in the sense that he extended credit to the 
debtor. So, for instance, where goods are supplied to the company on a cash-on-
delivery basis, payment of the amount on delivery of the goods will not be a 
preference, because the supplier was not at any time a creditor of the company. The 
same will apply when the goods are only supplied when payment is received in 
advance. If security is granted to a person for a contemporaneous or subsequent 
advance, that person does not obtain a preference, since the granting of the security is 
matched by the granting of new funds. This view is also held by Goode.251 
 During most securitisation transactions the SPV will rather be a debtor of the 
originator than a creditor, because the assets will be transferred to the SPV marginally 
before payment is made to the originator. There may also be a small part of the sales 
price that is deferred until the transferred claims are collected.  
As discussed above, the risk of recharacterisation of the sale of the assets to the 
SPV as a secured loan is very small in English law. If a recharacterisation is ordered 
by a court, the SPV will be a creditor of the originator for purposes of section 239. 
However, it would not make sense to launch an application in terms of section 239 
after the recharacterisation of the securitisation transaction. The only preference given 
to the SPV under such circumstances would be the constructive charges over the 
assets in favour of the SPV. Since the non-registration of the charges over the assets 
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 Section 239(5). See also Doyle & Keay Insolvency Legislation at 273–274; Keay & Walton 
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will in any case lead to their invalidity,252 there will be no need for an office holder to 
undo charges over those assets by way of a section 239 application. 
3.3.3.3 Transactions that defraud creditors 
Sections 423 to 425 of the Act are aimed mainly at the actions of individuals, where 
they part with their property for little or no consideration in order to put it beyond the 
reach of their creditors.253 However, those sections can also be used by an office 
holder of an insolvent company that entered into such transactions before its insolvent 
liquidation or administration. Section 423 reads substantially the same as section 238 
in that the applicant must show that the transaction was at an undervalue.254       
Section 423 does not offer the office holder any benefits above an application in terms 
of section 238 when the company is under insolvent liquidation. 
 An application under sections 423 to 425 differs from an application under    
section 238 in two respects. First, any person prejudiced or capable of being 
prejudiced by the transaction may launch the application and not only the 
administrator or liquidator.255 Second, the application can be brought outside the 
insolvency of the company.256  
The applicant must prove that the purpose of the transaction was to put the assets 
of the company out of reach of its creditors, which is a subjective measure and 
difficult to prove, especially in the case of a securitisation scheme where the 
transaction usually has a commercial motivation.257 
I therefore do not think that this section is any real threat to the bankruptcy-
remoteness of the SPV.258 
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 See par 3.2.6 n 154–158. 
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3.4 CONCLUSION 
After the decision of the House of Lords in Spectrum Plus Ltd v National Westminster 
Bank plc259 a charge over the book debts of a company in English law will mostly be 
in the form of a floating charge. The Court held that it was possible to create a fixed 
charge over the chargor‘s book debts, but that the charge agreement would then need 
to place restrictions on the ability of the chargor to deal with the proceeds of the book 
debts after their collection.260 Such restrictions will leave a company without access to 
its cash. A fixed charge over a large part of a company‘s book debts is therefore not a 
viable option. 
 The only alternative available to a company is to grant a floating charge over its 
book debts. However, the floating charge has many disadvantages compared to other 
forms of security, of which the weak priority it provides to its holder is the most 
important. These disadvantages make the floating charge an unattractive form of 
security for a prospective lender.261 Previously, a floating charge holder could at least 
appoint an administrative receiver who, in turn, could block an application for an 
administration order, but the ability to appoint an administrative receiver was 
restricted by the Enterprises Act 2000. 
 Although I could find no quantitative research on this topic, one wonders to what 
extent this lack of an effective security over claims in England encouraged the growth 
of securitisation as a financing form. 
 Compared to the uncertainty experienced in English law in granting security over 
book debts, the sale of book debts by way of assignment is more certain. The transfer 
of book debts by an originator to an SPV will take the form of an equitable 
assignment, for which notice to debtors is not a requirement.262 However, the lack of 
notice to the debtor does hold certain dangers, of which the application of the rule in 
Dearle v Hall263 is possibly the most serious.264 If an assignor assigns the same book 
debt to more than one assignee, the assignee who first gives notice to the debtor will 
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have priority above the other, regardless to whom the debt was first assigned, as long 
as the second assignee does not have knowledge of the first assignment. The rule 
finds equal application when the book debts that are subject to a fixed charge are 
subsequently assigned.265 In the rare instances where the originator is not the servicer 
of the transferred book debts, the possibility remains that the debtor will discharge his 
debt by payment to the originator if the debtor did not receive notice of the 
assignment. It is therefore necessary to instruct the debtor under such circumstances 
to make payment to the servicer. 
 The risks associated with the lack of notice to the debtor are usually dealt with in 
the transaction documents of the securitisation scheme. However, they are dependent 
on the adherence by the originator to the terms of these agreements. 
 One consequence of assigning the book debts to the SPV by way of an equitable 
assignment is that the SPV will only be able to grant equitable security to the 
investors in the securities.266 Mostly such security takes the form of fixed charges, 
although there may be floating charges over specific assets, such as the bank account 
into which the servicer deposits the proceeds of the book debts. 
 It is very unlikely that an assignment of book debts would be recharacterised as a 
secured loan, where it is clear that the intention of the parties was to transfer the book 
debts outright to the estate of the assignee.267 English courts have repeatedly held that 
the effect of a transaction, which in the case of securitisation would be to provide 
financing to the originator, is of less importance in the characterisation of a 
transaction than the method by which the parties intend to reach that effect. This is a 
major benefit for securitisation in English law. Furthermore, there are policy 
considerations in favour of characterising the assignment as a sale, such as the 
importance of securitisation for the English economy. 
 The effect of non-assignment clauses in the underlying agreements of claims is not 
settled in English law and poses some risk to securitisation.268 This means that the 
underlying agreements must be closely examined before the securitisation of those 
claims in order to decide whether the claims are available for use in the scheme.  
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 I considered the possible avoidance of the sale of the book debts by the originator 
to the SPV in terms of English insolvency law. I submit that the risk of avoidance is 
very small, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. An application by the 
liquidator to have the transaction set aside as a voidable preference will fail, because 
the SPV will usually not be a creditor of the originator before, or for that matter after, 
the securitisation transaction.269  
 The possibility that the liquidator will be able to convince a court that the 
securitisation transaction was at an undervalue, is in my opinion very small.270 
However, even if the liquidator is successful in proving that the transaction was at an 
undervalue, I believe that the defence in section 238(5) would be available to the 
SPV. In terms of this section, the court will not make an order if it is satisfied that the 
company entered into the transaction in good faith and for the purpose of carrying on 
its business, and that at the time of the transaction there were reasonable grounds for 
believing that it would benefit the company. Bearing in mind the advantages of 
securitisation as discussed in Chapter 2, I believe that it will be easy to show that the 
securitisation could benefit the originator, even when it was in financial difficulty at 
the time of the transaction.  
I further think that it is likely that a court will use its discretion in terms of    
section 238 not to make an order, even if all the requirements are met, when the 
transaction under consideration is securitisation. The investors in the securities of the 
SPV will have acted in good faith and are protected from any negative effects in terms 
of a section 238 order.271  
I briefly considered some legislative provisions relevant to securitisation in English 
law. There are no legislative bars to securitisation in English law. 
On the whole, English law provides a favourable legal environment for 
securitisation. The financing needs of companies might be better served by a sale of 
assets than by using those assets as security, especially when those assets are claims. 
Although an equitable assignment of book debts in English law without notice to 
debtors does carry some risk, as is evident in the next chapter on the position in the 
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United States, no legal system provides an entirely risk-free environment for 
securitisation. 





Originally, the English common law was the law of the colonies that eventually 
formed the United States of America.1 However, the social and commercial 
environment of the New World differed a great deal from that in England. This led to 
the evolution of a legal system that today differs substantially from English law. 
These differences are further shaped by the fact that the American law serves a dual 
system of government, whereas the English law serves a unitary system of 
government.2 
 The interplay between the federal law and the law of the 50 states requires a 
practitioner to determine which law will govern a particular transaction. The Federal 
Constitution grants the federal government only those powers that have been 
expressly conveyed to it by the states.3 As a result, state law governs most of the day-
to-day legal matters.4 
 There are three additional factors that influence the decision whether to apply 
federal or state law:5 
1 Even though a state may retain jurisdiction over a particular field of law, its 
legislative and administrative declarations must not conflict with the broad, 
underlying Federal Constitutional principles and legislative declarations that relate 
to those matters. 
2 States may legislate on matters that fall within the normal jurisdiction of the 
federal government, as long as the resulting legislation does no more than 
supplement or complement the federal legislation. 
                                                 
1
 In Calvin‘s Case (1608), 7 Co. I., 17b, 77 E.R. 397 it was held that in principle the common law of 
England would apply in the colonies, but only as far as adapted to local institutions and 
circumstances. See further Dennis Campbell & Winifred Hepperle The US Legal System: A Practice 
Handbook (1983) at 2–3. 
2
 Campbell & Hepperle US Legal System at 3. 
3
 The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, enacted in 1791, declares: ―The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively or to the people.‖ 
4
 Campbell & Hepperle US Legal System at 5 and 51. 
5
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3 In certain circumstances the federal courts may apply state laws to resolve a legal 
matter.6  
 
The United States Supreme Court held in Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins7 that there is 
no such thing as a federal or national ‗common law‘ in the United States of America. 
That notwithstanding, there is cohesion in the laws of the different states and judges 
often cite, and rely on, decisions from other states in their decisions. The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was established to further such 
cohesion. This organisation drafts uniform laws. States elect whether to adopt the 
uniform law and they often modify the law to shape their own point of view. 
 Apart from deciding whether a legal matter falls under the jurisdiction of the 
federal or the state law, legal practitioners must also decide which state law will 
govern a legal matter. To this end, a sophisticated body of conflict of laws rules has 
developed.8 
 The federal court system is organised in three tiers.9 At the lowest or trial level is 
the United States District Courts, to which a geographical jurisdiction is assigned. On 
the next tier is the United States Courts of Appeal, which are empowered to review all 
decisions of the District Courts, unless the law provides for direct access to the 
Supreme Court. The Courts of Appeal are organised in 11 geographical Circuits. The 
court of last resort in the federal system is the United States Supreme Court. Appeal to 
the Supreme Court is usually not a matter of right, but the court has discretion to 
select those matters it wants to hear. 
 There is great variation between the court systems of the various states.10 Most 
states have followed the three-tier system preferred at federal level, but some have 
opted for a four-tier system and a few have systems even less structured.  
4.1.1 Securitisation in United States of America 
Securitisation11 as a financing method has its origin in the United States of America.12 
During the Great Depression the housing credit market collapsed and Congress passed 
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 304 US 64 (1938). 
8
 Campbell & Hepperle US Legal System at 6–7. 
9
 Campbell & Hepperle US Legal System at 52–53. 
10
 Campbell & Hepperle US Legal System at 53–55. 
CHAPTER 4 AMERICAN LAW 
155 
the National Housing Act 1934 to create a secondary market in mortgages. The 
Federal National Mortgage Association was established in 1938 as a result of this 
legislation to provide liquidity to mortgage markets by purchasing mortgages when 
funds were low and selling when funds were adequate. The association is generally 
known as ‗Fannie Mae‘. In 1970 two further mortgage associations were established, 
namely the Government National Mortgage Association (‗Ginnie Mae‘) through a 
privatisation of part of Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(‗Freddie Mac‘). Also in 1970 these associations started to trade mortgage-backed 
securities to the public.13 
 The mortgage associations are sometimes referred to as ‗government-sponsored 
enterprises‘. Despite the suggestion created by the term, only Ginnie Mae is backed 
by government guarantees. The term probably originated from the fact that these 
corporations were created by the United States Congress in order to enhance the flow 
of credit to targeted sectors of the economy.14 However, the capital markets regard 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as virtually guaranteed by the United States 
Government, because Congress will probably not allow them to collapse.15 
 Government-sponsored enterprises only accept mortgages from borrowers with 
good credit histories. The mortgages bought by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
fairly homogeneous in terms of their maturity and interest rates. The government-
sponsored entities further require standardised documentation to be used in the 
mortgages they buy. 
 Mortgages that do not qualify to be securitised through one of the government-
sponsored enterprises are also securitised, but at greater risk to the investor. It is this 
                                                                                                                                            
11
 American sources refer to ‗securitization‘, but to be consistent I maintain the spelling used in English 
sources. 
12
 Joseph Jude Norton & Paul R Spellman Asset Securitization: International Financial and Legal 
Perspectives (1991) at 19; Norton et al Asset Securitization at 3. 
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 For a detailed account of the development of the securitisation market in the USA, see Christopher L 
Peterson ―Predatory Structured Finance‖ (2007) 28 Cardozo LR at 2191–2206. 
14
 The other two sectors targeted by similar vehicles are agriculture and education. 
15
 See Christopher L Peterson ―Over-Indebtedness, Predatory Lending, and the International Political 
Economy of Residential Home Mortgage Securitization: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. 
Subprime Home Mortgage Lending Crisis‖ in William Whitford, Ian DC Ramsay & Johanna Niemi 
Consumer Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy: National and International Perspectives (forthcoming 
2009). This was finally proven on 7 September 2008 when the US Federal Reserve took over Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac to fend off the effects of the credit crisis. 
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sector of the mortgage market that has come to be known as the ‗sub-prime‘ sector16 
and which has come under considerable strain in recent times. The pressure 
experienced by the mortgage market in this sector is due to a number of factors, 
among which is a downturn in the housing market17 and poor consumer practices in 
general.18 In this discussion I shall only deal with how securitisation could have 
contributed to the scale of the problem. 
 The securitisation market in the United States of America is known for its 
innovation and vitality. Today almost any asset of a company can be securitised.19 
In this chapter I provide an overview of the system that creates security interests 
over property in the United States of America. I then review specific legal 
considerations surrounding securitisation. The general form and function of a 
securitisation scheme are set out in Chapter 2. 
4.2 REVISED ARTICLE 9 OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
The Uniform Commercial Code is a collection of recommended laws first issued by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1951, which 
deals with legal issues that may arise during commercial dealings. The Code consists 
of 11 articles that have been revised from time to time.20 All the states have enacted 
the Code, except Louisiana, which enacted only certain parts of it. However, not all 
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 See Peterson 2007 Cardozo LR at 2199–2206 for a discussion of the development of the sub-prime 
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states have enacted the Code without amendment, which means that some 
discrepancies remain between the different states in their commercial laws.21 
The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code with the 
support of its sponsors, the American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, formed a committee in 1990 to study the 
possible revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.22 The revision 
process was completed in 1998. Revised Article 9 became effective in all the states on 
1 July 2001.23 All references in this discussion are to the revised Article 9, unless 
specifically indicated otherwise. 
Article 9 is the most important article in the Uniform Commercial Code for 
securitisation.24 It addresses both the creation of security interests and the sale of 
certain kinds of property. The distinction between the creation of a security interest 
and a sale of the property, as well as the classification of a transaction as one or the 
other is very important for securitisation.25  
The sale of the assets to the SPV must be in the form of a true sale before a rating 
agency will assign a rating to the securities issued by the SPV. To this end, they 
require legal opinions that the sale is a true sale and that the originator is bankruptcy-
remote from the SPV.26 Although Article 9 makes it clear that a sale of accounts will 
leave no legal or equitable interest in the estate of the seller,27 it does not describe 
under what circumstances a transaction will be considered a sale. This is seen by 
McCormack as a major flaw in the Article 9 system.28 
 Section 9-109 sets out the transactions to which Article 9 applies. For purposes of 
this thesis it is important to note that Article 9 applies to a transaction, regardless of 
its form, that creates a security interest in personal property by contract,29 as well as to 
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a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.30 
‗Accounts‘, ‗chattel paper‘ and ‗payment intangibles‘ are defined extensively in 
section 9-102.31 ‗Account‘ means a right to payment of a monetary obligation, 
whether or not earned by performance, that arose from one of the following 
transactions:32 
 Property that has been sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of. 
 Services rendered or to be rendered. 
 An insurance policy issued or to be issued, including health care insurance 
receivables. 
 A secondary obligation incurred or to be incurred. 
 Energy provided or to be provided. 
 The use or hire of a vessel under a charter or other contract. 
 Credit card transactions. 
 The winnings in a lottery or other game of chance sponsored or authorised by the 
State. 
 
Most of those assets generally transferred to an SPV during a securitisation 
transaction will be an account in terms of this definition.33 
‗Chattel paper‘ is defined as a record that evidences a monetary obligation coupled 
with a security interest in specific goods, or a security interest in specific goods and 
software used in the goods, or a security interest in specific goods and a licence of 
software used in the goods, or a lease of specific goods, or a lease of specific goods 
and a licence of software used in the leased goods.34  
                                                 
30
 § 9-109(a)(3). A sale of these asset types for collection purposes only, such as in the case of a 
factoring agreement, is specifically excluded from the scope of article 9 in § 9-109(d)(5). 
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 This individualisation and categorisation of collateral in Article 9 is criticised by McCormack 
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 § 9-102(a)(2). 
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A payment intangible is a general intangible in terms of which the account debtor‘s 
principal obligation is a monetary obligation. The practical effect of this definition is 
that a payment intangible is considered a general intangible for purposes of the 
creation of security interests, but as a category on its own when the sale of those 
assets are at issue.35 Before Article 9 was revised in 1998, such intangibles fell outside 
the scope of Article 9 when sold during a securitisation transaction, which meant that 
the purchase went unperfected36 and left the buyer vulnerable to rights acquired by 
subsequent transferees.37 
The revised Article 9 also extended the definition of ‗proceeds‘, with significant 
implications for securitisations. Assets that are acquired by the bankruptcy debtor 
after the filing of the bankruptcy petition fall outside the reach of secured parties, 
unless these assets are proceeds of the original collateral.38 The revised               
section 9-102(a)(64) defines ‗proceeds‘ as ―whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, 
licence, exchange, or other disposition of collateral; whatever is collected on, or 
distributed on account of, collateral and; rights arising out of collateral‖. More assets 
will therefore in future be considered ―proceeds‖ under this definition and will fall 
outside the scope of the bankrupt estate of the originator.39 
Most asset types ordinarily transferred during a securitisation transaction will fall 
under one of these definitions. Consequently, the purchase of the assets by the SPV 
from the originator will have to comply with the requirements of Article 9.40 
4.2.1 Security interests in property 
Article 9 does not classify types of security as mortgages, charges or pledges as is the 
case in English and South African law, but uses the generic term ‗security interests‘ to 
denote all forms of security. It also makes no distinction between legal and equitable 
                                                 
35
 Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 5-8. 
36
 See par 4.2.1 for a definition of perfection. 
37
 Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 5-13. 
38
 11 USC §§ 552(a) and 552(b)(1). § 9-102(a)(12) UCC defines ‗collateral‘ as ―the property subject to 
a security interest or agricultural lien. The term includes: (A) proceeds to which a security interest 
attaches; (B) accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes that have been sold; 
and (C) goods that are the subject of a consignment.‖ 
39
 See also Lupica 2002 Fordham J of Corporate & Financial Law at 340. 
40
 On these amendments of Article 9 generally, see Lois R Lupica ―Circumvention of the Bankruptcy 
Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization‖ (2000) 33 Connecticut LR at 218–219. 
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security interests or between fixed and floating security interests.41 ‗Security interest‘ 
is defined in section 1-201(35) of the Uniform Commercial Code as an interest in 
personal property or fixtures that secures either payment or else the performance of an 
obligation. 
 The concepts of ‗attachment‘ and ‗perfection‘ are central to a proper understanding 
of the functioning of Article 9. A security interest attaches when it becomes 
enforceable between the debtor and the creditor.42 A security interest becomes 
perfected when it becomes effective against third parties. 
4.2.1.1 Attachment of security interest 
A security interest is only enforceable against a debtor if43 
 value has been given; and 
 the debtor has rights in the collateral or the entitlement to transfer rights in the 
collateral to a secured party. 
 
In addition, one of a possible four conditions must be met before attachment will 
follow.44 The condition most often met is that the debtor has authenticated45 a security 
agreement that provides a description of the collateral.46 A ‗description‘ is defined as 
sufficient if it reasonably identifies what is described.47 A description of the collateral 
as ―all the debtor‘s assets‖ or ―all the debtor‘s personal property‖ does not reasonably 
identify the collateral,48 but a category of collateral will qualify as a sufficient 
description,49 for example ―the stock-in-trade of the debtor‖. 
 The other three conditions that can be fulfilled in order to lead to attachment are as 
follows: 
                                                 
41
 McCormack Secured Credit at 71. For the position in English law, see par 3.1 and for the position in 
South African law, see par 5.4. 
42
 § 9-202(a). See also McCormack Secured Credit at 73. 
43
 § 9-203(b)(1) and (2). 
44
 § 9-203(b)(3). 
45
 According to §9-102(a)(7) ‗authenticate‘ means: ―(A) to sign; or (B) to execute or otherwise adopt a 
symbol, or encrypt or similarly process a record in whole or in part, with the present intent of the 
authenticating person to identify the person and adopt or accept a record.‖ 
46
 See n 38 for the definition of ‗collateral‘. 
47
 § 9-108(a). 
48
 § 9-108(c). 
49
 § 9-108(b)(2). 
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1 The secured party is in possession of the collateral pursuant to the debtor‘s 
security agreement and the collateral is not a certificated security.50 
2 The collateral is a certificated security in registered form and has been delivered 
to the secured party in terms of the debtor‘s security agreement.51 
3 The secured party has control of the collateral as described in the relevant sections 
of Article 9.52 The collateral in this case will be deposit accounts,53 electronic 
chattel paper, investment property,54 letter-of-credit rights55 or electronic 
documents. 
 
Although Article 9 does not specifically mention a floating charge, it specifically 
allows a security interest over the collateral where the debtor remains entitled to deal 
freely with the collateral. Section 9-205 provides that a security interest is not invalid 
or fraudulent against creditors because the debtor has the right or ability to 
 use, commingle, or dispose of all or part of the collateral, including returned or 
repossessed goods; 
 collect, compromise, enforce or otherwise deal with the collateral; 
 accept the return of the collateral or make repossessions; 
 use, commingle or dispose of proceeds; or 
 because the secured party fails to require the debtor to account for proceeds or to 
replace the collateral.56 
 
A security agreement may create a security interest in an after-acquired collateral, but 
such a security interest will only attach when the debtor ―has rights in the collateral‖.57 
                                                 
50
 § 9-203(b)(3)(B). 
51
 § 9-203(b)(3)(C). 
52
 § 9-203(b)(3)(D). 
53
 See n 75 on how control over deposit accounts can be obtained. 
54
 See n 74 on how control over investment property can be obtained. 
55
 See n 76 on how control over letter-of-credit rights can be obtained. 
56
 See McCormack Secured Credit at 73–75 for the history of this provision. 
57
 § 9-204(a). If the after-acquired collateral clause relates to consumer goods or to a commercial tort 
claim, the security interest will not attach. See § 9-204(b). 
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4.2.1.2 Perfection of security interest 
Section 9-308(a) provides that a security interest is perfected when it has attached, 
and when all steps required for perfection under any provision of the Article have 
been complied with. Perfection of a security interest in a right to payment also 
perfects a security interest in a security interest, mortgage or other lien over personal 
or real property securing the right.58 In other words, when a security interest in a loan 
secured by a mortgage is perfected, the security interest in the mortgage is perfected 
simultaneously. 
The usual method of obtaining perfection of a security interest is by way of filing, 
and the date of filing is used to determine priorities between the security interests of 
competing parties to the same collateral.59 
4.2.1.2.1 Notice filing 
Notice filing must be distinguished from the registration requirement of English law. 
Under the English system of registration certain particulars of a charge must be filed 
with the Registrar of Companies, together with the security agreement, within 21 days 
after the creation of the charge. When satisfied that the filed particulars and the 
security agreement correspond, the Registrar issues a certificate, which is conclusive 
evidence that all registration requirements have been complied with.60 
 Under a notice filing system the security agreement is not filed, but only a simple 
record known as a ‗financing statement‘. The financing statement is usually filed by 
the secured party.61 The financing statement contains only a limited amount of 
information and may be filed before or after attachment. The statement indicates that 
the person may or may not have a security interest in the collateral mentioned, and an 
interested party will then have to make his own further enquiries to ascertain the true 
position.62 This means that the filing of one notice can cover the whole credit 
                                                 
58
 § 9-308(e). 
59
 McCormack Secured Credit at 76. See also Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 5-20. 
60
 See par 3.2. 
61
 Under the previous version of Article 9 the debtor‘s signature was required on the financing 
statement (§ 9-402(1)). In the revised Article 9 the debtor‘s authorisation of a security agreement 
constitutes authorisation of the filing of a financing statement. The secured party is not required to 
obtain any further authorisation (§ 9-509(b)). 
62
 In many cases the secured party will divulge such supplementary information freely. However, § 9-
210 provides measures whereby a prospective creditor can require a possible secured party to 
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relationship between two parties, without the need for repeated filing as the collateral 
changes or when new advances are made, provided that the collateral is described 
broadly enough.63 A filing statement is valid for a period of five years after the date of 
filing.64 
 A financing statement must contain the name of the debtor, the name of the 
secured party or of the representative of the secured party and indicate the collateral 
covered by the financing statement.65 An indication that the financing statement 
covers all the assets of the debtor or all of his personal property will suffice for the 
financing statement, but not for a sufficient description of the collateral in the security 
agreement.66 Such a description in the security agreement cannot lead to attachment of 
the security interest.67 
 The following are considered to be advantages of the notice filing system as 
compared to the registration of transactions:68 
 It facilitates the use of stock-in-trade or claims (referred to as ‗receivables‘ in 
American sources) as collateral, because there is no need to file repeatedly where 
there are numerous transactions between the parties. 
 There is no need to file repeatedly when the collateral changes from day to day. 
 A financing statement can cover a security agreement that was not yet in existence 
at the filing of the notice, even if it was not yet under consideration between the 
parties.69 The only requirement is that the description of the collateral should be 
broad enough to cover the collateral eventually provided as security. 
 A financing statement can include after-acquired assets as collateral and future 
advances to be secured without the need to mention these future transactions 
specifically.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
disclose whether and to what extent his claims against the debtor is secured. See also McCormack 
Secured Credit at 77. 
63
 McCormack Secured Credit at 77. 
64
 § 9-515(a). 
65
 § 9-502(a). § 9-503 elaborates on the sufficient indication of the debtor. 
66
 § 9-504(2). See also McCormack Secured Credit at 78. 
67
 See par 4.2.1.1. 
68
 McCormack Secured Credit at 77. 
69
 § 9-502(d) allows this specifically. 
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4.2.1.2.2 Perfection without notice filing 
There are a few security interests where perfection is permissible by means other than 
notice filing. Certain security interests are perfected automatically on attachment, 
including:70 
 An assignment of accounts or payment intangibles that does not itself or in 
conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part 
of the assignor‘s outstanding accounts or payment intangibles. 
 A sale of payment intangibles.71 However, when the sale of payment intangibles 
takes place in connection with a securitisation transaction, it will be safer to also 
file a financing statement.72 Otherwise there is a risk that if a court recharacterises 
the transaction as a ‗loan‘ rather than a ‗sale‘, the security interest would not be 
perfected. Such filing further safeguards the position of the SPV should the 
originator attempt to sell the same claims more than once. In the absence of 
notice-filing, the priority in such a case would be determined by the date of first 
perfection. However, it may be very difficult to prove which party perfected first. 
Furthermore, since previous sales of payment intangibles might not have been 
filed, the securitisation of payment intangibles remains riskier, because it is less 
certain that there are no competing claims on the transferred assets.73 
 
A security interest in investment property,74 deposit accounts,75 letter-of-credit rights76 
or electronic chattel paper77 may be perfected through control of the collateral.78 
                                                 
70
 § 9-309. 
71
 See par 4.2 for a definition of ‗payment intangible‘. The automatic perfection of payment intangibles 
was the result of pressure from financiers involved in loan participations. These financiers were 
satisfied with existing methods for the perfection of a sale of loans, namely that it would perfect 
immediately, and were concerned that notice filing would complicate their dealings. Initially it was 
recommended that the sale of payment intangibles between ‗financial institutions‘ should be 
excluded from the general perfection requirements. However, it emerged that a uniform definition of 
‗financial institution‘ was just as difficult to come by. Consequently, it was decided that a sale of 
payment intangibles would be perfected automatically on attachment. See the discussion of Paul M 
Shupack ―Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A Brief History‖ (1999) 73 American 
Bankruptcy LJ at 174–176; Steven L Schwarcz ―The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC 
Article 9‖ (1999) 74 Chicago-Kent LR  at 955; Lupica 2000 Connecticut LR at 220. 
72
 Shupack 1999 American Bankruptcy LJ at 179. 
73
 Schwarcz 1999 Chicago-Kent LR at 955. 
74
 ‗Investment property‘ is defined in § 9-102(a)(49) as ―a security, whether certificated or 
uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, commodity contract, or commodity account.‖ 
Although perfection of investment property can also follow on notice filing, perfection by way of 
control confers priority on the person who controls. Certificated securities can either be in bearer 
form or in registered form. Security interests in certificated securities in bearer form are perfected by 
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4.2.1.3 Priorities among conflicting security interests 
The general principle is that the first party to file a financing statement has priority 
over other secured parties with security interests in the same collateral.79 This priority 
will follow, regardless of the time that the security agreement actually came into 
being.80 A perfected security interest has priority over an unperfected security 
interest.81 If all the security interests are unperfected, the security interest that attached 
first will enjoy priority.82 
 Priority for security interests in deposit accounts and in letter-of-credit rights is 
determined by who is in control.83 Security interests in investment property can follow 
through notice filing, but the secured party who gains control over the investment 
property will enjoy priority.84 
                                                                                                                                            
control when a person takes delivery of the certificate (UCC § 8-106(a)). To take control of a 
certificated security in registered form, the secured party must take delivery of the certificate and 
either have it indorsed to him in blank by an effective endorsement or have the issuer register it in 
his name (UCC § 8-106(b)). Control over an uncertificated security is established either by delivery, 
or by an agreement that the issuer of the security will comply with the secured party‘s instructions 
without further consent by the debtor (UCC § 8-106(c)). Investment property as defined can be a 
securitised asset type (see par 2.4), which makes these provisions important for our discussion. 
75
 A deposit account is a bank account. Security taken over the account where the servicer deposits its 
collected payments is important in the event of the servicer‘s bankruptcy. The only method to 
perfect a security interest in a deposit account under Article 9 is by control (§ 9-312(b)(1)). If the 
party attempting to perfect its security interest is the bank where the account is held, it has control  
(§ 9-104(a)(1). Otherwise the secured party will gain control over the account when the debtor, the 
secured party and the bank have agreed in an authenticated record that the bank will comply with the 
instructions of the secured party without further consent of the debtor (§ 9-104(a)(2)), or when the 
secured party becomes the customer of the bank with respect to the deposit account (§ 9-104(a)(3)). 
Neither the section nor the Official Comment sheds any light on how this latter possibility will come 
about, but I assume it will be through a novation of the bank‘s agreement with the debtor. Perfection 
will only remain while the secured party retains control over the deposit account (§ 9-314(b)). 
76
 Letter-of-credit rights are often a credit enhancement method during a securitisation scheme and will 
form part of the security in favour of the investors in the securities issued by the SPV. Perfection of 
security interests in letter-of-credit rights can only be effected by control (§ 9-312(b)(2)). A secured 
party has control of a letter-of-credit right to the extent of any right it has to payment or performance 
by the issuer if the issuer has consented to an assignment of the proceeds of the letter-of-credit under 
§ 5-114(c) or otherwise applicable law or practice (§ 9-107). The secured party must retain control 
over the deposit account (§ 9-314(b)). 
77
 For the control provisions of electronic chattel paper, see § 9-105. 
78
 § 9-314(a). 
79
 § 9-322(a)(1). 
80
 McCormack Secured Credit at 80–81. 
81
 § 9-322(a)(2). 
82
 § 9-322(a)(3). 
83
 See n 75and 76. See also Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 5-26 to 5-28. 
84
 See n 74; Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 5-28 to 5-29. 
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 Knowledge of a prior unperfected security interest will not deprive a perfected 
security interest holder of his priority. Article 9 does not make good faith a 
requirement for priority.85 
 A secured party may agree that his claim be subordinated to that of another secured 
party, even if he would normally have priority. Subordination agreements are 
specifically provided for in section 9-339. 
 Generally, a purchase money security interest will have priority over an earlier 
perfected security interest in the same collateral.86 However, if the purchase money 
security interest is in inventory,87 this priority will not extend to the proceeds of the 
inventory after it has been sold. The proceeds may be sold without being subject to 
the security interest of the purchase money financier.88 This benefits securitisation, 
where the assets sold might be claims that result from the sale of inventory.  
4.2.2 Sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles and promissory notes 
The usual method by which assets are transferred to the SPV is by assignment. 
Novation is seldom used, because the debtor‘s consent is necessary for a valid 
novation and originators do not want their clients to know that they have securitised 
the claims. Furthermore, novation terminates any security interest that attached to the 
original agreement. Since the original agreement is terminated by novation, the 
security for the claims resulting from that contract is also terminated. This has the 
practical effect that the newly agreed security interest must be filed, which has an 
effect on the priority of the security and will mean that the avoidance periods will 
start to run afresh.89 
                                                 
85
 McCormack Secured Credit at 155–158; Re Smith (1971) 326 F Supp 1311 at 1314: ―the drafters of 
the code were aware of and intended that knowledge be irrelevant in determining priorities under 
that section.‖ 
86
 § 9-324(a). A ‗purchase money security interest‘ is a security interest held by a financier who 
advanced money so that a person could purchase a specific asset. The financier then takes a security 
interest in the asset purchased. 
87
 For the definition of ‗inventory‘, see § 9-102(a)(48). 
88
 See the Official Comment to § 9-324; Schwarcz 1999 Chicago-Kent LR at 956. 
89
 Albrecht & Smith 1998 Duke J of Comp & Int L at 432–440. It is possible for the SPV to take up a 
participation in the pool of claims securitised, but this will probably not constitute a true sale of the 
claims but only a transfer of some of the risk associated with the outstanding claims. It is likely that 
such a transaction will be characterised as a synthetic securitisation rather than a traditional 
securitisation, and this aspect falls outside the scope of this thesis. See Albrecht & Smith 1998 Duke 
J of Comp & Int L at 444–447. 
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Before the revision of Article 9 in 1998 there was some uncertainty as to the 
effects of a sale of property that falls under the Article. More particularly, some 
authors argued that such sales had to be recharacterised as security interests rather 
than true sales, which would have meant that the property remained in the estate of 
the seller and was vulnerable in the event of the seller‘s bankruptcy.90 Such an 
interpretation was especially prevalent after the decision in Octagon Gas Systems, Inc 
v Rimmer91 where the Court held that the sale transactions covered by Article 9 
created a situation where the buyer became a secured party who acquired a security 
interest in the purchased asset and the seller was the debtor.92  
The Uniform Commercial Code‘s Permanent Editorial Board issued a draft 
commentary on the decision to disapprove of the reasoning followed in Octagon Gas 
Systems.93 According to the commentary, the purpose of including sale of accounts 
under the provisions of Article 9 was to recognise the similarity that such transactions 
show with secured transactions and to provide notice to third parties.94 However, it 
was not the intention to change the nature or the effect of the transaction from a sale 
to a secured loan. 
 Revised section 9-318(a) now provides that a debtor who has sold an account, 
chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or 
equitable interest in the collateral sold. This means that the purchased accounts will 
not form part of the debtor‘s estate during his bankruptcy, and removes the 
uncertainty that existed previously in this regard. This amendment is beneficial to 
securitisation, where the sale of accounts by an originator to an SPV makes up an 
integral part of transactions. However, the applicability of the section is dependent on 
                                                 
90
 Article 9 refers to ‗debtor‘ throughout, also when it sets out the provisions relating to sale of 
accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles and promissory notes. I shall refer to ‗seller‘ in the 
discussion of sale. 
91
 995 F 2d 948, 945–955 (10th Cir). See also Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 655–657; Lupica 2002 Fordham 
J of Corporate & Financial Law at 332–333. 
92
 At 955. 
93
 UCC Permanent Editorial Board Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code, Commentary No 
14 (Section 9-102(1)(b)) (10 June, 1994). 
94
 See Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 5-16. 
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a finding that the transaction is a sale of accounts, rather than the use of the accounts 
as security, which leaves the characterisation of the transaction as important as ever.95 
An account debtor96 on an account, chattel paper or payment intangible may 
continue to discharge his obligations by paying the assignor, until the account debtor 
receives notice that the claim has been assigned and that payment must now be made 
to the assignee.97 After receiving such notice, the account debtor may only discharge 
his obligation by payment to the assignee. Such notification will not be effective if it 
does not reasonably identify the rights assigned, if an agreement between the debtor 
and the assignor limited the account debtor‘s duty to pay a person other than the 
assignor, or if the notification notifies the account debtor to make a payment to the 
assignee that is less than the full amount payable in terms of an instalment or periodic 
payment.98 Unless the account debtor has entered into an enforceable agreement not to 
make use of defences or claims, the assignee takes the account subject to any defence 
or claim that the account debtor may have had against the assignor before the account 
debtor received notice of the assignment.99 
Article 9 aims to limit restrictions on the assignment of claims by providing that 
contractual terms restricting the assignment of interests in accounts,100 chattel paper, 
payment intangibles or promissory notes are ineffective. Contractual terms that 
provide that such assignment will lead to a default, breach, claim, defence, or 
termination, among other remedies listed, will also be ineffective.101 However, with 
respect to payment intangibles, promissory notes and health care insurance 
receivables, assignment in contravention of such restrictions will not be enforceable 
                                                 
95
 See also the comments of Shupack 1999 American Bankruptcy LJ at 179 and 180; Lupica 2002 
Fordham J of Corporate & Financial Law at 337. See par 4.3.2.1 for a discussion of the possibility 
of recharacterisation. 
96
 An ‗account debtor‘ is defined as ―a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general 
intangible.‖ The term does not include persons obligated to pay a negotiable instrument, even if the 
instrument constitutes part of chattel paper (§ 9-102(a)(3)). 
97
 § 9-406(a). See also McCormack Secured Credit at 233–234. Usually the debtor will not receive 
notification of the assignment of the claim in securitisation. Since the originator often continues to 
act as servicer of the claims on behalf of the SPV, the identity of the person whom the debtor must 
pay does not change. If the originator does not act as servicer these aspects become more important. 
98
 § 9-406(b). 
99
 § 9-404(a)(2). See also McCormack Secured Credit at 235. 
100
 Referred to as non-assignment clauses in English law (see par 3.2.2.4) and pacta de non cedendo in 
South African law (see par 6.2.4 n 84). 
101
 § 9-406(d). See further McCormack Secured Credit at 229–230; Lupica 2000 Connecticut LR at 
221–223. 
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against the debtor or the person obliged in terms of the promissory note, nor impose 
any duty on such a debtor or person, nor require the debtor or such a person to 
recognise the security interest or make payment to the assignee. Furthermore, such an 
assignee will not be entitled to enforce the security interest.102 
4.3 SECURITISATION: SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS 
4.3.1 Regulatory considerations 
Apart from the provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code discussed 
above, various statutes have an important impact on securitisation transactions in the 
United States of America. They are discussed below. I discuss selected provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code separately in paragraph 4.3.2. 
4.3.1.1 Investment Company Act of 1940 
In terms of the Investment Company Act of 1940103 an issuer primarily engaged in the 
business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding or trading in securities must 
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an investment 
company.104 The Act was intended to regulate mutual funds, investment funds and 
other investment vehicles. 
 ‗Security‘ is defined broadly and includes notes, stocks, bonds, debentures, 
securities futures, evidence of indebtedness, or any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a ‗security‘.105 Most claims106 will fall under this definition, because they are 
evidence of indebtedness.107 
 The Act is a comprehensive regulatory scheme and compliance with its provisions 
is burdensome and costly.108 For these reasons registration of an SPV as an investment 
                                                 
102
 § 9-408(a) and (d). See also Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 5-30 to 5-31. This exception was 
included especially to satisfy the needs of financiers involved in loan participations. Loan 
participation agreements often include restrictions on the transferability of the loan, to ensure that 
only eligible institutions join the loan syndication. See Shupack 1999 American Bankruptcy LJ at 
176–178; Schwarcz 1999 Chicago-Kent LR at 959–960. 
103
 15 USC § 80a et seq. 
104
 § 80a-3. 
105
 § 80a-2(a)(36). 
106
 Claims are mostly referred to in American literature as ‗receivables‘.  
107
 Norton & Spellman Legal Perspectives at 34; Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 3-32. 
108
 Norton & Spellman Legal Perspectives at 34 and 96; Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 3-32. 
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company is usually considered economically unfeasible. Transactions are structured 
so that one or more of the exemptions from registration under the Act would apply. 
 The SPV could make use of the exemption under section 3(c)(5)(A), which 
excludes from the definition of ‗investment company‘ a person who is primarily 
engaged in purchasing or acquiring ―open accounts receivable, and other obligations 
representing part or all of the sales price of merchandise, insurance, and services‖. 
The securitisation of consumer credit and trade receivables will fall under this 
exemption,109 because these claims will mostly reflect the purchase price of goods or 
services. 
If a particular securitisation does not clearly fall under this exemption, the SPV 
could try to obtain a no-action letter from the SEC. A no-action letter is a non-binding 
response by the SEC staff to a private enquiry indicating that the staff of the SEC will 
not recommend enforcement action if a proposed transaction is carried out in a 
particular manner.110 
Another possible way to avoid registration under the Act is to make use of the 
exemption given to issuers whose outstanding securities do not have more than 100 
beneficial owners and who are not making a public offering of their securities.111 This 
is often used together with the disclosure exemptions for private offerings contained 
in the Securities Act of 1933.112 The securities in the SPV are then placed with a 
limited number of institutional and other investors.113 
However, before the adoption of Rule 3a-7,114 a particular securitisation scheme 
could still fall outside any of these exemptions. As a last resort the SPV could still 
have applied to the SEC for an order exempting it from registration. There are two 
possible grounds for such an application, namely that the SPV is primarily engaged in 
                                                 
109
 See par 6.4. 
110
 Norton & Spellman Legal Perspectives at 48. 
111
 § 80a-3(c)(1). ‗Beneficial ownership‘ if the investor is a company means one person, unless the 
company acquires more than ten per cent of the voting securities in the issuer. In the latter case the 
holders of the securities in the company will count as the beneficial owners (§ 80a-3(c)(1)(A). The 
company will, however, still count as one person if its total investment in all the companies that fall 
under this exemption, or would have fallen under the exemption were it not for the beneficial owner 
rule, does not amount to more than ten per cent of its total assets. See also Norton & Spellman Legal 
Perspectives at 48. 
112
 See below. 
113
 Norton & Spellman Legal Perspectives at 35. 
114
 17 CFR § 270. 3a-7. See below. 
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a business other than that of investing, owning or trading in securities115 or that an 
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and is consistent with the 
protection of investors and the policy and purposes of the Act.116 It may take a long 
time for such an exemption to be given and there are no guarantees that the 
application will be successful. It is also possible that the SEC will grant the exemption 
conditionally, which may cause further expense and delay.117 
However, since the adoption of Investment Company Act Rule 3a-7, it will seldom 
be necessary to obtain exemption from compliance with the Act. The Rule was 
adopted specifically to exempt asset-backed securities transactions from complying 
with the Act.118 
Rule 3a-7 excludes from the definition of ‗investment company‘ any issuer who 
 is engaged in the business of purchasing or otherwise acquiring, and holding 
eligible assets119 and certain related activities;  
 does not issue redeemable securities;  
 complies with the provisions of the Rule that require segregation of the underlying 
assets and restricts the ability of the issuer to acquire or dispose of the underlying 
assets; and 
 offers certain types of asset-backed securities, namely non-investment grade 
securities and residual interests, only to sophisticated investors. 
 
The SPV must issue fixed-income securities120 or other securities, which entitle their 
holders to receive payments that depend primarily on the cash flow from eligible 
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 § 80a-3(b)(2). 
116
 § 80a6(c). 
117
 Norton & Spellman Legal Perspectives at 35 and 99. 
118
 Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 3-33. See also Gambro & McCormack Global Securitisation and 
Structured Finance at 2. 
119
 ‗Eligible assets‘ is defined as ―financial assets, either fixed or revolving, that by their terms convert 
into cash within a finite time period plus any rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing 
or timely distribution of proceeds to security holders‖ (Rule 3a-7(b)(1)). 
120
 ‗Fixed income securities‘ is defined as ―any securities that entitle the holder to receive: (i) A stated 
principal amount; or (ii) Interest on a principal amount (which may be a notional principal amount) 
calculated with reference to a fixed rate or to a standard or formula which does not refer to any 
change in the market value or fair value of eligible assets; or (iii) Interest on a principal amount 
(which may be a notional principal amount) calculated by reference to auctions among holders and 
prospective holders, or through remarketing of the security; or (iv) An amount equal to specified 
fixed or variable portions of the interest received on the assets held by the issuer; or (v) Any 
combination of amounts described in paragraphs (b)(2)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) of this section; 
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assets in order to comply with the provisions of the Rule.121 This will include most 
types of asset-backed securities.122 
The securities issued may be sold to any investor, provided that the securities 
received an investment grade rating, which means that they must have obtained a 
rating in the four highest categories for long-term debt or its equivalent for short-term 
debt, by at least one nationally recognised statistical rating agency.123 This is yet 
another reason why the role of the rating agency is very important during a 
securitisation transaction.124 Securities that do not comply with this restriction may 
only be sold to a specified list of investors.125 These specified investors are 
sophisticated enough to make informed choices about riskier investments. If the SPV 
wants to issue such securities to investors other than those in the specified list, it will 
have to find an exemption in the Act and cannot rely on Rule 3a-7.126 
The SPV‘s power to manage its pool of assets must be restricted if it wants to 
qualify for the exemption in terms of the Rule.127 This is an important distinguishing 
characteristic between the SPV in securitisation and the manager of an investment 
company. The manager of an investment company will trade in its pool of assets 
depending on the changes in the market. In contrast, the Rule requires that 
acquisitions and dispositions of the eligible assets 
 be made in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the documents 
pursuant to which the asset-backed securities are issued; 
                                                                                                                                            
Provided, That substantially all of the payments to which the holders of such securities are entitled 
consist of the foregoing amounts‖ (Rule 3a-7(b)(2)). 
121
 Rule 3a-7(a)(1). 
122
 Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 3-35; Wood Project Finance at 173–174. 
123
 The SEC uses the term ‗Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organization‘ (NRSRO) to 
indicate whether an agency‘s ratings may be relied upon for purposes of the federal securities law 
and rules. See Exchange Act Rule 3b-10.  
124
 See also par 2.6. 
125
 Rule 3a-7(a)(2): ―(i) Any fixed-income securities may be sold to accredited investors as defined in 
paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (7) of rule 501(a) under the Securities Act of 1933 (17 CFR 230.501(a)) 
and any entity in which all of the equity owners come within such paragraphs; and (ii) Any 
securities may be sold to qualified institutional buyers as defined in rule 144A under the Securities 
Act (17 CFR 230.144A) and to persons (other than any rating organization rating the issuer's 
securities) involved in the organization or operation of the issuer or an affiliate, as defined in rule 
405 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.405), of such a person.‖ 
126
 See Dolan & Davis Securitizations at 3-35. 
127
 Rule 3a-7(a)(3). 
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 do not result in the downgrade in the rating assigned to the SPV‘s outstanding 
fixed income securities; and 
 that the assets are not acquired or disposed of for the primary purpose of 
recognizing gains or decreasing losses resulting from market value changes. 
 
Despite the fact that most securitisation schemes are currently exempted from the 
application of the Act, it is important to remember that the SEC could revise or amend 
its conditions later if needs be. The SEC opted for an exemptive rule rather than an 
amendment of the Act. In its investigation of the possibility of abuses occurring 
during securitisation that are similar to the possible abuses that led to the enactment of 
the Investment Company Act,128 the SEC concluded that although the possibility of 
such abuse existed it had not thus far occurred during securitisation.129 A similar 
investigation in future may find that such abuses do occur, which could lead to greater 
restrictions on the possible exemption of securitisation schemes from the provisions 
of the Act. 
4.3.1.2 Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
For many years is was uncertain whether asset-backed securities are, in fact, 
‗securities‘ according to the definition in the Securities Act of 1933130 and the 
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 Tamar Frankel Securitization: Structured Financing, Financial Asset Pools, and Asset-Backed 
Securities (1991) at 487 identifies the following possible abuses that may occur in both  investment 
companies and securitisation transactions: (1) pools that hold financial assets (for instance 
negotiable securities) can be easily embezzled and therefore the custody of documents evidencing 
title to such assets must be regulated (2) the originator or sponsor and the managers of the SPV may 
have conflicts of interest similar to those that exist in investment companies (3) if the SPV has a 
discretion to change the nature of the assets held by the SPV, the risk associated with the securities 
may be increased if the managers substitute the assets with riskier ones. She therefore argues in 
favour of the regulation of the investment policies of managers. 
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 US SEC, Division of Investment Management Protecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment 
Company Regulation (1992) at 81–83. The SEC attributes the lack of such abuses to three factors: 
(1) the purchasers are institutional investors with a high degree of financial sophistication (2) usually 
publicly offered asset-backed securities have at least one class of highly rated securities, and (3) the 
originators/sponsors of asset-backed securities are mostly large well-known companies with a 
significant reputational stake in seeing to it that the scheme is structured fairly. 
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 15 USC § 77b(a)(1). The Act makes it illegal to offer or sell securities without proper registration or 
an exemption from registration. 
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934.131 The current view is that they are securities, 
especially when offered on the public markets.132 
 The Securities Act prescribes registration statements that contain appropriate 
disclosures to prospective investors, unless the securities or the transactions in which 
the securities are issued are exempt. The following asset-backed securities and 
transactions are exempt from the registration requirement: 
 Issues by government-sponsored enterprises.133 
 Issues that are backed by bank-issued letters-of-credit or guarantees.134 
 Issues that qualify for a ‗private placement‘ or similar exemption.135 
4.3.1.3 Consumer protection legislation 
The recent crisis in the American subprime market led to a renewed focus on the role 
of securitisation in poor consumer lending practice. I will therefore briefly set out how 
securitisation could have contributed to some of these problems. 
 There are several federal statutes that aim to ensure fair lending practices. The 
Federal Trade Commission Act136 prohibits the use of unfair or deceptive trade 
practices. It gives the Federal Trade Commission the power to bring action against 
non-compliant lenders that fall under its jurisdiction.137 
 The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act138 prescribes that certain information 
must be disclosed to prospective borrowers, such as the settlement costs of their loan, 
as well as the fees that will be paid to the real estate agent, the loan broker and other 
miscellaneous costs. It further prohibits referral fees, which unnecessarily increase the 
cost of settlement services. 
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 15 USC § 78c(a)(10). 
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 See Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 651–652. See further Tamar Frankel ―Securitization: The Conflict 
Between Personal and Market Law (Contract and Property)‖ (1999) 18 Annual Review of Banking 
Law at 216–218. 
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 § 77c(a)(2). See par 4.1 for an explanation of the term ‗government-sponsored enterprise‘. 
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 15 USC § 77c(a)(2). 
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 15 USC § 77d(2): ―transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.‖ 
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 15 USC § 41.  
137
 Its jurisdiction is fairly limited. For instance, it does not have jurisdiction over depository 
institutions, which are usually regulated by banking law. Furthermore, the fact that consumers 
cannot litigate on their own behalf in terms of the Act limits its usefulness. See Peterson 2007 
Cardozo LR at 2226. 
138
 12 USC § 2601-2616. 
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 The Truth in Lending Act139 requires lenders to give consumers a disclosure 
statement that sets out the most important provisions of the credit contract in 
prescribed terminology. This aims to help consumers to make informed decisions and 
to be able to compare different credit offers. The Act makes it mandatory to include a 
clause in the credit agreement that the consumer may back out of the loan for up to 
three days after the agreement had been signed. 
 The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act140 created a special class of high-
cost mortgages that are subject to additional regulation. A mortgage will be subject to 
the terms of the Act if it triggers one of two price thresholds: the first relating to the 
interest rate, the second to the fees associated with closing the loan.141 The Act 
requires the lender to deliver a special notice to the prospective borrower at least three 
days before the loan is agreed on, in which it is stated what the percentage rate of the 
loan will be, the size of any balloon payments,142 the cost of credit insurance charges 
and a notice that the consumer may still back out of the transaction.143 The notice must 
make it clear to the consumer that she may lose her home if she cannot meet these 
obligations. The Act was a direct consequence of unfair lending practices that focused 
on vulnerable consumer groups. These loans are therefore further subject to certain 
substantive requirements.144 
 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act145 and the Fair Housing Act146 prohibit 
discriminatory behaviour in the provision of financing for housing, based on the 
consumer‘s race, gender or religion. The Acts are applicable to both mortgage loan 
originators and brokers. 
 The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act147 governs abusive practices in debt 
collection. 
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 15 USC § 1601. 
140
 The Act appears in various sections of 15 USC. 
141
 15 USC § 1602(aa)(1). 
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 A ‗balloon payment‘ is an inflated instalment that falls due at the end of the credit agreement. 
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 15 USC § 1639. 
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 See Peterson 2007 Cardozo LR at 2227–2228. 
145
 15 USC § 1691. 
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 42 USC § 3601–3619. 
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 These are the main statutes that regulate consumer credit on a federal level. Most 
States also have legislation to further regulate fair lending practices.148 
 As I briefly explained in the introduction to this chapter, prime mortgages are those 
that qualify to be resold to one of the government-sponsored enterprises, whereas 
subprime mortgages are generally granted to borrowers with unacceptable credit 
histories that do not meet the criteria of the government-sponsored enterprises. The 
securitisation of subprime mortgages has become the norm in the United States since 
the early 1990s.149 
 It is now clear that unfair lending practices to consumers that only qualify for 
subprime mortgage loans have been rife and it is argued by some commentators that 
securitisation aided these practices.150 The legislation set out above provides for the 
liability of mortgage brokers and lenders who engage in unfair lending practices. 
However, during securitisation the mortgage is sold to the SPV, usually with the 
financial backing of one or more investment banking firms. The debt is not collected 
by the SPV, but by a servicer who is not the holder of the claim. In other words, the 
originator is only involved in the life of the mortgage for a very short time, after 
which there may be as many as ten different participants in the securitisation process, 
each with its own role and gains to be made from the process.151 This has led to 
several difficulties in the sphere of consumer protection. 
 The first problem is that assignee liability is often either restricted by way of a 
waiver of the right of the borrower to assert claims or defences against an assignee,152 
or by the holder in due course exception.153 The holder in due course exception states 
that if an assignee, in good faith, paid value for a negotiable promissory note and 
lacked notice that the loan is in default or subject to a short list of specified consumer 
claims or defences, the assignee will be free of any ‗personal‘ claims or defences that 
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 See Peterson 2007 Cardozo LR at 2229–2230. 
149
 Peterson 2007 Cardozo LR at 2214. 
150
 Peterson 2007 Cardozo LR at 2215 et seq; Kurt Eggert ―Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, 
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 The legality of such waivers are expressly acknowledged in UCC § 9-403. 
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might assert against the assignor. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 336(2) reads as follows: 
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the consumer may raise.154 These personal claims and defences include fraud, 
unconscionability and, in some states, statutory claims based on unfair and deceptive 
trade practices. The assignee will still be liable for ‗real‘ claims or defences, such as 
that the borrower was a minor or acted under duress. Most consumer claims for unfair 
lending practices will fall under the ‗personal‘ class.155 
 Courts have declined to enforce waiver of defence clauses or holder in due course 
status if the assignee had notice of the consumer‘s defences.156 Although section 3-302 
of the Uniform Commercial Code contains a list of facts of which the assignee must 
have lacked actual or implied knowledge, aspects that could be the basis for a 
personal defence do not appear in the list. The section does, however, contain a 
requirement that the assignee must take the instrument in good faith. The courts have 
held that good faith is lacking where there is a close connection between the assignor 
and the assignee.157 
 In 1975 the Federal Trade Commission introduced a regulation in terms of its 
authority derived from the Federal Trade Commission Act that is appplicable to all 
contracts between consumers and financiers of consumer goods or services. The 
Regulation contains a clause that must be included in all such contracts to the effect 
that an assignee of the original lender takes the contract subject to all claims and 
defences that the consumer may have asserted against the original lender.158 The 
Uniform Commercial Code was subsequently amended to provide that where the 
inclusion of this notice is required by federal law, state law will regard such contracts 
as if this clause was included, even when it was left out.159 However, since a mortgage 
loan is not a transaction relating to a ‗sale or lease of goods or services‘, as the 
regulation requires, this clause need not be included in mortgage agreements. 
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 UCC § 3-302(a)(2). 
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 Peterson 2007 Cardozo LR at 2233. 
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 Peterson 2007 Cardozo LR at 2236. 
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Peterson160 argues that there is no sound reason for such exclusion and that the 
regulation ought to be amended to make the inclusion of the notice in mortgage 
agreements compulsory. 
 A second problem regarding consumer protection measures is that the terminology 
used in consumer protection legislation is no longer extensive enough to cope with the 
realities of modern structured financing.161 For instance, the Truth in Lending Act 
requires a ‗creditor‘ to comply with the Act‘s requirements of disclosure that must be 
made to the consumer when negotiating the terms of the loan agreement. ‗Creditor‘ is 
defined as ―the person to whom the debt arising from the consumer credit transaction 
is initially payable on the face of the evidence of indebtedness‖.162 But in recent times 
the the loan agreement is often negotiated by a broker who will never be a creditor in 
terms of the Act. 
 A third problem is that securitisation makes the process of litigation much more 
expensive for a consumer.163 For instance, owing to the separation of the collecting 
function from the legal holder of the claims, and also because the claims originated 
with another party who is not necessarily the servicer, several parties will have to be 
approached during discovery. In the United States such problems are exacerbated by 
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). Although originally intended 
to be an electronic document custodian only, the MERS is now often registered in the 
county registration offices‘ records as the nominee holder of the mortgage. A 
consumer is therefore unable to ascertain the mortgagee from the public records. Even 
more disconcertingly, the MERS now brings foreclosure proceedings in its own name, 
even though it is unequipped to comply with consumers‘ discovery requests and holds 
no financial or other interest in the loan. It succeeds in bringing the application in its 
own name, because the consumer is usually ill-equipped to engage in lengthy 
litigation in order to contest the MERS‘s standing. Peterson164 argues that courts ought 
to insist that only the true mortgagee can apply for foreclosure and that the practice of 
registering mortgages in the name of the MERS should not be allowed. 
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 It remains to be seen how these problems will be addressed by the United States 
legislator. However, it seems clear that the extension of assignee liability alone will 
not be adequate to address some of the problems associated with consumer protection, 
nor will it be fair. The parties most likely to lose from an unlimited extension of 
assignee liability are the investors in the SPV, who are also innocent in that they 
would have been completely unaware of the unfair practices that led to the creation of 
the loans. Consequently, one must look at means to deflect some of the liability to the 
other parties to the securitisation scheme, such as the sponsors, underwriters and 
trustees, who are never themselves assignees, but who benefit enormously from the 
transaction. Peterson165 suggests that courts ought to consider extending the common 
law principles of aiding and abetting,166 conspiracy167 or joint venture168 to include 
these parties in the sphere of possible defendants that must answer to the claims of 
wronged consumers. 
4.3.2 Bankruptcy law considerations 
There have been very few bankruptcies of originators and SPVs in the United 
States.169 Consequently, many of the concerns surrounding this issue have not yet been 
tested in courts and are debated by commentators on a theoretical basis. The aspects 
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 Katherine D Kale ―Securitizing the Enterprise: Enterprise Liability and Transferred Receivables in 
Bankruptcy‖ (2003) 20 Bankruptcy Developments Journal at 326. This might soon change due to 
the turbulence in the sub-prime mortgage market and the general economic downturn experienced in 
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discussed in this section are important, because the insulation of the SPV from the 
bankruptcy of the originator is an important pillar of the securitisation scheme. 
4.3.2.1 Transfer of rights and ‗true sale‘ requirement  
The securitisation transaction must be structured in such a manner that the courts will 
consider the transaction to be a sale and not a secured loan. This is referred to as the 
‗true sale‘ requirement. When a securitisation complies with the true sale requirement, 
the sold assets no longer form part of the originator‘s estate and are therefore isolated 
from the potential future bankruptcy of the originator.170 
4.3.2.1.1 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001171 proposed to amend the Bankruptcy Code to 
provide greater certainty to investors that the transfer of assets during a securitisation 
transaction would be considered a sale rather than a secured loan in the event of the 
originator‘s bankruptcy. However, although certain sections of the Bill became law, 
the provisions I shall discuss hereafter were never enacted out of fear of the misuse of 
off-balance sheet vehicles in the Enron debacle.172  
If these provisions had been enacted, most assets transferred during an asset-
backed securitisation scheme would have fallen outside the estate of a bankrupt 
originator. In terms of section 541(b)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code if amended,173 from 
the estate would have been excluded 
 
any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such eligible asset was transferred by 
the debtor, before the date of commencement of the case, to an eligible entity in connection with 
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an asset-backed securitization, except to the extent such asset (or proceeds or value thereof) may 




This provision would have superseded any conflicting provision of state law, as well 
as precedent in terms of state law on the characterisation of a transaction as a sale or a 
secured loan.175 It would also have meant that the avoidance powers in terms of 
sections 544(a)(1)176 and 547(b)(5)177 of the Bankruptcy Code would not be available 
to the trustee of a bankrupt originator. 
An ‗asset-backed securitisation‘ was defined as a transaction in which eligible 
assets transferred to an eligible entity were used as the source of payment on 
securities, at least one class or tranche of which were rated investment grade by one or 
more nationally recognized securities rating organizations, when the securities were 
initially issued by an issuer. 
 ‗Eligible assets‘ were defined as financial assets (including interests therein and 
proceeds thereof), either fixed or revolving, whether or not they were in existence as 
of the date of the transfer, including residential and commercial mortgage loans, 
consumer receivables, trade receivables, assets of governmental units, including 
payment obligations relating to taxes, receipts, fines, tickets, and other sources of 
revenue, and lease receivables, that, by their terms, convert into cash within a finite 
time period, plus any residual interest in property subject to receivables included in 
such financial assets plus any rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing or 
timely distribution of proceeds to security holders.178 Cash and securities were also 
eligible assets in terms of this section. 
 An ‗eligible entity‘ was an issuer engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring 
and holding eligible assets, issuing securities backed by eligible assets, and taking 
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 I consider the avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in par 4.3.2.3. In terms of 11 USC        
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actions ancillary thereto, or an entity engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring 
and transferring eligible assets directly or indirectly to an issuer and taking actions 
ancillary thereto.179 In other words, an ‗eligible entity‘ referred to an SPV.180 The 
second possibility in the definition was added, because in many securitisations in the 
United States the assets are first sold to a subsidiary of the originator, which will 
constitute a true sale because the originator will not provide guarantees or recourse to 
its subsidiary. This SPV then transfers the assets to a security trustee for the benefit of 
the investors, which transaction will not constitute a true sale. This is because the SPV 
will retain a subordinated interest in the proceeds of the accounts and a right to any 
surplus. The trustee will therefore have to file a first priority security interest in the 
accounts.181 Schwarcz182 argued that the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
would have lessened the need for such structures. 
 Section 541(f)(5) would have defined ‗transferred‘ very widely to include 
situations where the transferor held a direct or indirect interest in the issuer (SPV) or 
in the securities issued by the issuer. It would also have included the situation where 
the transferor had an obligation to repurchase all or any of the eligible assets or to 
service or supervise the servicing of the eligible assets. The characterisation of the 
transfer under tax, accounting or for regulatory reporting purposes would have been 
irrelevant. 
 If these exceptions in the Bankruptcy Code were enacted, the possibility of the 
recharacterisation of the sale of the assets as a secured loan would have been largely 
excluded. Most asset-backed securitisation transactions would have complied with the 
requirements of section 541 and would not have formed part of the originator‘s 
bankrupt estate.183 
 The important role of the rating agencies, referred to in the proposed section 
541(f)(1) as ―nationally recognized securities rating organizations‖, was very obvious 
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in these provisions.184 An asset-backed securitisation would only benefit from the 
exception in this section if one or more of the tranches of securities issued during the 
securitisation received an investment grade rating.185 Although most securitisations 
would have complied with this requirement, the ones that did not would still have 
been vulnerable to the recharacterisation risk. It further meant that private placing of 
asset-backed securities, where a rating was considered unnecessary, would not have 
benefited from these provisions.186 Lupica187 argues that this qualification meant that 
only Wall Street firms, with the means to have pushed this amendment forward, 
would have benefited from the Reform Act. 
 Janger188 argues that reliance on the opinion of rating agencies could lead to the 
following result: rating agencies rely on opinions expressed by legal council that the 
transaction would constitute a true sale and would be bankruptcy remote from the 
originator. These considerations would have fallen away if the Act were adopted, 
which would have meant that the opinion of the rating agencies would only rely on 
the quality of the assets transferred to the SPV. Reliance on the rating also focuses the 
enquiry on the quality of the SPV, rather than on the potential harm that the 
securitisation may cause the originator and its creditors if the transaction was not a 
true sale or constituted a fraudulent conveyance under state law.189 
 Specific mention was made under the definition of ‗eligible assets‘ to assets that 
were not yet in existence on the date of transfer. Previous versions of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act did not include this phrase, which led to concerns that the securitisation 
of assets not yet in existence, or the securitisation of the proceeds of such assets, 
would not fall under the definition of ‗eligible assets‘ and could therefore be at risk of 
                                                 
184
 The more correct term is ‗Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organization‘ (NRSRO), which 
indicates that an agency‘s ratings may be relied upon for purposes of the federal securities law and 
rules. See Exchange Act Rule 3b-10. In terms of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (S. 
3850-190
th
 Congress) the Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority to oversee the 
credit rating industry. For more on the regulation of rating agencies, see Locke 2008 De Jure 545. 
Rating agencies are discussed in detail in par 2.6. 
185
 An ‗investment grade rating‘ is a term originally used by various regulatory bodies in the United 
States to indicate debt securities that are eligible for investment by institutions such as banks, 
insurance companies and savings and loan associations (pension funds). See Schwarcz 2002 
University of Illinois Law Review at 7–8. 
186
 See also Schwarcz 2002 Fordham J of Corporate & Financial Law at 360. 
187
 Lupica 2000 Connecticut LR at 228–229. 
188
 2002 Fordham J of Corporate & Financial Law at 316. 
189
 Janger 2002 Fordham J of Corporate & Financial Law at 316–317. 
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
184 
recharacterisation.190 The addition of this species of asset to the definition of ‗eligible 
asset‘ alleviated such concerns. However, the securitisation of future assets carries 
more uncertainty than when assets already in existence are securitised. It would be 
more difficult to obtain an investment grade rating for securities backed by future 
assets. An investment grade rating for at least one of the tranches of the securities 
issued by the SPV191 was the other important requirement if a securitisation were to 
fall under the exception in section 541. 
4.3.2.1.2 Future legislative intervention 
Schwarcz192  believes that the proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code ought to 
be reconsidered at some future date. Other authors voiced concerns that such 
legislative protection of securitisation transactions does not adequately take account 
of all the relevant issues. Lupica193 argues that securitisation hampers the possibility of 
a successful reorganisation of a struggling originator, because its cash-producing 
assets are no longer part of its estate. If the assets served as security for a loan, and the 
assets were needed in the reorganisation process, they could be retained in the estate 
in return for alternative ―adequate protection‖ of the secured creditor‘s interests.194 
However, if the assets were sold, they would no longer be available to contribute to 
the originator‘s effective reorganisation.  
However, Schwarcz195 argues that one cannot assume wasteful behaviour simply 
because receivables are substituted for cash. In fact, the cash boost may stave off 
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bankruptcy for a while or may help the originator to avoid bankruptcy altogether.196 
He further argues that the interest rate saving caused by securitisation may benefit the 
originator‘s creditors, especially the unsecured creditors.197 He also regards the 
widespread absence of restrictions on prospective securitisation transactions from 
debt agreements as an indication that creditors of the originator do not see 
securitisation as a danger to the proper fulfilment of their claims.198 An empirical 
analysis carried out by Schwarcz of originators who had public offerings of bonds as 
well as securitisation offerings showed that the bond prices did not decrease after a 
securitisation transaction, but, in fact, increased. This shows that the creditors of the 
originator regarded the securitisation at least as neutral, but even as beneficial to the 
value of their debt.199 Finally, the author argues that even if there are some creditors of 
the originator who are prejudiced by the transfer of the assets during a securitisation 
transaction, the net effect of the transaction is efficient in that the benefit to the 
majority of stakeholders is larger than the potential harm.200 
 Another aspect that needs further exploration is the effects of the sudden boost in 
cash after a securitisation scheme that an originator experiences on the management 
decisions of the originator.201 If the cash injection is used in a project with positive 
value or for one that retains a high degree of liquidity, the securitisation will likely not 
affect third parties, such as the unsecured creditors of the originator, negatively. 
However, if the cash is used to invest in higher risk activities or for payments that will 
lower the originator‘s liquidity202 it might have a negative impact on third parties. 
Although these risks are also present in secured lending, a secured creditor has an 
incentive to monitor the borrower‘s activities to ensure repayment of the loan and 
preservation of its security. Third parties, such as unsecured creditors benefit from 
this monitoring function. There is no one to fulfil this monitoring function after a 
securitisation.  
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4.3.2.1.3 Current position 
As the law currently stands, every securitisation transaction will be considered to 
determine whether the transaction took the form of a sale or of a secured loan. This 
determination is derived from the equitable powers of the court,203 and is largely 
governed by state law.204 Some states have adopted legislation that provides a so-
called true-sale safe harbour for determining what constitutes a true sale during a 
securitisation transaction. For instance, Delaware‘s Asset-Backed Securities 
Facilitation Act of 2002205 provides that any asset purported in the transaction 
documents to be transferred in a securitisation transaction shall be deemed no longer 
to be the property, asset or right of the transferor.206 The Act clarifies this position 
further by stating that ―the transferor in securitization transactions, its creditors [and 
any] bankruptcy trustee shall have no rights, legal or equitable, whatsoever to  reclaim 
or recharacterize as property of the transferor any property, assets or rights purported 
to be transferred‖.207 Furthermore, ―in the event of a bankruptcy, receivership, or other 
insolvency proceeding with respect to the transferor such property, assets and rights 
shall not be deemed to be part of the transferor‘s property, assets, rights or estate‖.208  
In the absence of legislation that creates true-sale safe harbours, the courts can take 
one of two possible approaches in the exercise of their equitable power to 
recharacterise a transaction. They could use a scoring technique whereby the court 
considers how many attributes of a true sale the securitisation showed. Alternatively, 
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courts could arrive at a decision after a consideration of the interests of all the parties 
that will be affected if the transaction is recharacterised.209 Although the predominant 
approach in other financing transactions, such as factoring, has been to follow a 
scoring technique, there is definite merit in a consideration of all equities, especially a 
consideration of the effects of a recharacterisation on the investors in the securities 
issued by the SPV.210 It must further be noted that when considering ordering 
substantive consolidation, the consideration of which is also derived from their 
equitable powers, courts follow the scoring approach.211 
There have been no decisions that specifically considered the recharacterisation of 
a securitisation as a secured loan. Guidance is therefore sought from precedent in 
factoring transactions, where the issue has been considered. When following the 
scoring technique, a number of aspects emerged from case law as important to 
determine whether the transaction is a sale or a secured loan: 
 A sale of assets usually leaves the purchaser bearing the risks associated with 
those assets. If the purchaser has extensive recourse against the seller for losses, 
this is seen as an indication of a secured loan rather than a true sale.212 Most 
commentators regard recourse as the most significant indicator that a transaction 
is a secured loan rather than a sale.213 The following situations were indicated in In 
re Evergreen Valley Resorts, Inc as examples of recourse that will indicate a 
secured loan rather than a sale:214 
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o Where the assignee retains a right to payment of a deficiency on the debt if 
the assignment does not provide sufficient funds to satisfy the amount of the 
debt. 
o Where the assignee acknowledges that his rights in the assigned property 
would be extinguished if the debt owed were paid through some other 
source. 
o Where the assignee must account to the assignor for any amount received 
over the amount of the debt. 
 The courts do take note of the intention of the parties as evidenced by the 
transaction documents.215 
  The courts may consider whether the sale price was set at a fair market value as 
determined by independent appraisers.216 
 If the transaction covers specifically identified receivables rather than an interest 
in a pool of receivables, this might be an indication of a sale rather than a loan.217  
 Whether or not notice was given to account debtors may be taken into account. 
 A purchase price at a fixed discount that reflects the expected life of the 
receivables, rather than an interest-like monthly payment program at a floating 
rate, is more in line with a sale of the receivables than with a loan.218 
 In a sale the purchaser (SPV) cannot alter the terms of the agreement after the sale 
and the originator has no right to receive any surplus collected from the 
transferred receivables.219  
 
If a securitisation transaction is recharacterised as a loan rather than a sale, the SPV 
will still be a secured party,220 but the objective of separating the SPV from the 
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potential bankruptcy of the originator would have failed. A recharacterisation will 
mean that the SPV will be a party to the bankruptcy proceedings of the originator and 
will be subject to collateral substitution, reduction in priority of payment and other 
alteration of rights in terms of the Bankruptcy Code.221 
4.3.2.2 Equitable doctrine of substantive consolidation 
The equitable doctrine of substantive consolidation provides that to prevent a 
perceived injustice, the separate legal status of two or more entities may be 
disregarded so that their assets and liabilities may be consolidated and dealt with as if 
it is being held by one entity.222 This excludes liability between the entities, which is 
erased after consolidation.223 Courts derive their equitable powers to order substantive 
consolidation from section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.224  
Although substantive consolidation has not yet been applied to an originator and an 
SPV during a securitisation scheme, most commentators mention it as a possibility.225 
An order for substantive consolidation of a securitisation scheme would merge the 
assets of the SPV and those of the originator on the bankruptcy of the originator. The 
assets that served as security for the obligations of the SPV toward its investors will 
then fall in the bankrupt estate of the originator. Their security interests in the assets 
will be kept intact, but whereas the investors were the only creditors of the SPV, the 
originator may have many other secured creditors with prior claims.226 
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 Substantive consolidation goes further than piercing of the corporate veil and 
fraudulent transfer law in that it does not affect only shareholders, nor only those 
creditors who were party to a fraudulent transfer. It also affects innocent creditors and 
mandates more than the return of specific assets to their previous owner.227 Whereas 
the creditors of the consolidated companies could previously look only at the 
company with whom they contracted for payment of their claims, they must look at a 
much larger enterprise after consolidation, which will probably mean that they will 
receive less of their claim.228 
 Two possible rationales emerged from case law on substantive consolidation in 
terms of which the courts decide whether an order for substantive consolidation is 
justified, namely the Augie/Restivo229 approach or the Auto-Train230 approach.231 In 
terms of the Augie/Restivo approach232 
 
Competing considerations are merely variants on two critical factors (i) whether creditors dealt with 
the entities as a single economic unit and did not rely on their separate identity in extending credit, 
or (ii) whether the affairs of the debtors are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors. 
 
The approach in Auto-Train takes these factors into consideration, but it emphasises 
the ―substantial identity‖ of the entities and allows consolidation in spite of creditor 
reliance on separateness when the demonstrated benefits of consolidation heavily 
outweigh the harm.233 
 Whichever approach a particular court follows, it seems that there is consensus 
amongst the various states that the remedy must be used sparingly.234 The reason for 
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courts‘ reluctance to order substantive consolidation was expressed as follows in In re 
Snider Bros, Inc: 235 
 
It must be recognized and affirmatively stated that substantive consolidation, in almost all 
instances, threatens to prejudice the rights of creditors. This is so because separate debtors will 
almost always have different ratios of assets to liabilities. Thus, the creditors of a debtor whose 
asset-to-liability ratio is higher than that of its affiliated debtor must lose to the extent that the asset-
to-liability ratio of the merged assets will be lower. 
 
In Flora Mir Candy Corporation this reluctance was expressed as follows: 236 
 
Because of the dangers in forcing creditors of one debtor to share on a parity with creditors of a less 
solvent debtor, substantive consolidation, ‗is no mere instrument of procedural convenience,‘ but a 
‗measure vitally affecting substantive rights‘. 
 
In In re Owens Corning the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit preferred the 
Augie/Restivo approach, rejecting the Auto-Train approach as ―not sufficiently 
egregious and too imprecise‖.237 Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court 
denied a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeal, which means that the 
law in the third circuit at least is now settled.238  
The Court In re Owens Corning held that when an objecting creditor relied on the 
separateness of the entities, consolidation could not be justified with regard to the 
claims of that creditor. The Court set out the following principles, which it believes 
underlie the remedy of substantive consolidation:239 
 The general expectation of state law, the Bankruptcy Code and of the commercial 
markets is that courts respect the separateness of entities, in the absence of 
compelling circumstances calling for equity. 
 The harm that substantive consolidation addresses is nearly always caused by 
debtors and the entities they control. Harm caused by creditors are remedied by 
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, such as those dealing with fraudulent 
transfers.240 
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 Mere benefit to the administration of a case is not sufficient to justify substantive 
consolidation. 
 Substantive consolidation is an extreme remedy and should be rare and one of last 
resort. 
 Substantive consolidation may be used defensively to remedy the identifiable 
harms caused by entangled affairs, but not offensively. An example of offensive 
use would be if the application had as it primary purpose to disadvantage 
tactically a group of creditors in a reorganisation plan. 
 
From these underlying principles the Court held that an applicant for substantive 
consolidation must either prove (1) that before the bankruptcy petition the 
separateness of the entities were so severely disregarded that their creditors treated 
them as one entity, or (2) that after the bankruptcy petition the assets and liabilities of 
the entities are so scrambled that it would benefit all creditors to consolidate.241 This 
means that creditors will be able to defeat the application by showing that they are 
adversely affected by consolidation and actually relied on the separateness of the 
entities when extending credit.242 The basis for a consolidation order under these 
circumstances is that creditors have dealt with the separate entities as one business 
and that the consolidation order basically gives effect to the creditors‘ contractual 
expectations.243  
If the approach of the Court in In re Owens Corning is adopted more widely than 
the Third Circuit,244 substantive consolidation should not really be a threat to 
securitisation transactions, since it can be easily avoided by proper separation and 
representation of the businesses of the originator and the SPV.245 While the creditors 
of the originator might have expected to share in the assets that were transferred to the 
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SPV, the creditors of the SPV relied on the SPV‘s separation from the originator. The 
SPV‘s creditors expected that the separate legal personality of the SPV would be 
upheld during the originator‘s bankruptcy. Consolidation therefore does not fall 
within their contractual expectations.246 Instead, the creditors of the SPV rely on the 
separateness of the SPV and the originator in their decision to extend credit to the 
SPV.247 
The principles set out in In re Owens Corning will also guard against the offensive 
use of substantive consolidation by the trustee of a bankrupt originator to limit the 
rights of the investors in the SPV in favour of the creditors of the originator.248 
The SPV must be prohibited from any activity that would create the impression 
that it does not operate as a separate entity from the originator. Courts view the 
following as indications that consolidation may be proper:249 
 The presence of consolidated financial statements. 
 The entities have officers or directors in common. 
 The entities share an office location. 
 The entities share operational expenses. 
 The bankrupt entity has control or majority ownership of the SPV.250 
 The bankrupt entity has assumed the SPV‘s obligations, which includes the 
presence of inter-corporate guarantees. 
 The transfer of assets without formal observance of corporate formalities. 
 The degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining the individual assets and 
liabilities of the two entities. When the assets and liabilities of the entities are so 
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SPV at a higher discount. 
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intertwined that they cannot be distinguished as belonging to the one or the other, 
consolidation will be proper. 
 
However, even if all of these indications are present, the overriding concern is 
whether consolidation would benefit creditors generally.251 
 Owing to the risk of substantive consolidation in American securitisation 
transactions, rating agencies require legal opinions that all possible steps have been 
taken to guard against such an order in the event of the originator‘s bankruptcy. 
However, since the remedy of substantive consolidation is dependent on the equitable 
discretion of the court, it is difficult to provide definite answers as to the likelihood of 
such an order being granted.252 Substantive consolidation is also criticised as deviating 
from the expectations of creditors who rely on limited liability and on the basis that it 
places too much discretion in the hands of bankruptcy judges.253 
4.3.2.3 Avoidance provisions of Bankruptcy Code 
Bankruptcy law is federal statutory law contained in Title 11 of the United States 
Code. The United States Constitution grants the United States Congress the authority 
to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States of 
America.254 This means that although states may regulate other aspects of the debtor–
creditor relationship, they are not allowed to regulate bankruptcy. Bankruptcy 
proceedings are supervised by, and litigated in, the United States Bankruptcy Courts, 
which form part of the District Courts of the United States.255 
The avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are contained in sections 547 
and 548 of Title 11 of the United States Code. Section 547 sets out the circumstances 
                                                 
251
 In re Snider Bros, Inc. 18 B.R. 230 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) at 238. In this case the Court refused to 
grant an application for substantive consolidation despite substantial evidence of a disregard of 
formal separateness of the different companies in the group. The mingling of the different 
businesses was not so severe that it was irreparable. See also In re Richton International 
Corporation, 12 B.R. 555 (Bankr. N.Y. 1981). In this case the Court followed the approach in 
Vecco, but ended its consideration of whether to allow substantive consolidation as follows: 
―Finally, a key factor for this Court, although not mentioned by the Vecco court, is that substantive 
consolidation of these Debtors will yield an equitable treatment of creditors without any undue 
prejudice to any particular group (at 558).‖ 
252
 See Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 646–647; Kale 2003 Bankruptcy Developments J at 337. 
253
 Kale 2003 Bankruptcy Developments J at 336. 
254
 US Constitution Article I, Section 8. 
255
 See also the explanation of the court system in the USA in par 4.1. For a succinct overview of the 
bankruptcy system in the USA, visit http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/Bankruptcy (accessed          
16 May 2008). 
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under which a trustee may avoid a transfer of property to a creditor of the bankrupt 
debtor. The debt must have been incurred before the transfer and the transfer must 
have enabled the creditor to receive more than he would have received in terms of 
bankruptcy proceedings.256 This section only has bearing on transfers that took place 
within  90 days of the filing of the petition for bankruptcy, or for a year and 90 days if 
the creditor was an insider.257  
 The provisions of section 547 will seldom be relevant to avoid a securitisation 
undertaken by a bankrupt originator, since the SPV will mostly not be a creditor of the 
originator in terms of the section. It is further rare for an originator to become 
bankrupt so soon after a securitisation transaction. Even if a case could be made out 
that the SPV was a creditor of the originator, the transaction will probably succeed on 
one of the following two defences set out in section 547(c), namely that the transfer 
was 
 intended by the debtor and the creditor for whose benefit such transfer was made 
to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor.258 ‗New 
value‘ is defined in section 547(a)(2) as ―money or money‘s worth in goods, 
services, or new credit‖; 
 in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or 
financial affairs of the debtor and made according to ordinary business terms.259 
Securitisation is a tried and tested method of financing in the United States. It is 
not out of the ordinary, nor is it undertaken in extraordinary business terms. 
 
The more probable route that a trustee might take to try and avoid a securitisation 
transaction undertaken by a bankrupt originator is the fraudulent transfer provisions 
contained in section 548. In terms of section 548(a)(1) the trustee may avoid any 
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the 
debtor that was made or incurred on or within  one year before the date of the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily 
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 11 USC § 547(b). 
257
 11 USC § 547(b)(4). 
258
 11 USC § 547(c)(1). 
259
 11 USC § 546(c)(2). 
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 made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, 
or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that 
such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; 260 or 
 received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or 
obligation.261 
 
If the trustee relies on the second of these circumstances, he must further prove that 
the debtor262 
 was insolvent on the date of such transfer or when such obligation was incurred, 
or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation; 
 was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a 
transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an 
unreasonably small capital;263 or 
 intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be 
beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured. 
 
The first circumstance that falls under section 548 is when the debtor intentionally 
made a transfer or incurred an obligation that would hinder, delay or defraud a 
creditor. This is often referred to in American literature as ‗fraudulent transfers‘. The 
second circumstance is similar to transactions at an undervalue in English law, and is 
referred to as constructively fraudulent transfers. 
 When a transaction is successfully avoided in terms of section 548, the trustee may 
recover for the benefit of the estate the property transferred or the value of the 
property so transferred from the initial transferee or from the immediate transferee of 
                                                 
260
 See also § 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act of 1984. The provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code are substantially similar to the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The latter 
Act was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws and 
adopted by 43 states and the District of Columbia. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is also 
available to creditors outside the bankruptcy of the debtor. For this reason it is possible for a creditor 
to obtain an injunction to restrain a debtor or a transferee from further disposing of the assets          
(§ 7(a)(3)(i)). I shall contain my discussion to the Bankruptcy Code and will refer to the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act only where its provisions materially differ. 
261
 See also § 5 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
262
 § 548(B)(ii)(I)–(III). 
263
 § 4(a)(2)(ii) of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act refers to ‗assets‘ in the same context rather than 
‗capital‘. This is the more correct wording, since ‗capital‘ has a specific meaning within corporate 
law which is far narrower than intended in the course of fraudulent conveyance law. See Comment 4 
on § 4 of the Official Comment on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
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the initial transferee.264 However, the trustee may not recover such property from a 
transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or 
antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the 
transfer avoided; or any immediate good faith transferee of such transferee.265 
4.3.2.3.1 Fraudulent transfers 
It is generally agreed among commentators that there is no real risk that a 
securitisation scheme will be found to be a fraudulent transfer. The transactions are 
not conducted in secret and they do not carry the ‗badges of fraud‘.266 The term 
‗badges of fraud‘ refers to the development of a list of indications which the courts 
over time agreed upon as showing that fraudulent intent was present during a 
transaction.267 
 The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act of 1984 elaborates on aspects that the court 
may consider determining whether the debtor had actual intent to defraud, hinder or 
delay payment, without forming a closed list. Section 4(b) lists the following aspects, 
which corresponds to some extent with the common law ‗badges of fraud‘: 
 Whether the transfer was to an insider.268 The SPV might be an affiliate of the 
originator and therefore an insider, but this aspect alone is not conclusive to justify 
the conclusion that there was intent to defraud. 
 Whether the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after 
the transfer. If the transferred assets are claims and the originator continues to 
service these claims, it might be argued that the originator continued to exercise 
                                                 
264
 11 USC s 550(a). 
265
 11 USC s 550(b). See also § 8(a) of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
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 Frost 1997 Tulane LR at 114. 
267
 These were first set out in Twyne‟s Case, 3 Coke Rep. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). 
The following were held to be signs that an asset was disposed of with fraudulent intent: (1) A gift 
has the signs of fraud. (2) The donor remained in possession of the thing and used it as his own, 
which led others to deal with him and which deceived and defrauded them. (3) The disposition was 
made in secret. (4) The disposition was made during impending litigation against the donor. (5) 
There was a trust between the parties. (6) The deed of transfer contains a provision to the effect that 
the disposition was made honestly, truly and bona fide. 
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 In terms of § 1(7)(ii) an ‗insider‘, if the debtor is a corporation, includes a director or officer of the 
debtor and a person in control of the debtor. § 1(7)(iv) provides that an affiliate is also an insider. If 
the debtor directly or indirectly owns, controls, holds or has the power to vote on 20 per cent or 
more of the outstanding voting securities of a corporation, the latter will be an affiliate of the debtor 
(§ 1(1)(ii)). A person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a 
person all of whose assets are substantially controlled by the debtor, will also be an affiliate in terms 
of the Act (§ 1(1)(iii)). 
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control over those assets. However, this aspect again is not conclusive on its own 
to lead to a finding of fraudulent intent. 
 Whether the transfer was disclosed or concealed. Transfers during securitisation 
transactions are disclosed at least in the financial statements of the originator, 
even if the SPV‘s securities are privately placed. It therefore cannot be argued that 
these transactions are as a rule concealed. However, if it does emerge that a 
particular transaction was not disclosed in the prescribed manner in the financial 
statements of the originator, this will undoubtedly raise questions. 
 Whether the debtor was sued or threatened with suit before the transfer was made. 
This aspect might be of importance if it is coupled with an accusation that the 
originator misused the securitisation scheme to effect judgment proofing.269 
 Whether the transfer included substantially all the debtor‘s assets. 
 Whether the debtor absconded. This aspect is more relevant to natural persons. 
 Whether the debtor removed or concealed assets. 
 Whether the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably 
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred. 
 Whether the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer 
was made or the obligation was incurred. 
 Whether the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was 
incurred. 
 Whether the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who 
transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
 
The presence of one or more of these aspects may point to the required intent, but it 
does not create a presumption of such intent.270 Instead, the court will evaluate all 
relevant circumstances involving a challenged transfer.271 
4.3.2.3.2 Constructively fraudulent transfers 
‗Reasonably equivalent value‘ is not defined in the Act.272 Cases that considered 
‗reasonably equivalent value‘ have generally held that ‗fair market value‘ constitutes 
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 See Comment 5 on § 4 of the Official Comment on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
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 See Comment 6 on § 4 of the Official Comment on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
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‗equivalent value‘ and have then proceeded to consider what percentage of that value 
would constitute reasonably equivalent value. However, these cases mostly dealt with 
value received at public auctions and did not specifically consider value received for a 
sale of financial assets.273 
The scrutiny of rating agencies, credit enhancers, stock exchanges and other 
participants in the scheme will probably ensure that the SPV provides ‗reasonably 
equivalent value‘ for the transferred assets. Even if low-quality assets are heavily 
discounted, the consideration received will probably still comply with the reasonably 
equivalent value criterion.274 
 Another reason why the transaction will usually not be avoidable under this 
provision is that the transaction will usually not leave the originator bankrupt, nor will 
the originator be bankrupt before it enters into the scheme.275 
4.3.2.4 Doctrine of enterprise liability 
The doctrine of enterprise liability entails that courts should ignore the separate legal 
personality of holding companies and subsidiaries when they function as a single 
integrated enterprise.276 As in the case of substantive consolidation this doctrine has 
not yet been used in bankruptcy proceedings against an originator, and the discussion 
of its possible use is voiced theoretically by commentators. 
 Enterprise liability can either follow from a disregard of the corporate formalities, 
which is similar to piercing of the corporate veil, or it may follow on proving that the 
one corporation is really acting on behalf of the other and is subject to the control of 
the other. The latter form is referred to as ‗agency enterprise liability‘ and is put 
forward by some commentators as an alternative to substantive consolidation to reach 
the assets of the SPV during the bankruptcy of the originator.277 The effect of a 
successful application for enterprise liability is the same as that of substantive 
                                                                                                                                            
272
 Nor is it defined in s 3(a) of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which provides a general 
definition of ‗value‘. 
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 See Jason HP Kravitt Securitization of Financial Assets 2 ed (2008) at 5-182. 
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 See Lupica 1998 Texas LR at 648; Frost 1997 Tulane LR at 115. 
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 Frost 1997 Tulane LR at 115. 
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 Kale 2003 Bankruptcy Developments J at 338. The doctrine is available under state law and is 
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 Kale 2003 Bankruptcy Developments J at 339. 
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
200 
consolidation: the assets of the subsidiary will be available for the creditors of the 
holding company. 
 The possibility of invoking enterprise liability in the United States is a result of the 
corporate structure often found between the originator and the SPV. The SPV is often 
a wholly owned subsidiary of the originator, which means that it is easier to show that 
the two companies function as one economic entity.278 
 However, there are considerations that make a finding of enterprise liability more 
difficult. As in the case of substantive consolidation, the court will take into account 
the possible prejudice to the creditors of the affiliated company if a finding of 
enterprise liability is made.279 A further point of uncertainty is whether the bankruptcy 
trustee will have standing to invoke enterprise liability on behalf of the creditors of 
the estate. Outside bankruptcy, only the creditors of the holding company will have 
standing to pursue the remedy. The issue has not yet been resolved, and each state 
takes its own view on the matter.280 
4.4  CONCLUSION 
Sales of the type of asset most commonly used during securitisation transactions must 
adhere to the requirements of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. If a 
transaction is a sale, the transferred assets will no longer form part of the transferor‘s 
estate. However, Article 9 does not contain guidance as to when a transaction is a 
sale.281 Such guidance must instead be found in precedent from the individual states 
on when it is necessary to recharacterise a purported sale as a secured loan.282  
Recharacterisation is a risk for securitisation, because the rating assigned to the 
securities issued by the SPV is dependent on a finding that the assets are permanently 
severed from the estate of the originator by way of a true sale and will therefore not 
be affected by the possible bankruptcy of the originator. The rating agencies rely on 
opinions by legal council in this regard. 
Contrary to the approach in English law, legislation in the United States on federal 
and state level aims to clarify and simplify the legal position with regard to 
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securitisation.283 However, this does not extend as far as creating a federal ‗true sale 
safe harbour‘ for securitisation transactions as is found in the state of Delaware. A 
‗true sale safe harbour‘ was proposed as an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code in 
2001, but the proposals were subsequently abandoned.284 It follows that the 
characterisation of the transaction as a sale remains important in the event of the 
originator‘s bankruptcy.  
My analysis of the legislative provisions surrounding securitisation further shows 
that several uncertainties remain about the efficiency of securitisation as a financing 
tool.285 There are specific concerns that securitisation may cause prejudice to 
unsecured creditors of the originator for which they cannot renegotiate interest rates 
and which therefore goes uncompensated. There are also concerns that securitisation 
removes cash-generating assets from the originator, who may subsequently be unable 
to reorganise, should it land in economic difficulty. I have set out the arguments for 
and against these points of view. I favour the view expressed by Schwarcz that 
securitisation probably does not cause harm to unsecured creditors that outweigh the 
benefits of the financing tool. However, a more definite picture should emerge when 
the efficiency of securitisation has been empirically tested. 
The brief description of consumer protection legislation shows that even in the 
United States, where securitisation has a much longer history than in South Africa, 
legislation cannot keep track with the rapid evolution of the practices that accompany 
this form of financing.286 
Courts take one of two approaches when considering the characterisation of a 
transaction, namely a scoring approach or an all-equities approach. The former takes 
into account a list of considerations that courts have previously determined to show 
that a transaction was either a sale or a secured loan. The transaction type that 
receives the most ticks wins the characterisation race. In the all-equities approach the 
court considers all parties who will benefit or will be prejudiced by recharacterisation 
and then takes a decision that will favour most interested parties. There have as yet 
been no cases where a recharacterisation of securitisation transactions has been 
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considered, but in factoring transactions the scoring approach has so far been 
favoured.287 
I considered the equitable doctrine of substantive consolidation as applied by the 
courts at state level.288 The approach of the court in the Third Circuit is to refuse an 
application for substantive consolidation if it would cause harm to a specific creditor, 
because that creditor extended credit to one entity based on its belief that the entity is 
separate from the other. The consolidation must benefit all the creditors of the merged 
entities. Furthermore, substantive consolidation is not to be used as an offensive tool 
to prejudice one group of creditors in favour of another group. If this approach is to be 
applied more widely than the Third Circuit, and it seems to me to be sound, 
substantive consolidation ought not to be a substantial risk to securitisation 
transactions. This is because it is easy to keep a clear corporate distinction between an 
originator and the SPV. Furthermore, the expectations of the creditors of the SPV will 
be that the SPV will be treated as an entity separate from the originator.  
It seems that a securitisation scheme should not often be at risk of avoidance in 
terms of the provisions of the Backruptcy Code.289 The SPV will usually not be a 
creditor of the originator in terms of section 547 and even if it were a creditor, one or 
more of the exceptions under that section will probably apply to the transaction. The 
transaction will usually not be a fraudulent transfer in terms of section 548, because it 
does not carry one of the ‗badges of fraud‘ associated with such transactions and is 
not conducted in secret. Nor will it be a constructively fraudulent transfer, because 
reasonable equivalent value is given in return for the transfer of the assets and the 
transaction will seldom leave the originator bankrupt or be carried out whilst the 
originator is bankrupt. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DEBT FINANCING OF COMPANIES 
5.1 COMPANY DEBT 
A company obtains the funds it needs to conduct its business from two possible 
sources.
1
 The first source is share capital obtained from the issue of shares to 
shareholders, also called ‗equity financing‘.2 The second source is funds obtained 
from outside parties in the form of loans or credit supplied, also called ‗debt 
financing‘. Funds obtained from long- and short-term creditors together represent 
‗external equities‘ on the balance sheet of a company. From these two sources a 
company can reach a wide variety of potential investors, ranging from single persons 
to large institutional investors such as pension funds. The ability of a company to 
attract large investments is one of its advantages as a business form.3 
A company may decide to opt for debt rather than equity financing for a variety of 
reasons.
4
 Compared to equity, debt financing is a relatively cheap way to raise 
money.
5
 Furthermore, unless the current shareholders can afford to raise the additional 
funds themselves, the issue of new equity dilutes ownership.
6
 Debt financing may also 
have favourable tax implications, since the payment of interest is considered an 
expense that leads to lowered taxable income.
7
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Cilliers et al Corporate Law at 199–200. 
2
 On share capital generally, see Kathleen Emmarencia van der Linde Aspects of the Regulation of 
Share Capital and Distributions to Shareholders (2008 thesis Unisa). 
3
 See also SJ Naudé Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur met Besondere Verwysing na die 
Interne Maatskappyverband (1970) at 2. 
4
 Keith Ward Corporate Financial Strategy (1993) at 174. 
5
 Michael J Barclay & Clifford W Smith Jr ―The Capital Structure Puzzle: Another Look at the 
Evidence‖ in Donald H Chew The New Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice 3 ed 
(2001) at 209. 
6
 See Barclay & Smith in Chew New Corporate Finance at 200 fn 6 for an example of this principle. 
Suppose a company has 100 members. It needs further capital of R100 and it is decided that 100 
shares of R1 each will be issued to raise this capital. If the original 100 members take up all the 
freshly issued shares there will still only be 100 members of the company. However, if 100 other 
persons take up these shares there will now be 200 members, each with voting rights and rights to 
dividends. This means that the original 100 members will now have a smaller slice of the cake when 
decisions are taken and dividends declared. 
7 Merton H Miller ―The Modigliani-Miller Propositions after Thirty Years‖ in Chew New Corporate 
Finance at 189 refers to interest payments as the ‗costs of doing business‘. In this article the writer 
examines his propositions set out in conjunction with Franco Modigliani in an article ―The Cost of 
Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment‖ (1958) 47 American Economic Review 
261 and (1959) 48 at 655. The gist of these propositions is that the value of a firm is independent of 
its capital structure (its debt–equity ratio). They then postulate that the gains from using debt capital 
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5.1.1 Gearing 
The higher a company‘s debt is in relation to its equity (debt-equity ratio), the greater 
the possibility of higher returns for shareholders when the company‘s business 
performs well. This is referred to as ‗gearing‘ and may be explained as follows:
8
 
 If a company has 100 ordinary shareholders who each holds one share at a par 
value of R1 000 and debentures of R100 000 bearing interest at 10 per cent per 
annum, the company has raised capital of R200 000 and its debt-equity ratio is 1:1. 
The company will have to show an annual profit of at least R10 000 to pay the interest 
due. If the company shows a profit of less than R10 000, the shareholders will not 
receive any dividends. However, all the profit above R10 000 will, depending on 
management‘s strategy, be available for dividends. If the company is performing well, 
it can afford to have fewer shareholders who receive a higher return on investment.  
Suppose the same company shows a profit of R100 000. In the given scenario the 
first R10 000 must go towards the service of the debt instrument. R90 000 is still 
available for dividend distribution, which means that each shareholder may receive up 
to R900 in dividends.  
Now suppose that the company did not make use of gearing, but chose to raise all 
its capital by way of equity. It raised R200 000 from the issuance of 200 shares at a 
par value of R1 000 each to 200 shareholders. The full R100 000 is available for 
dividend distribution, but since it has to be divided by 200, each shareholder may 
receive a maximum of R500 in dividends. 
It is obvious that the company in this example could afford even higher gearing. 
Suppose the company converted 50 of its ordinary shares into preference shares, 
redeemable at the option of the company, and the company redeems them. It then 
                                                                                                                                            
is offset by the increase in risk to the holders of equity capital. However, these propositions rest on 
the assumption that there are no external influences due to tax, imperfect information, transaction 
costs and bankruptcy costs. These propositions were later elaborated on by the authors in ―Corporate 
Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction‖ (1963) 53 American Economic Review 433. 
They argued that income tax may be significantly reduced by using debt, which in turn leads to 
higher returns for shareholders. Miller comes to the conclusion that recent developments in taxation 
law in the United States of America mean that the benefits of debt capital for that country remain 
unchanged since the publication by Modigliani and himself of their 1963 article. Barclay & Smith in 
Chew New Corporate Finance at 199 make the valid comment that many financing theories fail to 
consider the fact that the investor will have to pay income tax on interest received. In other words, 
debt may have tax benefits for the company but not for the investor. 
8 
For very interesting case discussions of the dynamics of debt policy in the financial strategy of 
companies, see W Carl Kester, William F Fruhan Jr, Thomas R Piper & Richard S Ruback Case 
Problems in Finance 11 ed (1997) at 147–216. The simple example that follows forms the basis of 
many aspects considered by companies when deciding on the extent of their exposure to debt. 
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continues to raise R50 000 through the issuance of further debentures on the same 
terms as the first series of debentures. The company still has capital in the amount of 
R200 000 but it now has a debt–equity ratio of 3:1.
9
  
Suppose the company shows a profit of R100 000. It pays R15 000 in interest on its 
debt instruments. It still has R85 000 available for dividend distribution. However, 
there are now only 50 shareholders. This means that each shareholder may receive up 
to R1 700 in dividends.
10
  
From this example one may draw the following conclusions: first, debt is only a 
truly viable option to raise finances if the company is mature, meaning that it has 
reached its full economic potential within a specific industry.
11
 Second, there is 
always the risk that the financial situation of the company may change for the worse, 
in which case the shareholders carry the risk of no or little return on their investment. 
This is often cited as one of the reasons why companies may opt not to use debt 
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 For the sake of simplifying the example, the costs of conversion and of the further issuance of the 
debentures will not be discussed. Another factor that is usually considered is the terms of repayment 
of the debt. If the debt becomes repayable in yearly instalments, this must be incorporated in the 
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Carriers, Inc‖ in Kester et al Case Problems at 147–149 and ―Crown Corporation‖ in Kester et al 
Case Problems at 205–209. 
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 Michael C Jensen ―Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers‖ (1986) 76 
American Economic Review at 324; Barclay & Smith in Chew New Corporate Finance at 200 and 
207 show that debt is especially attractive to large, mature public companies with large cash flows 
that cannot be profitably reinvested in the company. This may lead to an inclination by managers to 
sustain growth in the company at the expense of profitability, due to overinvestment in the 
company‘s core business or due to diversification into unfamiliar areas. Coupled with the principle 
of gearing explained above, higher interest payments may be a more effective way of distributing 
the excess cash. Building on this reasoning, debt is seen as a less suitable option for high-growth 
companies (see Bennett Stewart in Bank of America Roundtable on the Link between Capital 
Structure and Shareholder Value held at Pebble Beach, California (June 25, 1997) in Chew New 
Corporate Finance at 266–267). In these companies financial flexibility is seen as more urgent than 
savings on tax or control benefits. Since free cash can be channelled into profitable investment 
opportunities, debt becomes less necessary. See also Myers 1977 JFE at 170. 




 This risk may be countered by vesting both control of the shareholding 
and the risky debt in the same institution or person.
13
 
It should be borne in mind that lenders will insist on monitoring the company to 
ensure that their investment and security are not at risk. This may lead to some 
operational restrictions on the company. However, some argue that higher leveraging 
in a company leads to better management, since managers must work harder to reach 
the interest targets created by debt capital and that it also leads to a more conservative 




 commented that because 
increased debt usually leads to more concentrated ownership of shares – often in the 
hands of insiders – the incentive for stricter control is also increased.  
5.1.2 Insider debt 
Operational restrictions that come with monitoring arrangements, sometimes referred 
to as ‗restrictive covenants‘ in English law, may make debt less attractive for small 
high-growth companies, because they need to invest in research and development in 
order to achieve ultimate sustainability. Restrictive covenants serve as a disincentive 
for these companies to opt for debt financing. A further reason why start-up 
                                                 
12
 See Miller in Chew New Corporate Finance at 185 and 190; Barclay & Smith in Chew New 
Corporate Finance at 200. Companies may also decide not to make use of their full debt potential in 
order to retain the flexibility of emergency reserves. See Miller & Modigliani 1963 American 
Economic Rev at 441. 
13
 Miller in Chew New Corporate Finance at 191–192. According to the author this strategy is often 
used successfully in Japan, where the debt–equity ratios are higher than in the United States. 
14
 See Miller in Chew New Corporate Finance at 191–192. The financing theories of ‗signalling‘ and 
the ‗pecking order‘ are also relevant. Signalling entails that debts are considered a credible ‗signal‘ 
to investors that the company is undervalued, because managers that believe their assets are 
undervalued will rather issue debt than equity. For example, if the company‘s shares are trading at 
200 cents per share, but the managers believe the share is really worth 220 cents, a new issue of 
shares will generate 20 cents per share less capital for the company than the managers know the 
shares to be worth. Debt now becomes more attractive. The ‗pecking order‘ entails that new 
investments should be financed from the cheapest available source of funds. According to this 
theory, the first option should always be internal funding (retained earnings), followed by debt (due 
to the reasoning followed in signalling) and as a last resort, equity. However, case studies show 
mixed reliability of the theories of signalling and the pecking order, because many companies take 
financing decisions directly contradicting these assumptions. It is therefore best to keep them in 
mind but not to attach too much significance to these theories. See Barclay & Smith in Chew New 
Corporate Finance at 201–202 and 205–206. Myers 1977 JFE at 161 argues that managers accept 
monitoring costs, because they have decided that it will benefit the company to accept them. In other 
words, though the managers may complain about operational restrictions, they probably traded the 
acceptance of the covenants for lower interest rates.  
15
 At the ―Bank of America Roundtable‖ discussed in Chew New Corporate Finance at 250. See also 
the comments of Cheryl Francis at 257. 
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companies may avoid debt is that such companies often do not have assets to offer as 
security, which means that they are charged higher interest rates.
16
 
 When these companies decide to raise debt financing, they prefer to make use of 
bank loans or privately placed debt. Privately placed debt is debt placed at a selected 
few investors rather than the larger public, therefore often with institutional 
investors.
17
 Bank loans and privately placed debt have been termed ‗insider debt‘, 
referring to the situation where the lender is privy to more management information 
than the general public because it serves on the board of the company or on some of 
its management structures.  
The use of ‗insider debt‘ by smaller companies has several potential advantages. 
Assuming that the bank has better knowledge of, and thus more confidence in, a 
company‘s ability to comply with the loan, it may be willing to provide the debt at a 
better interest rate. Banks may be in a better position to monitor the company and 
there may be more confidentiality of the venture to be financed by the loan. Lastly, 




A secondary motivation for using bank loans or private debt, which applies to both 
large and small companies, is that stock market reaction to the issuance of public debt 
is more negative. A possible reason for this is that investors regard the longer dates of 
maturity associated with public debt (on average 20 years) as a negative signal, 
namely that the management of the company is not positive about the company‘s 
long-term credit position. By contrast, bank loans and private debt usually have 
shorter maturity dates, which indicate management‘s expectations of a positive cash 
                                                 
16
 Michael J Barclay & Clifford W Smith Jr ―On Financial Architecture: Leverage, Maturity, and 
Priority‖ in Chew New Corporate Finance at 214–217. Lenders still insist on security when 
providing finance to small high-risk companies. This often takes the form of security by means of 
receivables. The authors quote (at 220) the Chief Financial Officer of an American bank that 
specializes in providing finance to Silicon Valley technology firms: ―Secure everything you can. 
Attaching assets not only increases your chances of getting paid back, but also deters borrowers 
from bringing in junior creditors. Junior creditors are likely to cause big problems if the firm has 
trouble servicing the debt.‖ 
17
 Eugene F Fama ―What‘s Different about Banks?‖ (1985) 15 Journal of Monetary Economics at 36–
38; Cristopher James & Peggy Wier ―Are Bank Loans Different?: Some Evidence from the Stock 
Market‖ in Chew New Corporate Finance at 326. See also Oditah Global Securities Market at 93–
94. 
18
 James & Wier in Chew New Corporate Finance at 328. 




 They also signal that banks, with their improved ability to assess the company, 
regard the company as creditworthy.
20
 
From the above it may be concluded that some of the factors that a company‘s 
management will keep in mind when choosing between equity and debt financing are: 
 debt financing can be beneficial to shareholders 
 the risks associated with debt financing are less in companies that have reached 
maturity in their specific industries 
 debt financing is a less-attractive financing option for small, high-growth 
companies, because the restrictive agreements contained in debt financing 
agreements may conflict with their aims of research and development  
 if they do decide on debt financing, smaller companies will often prefer ‗insider 
debt‘ 
 even mature companies may prefer ‗insider debt‘ in order to avoid negative 
signalling caused by the issuance of debt securities on a securities exchange. 
5.2 DEBENTURES 
The South African Companies Act21 provides for the issuance of one specific form of 
corporate debt, namely debentures.22 A discussion of debentures is important in the 
context of securitisation, because the SPV will usually issue debentures as a means of 
obtaining funds for the purchase of the assets from the originator.23 
                                                 
19
 James & Wier in Chew  New Corporate Finance at 331–332. 
20
 Fama 1985 JME at 37. 
21
 61 of 1973, ss 116–131. Debentures are sometimes referred to as ‗bonds‘. 
22
 On debentures generally, see Blackman et al Commentary at 5-325 et seq. There are two licensed 
securities exchanges in South Africa that offer facilities for the trade of debt securities, namely 
Yield-X on the JSE Limited and the Bond Exchange of South Africa. See generally JG van der 
Merwe, RB Appleton, PA Delport, RW Furney, DP Mahony & M Koen as edited by MK Havenga, 
IM Esser, WD Geach, N Locke, MR Vermaas & DP Mahony South African Corporate Business 
Administration (2008) at 10-37 et seq. The Bond Exchange of South Africa defines a ‗bond‘ as ―an 
interest-paying debt instrument with a redemption date of one year or more after its issuance‖ 
(www.bondexchange.co.za (accessed 31 October 2008)). Since the Companies Act 61 of 1973 does 
not qualify debentures in terms of their redemption date, it can be said that all bonds are debentures, 
but not all debentures will qualify as bonds. 
23
 See ch 2 for a discussion of the form and function of securitisation. 
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5.2.1 Definition 
The meaning of the term ‗debenture‘ has not yet been adequately defined in South 
African law.24 
In terms of section 1(1) of the Companies Act,25 a debenture includes debenture 
stock, debenture bonds and any other securities of a company, whether constituting a 
charge on the assets of the company or not. This is clearly not an attempt to define the 
term ‗debenture‘. 
According to Cilliers and Benade,26 no comprehensive definition of the term has 
been formulated. They provide an ordinary commercial definition according to which 
a ‗debenture‘ means ―a document or certificate issued by a company designating itself 
a debenture, which acknowledges the indebtedness of a stated sum of money, and 
specifies the rate of interest and the repayment dates and conditions of repayment‖.27  
Henochsberg28 defines a ‗debenture‘ as ―any document, however it may be 
described, and whatever form it may take, which creates or acknowledges 
indebtedness in the company to another for moneys advanced or to be advanced on 
loan‖. According to the authors, the phrase ―and any other securities of the company‖ 
in section 1(1) of the Companies Act refers to ―documents embodying obligations of 
the company to repay moneys advanced or to be advanced on loan which are secured 
by property whether owned by the company or by another‖.29 This interpretation 
constitutes a replication of their definition of ‗debenture‘. Furthermore, there is 
nothing to suggest that these ‗securities‘ will be secured. In fact, the Companies Act 
states unambiguously that these securities need not necessarily constitute a charge30 
on the assets of the company.  
                                                 
24
 A precise definition is also still lacking in English law. See Davies Gower and Davies‟ Principles at 
807–809. 
25
 61 of 1973. 
26
 Cilliers et al Corporate Law at 235. See also Pretorius et al Hahlo‟s at 170; MS Blackman et al 
―Companies‖ in WA Joubert et al The Law of South Africa Vol 4 (1995) at 203–204. 
27
 Cilliers et al Corporate Law at 236. 
28




 ‗Charge‘ is a term used in English law to refer to equitable security over property. See par 3.2. South 
African law does not know this form of security and its use in the Companies Act is therefore 
unsound. 
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This use of the word ‗securities‘ in the definition provided in the Companies Act is 
unfortunate. Elsewhere reference is made to the Securities Services Act31 for a 
definition of the term.32 There ‗securities‘ are widely defined.33 It could not have been 
the intention of the legislature that the definition used there should be read into the 
definition of debentures, since that would mean that the term ‗debentures‘ includes 
‗shares‘. I submit that ‗securities‘ was probably included to cover all miscellaneous 
cases of debt owed by the company, specifically in the course of raising capital,34 
whether secured or unsecured and regardless of whether it is documented in the way a 
debenture usually is. 
The definition provided by Blackman35 is, in my opinion, so far the best attempt at 
defining debentures: 
 
In the context of company law, a debenture is essentially a written acknowledgement of 
indebtedness, irrespective of its form, executed by the company, which may (but need not) include 
terms providing for the indebtedness to be secured by a charge over property of the company. 
 
There should not be a strong emphasis on the document that evidences the 
acknowledgement. The use of the term ‗debenture‘ was received into South African 
law from English law.36 South African courts relied on English judicial interpretation 
to understand the scope of ‗debenture‘. In the early English decision English and 
                                                 
31
 36 of 2004. 
32
 See, for instance, ss 91A(1), 134(c) and 140A(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The Stock 
Exchanges Control Act 1 of 1985 was repealed by the Security Services Act 36 of 2004 which 
provides for the definition of ‗securities‘ in s 1. 
33
 Section 1 of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 defines ‗securities‘ as follows: “securities” – (a) 
means – (i) shares, stocks and depository receipts in public companies and other equivalent equities, 
other than shares in a share block company as defined in the Share Blocks Control Act, 1980 (Act 
No. 45 of 2002); (ii) notes; (iii) derivative instruments; (iv) bonds; (v) debentures; (vi) participatory 
interests in a collective investment scheme as defined in the Collective Investment Schemes Control 
Act, 2002 (Act No. 45 of 2002), and units or any other form of participation in a foreign collective 
investment scheme approved by the Registrar of Collective Investments Schemes in terms of   
section 65 of that Act; (vii) units or any other form of participation in a collective investment 
scheme licenced or registered in a foreign country; (viii) instruments based on an index; (ix) the 
securities contemplated in subparagraphs (i) to (viii) that are listed on an external exchange; and (x) 
an instrument similar to one or more of the securities contemplated in subparagraphs (i) to (ix) 
declared by the registrar by notice in the Gazette to be a security for the purposes of this Act; (xi) 
rights in the securities referred to in subparagraphs (i) to (x); (b) excludes – (i) money market 
instruments except for the purposes of Chapter IV; and (ii) any security contemplated in paragraph 
(a) specified by the registrar by notice in the Gazette. 
34
 As opposed to trade credit extended by suppliers. 
35
 Blackman et al Commentary at 5-326. 
36
 See ch 1 n 13 for a description of the development of South African company law legislation. 
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Scottish Mercantile Investment Company, Limited v Brunton37 the Court of Appeal 
distinguished between three usual forms of debentures, namely an acknowledgement 
of debt38 
1 under seal 
2 coupled with a charge on the property of the company to secure the repayment of 
the debt 
3 coupled with a charge on the property of the company and an agreement that the 
company is restricted from giving a prior charge to a third party. 
 
The definition of English and Scottish Mercantile Investment Company, Limited v 
Brunton was accepted unchanged into South African law in Coetzee v Rand Sporting 
Club.39 The Rand Sporting Club never issued debentures to Coetzee, acknowledging a 
debt of £1 600 at 12,5 per cent interest. The agreement was that the principal amount 
would become payable upon the non-payment of such interest for one month. The 
Rand Sporting Club remained in arrears and Coetzee called in the money lent and the 
interest due. It was then alleged by the Rand Sporting Club by means of an exception 
that the agreement was only for the issuance of debentures, and that the debentures 
should be issued first before the plaintiff could sue for the principal amount and 
interest. 
                                                 
37
 English & Scottish Mercantile Investment Co v Brunton [1892] 2 QB 700 CA. Earlier attempts by 
English courts to interpret the definition of ‗debenture‘ were also not very conclusive. In Edmonds v 
Blaina Furnaces Company; Beesley v Blaina Furnaces Company [1887] 36 Ch 215 the Court found 
that ‗debenture‘ has no real definition, but that it is often used to describe instruments of a company 
of which a register must be kept, even though the terms used in the Companies Act of 1862 were 
‗mortgages‘ and ‗charges‘. These obligations or covenants to pay a debt are then usually 
accompanied by a charge or security (at 219). This decision was followed in Levy v Abercorris Slate 
and Slab Company [1887] 37 Ch 260 at 263. The Court refused to accept an argument that a 
debenture must necessarily follow in a series of instruments and accepted that a single debenture 
may also be issued. A ‗debenture‘ was described as a document that either created a debt or 
acknowledged it, but the Court refused to be any more restrictive in giving a definition (at 264). A 
document will be treated as a debenture if the legal effects intended by the document are those of a 
debenture, regardless of whether the document was called something different (at 265). It is 
noteworthy that these early cases are contemporaneous with the decisions that founded the definition 
of the floating charge in English law. See in this regard par 3.2.1. This may be one reason why 
debentures and floating charges are so closely associated and often ill-distinguished. See In re 
Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200 at 214: ―The floating charge was invented by Victorian lawyers to 
enable manufacturing and trading companies to raise loan capital on debentures. It could offer the 
security of a charge over the whole of the company‘s undertaking without inhibiting its ability to 
trade.‖  
38
 At 712. Also see British India Steam Navigation Company v The Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
(1881) 7 QBD 165 at 172. 
39
Coetzee v Rand Sporting Club 1918 WLD 74 at 76–77. 
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 The Court held that a company could not through a refusal to deliver a debenture 
deed evade its obligation to pay interest. I agree with the Court‘s approach, namely 
that any definition of a debenture cannot revolve around the document that evidences 
it, but should rather focus on the loan agreement.  
A debenture document is to a debenture what a share certificate is to a share.40 A 
share certificate evidences the title of the shareholder. The person registered as a 
member of a company may be a nominee of the real owner of the share.41 Therefore, 
the register of members and the share certificate are only prima facie evidence of the 
ownership of shares.42 Share certificates are not negotiable instruments.43 A ‗share‘ in 
the company has a legal meaning separate from the certificate that evidences it, 
namely ―a bundle, or conglomerate, of personal rights entitling the holder thereof to a 
certain interest in the company, its assets and dividends‖.44 
Similarly a ‗debenture‘ should be defined, without reference to the document that 
evidences it, as a claim against a company, issued by a company to meet its capital 
requirements, where the holder is usually entitled to interest at specified intervals and 
repayment of the capital amount at a specified time. The contract between the 
debenture-holder and the company may also provide for other rights and obligations. 
However, the emphasis is on the nature of the debenture as a claim and the fact that it 
is issued for the capital requirements of the company which implies a longer term of 
maturity for the loan than that granted by trade creditors.45 This point of view is 
                                                 
40
 This conclusion is supported by s 126(4) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, which provides that a 
debenture or debenture certificate is prima facie evidence of the title of the person named therein. 
‗Debenture‘ here refers to the document, but it is only given evidentiary importance. 
41
 Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 666; Oakland Nominees 
(Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (A) at 453. 
42
 Section 94(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
43
 On the definition of ‗shares‘ and the legal effect of share certificates generally, see Pretorius et al 
Hahlo at 148–149 and 168–169. See further Van der Linde Share Capital at 259 et seq. 
44
 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 (1) SA 276 (A) at 288. 
45
 PA Delport Die Verkryging van Kapitaal in die Suid-Afrikaanse Maatskappyereg met Spesifieke 
Verwysing na die Aanbod van Aandele aan die Publiek (1987 thesis UP) at 87 places the emphasis 
on the document: ―Alhoewel die skepping of erkenning van ‘n skuld die voorvereiste vir ‘n 
skuldbrief is, is dit duidelik dat die begrip skuldbrief nie slegs op die onderliggende skuld dui nie 
maar veral op die dokument waarin die skuld beliggaam is.‖ However, the authority he offers for 
this point of view deals with bearer debentures (Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd v 
Custodian of Enemy Property 1923 AD 576 at 580). Delport agrees that the current lack of a proper 
definition is unsatisfactory (at 115–116). 
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enhanced by the fact that debt securities may be traded in dematerialised form on the 
Bond Exchange of South Africa and on the JSE Limited via Yield-X.46  
Unless specifically issued as bearer debentures, debentures are non-negotiable 
instruments. The document is more important for the definition of a ‗debenture‘ if it is 
a bearer debenture.47 A ‗bearer debenture‘ is a negotiable instrument and may be 
transferred by mere delivery of the document without notice to the company.48 A bona 
fide transferee for value takes the bearer debenture free from the defects of title of the 
transferor.  
The various definitions explored above and the provisions of the Companies Act 
specific to debentures lead to the following summary: 
 A debenture-holder is a creditor of the company. As such he is entitled to interest 
and repayment of the capital amount advanced (redemption) as indicated by the 
terms of the issue.  
 These terms, or conditions, must be indicated on the debenture document, 
otherwise the document will not be prima facie evidence of the debenture-holder‘s 
title to the debenture.49 This is then also the primary function of the debenture 
document, also referred to as the ‗debenture certificate‘. 
                                                 
46
 ‗Dematerialisation‘ refers to the elimination of physical certificates or documents of title which 
represent the ownership of securities so that the securities exist only as electronic records (Strate Ltd 
Draft Bonds Blueprint Version 3.9 (2006) at 57). Approximately 34 per cent of debt securities traded 
on the Bond Exchange of South Africa were certificated in March 2006 (Strate Ltd Bonds Blueprint 
at 5). All new listed bonds are issued in immobilised format, except for National Treasury and 
Eskom Bonds. Strate Ltd sets as an objective that all securities should be dematerialised (Strate Ltd 
Bonds Blueprint at 15). It recommends that any new security that is not dematerialised should not be 
allowed to be listed on the Bond Exchange or Yield-X and that existing certificated securities traded 
on the Bond Exchange must be reduced (Strate Ltd Bonds Blueprint at 16). Strate Ltd identifies the 
reluctance by issuers to dematerialise as a constraint on these objectives (Strate Ltd Bonds Blueprint 
at 39). The International Organisation of Securities Commissions has issued 19 Recommendations 
for Securities Settlement Systems. Recommendation 6 is that securities should be dematerialised to 
the greatest degree possible (Strate Ltd Bonds Blueprint at 47). Strate Ltd aims to adhere to 
international best practice. 
47
 Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd v Custodian of Enemy Property 1923 AD 576 at 580: ―A 
bearer debenture is an acknowledgment of debt in favour of the holder as a creditor of the Company 
for the specified amount with a right to interest therein as stipulated.‖ See also Blackman et al 
Commentary at 5-349. 
48
 Meskin et al Henochsberg at 230; Blackman et al Commentary at 5-349. 
49
 Section 126(1) read with s 126(4) of the Companies At 61 of 1973. See also Blackman et al 
Commentary at 5-349. 
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 Debentures can be secured or unsecured.50 This must also be clearly indicated on 
the debenture certificate. Debentures issued by an SPV will always be secured by 
the assets transferred from the originator.51 
 
The registration of debenture-holders,52 the issuance of debenture certificates,53 the 
transfer of debentures54 and the holding of a debenture by a nominee55 are regulated by 
the Companies Act in a manner similar to shares. These aspects are less important for 
purposes of this discussion. 
5.2.2 Debenture stock 
Debentures may be issued in series where every debenture represents a separate debt. 
Alternatively, a single debt may be created and debenture stock certificates issued to 
subscribers in such amounts as each wants, usually subject to a prescribed minimum 
amount.56 The holder of debenture stock certificates is a participant with the other 
holders in the whole of the stock. He may sell and transfer any fraction of the amount 
issued to him. 
 Although the individual debenture stockholders are issued with debenture stock 
certificates, the contract is usually entered into between the company and the trustees 
for the debenture stockholders.57 The trustees are the creditors of the company and the 
debenture stockholders are only the beneficiaries of the trust. The contract may 
provide that interest and repayment of the loan is made to the trustees, or it may 
provide that the company will make payment directly to each debenture stockholder. 
Such an arrangement does not, however, change the character of the scheme. The 
debenture stockholders are not creditors of the company. Consequently, a debenture 
                                                 
50
 Sections 116 and 117 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. See also par 5.4 below. 
51
 This process was discussed in ch 2.  
52
 Sections 128–130 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
53
 Section 91A of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. For a discussion of the issuance of debentures, see FJ 
Dreyer ―Praktiese Aspekte Rakende die Uitreiking van Skuldbriewe as Wyse om Beleggersfondse te 
Mobiliseer‖ (1993) 2 TSAR 287.  
54
 Sections 133–169 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
55
 Section 140A of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
56
 Blackman et al Commentary at 5-328. 
57
 See also par 2.8.2.2.3. 
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stockholder will usually not have remedies against the company, but will have to take 
action against the trustee in case of default. 
The issuance of debenture stock as explained above is much more satisfactory 
from a theoretical point of view when the trustee holds security in favour of the 
debenture-holders. Since they are equal beneficiaries under the trust, the debenture 
stockholders will rank pari passu without any need for legislative intervention as is 
the case with debentures issued in series.58 More importantly, the trustee for debenture 
stockholders will be both the creditor and the security taker of the company. Such a 
construction therefore complies with the accessory nature of real security rights.  
5.2.3 Security 
The rest of this chapter evaluates one further aspect that may influence the company‘s 
decision whether to raise further finance by way of equity or debt financing, namely 
the company‘s ability to provide adequate security to the lender.  
Debentures may be secured by the movable and immovable property of a 
company.59 The binding of movable property as security for debentures may be 
effected through pledge,60 notarial bond61 and cession in securitatem debiti.62  
A company must keep a register of pledges, cessions, notarial bonds, mortgage 
bonds and notarial debentures63 affecting the property of the company.64 The register 
must give a short description of the encumbered property, as well as the name and 
addresses of the security takers. The idea behind this provision is that it must provide 
                                                 
58
 Section 120 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 provides: ―In any bond or deed of pledge executed in 
favour of a trustee for debenture-holders generally, provision may be made that the debentures 
thereby secured or to be secured may be issued form time to time and at different dates, as the 
company may determine, but all such debentures, whenever issued, shall rank in preference 
concurrently with one another as from the date on which the pledge was constituted or the bond was 
registered.‖ This provision can only have effect if the debentures were issued in series. 
59
 Section 117 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. A debenture must be clearly described as either 
secured or unsecured on the debenture, debenture certificate and in a prospectus relating to the issue 
of debentures (s 125 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973).  
60
 Section 117(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
61
 Section 117(1)(b) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
62
 Section 117(1)(c) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973: ―the pledging of incorporeal rights by means of 
cession of such rights, whether present or future, in due and proper form‖. Obviously this section 
does not distinguish between a pledge of rights and a fiduciary security cession, but it is broad 
enough so that both forms of security by means of claims are possible. 
63
 In terms of s 119 if a debenture was executed  before a notary public, it may be registered in the 
deeds registry as if it were a notarial bond. 
64
 Section 127 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
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a means for third parties, including investors, to ascertain the creditworthiness of a 
company.65  
Although section 117 is included in that part of the Act that deals with debentures, 
it is not restricted to security granted in favour of debenture-holders. If the aim of the 
register is that third parties, including potential investors, may gain information about 
the extent to which a company has encumbered its property as security, the register 
ought to include all security granted by a company. This includes security for loans 
other than debentures. 
 It is important that the law allows for effective security to be taken over most of the 
company‘s assets.66 Debentures are usually only in demand when they are secured, 
which makes the availability of security even more important. 
5.2.4 Provisions of Companies Bill 61 of 200867 
The Companies Bill does not contain any definition of ‗debenture‘. Instead, it deals 
with all securities issued by a company that are not shares in clause 43. Clause 
43(1)(a) states that a ‗debt instrument‘ 
 
(i) includes any securities other than the shares of a company, irrespective of whether or not 
issued in terms of a security document, such as a trust deed; but 
(ii) does not include promissory notes and loans, whether constituting an encumbrance on the 
assets of the company or not. 
 
This description does not define a ‗debt instrument‘. Although it is not entirely clear 
from the description above, I do not think that the legislature, by using the word 
‗instrument‘, intends to require debt securities to be issued in documentary form. This 
will not be in accordance with the general objective of dematerialising securities 
offered to the public.68 According to clause 43(1)(b), a security document includes 
 
                                                 
65
 Meskin et al Henochsberg at 235. 
66
 Phillip Wood Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees (1995) at 10 refers to ‗comprehensive 
business security‘ as a universal or general business charge. He defines this as ―security over all of 
the present and future assets of a corporate debtor, including its inventory and receivables.‖ 
According to Wood, the floating charge found in English law is the type of charge that complies 
most with this definition. Although the author does not state so expressly, it seems that he regards 
the possibility of the appointment of a receiver to manage, and possibly to sell, the business as a 
whole as a determining factor in the classification of security as ‗universal‘ or ‗general‘. Recent 
developments in English law have more or less removed this possibility for holders of the floating 
charge. See par 3.2.4. 
67
 For a detailed discussion of the relevant sections of the Bill, see par 6.6. 
68
 See my comments in n 46. 
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any document by which a debt instrument is offered or proposed to be offered, embodying the terms 
and conditions of the debt instrument including, but not limited to, a trust deed or certificate. 
 
The lack of a definition in the Bill means that my comments above on the meaning of 
the term also apply to the Bill. 
 As in the current Act, the Bill requires that the security document must clearly 
indicate whether the debt instrument is secured or unsecured.69 However, the Bill does 
not indicate what forms of security may be used to secure debt instruments. This is to 
be welcomed, because it should be possible to secure debt instruments with any form 
of security available to secure claims generally. An attempt to describe these forms of 
security in the Companies Act only leads to uncertainty.70 
5.3  PURPOSE OF SECURITY 
The most important purpose of security is to ensure payment of the debt. This is 
achieved by providing the lender with priority over other creditors in case of the 
debtor‘s insolvency,
71
 and by providing the lender with a right of recourse against a 
specific asset of the debtor in case of the latter‘s non-performance on the principal 
debt. The priority of a security may be ascertained from the date of registration
72
 or 
from the date on which control was taken of the thing delivered as security.
73
 The 
effectiveness of the security is closely linked to the priority it can give its taker. If 
several security interests are created over the same asset, the one created first in time 
will have priority over those created later in time. This is in accordance with the 
maxim ―qui prior est tempore, potior est iure‖.
74
 
                                                 
69
 Clause 43(4). 
70
 See also my comments in par 2.8.2.2.2.1. 
71
 Goode Legal Problems at 1. 
72
 Priority is determined by the date of the registration for mortgages (s 102 of the Deeds Registries Act 
47 of 1937) and special notarial bonds (s 1(1)(a) of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 
57 of 1993). 
73
 Priority of pledge is determined with reference to the date and time that the pledged object came into 
the control of the pledgee: Hugo de Groot Inleydinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleertheyt 
Bevestigd met Placaten, Hand-Vesten, ouder Herkomen, Rechten & c. & c. Midsgaders Eenige 
Byvoegsels en Aanmerkingen op de zelve, Simon van Groenewegen van der Made (1767) at 2 48 26–
28; Johannes Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 20 1 12 as translated by Percival Gane The 
Selective Voet being the Commentary on the Pandects (Paris edition of 1829) by Johannes Voet 
(1647–1713) and the Supplement to that Work by Johannes van der Linden (1756–1835) (1958); 
Simon Van Leeuwen Het Rooms-Hollandsch Recht 10 ed (1732) at 4 12 1. 
74
 [Priority in time gives priority in law.] See Digesta 20.4.11pr; Codex 8 18 4 (Imp Antoninius):  
“sicut prior es tempore, ita potior iure.‖ [as you are first in time, so you shall have preference in 
law]. Verified from Danielis Elsevirii, Janssonio-Waesbergios, Johannis à Someren, Abraham 
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A secondary purpose of security is to provide its holder with a measure of control 
over the assets of the borrower.
75
 This is especially true if the security is granted over 
a substantial part of the debtor‘s assets. This control may be increased through the use 
of contractual restrictions on the borrower.  
The ability of a borrower to offer security may give it the opportunity to gain 




5.4 SECURING DEBT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
5.4.1 General 
South African law distinguishes two forms of security, namely personal security and 
real security. 
The most common forms of personal security are suretyship and guarantees.
77
 
Suretyship is an accessory contract in terms of which a person (the surety) undertakes 
to the creditor of another (the principal debtor), primarily, that the principal debtor, 
who remains bound, will perform his obligation to the creditor and, secondarily, that 
if and so far as the principal debtor fails to do so, he, the surety, will perform, or 
failing that, indemnify the creditor.78 Guarantee is a contract in terms of which a 
person (the guarantor) undertakes to perform the obligation of the principal debtor 
when the specified circumstances arise.79  
The grantor of personal security makes its personal estate available to the creditor 
in the event of the debtor‘s default, whereas the grantor of real security makes a 
specific object available to the creditor in the event of the debtor‘s default. Real 
security provides the creditor with a limited real right to the security object. The 
creditor may be paid from the execution proceeds of the security object before other 
                                                                                                                                            
Wolfgang & Theodori Boom Corporis Iuris Civilis. Tomus Primus, Quo continentur Institutionem 
Libri Quatuor, et Digestorum five Pandectarum Libri Quinquaginta (1681). 
75
 Goode Legal Problems at 2. 
76
 Goode Legal Problems at 2. 
77
 For the difference between suretyship and guarantee, see CF Forsyth & JT Pretorius Caney‟s The 
Law of Suretyship in South Africa 5 ed (2002) at 30–32. 
78
 Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Frysch 1977 (3) SA 562 (A) at 584F; Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping 
Co (SA) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 1 (A) at 11H; Nedbank v Van Zyl 1990 (2) SA 469 (A) at 473H. 
79
 Forsyth & Pretorius Caney‟s at 30. 
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creditors.80 In the event of the debtor‘s insolvency, secured creditors are paid from the 
proceeds of the security object before other creditors. The most notable forms of real 
security are mortgage, pledge and notarial bonds.81  
A mortgage provides a real security right to the creditor over the immovable 
property of the security grantor. Publicity of the creation of a mortgage is ensured by 
means of registration.82  
Pledge provides a real security right to the creditor over a specific movable object 
of the security grantor. Delivery of the pledged object is necessary to fulfil the 
publicity requirement and thereby effectively constituting the pledge with effect 
against third parties.83 The security grantor loses control of the pledged objects. This 
makes pledge an unsuitable form of security for most businesses, because a business 
usually uses its movable assets in its normal commercial activities.84 For this reason, 
notarial bonds provide a more practical form of security over movable property.  
Notarial bonds provide security over movable property, but the grantor remains in 
control of the security objects. Publicity to third parties takes place by means of 
registration in the Deeds Office.85 South African law recognises two forms of notarial 
bond, namely (1) special notarial bonds and (2) general notarial bonds.86 
The Security by Means of Movable Property Act87 introduced special notarial 
bonds after some confusion had arisen as to the priority of notarial bonds registered 
                                                 
80
 For detailed discussions of real security rights in the South African law, see CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg 2 ed (1989) at 605 et seq; TJ Scott & Susan Scott Wille‟s Law of Mortgage and Pledge in 
South Africa 3ed (1987); Badenhorst et el Silberberg at 357 et seq. 
81
 These security interests are negotiated between the creditor and the security grantor (express 
mortgages), but there are forms of real security that are vested in the creditor by law (tacit 
mortgages). These are the landlord‘s tacit hypothec, the tacit hypothec of the hire-purchase seller 
and liens (rights of retention). For more on these forms of security see Van der Merwe Sakereg at 
698–708 and 711–726, Scott & Scott Wille‟s at 85–105; Badenhorst et el Silberberg at 403 et seq. 
82
 Section 102 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. On mortgage generally, see Scott & Scott 
Wille‟s at 48–52; Badenhorst et al Silberberg at 358 et seq. 
83
 See n 73. 
84
 See Van der Merwe Sakereg at 651–652. On pledge in general, see Scott & Scott Wille‟s at 56–65; 
Badenhorst et el Silberberg at 390–395. 
85
 Section 61(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. Companies need only register the notarial 
bond in the deeds registry for the area in which their registered office is situated (s 62(4)). See also 
Hare v Trustee of Heath (1884–1885) 3 SC 32 at 34. 
86
 ‗Notarial bond‘ is defined in s 102 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 as ―a bond attested by a 
notary public hypothecating movable property generally or specially.‖ On notarial bonds generally, 
see GF Lubbe ―Mortgage and Pledge‖ in WA Joubert et al The Law of South Africa Vol 17 Part 2 2 
ed (2008) at 287 et seq; Badenhorst et al Silberberg at 384 et seq. 
87
 57 of 1993. 
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over specific movable property.
88
 Priority of special notarial bonds is determined with 
reference to the date of registration of the bonds.89  
Section 1 of the Act provides that notarial bonds hypothecating corporeal movable 
property specified and described in the bond in a manner that makes it readily 
recognisable and which were registered after commencement of the Act, provide the 
holder with a real security right in that property similar to pledge, even though no 
delivery of the property took place.  
The following conclusions may be drawn from section 1: 
 Only corporeal movable property may be the subject of a special notarial bond. 
Claims cannot be used as security in this manner,90 nor can intellectual property be 
the object of a special notarial bond. 
 It must be possible to describe the object of the special notarial bond in such a 
manner that it is readily recognisable. This leads to the exclusion of certain 
revolving asset classes, such as stock-in-trade.91 It is also uncertain whether it 
                                                 
88
 In Cooper NO  v Die Meester 1992 (3) SA 60 (A) the Appellate Division, as it then was, held that 
notarial bonds over specifically determined movable property did not give the security holder any 
preference over concurrent creditors with regard to the free residue, unless possession of the goods 
was taken before the insolvency of the debtor. (At 85G: ―Dit volg dat die spesiale notariële verband 
van bepaalde roerende sake in die onderhawige geval nie ‘n statutêre preferensie verleen nie en 
gevolglik het dit geen preferensie bo ander konkurrente skuldeisers ten opsigte van die vrye oorskot 
nie‖.) This was confirmed by the Appellate Division on the same date in Sentraalwes (Koöp) Bpk v 
Die Meester 1992 (3) SA 86 (A). The Cooper decision had significant consequences for many 
security holders, who took this kind of security under the false impression that the priority they 
would receive was either similar to that provided for expressly in Natal by virtue of the Notarial 
Bonds (Natal) Act 18 of 1932, or would at least provide them with a preference similar to that 
provided by a general notarial bond. That Natal Act provided that a notarial bond over specially 
noted movable property enjoyed the same priority as would a pledge, regardless of the absence of 
possession of the goods. The situation was rectified by the Security by Means of Movable Property 
Act 57 of 1993, which basically extended the Natal situation to the rest of the country. The Natal 
Act was repealed (s 3), but case law relating to that Act remains relevant to the application of the 
Security by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993. Special notarial bonds registered before 
commencement of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993 were given a 
preference similar to that of general notarial bonds (s 1(3)). See also JC Sonnekus ―Die Notariële 
Verband: ‘n Bekostigbare Figuur teen Heimlike Sekerheidstelling vir ‘n Nuwe Suid-Afrika?‖ (1993) 
1 TSAR 110; Susan Scott ―Notarial Bonds and Insolvency‖ (1995) 58 THRHR 673; Jeanne Cilliers 
―Notarial Bonds as Security for the Payment of Debts: The Current Legal Position Explained‖ 
(1994) 35 Codicillus 36. On the position in the common law, see n 98. 
89
 Section 1(1)(a) of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993. 
90
 This has been criticised by Scott 1995 THRHR at 683. 
91
 See Ikea Trading und Design AG v BOE Bank Ltd 2005 (2) SA 7 (SCA) at 14I–15B: ―the unique 
item of property must be readily recognisable from its description in the bond … Where a generic 
item is sought to be pledged it is the unique item that is the subject of the pledge and it is not enough 
to describe it only with reference to its generic characteristics.‖ This judgment applied the approach 
in Rosenbach & Co (Pty) Ltd v Dalmonte 1964 (2) SA 195 (N) at 204G–205A where it was stated 
with reference to the Notarial Bonds (Natal) Act 18 of 1932: ―it is not a compliance with the statute 
to describe the assets to be hypothecated in wide general terms, as ‗goods, wares, merchandise, 
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would be possible to describe property to be acquired in future in a readily 
recognisable manner as required by this section. 
 Since a special notarial bond provides the holder with a real security right similar 
to a pledge, the bondholder can follow the property in the hands of a subsequent 
purchaser, regardless of whether the latter was aware of the special notarial 
bond.92 
 
General notarial bonds extend over all the movable property of the security grantor.93 
Control of the security object is unnecessary to establish the bond and the bond may 
also cover claims94 and intellectual property rights of the security grantor.95 As such, it 
is the most comprehensive form of security that a company may grant over its assets 
in South African law. However, unperfected general notarial bonds only provide their 
holders with a preference on the insolvency of the debtor.  
 In the next paragraph I elaborate on this form of security. The discussion of general 
notarial bonds is followed by an overview of security by means of claims. I focus on 
these two forms of security, because they are the means by which claims may be 
offered as security. In this thesis I assume that the assets transferred to the SPV are 
claims. The claims are used as security for the debt instruments issued by the SPV.  
                                                                                                                                            
stock-in-trade, fixtures, fittings, furniture and appliances.‘ It is necessary to know what are the 
goods, wares, merchandise and so on, the nature of them and the types or kind of each of them, and 
also the number of them.‖ This specific description must be contained in the bond document itself. It 
cannot be implied into the bond, since this would depend on the leading of extrinsic evidence of 
facts only known to the parties to the bond and not to outsiders who depend on the information in 
the bond to determine the creditworthiness of the company (Durmalingam v Bruce NO 1964 (1) SA 
807 (D) at 812G–813B with reference to the Notarial Bonds (Natal) Act 18 of 1932 and approved in 
the Ikea Trading decision). See, however, JC Sonnekus ―Omskrywing van Sekerheidsobjekte vir die 
Doeleindes van die Wet op Sekerheidstelling deur Middel van Roerende Goed 57 van 1993‖ 2005 
De Jure at 135–136, where the author argues that the Ikea decision leaves enough scope for the 
objects to be described separately from the registered deed in a register of assets, an inventory list or 
by reference to an identifying mark on the encumbered assets. See also JC Sonnekus 
―Sekerheidsregte: ‘n Nuwe Rigting‖ 1983 TSAR 230 at 245. 
92
 See Bokomo v Standard Bank van SA Bpk 1996 (4) SA 450 (C) at 455F; JC Sonnekus ―Spesiale 
Notariële Verband, Beskikkingsbevoegdheid en Logiese Vooroordeel‖ 1997 TSAR 154. 
93
 South African law does not allow the creation of a general bond over both the movable and 
immovable property of the security grantor. See s 53(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. 
94
 Netherlands Bank of South Africa v Yull‟s Trustee & The United Building Society 1914 WLD 133. 
95
 Rosenbach & Co (Pty) Ltd v Dalmonte 1964 (2) SA 195 (N); Hymie Tucker Finance Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Alloyex (Pty) Ltd 1981 (4) SA 175 (N). See further Lubbe in Joubert et al LAWSA at 360. 
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5.4.2 General notarial bonds 
5.4.2.1 Priority 
An unperfected96 general notarial bond does not provide real security to the holder, 
but only a statutory preference over the unsecured creditors of the company on its 
insolvency.97 This statutory preference is in relation to the entire free residue of the 
debtor company, which includes property and proceeds from any source.98 The 
preference is therefore not limited to the proceeds of the movable property, but 
extends over the proceeds of the total of the estate of the company remaining after the 
appropriate real securities, expenses and earlier preferences have been paid.99 This 
includes the proceeds from immovable property. 
When several unperfected general notarial bonds exist over the movable assets of 
the company, priority is determined with reference to the date of registration of the 
bonds.100 
                                                 
96
 A general notarial bond could be made into a pledge if the bondholder takes control of the security 
objects. This is referred to as perfection. See par 5.4.2.4 below. 
97
 Section 102 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. Also see Lubbe in Joubert et al LAWSA at 362. 
98
 This has always been the position in relation to the general notarial bond. See Philip Sacks ―Notarial 
Bonds in South African Law‖ (1982) 99 SALJ  at 611; Scott & Scott Wille‟s at 68–69. 
99
 In Vrede Koöp Landboumaatskappy Bpk v Uys 1964 (2) SA 283 (O) at 286D it was held that a 
general notarial bond over a part of the debtor‘s movable property, which is essentially an 
unregistered special notarial bond, creates a preference over concurrent creditors, not in terms of the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, but in terms of the common law. This is because the Insolvency Act 24 
of 1936 did not amend or repeal the common law on this matter. However, this does not 
automatically lead to the assumption (as was made by Sacks 1982 SALJ at 613) that only the 
proceeds left from the security objects of such a special notarial bond will be available for this 
preference. See also Scott & Scott Wille‟s at 68. The Vrede Koöp decision was subsequently rejected 
by the Appellate Division in Cooper NO v Die Meester 1992 (3) SA 60 (A) at 85H. The Appellate 
Division held that the legislator intended s 102 to be applicable only to general notarial bonds over 
all the movable property of the debtor (at 85D). A common law preference afforded to special 
notarial bonds would be contrary to the closed number of preferences listed in ss 96–102 of the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (at 85F). The conclusion was that such special notarial bonds do not 
afford any preference to their holders (at 85G). The holders of such special notarial bonds will be 
concurrent creditors of the insolvent estate and such claims will rank lower than subsequent general 
notarial bonds. Since the Cooper decision, the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 
1993 was enacted, which provides for the creation of special notarial bonds (see n 88). Special 
notarial bonds created before the commencement of the Act (7 May 1993) were provided with a 
preference above the concurrent creditors of an insolvent estate similar to that provided to general 
notarial bonds. However, a special notarial bond that does not comply with the provisions of the Act 
will still not provide any preference to its holder above the concurrent creditors of an insolvent 
debtor. This follows, because s 102 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 remains as it was at the time of 
the Cooper decision and the Cooper decision remains the leading authority on this question. See in 
this regard also Bertelsmann et al Mars at 438–439 and 491; Natania Locke ―Security Granted by a 
Company Over its Movable Property: The Floating Charge and the General Notarial Bond 
Compared‖ (2008) 41 CILSA at 143–144. 
100
 Hare v Trustee of Heath (1884–1885) 3 SC 32 at 35. 
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5.4.2.2 Alienation of encumbered security objects 
The holder of a general notarial bond cannot prevent the company from alienating the 
security objects.101 Such disposal leads to the release of the assets from the bond. A 
company may grant real security over the security objects and that real security will 
enjoy priority over the general notarial bondholder even when created after the 
general notarial bond.102 Movables encumbered by a general notarial bond are 
available for attachment by judgment creditors.103 The bondholder cannot follow up 
the property in the hands of the acquirer, unless the acquirer had actual knowledge of 
the notarial bond or did not give value in return.104  
Sacks105 distinguishes this position from the position relating to the hypothecation 
of a shop.106 He argues that the hypothecation of a shop is a distinct device with 
                                                 
101
 Voet Commentarius 20.1.14; Sacks 1982 SALJ at 615; Scott & Scott Wille‟s at 69; Lubbe in Joubert 
et al LAWSA at 362–363. Execution creditors enjoy preference to the general notarial bondholder, 
unless the former had actual knowledge of the existence of the bond. See Meyer v Botha and 
Hergenröder (1881–1884) 1 SAR TS 47 at 49. 
102
 In Netherlands Bank of South Africa v Yull‟s Trustee & The United Building Society 1914 WLD 133 
the Court held that the inclusion of book debts in a general notarial bond, without specific cession in 
securitatem debiti, does not amount to an intention to cede. As such it does not provide real security 
and will fail against a subsequent cession in securitatem debiti of the same book debts where the 
cession was coupled with notice to the debtors. 
103
 Nedbank Ltd v Norton 1987 (3) SA 619 (N) at 628D–F. 
104
 For authority on the applicability of the doctrine of notice, see Contract Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v 
Chesterfin (Pty) Ltd 2003 (2) SA 253 (SCA) at 257I. The SCA cites Coaton v Alexander 1879 Buch 
17 and Cato v Alion and Helps (1922) 43 NLR 469 as authority. Although authority for the doctrine 
of notice (kennisleer) does come from these cases, a properly constituted pledge did not exist in 
either of them. In Coaton the pledgee voluntarily gave up control and in Cato control was never 
given. The SCA describes the basis of the doctrine of notice as being a species of fraud (Grant v 
Stonestreet 1968 (4) SA 1 (A) at 20B-F) or an intentional interference with contractual relationships. 
On the latter ground, see NJ van der Merwe ―Die Aard en Grondslag van die Sogenaamde 
Kennisleer in die Suid-Afrikaanse Privaatreg‖ (1962) 25 THRHR 155. Van der Merwe argues that 
the doctrine of notice is basically a form of delict, which implies that negligent interference with the 
contractual relationship will suffice to vest liability (at 158). In other words, he foresees the 
possibility of applying the doctrine of notice to the situation where a third party ought to have known 
that there was a prior general notarial bond registered. The current position is, however, that only 
actual knowledge will suffice. See also New Klein Koffiefontein Company Ltd v Superintendent of 
Labourers 1906 TS 241 at 254; Sacks 1982 SALJ at 615–619; Badenhorst et al Silberberg at 386; 
Lubbe in Joubert et al LAWSA at 363. Third parties are not deemed to be aware of the existence of a 
bond. See Frye‟s (Pty) Ltd v Ries 1957 (3) SA 585 (A) at 583E–F. 
105
 1982 SALJ at 616–619. Sonnekus 1983 TSAR at 245 is of the opinion that a pledge of the enterprise 
(ondernemerspandreg) is impossible in the South African legal system. He continues: ―Indien die 
onderneming, soos dikwels die geval is, self ‘n regsubjek is, is dit logies onhoudbaar dat dit ook 
objek van ‘n sekerheidsreg kan wees.‖ As explained below, I agree that it is not possible to grant 
security over the enterprise of a legal person in the South African law. However, one should 
distinguish between the concepts of an ‗enterprise‘, sometimes referred to in English law as an 
‗undertaking‘, and a ‗legal person‘. When relating to associations with a profit aim, the latter refers 
to a company, whether incorporated by special statute or in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, 
or to a close corporation as incorporated in terms of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. A 
company or a close corporation is a legal subject in the South African system of subjective rights. 
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consequences different from that of a general notarial bond. More specifically, it is an 
essential term of the security agreement of such a hypothec that the security grantor 
will be free to deal with the encumbered assets in the ordinary course of business. 
Therefore, a third party who takes the property encumbered by a hypothecation of a 
shop with knowledge of the existence of the encumbrance, will take it free from the 
burden. Although this hypothec existed in Roman law and was, to some extent, 
allowed in Roman-Dutch law,107 the authorities show that it was a form of special 
notarial bond and not of a general notarial bond as Sacks seems to imply. 
Consequently, a hypothecation of a shop, as a form of security over a class of things, 
will in terms of the then Appellate Division‘s finding in Cooper NO v Die Meester108 
not provide its holders with any preference over the concurrent creditors of the 
                                                                                                                                            
The ‗enterprise‘ refers to the collective activities of the business by which it aims to make a profit. It 
is possible for one company to have more than one enterprise. And so while it is true to say that a 
company cannot be the object of a right, an enterprise could well be.  
106
 Sacks 1982 SALJ at 608 describes the hypothecation of a shop as follows: ―In terms of this bond, 
here named the ‗business bond‘ for convenience, the owner of the stock-in-trade and other movable 
assets of a shop or business hypothecates the assets as security for a debt to the creditor, but, unlike 
the common general bond, the trader is intended to be free to sell and acquire stock and assets in the 
ordinary course of business‖.  
107
 D 20.1.34pr: ―Where a debtor gave a shop in pledge to his creditor, the question arose whether the 
transaction was void, or whether it should be held that under the designation of ―shop‖ all of the 
property contained therein was pledged. And if the party should sell the said merchandise, from time 
to time, and purchase other goods and place them in said shop, and then should die, could the 
creditor recover by a hypothecary action everything found there, as the merchandise had been 
changed, and other articles substituted? The answer was that whatever was found in the shop at the 
time of the death of the debtor was held to have been pledged.‖ (Translation from SP Scott The Civil 
Law: Volume V (1932) at 130); Voet Commentarius 20.1.2: ―Special hypothec may be of thing or 
class. – A special hypothec is one by which individual things or even definite collections of things, 
such as a flock or herd or a shop, are put under obligation … When a shop is put under obligation, if 
the owner of the shop has from time to time sold off wares out of it and gotten others, all things 
which are later found in the shop are deemed to be part of the pledge.‖ (Translation from Percival 
Gane The Selective Voet.) See also Francis v Savage and Hill (1882) 1 SAR TS 33 at 36. Huber 
Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 2.47.22–23: ―There is this difference that the special form [of 
hypothecation] prevents the alienation of the property, so that, if the debtor sells the thing specially 
hypothecated, he may be punished as a thief or cheat; but the subject of a general hypothecation may 
be sold, though subject to its burden, and with the right in the creditor to get it back again. [23] But 
it should be noted that if a property is hypothecated which consists of many items, and is of such 
nature that the particular items are always changing, such as a herd of cattle, or, as more commonly 
happens, a shop full of wares which are sold by retail, then the hypothec covers the whole shop and 
not the particular items; the secured creditor therefore has no right over the particular items which 
are sold out of the shop, but only over the shop as a whole; and if owing to the embarrassment of the 
debtor the stock is not from time to time filled up, but becomes sold out, his hypothec becomes 
useless, a thing against which he should protect himself.‖ (Translation from Percival Gane The 
Jurisprudence of my Time (Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt) by Ulrich Huber (1636–1694) 
translated from the 5ed Volume 1 (1936) 345, describing the position in Friesland.) In my opinion 
subpar 23 indicates an exception to the general rule that objects subject to a special hypothecation 
could not be alienated. 
108
 1992 (3) SA 60 (A). 
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insolvent debtor, unless the assets are delivered to the security takers before the debtor 
is declared insolvent. Registration of such a security in terms of the Security by 
Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993 is impossible, because of the fluctuating 
nature of the typical contents of a shop, which cannot be described in the manner 
required by the Act.109  
However, stock-in-trade and other fluctuating movable assets of a company can 
form the object of a general notarial bond. I submit that when a third party acquires 
such assets even with knowledge of the existence of the general notarial bond, it will 
not affect the validity of such an acquisition. This is because parties to the security 
agreement will probably not mean to restrict alienation of such assets, because it is the 
life blood of the company, and a third party should be allowed to assume as much. If 
such a restriction is intended, I suggest that it must be expressly provided for in the 
security agreement.110 Even in such a case, only actual knowledge of the restriction 
will bar the valid alienation of such assets. 
5.4.2.3 Negative pledge clauses 
The general notarial bond may contain a so-called negative pledge clause, which is a 
clause that prohibits the alienation of the security objects.111 It should be possible to 
enforce this clause by means of an interdict, if the creditor learns in time that the 
security objects are about to be alienated.112 Automatic perfection113 as a result of the 
non-compliance with the negative pledge clause is, however, not possible in South 
African law.114 The general notarial bond will only be perfected when the creditor 
takes control of the security objects. Agreement alone will not suffice. 
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5.4.2.4 Perfecting clauses 
The security agreement may stipulate that the bondholder is entitled to take control of 
the security objects in certain circumstances,115 thereby creating a real security right. 
Such a clause is essentially an agreement to constitute a pledge over the encumbered 
movable property.116 These clauses are also referred to as ‗perfecting clauses‘. If the 
bond does not contain a perfecting clause, the bondholder does not have a right to take 
control of the security objects,117 except by way of an order of execution granted by a 
court. 
If the debtor co-operates in the delivery of the security objects, when the 
circumstances for delivery as set out in the bond are met, it is unnecessary to obtain a 
court order to give effect to the rights contained in the bond.118 If the debtor does not 
want to comply with the perfecting clause, a court order may be sought to order 
specific performance.119 
 When the property is delivered to the bondholder in terms of a perfecting clause, 
the bondholder effectively becomes a pledgee with its consequential rights and 
preferences.120 The perfecting clause may be coupled with a summary execution 
clause (parate executie clause), which entails that after he has taken control, the 
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bondholder will be entitled to sell the goods by public auction, public tender, private 
treaty or otherwise.121 The security agreement must make express provision for parate 
executie.122 
The effectiveness of perfecting clauses as a means to provide the creditor with real 
security is uncertain.123 The creditor would usually attempt to take control of the 
movable assets at a time when a company is either already insolvent or nearing 
insolvency. This is understandable, because the conversion of the general notarial 
bond into a pledge would take the movable assets of the company out of its control 
and would in most cases mean the end of its business operations and its ability to earn 
income. The bondholder relies foremost on the business‘ earnings to meet its 
                                                 
121
 The decision in Findevco (Pty) Ltd v Faceformat SA (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 251 (EC), where the 
Court held in an obiter dictum that such clauses are unconstitutional, did not follow precedent and 
relied on case law where the State was an actor. See Scott 2002 THRHR at 661–663. The Court did 
not draw a distinction to the position relating to immovable property, where parate executie has 
consistently been disallowed. The pledgor may seek the Court‘s protection if he can show that the 
pledgee has prejudiced him in his rights during the carrying out of the summary execution 
agreement (Osry v Hirsch, Loubser & Co Ltd 1922 CPD 531 at 547.) The pledgee is considered to 
be the agent of the pledgor during the summary execution proceedings and cannot deal with the 
goods as if it were his own. See also Sakala v Wamambo 1991 (4) SA 144 (ZHC) at 148, where the 
Court reversed the sale of a motor vehicle at a gross under-value, finding that the transaction was not 
in the best interests of the applicant-pledgor. Findevco was followed in Senwes Ltd v Muller 2002 
(4) SA 134 (T). The Court based its findings on the same precedent as Findevco and consequently 
the same criticism applies. The issue was put to rest in Bock v Duburoro Investments (Pty) Ltd 2004 
(2) SA 242 (SCA) at 250B–C and Juglal NO v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd t/a OK Franchise 
Division 2004 (5) SA 248 (SCA) at 256B, where the SCA confirmed the validity of parate executie 
clauses. See also SA Bank of Athens Ltd v Van Zyl 2005 (5) SA 93 (SCA) at 101E; JC Sonnekus 
―Onverwagte Raakpunte tussen Menseregte en Saaklike Sekerheidsregte?‖ (2002) 39 Tijdschrift 
voor Privaatrecht 1 at 10–11; Samantha Cook & Grant Quixley ―Parate Executie Clauses: Is the 
Debate Dead?‖ (2004) 121 SALJ 719; Lee Steyn ―Perfection Clauses, Summary Execution (Parate 
Executie) Clauses, Forfeiture Clauses (Pacta Commossoria) and Conditional Sales in Pledge 
Agreements and Notarial Bonds: The Position Clarified‖ 2004 (25) Obiter 443; Susan Scott ―A 
Private-Law Dinosaur‘s Evaluation of Summary Execution Clauses in Light of the Constitution‖ 
(2007) 70 THRHR 289; Badenhorst et al Silberberg at 390. 
122
 Mercantile Bank of India Ltd v Davis 1947 (2) SA 723 (C) at 736–737; Candid Electronics (Pty) Ltd 
v Merchandise Buying Syndicate (Pty) Ltd 1992 (2) SA (C) 459 at 463D. 
123
 See, for instance, JC Sonnekus ―Perfektering van Algemene Notariële Verbande en Loon vir 
Laatslapers‖ (2002) 3 TSAR 567 at 568; Sonnekus 2002 TPR at 4. It should be remembered that the 
bondholder will effectively take control of the business of the debtor when it takes control of the 
movable property encumbered by the general notarial bond. In Barclays National Bank Ltd v Natal 
Fire Extinguishers Manufacturers Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 650 (D) at 658C–H the Court stated 
that the granting of specific performance of a perfection clause that would lead to this result, would 
―operate unreasonably hardly‖ on the company and would be ―inequitable under all circumstances‖ 
to its other creditors. These observations must be considered as obiter, because the Court based its 
final decision on other considerations. The Court also did not consider that a pledgee is in fact an 
agent of the pledgor. See also Roos 1995 SALJ at 175. Taking control  of a business as security has 
subsequently been allowed by the SCA. See Juglal NO v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd t/a OK 
Franchise Division 2004 (5) SA 248 (SCA) at 261C–E. 
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
230 
obligations and only secondarily on its security. It is therefore in the bondholder‘s 
interest to postpone perfection until as late as possible. 
Converting the general notarial bond into a pledge would be considered a 
disposition in terms of the Insolvency Act.124 If a company is liquidated shortly after 
the perfecting of the general notarial bond, the liquidator may attempt to have it set 
aside as a voidable preference,125 or alternatively, as an undue preference.126  
However, two recent Supreme Court of Appeal decisions seem to have given 
approval to the perfecting of a general notarial bond, even though delivery was made 
only hours before the application for the provisional liquidation of the company was 
heard. This greatly enhances the importance of such clauses in general notarial bonds, 
as well as the usefulness of this form of security for those creditors alert enough to be 
the first to perfect. 
The first of these decisions was Development Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Van 
Rensburg.127 Here the Development Bank brought an urgent application for an interim 
order that it may take control of the debtor‘s (Serious Mills (Pty) Ltd) movable 
property. By pure chance it came to the Development Bank‘s attention that some of 
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the other creditors of the debtor would launch an application for its liquidation the 
following day. In fact, were it not that the Master was absent from his office on 9 
September, the application for liquidation may have been heard on that day. The 
interim order was granted at 22:00 on 9 September and the provisional order for the 
liquidation of Serious Mills was granted during the afternoon of 10 September. 
Control of Serious Mills‘ movable property was taken by the Deputy Sheriff during 
the course of the morning of 10 September. On the extended return day the 
provisional order for attachment was discharged. The appeal was against that 
decision. 
No attempt was made by the Development Bank to obtain delivery of the movable 
property from Serious Mills first. Usually, specific performance of the perfecting 
clause is only requested if the debtor does not give its co-operation. The co-operation 
of the debtor in this case would not have served the Development Bank, because it 
would then fall under the definition of ‗disposition‘ in terms of the Insolvency Act 24 
of 1936.128 If the perfection was done in terms of a court order, it would not be 
considered a disposition. This was not the first time that an attempt had been made to 
use a court order for this purpose.129 
The Court a quo held that the provisional winding-up order had to take precedence 
over the order for attachment and that the rule had to be discharged in the light of 
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International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Affinity (Pty) Ltd130 and Trisilino v De Vries.131 
The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the Court a quo and the 
provisional order for attachment was confirmed.132 
On appeal the majority held that reliance on the cases cited above were misplaced. 
The Court distinguished International Shipping Co based on the fact that the winding-
up order in that case was granted before the rule nisi and the interim order for 
attachment were granted.133 The Court rejected the finding in Trisilino that the effect 
of the interim order was to preserve the applicant‘s rights pending the return day.134  
The majority held that the Development Bank was entitled, immediately before the  
winding-up of Serious Mills, to take control of the movable property and that no 
reasons were advanced why the provisional order should not have been granted        
on that date. In other words, the Court held that it may not consider new 
considerations that had arisen after the interim order and the rule nisi had been issued, 
such as the consequent winding-up order. The Court held that the Development Bank 
took valid control of the movable property and became a pledgee of Serious Mills.135 
In my opinion the order should not have been confirmed under circumstances of 
imminent liquidation. Surely the abuse of the court‘s order so that such a late 
disposition cannot be avoided by the liquidators of a company must be an adequate 
reason why such an order should not have been granted. Whether or not the liquidator 
will be successful with an attempt to impeach the perfection of the bond depends on 
the circumstances of each case,136 but at the very least it affords the court the 
opportunity to consider the interests of the creditors of the company generally, but 
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specifically the interests of competing general notarial bondholders. It seems that the 
Court was not made aware of the implications of its confirmation of the rule nisi.  
The minority judgment delivered by Nienaber JA appreciates the true implications 
of confirmation of the interim order. This judgment found International Shipping Co 
and Trisilino in point and helpful.137 With regard to International Shipping Co 
Nienaber JA recognised that there are differences in fact between the two cases, but 
he agreed with the finding by that court138 that a rule nisi did not have finite and 
definite effect: ―An interim order is by its very nature both temporary and provisional; 
its purpose is to preserve the status quo pending the return day.‖139 In other words, a 
court may consider circumstances that arose after the interim order and the rule nisi 
had been issued in its decision whether or not to confirm the rule.140  
The minority judgment recognised that the reasons of the Court in International 
Shipping Co for not confirming the provisional order were relevant to the case before 
it, namely that the provisional liquidators of the company should be allowed to 
administer the estate of the company to the benefit of all creditors and that there were 
no reasons to allow the applicant to place himself in a better position of priority at that 
stage. Furthermore, Nienaber JA agreed with Trisilino that a provisional order of 
sequestration granted before the return date of the rule nisi should defeat the interim 
order of attachment, causing the rule to be discharged.141 Nienaber JA also approved 
the decision of the Court a quo in Chesterfin (Pty) Ltd v Contract Forwarding (Pty) 
Ltd,142 which came to the same conclusion.143 
Then followed the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, this time a full bench, 
in Contract Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Chesterfin (Pty) Ltd.144 The debtor in this case 
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was Eurotile. Contract Forwarding, a general notarial bondholder, obtained an interim 
order for attachment of Eurotile‘s movable assets and a rule nisi on 11 April 2001. 
The keys of the business premises of Eurotile were handed to Contract Forwarding by 
the sheriff on the same day. Before the return date of the rule nisi, Eurotile was placed 
under provisional liquidation. The return date was subsequently postponed several 
times, to the extent that at the time of the eventual hearing the liquidation order had 
been made final. The appointed liquidators had already sold the movable property in 
question and kept the proceeds in a separate account until the Court‘s final 
determination. 
Chesterfin was another creditor and also a general notarial bondholder of Eurotile. 
Its general notarial bond was registered prior to that of Contract Forwarding and its 
claim would rank prior to that of Contract Forwarding in Eurotile‘s insolvency, if both 
bonds were not perfected. There were two general notarial bonds in favour of 
Eurotile‘s bank ranking above Chesterfin‘s claim. Then there was a general notarial 
bond in favour of Metro International Ltd, which was registered after Chesterfin‘s 
bond, but before Contract Forwarding‘s bond. In other words, there were four general 
notarial bonds that would rank higher than Contract Forwarding‘s bond if the Court 
found that its interim order of attachment did not perfect the bond.  
Moreover, the general notarial bond in favour of Contract Forwarding was only 
registered on 19 October 2000, less than six months before the interim order was 
granted and only six months before the date of the provisional liquidation order        
(20 April 2001). In these circumstances a liquidator could even argue that the 
unperfected general notarial bond is a voidable preference.145  
Chesterfin‘s bond contained a negative pledge clause and an express clause 
allowing for the alienation of stock-in-trade in the ordinary course of business.146 
Chesterfin‘s argument was at least partially that Contract Forwarding should be 
considered to have constructive notice of the existence of its prior bond and its 
terms.147 However, its arguments were mostly based on the inequity of allowing 
Contract Forwarding to obtain the position of a secured creditor at such a late stage 
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before the liquidation of the company and in priority over other general notarial 
bondholders whose bonds were registered earlier. 
In the Court a quo it was found that the authorisation given to Contract Forwarding 
to take control of the movable property was only provisional and was therefore 
subject to reconsideration on the return day. A main factor in this finding was that the 
other notarial bondholders were not present at the urgent application. Dicta to this 
effect from previous decisions were approved and followed.148 
In its reconsideration of the provisional order, the Court a quo took into account 
that there were three other bondholders as well as the intervening liquidation of 
Eurotile. The Court decided that it was not persuaded that compelling reasons existed 
to use its discretion in favour of Contract Forwarding and allow a disposition after 
liquidation prejudicing the other creditors of the liquidated Eurotile. It would confer 
secure status on an otherwise unsecured claim.149 The arguments surrounding notice 
became superfluous and were not considered. The Court set aside the interim order 
and discharged the rule nisi. 
The Court a quo‘s decision was delivered before the Supreme Court of Appeal‘s 
decision in Development Bank.150 However, by the time the matter reached the appeal 
stage, Development Bank had been decided and had to be considered.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the Court a quo, and 
confirmed the interim order for attachment. The first finding of the Court was that the 
doctrine of constructive notice was not applicable to registered notarial bonds. In 
other words, a third party was not deemed to be aware of the existence of other 
notarial bonds.151  
 The Court then stated that the Court a quo was incorrect in finding that the 
previous bondholders enjoyed precedence over later bondholders.152 The Court failed 
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to consider that the principle of prior tempore potior iure applied to notarial bonds in 
terms of the common law.153 The Court went on to regard the general notarial bond as 
already perfected and then stated that ―real rights are stronger than personal rights‖. 
This was really what the Court still had to decide, namely whether it should confer the 
status of pledgee on Contract Forwarding. Only if that question was answered 
affirmatively would the principle as stated apply. Then the Court stated that a pledge 
was established by means of taking possession and not by means of an agreement to 
pledge.154 The Court failed to distinguish between an agreement to pledge, the so-
called real agreement,155 and delivery in order to perfect a pledge. 
The Court‘s most radical finding was that general notarial bonds containing 
perfecting clauses may be perfected on a first-come-first-served basis, regardless of 
other previously registered general notarial bonds.156 The only exception would be if 
the later bondholder had actual knowledge of the existence of a previously registered 
general notarial bond.157 The bondholder would then not be allowed to perfect the 
general notarial bond. A negative pledge clause158 in the bond would make no 
difference in this regard. 
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vir von Savigny se Teorie Betreffende die Saaklike Ooreenkoms‖ 2008 TSAR at 66. See further pars 
7.2 and 7.2.1.  
156
 It based this conclusion on the principle that the law protects those who are vigilant and not those 
that sleep (vigilantibus non dormientibus iura subveniunt) and prefered this to the Court a quo‘s 
reliance on what is just and equitable. 
157
 On the doctrine of notice, see n 104 above. 
158
 See the discussion in par 5.4.2.3 above. 
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The Court interpreted the decision of the Court a quo as finding that to confirm the 
interim order would be a disposition, which was prohibited by section 341(2) of the 
Companies Act.159 This is not how I understand the decision of the Court a quo. My 
understanding is that section 341(2) grants the court discretion to allow a disposition 
after commencement of a winding-up, but that the Court in this situation thought it 
unjust to use its discretion in terms of section 341(2) in favour of Contract 
Forwarding. The Court‘s consideration of section 341(2) is a result of its finding that 
the interim order did not perfect the general notarial bond into a pledge, thereby 
converting the bondholder into the position of a pledgee, and that it had the discretion 
to overturn the interim order.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal‘s remark that the Court a quo must have confused 
sections 348 and 359(1)(b)160 is not only unnecessary, taking into account its later 
findings, but also in my opinion incorrect. The ―later findings‖ I refer to is that it 
considered Contract Forwarding‘s possession following the interim order as valid for 
perfecting the pledge. It held that it could only refuse to confirm the order if the order 
had, for instance, not been granted properly due to an irregularity in the bond or 
because there was no outstanding debt.161 
The Court rejected the argument that the interim order of attachment had a mere 
holding effect.162 It also rejected the argument that it had a discretion to refuse specific 
performance of the perfecting clause in these circumstances. The Court stated that it 
could only exercise this discretion if the creditor had another remedy such as 
damages, but a claim for damages, it held, could not replace a claim for real 
security.163 The Court continued:164 
 
In the absence of a conflict with the Bill of Rights or a rule to the contrary, a court may not under 
the guise of the exercise of a discretion have regard to what is fair and equitable in that particular 
court‘s view and so dispossess someone of a substantive right. 
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 61 of 1973. The section reads as follows: ―Every disposition of its property (including rights of 
action) by any company being wound-up and unable to pay its debts made after the commencement 
of the winding-up, shall be void unless the Court otherwise orders.‖ The commencement of 
winding-up is the time of the presentation to the Court of the application for winding-up (s 348). 
160
 At 258G–H. Section 359(1)(b) provides that after the order for winding-up has been given, any 
order for attachment against the estate or assets of the company will be void. 
161
 At 259B. 
162
 At 259I. 
163
 At 260B–C. 
164
 At 260D. 
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I submit that the Court‘s view does not properly consider the interests of the other 
bondholders, nor the practicalities that surround the perfection of these bonds. Only 
one creditor can perfect a general notarial bond, because the requirement of physical 
control makes it impossible for more than one person to be a pledgee. It is probable 
that all the general notarial bonds in this case contained perfecting clauses. However, 
the Court did not consider this, nor did it consider anywhere in its judgment the fact 
that its decision would bar the liquidators of Eurotile to void the preference, because 
the disposition was done in terms of a court order. The Court‘s failure to see this 
consequence is manifest where it stated:165 
 
The order did not give Contract Forwarding possession but permitted it to take possession legally. 
The position would have been no different had Eurotile handed the goods to Contract Forwarding 
willingly (my emphasis). 
 
I submit that this is the ―manifest oversight or misunderstanding‖ that the Court, by its 
own admission, may have used rather to follow the judgment of Nienaber JA than that 
of the majority in Development Bank.166 The Court should have heeded its own 
previous statement on the exercise of its discretion to order specific performance, 
when it stated:167 
 
It [the discretion] is aimed at preventing an injustice – for cases do arise where justice demands that 
a plaintiff be denied his right to performance – and the basic principle thus is that the order which 
the Court makes should not produce an unjust result … Another principle is that the remedy of 
specific performance should always be granted or withheld in accordance with legal and public 
policy. 
 
                                                 
165
 At 259C. 
166
 At 259 F–H where the Court refuses to follow Nienaber JA‘s minority judgment based on the stare 
decisis principle, it refers to the following quote from Bloemfontein Town Council v Richter 1938 
AD 195 at 232 with approval: ―The ordinary rule is that this Court is bound by its own decisions and 
unless a decision has been arrived at on some manifest oversight or misunderstanding, that is that 
there has been something in the nature of a palpable mistake, a subsequently constituted Court has 
no right to prefer its own reasoning to that of its predecessors .‖ 
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 Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) at 783D. See also Haynes v 
Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) at 378H–379A; Roos 1995 SALJ at 178–179. 
In Barclays National Bank Ltd v Natal Fire Extinguishers Manufacturers Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 
650 (D) at 656D–G the Court mentioned the argument that each creditor must look after its own 
interests and initiate liquidation if needs be. However, only one general notarial bond can be 
perfected, which turns the bond into real security. In most cases there will be little incentive for 
unsecured creditors to initiate liquidation after a general notarial bond had been perfected. 
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Perfection will only be valid if the security objects are delivered to the bondholder 
before the provisional order of liquidation of the debtor.168 This principle remains 
notwithstanding the two Supreme Court of Appeal cases discussed above. 
5.4.2.4.1 Legislative intervention required 
I submit that the two decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal discussed above 
reveal certain underlying problems with the use of general notarial bonds in South 
African law. The current legal position is that the first general notarial bondholder that 
perfects his security will have a secured claim against the estate of the debtor. The 
other general notarial bondholders will always only have a preference over the 
unsecured creditors of the debtor‘s insolvent estate, because only one person can take 
physical control of the security objects. This is the position regardless of the fact that 
the general notarial bonds themselves might have been created before the one that was 
perfected. 
 Bondholders cannot effectively strengthen their position by means of contractual 
clauses to prevent later security over the assets, because later bondholders are not 
deemed to be aware of such clauses. It further makes no difference whether the other 
bondholders were only fractionally later than the successful bondholder in their 
attempts to perfect. Nor will the court refuse to confirm an interim order for 
attachment if the estate of the debtor is liquidated in the meantime.  
 The most recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Appeal on these matters 
seem to indicate that the court wants to uphold the secured status of a perfected 
general notarial bond as far as possible.169 This is to be welcomed, considering the 
frequency with which general notarial bonds are used and the fact that it is very 
difficult to perfect them before the impending insolvency of the debtor. 
 However, I submit that the legislature will have to consider intervention to remedy 
the inequities that result from the physical impossibility of more than one bondholder 
to acquire control of the encumbered assets. One possibility might be to introduce a 
form of receivership of the movable property of the debtor, which is activated on an 
application by any bondholder to perfect his security.170 The receiver will take control 
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 Trisilino v De Vries 1994 (4) SA 514 (O) at 518I–J.  
169
 See also Cooper NNO v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd 2000 (3) SA 1009 (SCA) and my comments 
in n 129. 
170
 On receivership in English law, see par 3.2.4. 
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of the assets and will manage the process on behalf of the general notarial 
bondholders. The receiver will owe the debtor the same duties as a pledgee.171 Secured 
status will then be granted to all general notarial bondholders on the appointment of 
the receiver and priority will be determined by the order of the registration of their 
bonds. All general notarial bonds must be granted the ability to be perfected in this 
manner and perfecting clauses should no longer be required. 
 I submit that bondholders should not be allowed to alter their priority based solely 
on chance. If creditors are not satisfied with where they will lie in order of preference 
if the proposal above is implemented, they ought to refuse to extend credit. It will be 
unnecessary to include restrictive clauses to prevent the further extension of general 
notarial bonds over the assets, because such later bondholders will not be able to 
better their position in relation to the first bondholder by way of perfection. The 
position of the general notarial bondholders in relation to other secured creditors will 
remain unchanged, as will the power of the debtor to grant further security over the 
encumbered assets. The order of priority must remain intact during the subsequent 
liquidation of the debtor. 
 I submit that such a system will lead to a far more satisfactory position for general 
notarial bondholders, although it will inevitably mean that there will be fewer assets 
available for distribution to preferent and unsecured creditors of the insolvent debtor. 
In the current system the amount that will be secured by a perfected general notarial 
bond will always be limited to one bondholder‘s claim.  
 It might also be argued that there will be no motivation for later general notarial 
bondholders to monitor the affairs of the debtor effectively, because their order of 
priority is fixed on the date of the registration of the general notarial bond. They will 
inevitably benefit from the diligence of the earlier bondholders. However, in my 
opinion this is a satisfactory position. Since the earlier bondholder stands to gain more 
from his attentiveness to the affairs of the debtor, he should carry a greater burden to 
monitor the debtor. Of course, the reverse is also true: the earlier bondholder stands to 
gain from the diligence of later bondholders who apply for perfection regardless of 
their lesser priority. 
 One negative aspect of the proposed system is that a general notarial bondholder 
will not be in a position to grant the debtor more time to overcome financial 
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 See n 121 and 123. 
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difficulties if any of the other bondholders do not agree. However, this is also a 
problem under the current system. I submit that the appointment of a receiver might 
actually alleviate this problem. The receiver could report to the bondholders on the 
possibility of the debtor managing its way out of financial difficulty. If approved, the 
debtor could continue with its business operations, with the restrictions agreed upon 
between it and the receiver. If the debtor manages to overcome its difficulties, control 
of the assets can be returned. If the debtor cannot overcome its difficulties, the 
receiver could apply for the debtor‘s winding-up due to inability to pay its debts. 
5.4.3 Security by means of claims 
The legislature excluded claims as possible security objects of a special notarial bond 
in terms of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act.172 Section 1 of the Act 
specifies that a special notarial bond may only be registered over corporeal movable 
property specified and described in the bond in a manner that renders it readily 




 However, in practice extensive use is made of claims as security. More 
importantly, the Companies Act specifically mentions the use of claims as a possible 
means of security for debentures.
174
 
 In the current South African system of subjective rights, a claim cannot be the 
object of real security, because it is not a thing.
175
 However, a claim is an asset and has 
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 57 of 1993. 
173
 The exception is shares, which are described in s 91 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 as follows: 
―The shares or other interest which any member has in a company shall be movable property, 
transferable in the manner provided by this Act and the articles of the company (my emphasis)‖. 
However, shares do not need to be identified by a number if they rank pari passu for all purposes 
with other shares of that class (s 95(1)(a)of the Companies Act 61 of 1973). Furthermore, I agree 
with the view expressed by Elias Leos ―Quasi-Usufruct and Shares: Some Possible Approaches‖ 
(2006) 123 SALJ at 137 that shares listed on a securities exchange have a fungible character, 
because one share is interchangeable with another. Therefore, it is questionable whether shares 
could be sufficiently described to adhere to the requirements of the Security by Means of Movable 
Property Act 57 of 1993. 
174
 Section 117(1)(c), where the use of ‗incorporeal rights‘ as security for debentures is allowed. 
175
 Our system of subjective rights is based on the work of WA Joubert Grondslae van die 
Persoonlikheidsreg (1953) and his later publication ―Die Realiteit van die Subjektiewe Reg en die 
Betekenis van ‘n Realistiese Begrip Daarvan vir die Privaatreg‖ (1958) 21 THRHR 12 and 98. This 
system classifies subjective rights according to the nature of their objects. According to this 
classification the object of a real right (such as pledge) is always a thing. By Joubert‘s own 
admission, incorporeal property as a possible object of a real right is left out of the classification 
because it does not fit into the system. He mentions the pledge of personal rights as an example of 
impossibility in the system (Grondslae at 120 and 122; 1958 THRHR at 113). I argued elsewhere 
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an intrinsic value that can be realised.
176
 Often it is the only asset available for security 
purposes. 
 The general notarial bond as a method of providing security by means of claims 
was dicussed above. Security by means of claims can be created in two further 
ways,177 namely (1) a pledge of claims or (2) a fiduciary security cession.178 
5.4.3.1 Pledge of claims 
When a pledge of claims is used in the context of a securitisation scheme, the SPV 
will be the pledgor and the trustee for debenture-holders will be the pledgee. In terms 
of this construction, the claims remain in the estate of the pledgor. Consequently, the 
pledgee will not be able to cede the claims given as security to third parties. 
 In accordance with the position relating to a pledge of things, a pledge of claims is 
also of an accessory nature.179 This means that the real security right is dependent on 
the existence of a principal debt for its creation and continued existence. If the 
principal debt is settled, the right of pledge will automatically cease to exist. The 
extent of the encumbrance on the claims in terms of the pledge of claims is 
determined by reference to the value of the principal debt. This further implies that a 
                                                                                                                                            
that the exclusion of the possibility of a pledge of personal rights must be seen as an indication that 
the current system of subjective rights ought to be adjusted: see Strydom Die Akessoriteitsbeginsel 
at 126–127; Natania Locke ―Aksessoriteit en Sekerheidstelling deur Middel van Vorderingsregte‖ 
2001 TSAR at 483. See further the comments of Gerhard Lubbe ―Die Verpanding van 
Vorderingsregte en die Regsdogmatiek: Quo Vadis?‖ (1991) 2 Stell LR at 141–144. 
176
 Voet Commentarius 20.3.1 as translated by Gane The Selective Voet: ―Gaius laid down a rule as to 
the putting of things under the obligation of pledge in the passage cited below when he said that: 
‗That which admits of purchase and sale can admit also of hypothecation‘ (D XX 1 9 1) For the rest 
things can be given in pledge which are movable or immovable, corporeal and incorporeal, such as 
accounts or actions, so that the creditor to whom an account had been put under obligation has 
beneficial actions.‖  
177
 On cession in securitatem debiti in general, see Scott Cession at 231–252; Susan Scott ―Evaluation 
of Security by Means of Claims: Problems and Possible Solutions. Section A: Problems‖ (1997) 60 
THRHR 179; Susan Scott ―Evaluation of Security by Means of Claims: Problems and Possible 
Solutions. Section B: Possible Solutions‖ (1997) 60 THRHR 434; Susan Scott ―Evaluation of 
Security by Means of Claims: Problems and Possible Solutions. Section C: Codification of the Law 
of Cession‖ (1997) 60 THRHR 633 and (1998) 61 THRHR 88. 
178
 Too often security agreements are drafted in such a way that both the pledge construction and 
fiduciary security cession of claims can apply to the transaction. This leads to uncertainty about the 
legal consequences of the agreement. It may also lead to a finding that the agreement is void for 
vagueness. See Susan Scott ―Algehele Sekerheidsessie‖ (1988) 51 THRHR at 450. The 
consequences of each interpretation of security by means of claims are reasonably settled, although 
this is truer for pledge of claims than for fiduciary security cession. Parties ought to state their 
intention clearly. See also Scott Cession at 235 and 252. 
179
 See Locke 2001 TSAR at 486 et seq. See also Scott Cession at 238–239; Scott 1997 THRHR at 182–
183 and 448. 
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security grantor may offer the same claims as security to several creditors, as long as 
the value of the claims is sufficient to cover all the debts. 
 By analogy to the position relating to pledge, it is essential that a pledge of claims 
be sufficiently publicised. Case law supports the position that cession of incorporeals 
is the equivalent of delivery of corporeals.180 Scott181 criticises this view with regard to 
a pledge of claims. In a pledge of claims only the power to realise the claim and not 
the claim itself is transferred. Whereas delivery of a corporeal security object is 
evident for third parties, cession is not and as such does not inform third parties of the 
legal position. She argues that the best method of publicity is to notify the debtor of 
the existence of the pledge.182 She adds that if notice to debtors were to be confirmed 
as a requirement for the proper constitution of a pledge of claims, many lenders and 
borrowers would not find it suitable as a form of security.  
 This would definitely be the case in securitisation, where the debtors might not be 
familiar with the concept of securitisation. During securitisation the claims will be 
ceded twice: first, in terms of a sale agreement between the originator and the SPV183 
and, second, in terms of security agreement between the SPV and the security SPV or 
trustee for debenture-holders.184 Notice is not a requirement for the cession of the 
claims to the SPV and will usually not be given. If the debtors are informed of the 
pledge of claims to the security SPV or trustee for debenture-holders without even 
knowing about the securitisation transaction, it is foreseeable that they may be 
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 Smith v Farelly‟s Trustee 1904 TS 949 at 955; Volhand v Molenaar (Pty) Ltd v Ruskin NNO 1959 
(2) SA 751 (W) at 754G–H; Guman v Latib 1965 (4) SA 715 (A) at 722C; Oertel v Brink 1972 (3) 
SA 669 (W) at 674D.  
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 Cession at 237. 
182
 Notice to the debtor of the existence of the pledge of claims does not necessarily mean that the 
debtor must afterwards pay the pledgee. The pledgee may still allow the debtor to pay the pledgor. 
Scott Cession at 238–239; Susan Scott ―Pledge of Personal Rights and the Principle of Publicity‖ 
(1989) 52 THRHR at 461. See further GF Lubbe ―Sessie in Securitatem Debiti en die Komponente 
van die Skuldeisersbelang‖ (1989) 52 THRHR at 500–501. He argues that there should be a 
distinction in a cession in securitatem debiti between the economic value of the claim that lies in the 
power to collect payment and lies with the cessionary, and the beneficial interest to dispose of the 
claim that remains with the cedent. This view has since not received much support. He also does not 
indicate whether such economic value will still vest with the cessionary/pledgee if the 
cedent/pledgor continues to collect payment. In a later article (1991 Stell LR at 148–149) Lubbe 
seems to favour a construction where the pledgee can collect in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary. The pledgee must keep the proceeds until payment of the principal debt. See also the 
discussion below. 
183
 See par 7.2. 
184
 See par 2.8. 
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uncertain and concerned.185 It should be added that while the investor in a 
securitisation scheme is usually sophisticated, the debtor of the transferred claims will 
often be the everyday person.  
 A further consideration in deciding whether notice ought to be a requirement for a 
pledge of claims is that if the pledge is only perfected after notice to the debtor, the 
security may be impeachable on the pledgor‘s subsequent insolvency shortly after 
notice was given.186 The same considerations as those discussed with regard to a 
perfection of general notarial bonds will then apply.187 However, this will rarely be a 
factor during securitisation, because the SPV is insulated as far as possible from 
insolvency.188 
In a pledge of claims the entitlement to realise the claims is passed to the pledgee. 
However, the pledgee may not exercise this entitlement before default by the 
pledgor.189 At the same time the pledgor cannot realise the claims, because he has 
transferred this entitlement to the pledgee. Since both the pledgor and the pledgee 
have interests in the claim, they should jointly institute action at this stage.190  
Furthermore, the pledgor cannot accept payment by the debtor who has knowledge 
of the pledge before maturity of the pledge, nor can the pledgee, who only gains this 
entitlement when the pledgor cannot pay the debt.191 Scott192 suggests three possible 
solutions to this problem:  
1 The parties may agree to notify the debtor to pay the pledgor and the pledgee 
jointly. 
2 The debtor must pay the pledgor and the pledgee jointly and they should invest the 
money. A pledge is constituted in favour of the pledgee over the investment. 
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 See further the comments by B Wunsh in Susan Scott Sessie in Securitatem Debiti: Quo Vadis? 
(1989) at 178. 
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 See ch 8. 
187
 See par 5.4.2.4 above. 
188
 See par 2.3.3. 
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 Also referred to as ‗maturity‘ of the pledge. See Land-en Landboubank van Suid-Afrika v Die 
Meester 1991 (2) SA 761 (A) at 771D. 
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 Scott 1997 THRHR at 194–195. 
191
 In Volhand v Molenaar (Pty) Ltd v Ruskin NNO 1959 (2) SA 751 (W) at 753G–H the Court 
described this result as absurd but declined to discuss it further, since it was not relevant to the 
exception stage of the proceedings. 
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 See Scott Cession at 242–243. See further Scott 1997 THRHR at 195. 
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3 The parties may agree that the debtor may pay the pledgee as representative of the 
pledgor. The pledgee will then keep the proceeds on behalf of the pledgor until 
maturity of the secured debt in a separate bank account. Alternatively the parties 
may agree that the pledgee will satisfy the debt owed to him from the proceeds. 
 
The requirement of specificity in pledge is fulfilled in a pledge of claims by clearly 
describing the object of the pledge in the deed of cession.193 
  The majority of case law supports the pledge construction of security by means of 
claims.194  
5.4.3.2 Fiduciary security cession 
It is also possible to create security by means of claims by way of a fiduciary security 
cession of claims.195 In this construction the SPV will be the cedent and the trustee for 
debenture-holders the cessionary. The cessionary undertakes to cede the claims back 
to the cedent after the settlement of the secured claim. This agreement is a fiduciary 
agreement (pactum fiduciae).196 Here the claims are transferred to the estate of the 
cessionary. This means that the claims cannot be used as security for more than one 
principal debt, even if the value of the claims is far more than the value of the 
principal debt. Furthermore, the cessionary receives more into his estate than the 
purpose of the cession, namely the provision of security, requires. 
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 Scott Cession at 238. 
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 See National Bank of South Africa v Cohen‟s Trustee 1911 AD 235; Guman v Latib 1965 (4) SA 
715 (A); Leyds v Noord-Westelike Koöperatiewe Landboumaatskappy Bpk 1985 (2) SA 769 (A); 
Marais v Ruskin 1985 (4) SA 659 (A); Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v The Master 1987 (1) SA 
276 (A); Incledon (Welkom) (Pty) Ltd v QwaQwa Development Corporation Ltd 1990 (4) SA 798 
(A); Land-en Landboubank van Suid-Afrika v Die Meester 1991 (2) SA 761 (A); Millman v Twiggs 
1995 (3) SA 674 (A); First National Bank of South Africa v Lynn 1996 (2) SA 339 (A). See also 
Badenhorst et al Silberberg at 396. 
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 Lief v Dettmann 1964 (2) SA 252 (A); Trust Bank of Africa v Standard Bank of SA 1968 (3) SA 166 
(A), although it may be argued that the Court‘s pronouncement on cession in securitatem debiti in 
both these cases were obiter dicta (Strydom Die Aksessoriteitsbeginsel at 116–117 and 119). On 
fiduciary security cession in general, see Scott 1988 THRHR at 434; Susan Scott ―Algehele 
Sekerheidsessies‖ (1989) 52 THRHR at 45; Scott 1997 THRHR at 197–201.  
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 It is uncertain whether our courts will allow a construction where the security cession is terminated 
by way of a suspensive condition on fulfilment by the cedent of his obligations under the secured 
debt. See Scott 1988 THRHR at 451–452. Lief v Dettmann 1964 (2) SA 252 (A) and Trust Bank of 
Africa v Standard Bank of SA 1968 (3) SA 166 (A) required an agreement for recession. While such 
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 It is important that parties to a fiduciary security cession pay careful attention to the 
terms of the pactum fiduciae.197 Consequences that will follow automatically as a 
result of the accessory nature of a pledge of claims, such as that the security 
immediately comes to an end when the principal debt is satisfied, do not follow 
automatically in a fiduciary security cession and must be stipulated in the 
agreement.198 The parties may further consider limiting the entitlements of the 
cessionary to transfer the claims and to provide expressly that any surplus amount 
collected from the claims must fall back to the cedent.199 The contractual undertaking 
of recession is all that remains in the estate of the cedent, which has several 
undesirable consequences: 
 Because the complete claim is transferred to the estate of the cessionary, it forms 
part of his estate.200 This means that the ceded claims will be available to the 
cessionary‘s creditors inside and outside of his insolvency. In the event of the 
cessionary‘s insolvency, the personal rights in terms of the pactum fiduciae will 
have little value for the cedent. 
 This type of transfer also means that no further security may be granted over these 
claims, regardless of whether their value exceeds that of the principal debt. 
 Fiduciary security cession is not an accessory security. This implies that cession 
may occur before the underlying obligation comes into existence. When the 
secured obligation is extinguished due to payment or otherwise, the claims will 
not automatically fall back to the cedent. 
 It is also possible for the cessionary to transfer the claims to third parties, although 
this will be in contravention of the pactum fiduciae. If such a transfer occurs, the 
cedent will have a claim for damages against the cessionary, but he will not be 
able to insist that the third party returns the claim to his estate.201  
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 For a detailed discussion of this aspect see Scott 1988 THRHR at 446–449. Aspects not discussed in 
detail here include adequate description of the parties to the agreement; stating whether the claims 
will also secure interest and collection costs; prohibition on settlement with the debtor; monitoring 
powers; the ratio between the value of the secured debt and the ceded claims. 
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 Scott Cession at 250. This agreement can be tacit, but it is better to put it in writing. See Aussenkehr 
Farms (Pty) Ltd v Trio Transport CC 2002 (4) SA 483 (SCA) at 492E–F. 
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 Although the Court has on occasion interpreted such provisions as indicating a simulated 
transaction. See Skjelbreds Rederi A/S v Hartless (Pty) Ltd 1982 (2) SA 710 (A) at 734B–E. See 
further Scott 1988 THRHR at 437–438. 
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 Scott Cession at 232. 
201
 The security agreement does not bind third parties. See Scott 1988 THRHR at 437 and 442.  
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 South African courts have refused to allow a transfer of ownership as security.202 
By analogy, a fiduciary security cession could be seen as a simulated transaction. 
However, whereas a transfer of ownership as security of a corporeal security 
object usually lacks delivery of the object and therefore does not provide publicity 
of the transaction to third parties, there is no method of providing such publicity 
when claims are used as security. A lack of publicity can therefore not be used as 
a criterion to question fiduciary security cession.203 
 
It is possible in a fiduciary security cession to stipulate that the cedent will continue to 
collect the book debts as the cessionary‘s representative and keep the proceeds. 204 
Such a cession will occur without notice to the debtors until default by the cedent. 205    
Such an arrangement is usual where the intention is that the security will be 
continuing security; extinguished claims are continually being replaced with new 
ones.206 The Supreme Court of Appeal has found that this arrangement effectively 
means that each claim is tacitly receded to the cedent.207 This will continue until the 
cessionary asserts the right to collect the claims himself. Scott208 argues that parties 
should institute action jointly under these circumstances, since the cedent is no longer 
creditor and the cessionary is only creditor for security purposes. 
                                                 
202
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 Regardless of some concerns, there is support for the fiduciary security cession 
construction in case law and it is used in practice.209   
5.5 FORM OF SECURITY GRANTED TO SECURITY SPV 
From the discussion above it follows that the claims serve as security for the duties of 
the SPV towards its investors by way of a general notarial bond, a pledge of claims or 
a fiduciary security cession. I shall now consider the use of each of these forms of 
security during securitisation.210 
5.5.1 General notarial bonds 
Some of the concerns raised regarding a general notarial bond as a form of security211 
will not be as important in securitisation as when it is used to secure traditional debt, 
for the following reasons: 
 The objects of the SPV are restricted. It is not allowed to trade or engage in 
activities unconnected with the securitisation scheme. It follows that there ought 
not to be any secured creditors other than the parties involved in the securitisation 
scheme. This greatly reduces the danger that the SPV will grant further security 
over the assets in priority to the general notarial bond. Furthermore, all parties 
involved in the SPV will have intimate knowledge of its structure. Such parties 
will probably not be able to escape the doctrine of notice if they try to take 
security, for instance a fiduciary security cession, in priority to a general notarial 
bond in favour of the debenture-holders. 
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 From the reasons given in the previous point, it further follows that more than one 
general notarial bond will not be registered over the assets. Consequently the 
problems surrounding perfection as discussed in paragraph 5.4.2.4 will not arise. 
 The priority of other preferent creditors will be irrelevant, because the SPV is 
supposed to keep its taxable income at virtually null and it will have very few, if 
any, employees.212 
 The security SPV can be given wide monitoring powers. This will assist in the 
timeous perfection of the general notarial bond. 
 
The claims will remain in the estate of the SPV. The security SPV will not have to 
concern itself with notice to debtors until it becomes necessary to perfect the general 
notarial bond. Collection will be managed by the SPV, usually through the servicer. 
The general notarial bond is therefore an acceptable form of security in a 
securitisation scheme. 
I argued in paragraph 2.8.2.2 that security during securitisation could also be 
granted in favour of a trustee for debenture-holders.  There is one important point of 
uncertainty regarding registration in favour of a trustee that makes the use of a general 
notarial bond during securitisation doubtful. 
Registration of mortgages and notarial bonds in favour of a trust has always been 
allowed by the Deeds Office by vesting the property in the name of the trustees for the 
time being, without specifying their names.213 However, until 2003 there was no 
inclusion of a trust under the concept of a ‗person‘ in the Deeds Registries Act.214 The 
Act only allows for the conveyancing of title to ‗another person‘.215 A trust is not a 
legal person and therefore registrations could not be made in the name of a trust. This 
shortcoming was pointed out in Joubert v Van Rensburg.216  The Court criticised the 
practice of the Registrar to allow registration in the names of ‗the trustees for the time 
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being‘ as not providing sufficient certainty about the identity of the owner of the 
property.217  
In response to these comments of the Court, the Deeds Registries Act was 
amended to include a trust under the concept of a ‗person‘. However, instead of 
adopting the original draft of the amendment which read: ―‗person‘ includes a 
trust‖,218 the definition of ‗person‘ now reads:219 
 
In this Act unless inconsistent with the context – ―person‖, for the purpose of the registration of 
immovable trust property only, includes a trust (my emphasis).  
 
It follows that while it is now possible to register land and mortgages over land in 
favour of trusts, it is still not possible to register notarial bonds in the name of a trust, 
because it relates to movable property.220  
This has led the Chief Registrar to issue a circular in which he argues that there is 
no practical difference between vesting the title in the trustees for the time being or in 
the name of the trust.221 On the computer system of the Deeds Office registration is 
always shown as in the name of the trust. Accordingly, the practice before the 2003 
amendment is maintained in respect of notarial bonds in favour of trusts, by vesting 
the title in the name of the trustees for the time being.  
However, despite this practice, the Court‘s comments in Joubert are still valid, 
namely that a mere practice cannot override the requirements of the Deeds Registries 
Act or legal principles.222 The fact remains that a trust is not a legal person and that the 
Act requires registration in the name of a person. The Act should therefore be 
amended to make provision for the registration of notarial bonds in the name of a 
trust. Until such an amendment is made, the use of the general notarial bond as 
security to investors during securitisation will not be on a sound footing and will lead 
to a lower rating of the securities. 
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5.5.2 Pledge of claims 
The role of notice to debtors in a pledge of claims before maturity of the underlying 
debt remains unclear. In a pledge of claims the pledgor transfers the entitlement to 
realise the claims to the pledgee. However, the pledgee may not exercise this 
entitlement before default by the pledgor. At the same time the pledgor cannot realise 
the claims, because he has transferred this entitlement to the pledgee. Since both the 
pledgor and the pledgee have interests in the claim, they should jointly institute action 
at this stage. This is unworkable in a securitisation scheme. It would mean that the 
SPV and the security SPV would have to institute action against a defaulting debtor 
jointly. However, the debtor up until that time would have dealt only with the servicer 
and may not even be aware that the claim against him was subject to a securitisation 
scheme.  
It is also unclear whether notice to the debtors is required to perfect the pledge as 
security.223  Such a requirement will eliminate security by way of a pledge of claims as 
an option during securitisation. Notice might confuse the debtors,224 it is costly, and 
administratively burdensome, especially when cession occurs continuously. 
Furthermore, the pledgor cannot accept payment by the debtor who has knowledge of 
the pledge, nor can the pledgee, who only gains this entitlement when the pledgor 
cannot pay the debt. This can be overcome by agreeing that the servicer will collect as 
representative of the pledgor and pledgee jointly.  
However, this does not overcome the difficulty of what to do with the money after 
it has been collected. Strictly speaking, such money must be kept separately in pledge 
in favour of the pledgee.225 However, the SPV relies on that income to service the debt 
securities issued. An inability of the SPV to use this income will render the scheme 
unworkable.  
5.5.3 Fiduciary security cession 
In a fiduciary security cession the cedent and the cessionary can agree that the cedent 
will continue to collect the claims as the cessionary‘s representative and keep the 
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proceeds for himself.226 Such an arrangement is the norm where the intention is that 
the security will be continuing security, in other words, old claims are continually 
replaced by new ones.227 The parties will not notify the debtor of the cession under 
these circumstances, but will continue as before until maturity of the secured debt. 
A minority judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal found that this arrangement 
effectively meant that each debt is tacitly receded to the cedent.228 This would 
continue until the cessionary asserts the right to collect the claims himself. Scott229 
argues that parties should institute action jointly under these circumstances, since the 
cedent is no longer creditor and the cessionary is only creditor for security purposes, 
which raises the same concerns as in the case of a pledge of claims.230 
The claims will vest in the security SPV as cessionary and will not be in the estate 
of the SPV any longer. I discussed the potential difficulties with this situation in 
paragraph 5.4.3.2 above. However, since the SPV will have few other creditors, these 
concerns are less important during securitisation. The claims vest in the security SPV 
and there will be virtually no risk of the SPV granting further security over the claims 
or alienating it, due to the restrictions on the powers of the SPV.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I showed that debt financing can be beneficial for shareholders, 
because of the principle of gearing.231 However, gearing may also hold some risk for 
shareholders. The risks associated with debt financing are less in companies that have 
reached maturity in their specific industries. 
 Debt financing is a less attractive financing option for small, high-growth 
companies, because the restrictions and monitoring arrangements contained in debt 
financing agreements may conflict with their aims of research and development. 
When they do decide on debt financing, smaller companies will often prefer ‗insider 
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debt‘.232 Even mature companies may prefer ‗insider debt‘ in order to avoid negative 
signalling caused by the issuance of debt instruments on a securities exchange. 
 The Companies Act233 provides for debt financing in the form of debentures. The 
term ‗debentures‘ has never been uniformly defined, but I define it as a claim against 
a company, issued by a company to meet its capital requirements, where the holder is 
entitled to interest at specified intervals and repayment of the capital amount at a 
specified time.234 I briefly discussed the relevance of the debenture certificate and 
specific provisions in the Companies Act relating to debentures. I explained the 
difference between debentures issued in series and debenture stock, which is of 
importance in the discussion on the trust for debenture-holders.235 
 I continued with an overview of the methods of providing security for debentures 
and other loans in South African law. I focused on the forms of security that may be 
used when the object of the security are claims, namely general notarial bonds and 
security by means of claims. 
 There are several reasons why the general notarial bond is a weak form of 
security:236 
 An unperfected general notarial bond does not give its holder real security, but 
only a statutory preference on the insolvency of the debtor. 
 Before perfection the debtor may alienate the encumbered property, may create 
real security over those assets in priority to the general notarial bondholder and 
the debtor‘s creditors may attach the encumbered property.  
 The hypothecation of a shop, last discussed by Sacks, is, in my opinion, a form of 
special notarial bond. The decision of the Appellate Division in Cooper NO v Die 
Meester237 held that the holder of such a bond does not enjoy a preference over the 
other creditors of the debtor. Security over the stock-in-trade cannot be created 
under the Security by Means of Movable Property Act,238 because of its 
fluctuating nature which means that it cannot be described in the manner required 
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by the Act. Stock-in-trade will fall under a general notarial bond. I further 
concluded that even if third parties had actual knowledge of the general notarial 
bond over the stock-in-trade, they will be able to assume that it was the intention 
of the parties to the security agreement that the stock-in-trade may be alienated.239 
 The perfection of general notarial bonds in current South African law gives rise to 
unsatisfactory results:240 
o Only the first general notarial bondholder that perfects his security will have 
a secured claim against the estate of the debtor.  
o The other general notarial bondholders will always only have a preference 
above the unsecured creditors of the debtor‘s insolvent estate, because only 
one person can take physical control of a security object.  
o This is the position regardless of the fact that the other general notarial 
bonds might have been registered before the one that was perfected. 
o Bondholders cannot effectively strengthen their position by means of 
contractual clauses to prevent later security over the assets, because third 
parties are not deemed to be aware of such clauses. 
o It makes no difference whether the other bondholders were only fractionally 
later than the successful bondholder in their attempts to perfect.  
o The provisional winding-up of the debtor will not cause a court to refuse to 
confirm an interim order for attachment in terms of a perfection clause.  
 
I conclude that the legislature will have to reconsider the perfection of general notarial 
bonds in order to overcome the impossibility of more than one creditor taking control 
of the assets encumbered by a general notarial bond.241 I suggest a system of 
receivership, whereby an application by any general notarial bondholder for the 
perfection of his bond will lead to the perfection of all notarial bonds. Priority will 
then be determined by the date of registration of the bonds and the receiver will act on 
behalf of all the bondholders in its dealings with the debtor. 
 I then considered security by means of claims in the form of a pledge of claims and 
a fiduciary security cession.  
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 In a pledge of claims the main area of concern is the uncertainty that exists over the 
role of notice to the debtors as a requirement for perfection of the pledge.242 I 
indicated that during securitisation notice of the pledge of claims to the debtors might 
cause them uncertainty and concern, because they would not have been informed 
about the initial cession of the claims to the SPV. It is also costly and administratively 
burdensome. 
 A fiduciary security cession does not require notice to debtors for validity, but it 
has unfavourable consequences of its own, especially on the insolvency of the 
cessionary or on the attachment of the claims by the cessionary‘s creditors.243 In other 
legal systems these unfavourable consequences have been tempered so that security 
cession will more closely resemble pledge in the insolvency of the cessionary and 
when the cessionary‘s creditors want to attach the claims.244 South African law will 
benefit from similar provisions,245 which in my opinion can only be introduced 
through legislation.246  
Additionally, legislation should also regulate a pledge of claims, but with the 
possibility of creating such a security without the need of notifying debtors. Such a 
system will function best if a register of a pledge of claims is introduced to replace the 
publicity function of notice to the debtors.247  
 After registration a pledge of claims will follow whether or not the debtor was 
informed of the pledge. The debtor must be able to satisfy the claim through payment 
to the pledgor until he receives notice that payment must be made to the pledgee. 
However, if the claim is under threat of attachment by other creditors of the pledgor, 
or in the event of the pledgor‘s insolvency, the pledgee will be a secured creditor even 
though no notice was given to the debtor. 248 Furthermore, if the pledgor grants further 
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security over the pledged claims, or cedes them to a third party, the pledgee will have 
a prior right to the proceeds of those claims by analogy to the position with regard to 
special notarial bonds. 
 The South African Law Commission investigated the position with regard to 
security by means of claims, but decided that no statutory intervention should take 
place.249 This position should be reconsidered.250 It is mostly businesses that make use 
of security by means of claims. Uncertainty about the consequences and application 
of security by means of claims is therefore detrimental to the ease with which 
businesses can obtain credit. Though this concern is of lesser importance for the 
securitisation process, it may influence the rating of the scheme.251 
I considered the form of security by means of claims most suitable for a 
securitisation scheme.252 I concluded that a general notarial bond, a pledge of claims 
or a fiduciary security cession may all be used in securitisation. Some of the concerns 
about the general notarial bond are of lesser concern in securitisation, due to the 
unique character of the scheme. However, the uncertain position of the registration of 
notarial bonds in the name of ‗the trustees for the time being‘, as is currently the 
practice of the Registrar of Deeds, is unfortunate. I argued that the definition of 
‗person‘ in the Deeds Registries Act253 ought to be amended to include trusts, also for 
registration of notarial bonds.254  
When considering which form of security to use, it is important to avoid any 
necessity of having to give notice to the debtors about the scheme. Notice may cause 
uncertainty and concern and carries administrative and cost implications. The 
originator will probably also want to maintain a relationship with its debtors and 
would not want the debtors to make payments to a third party. Since it is still 
uncertain in South African law whether notice to the debtors is necessary to perfect a 
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pledge of claims, a fiduciary security cession of claims ought to receive better ratings 
from rating agencies.255 
 In conclusion, South African law does not provide a certain and robust method of 
creating security over claims. Securitisation provides an alternative method of 
liquidating claims and enhancing the working capital of a company. However, 
securitisation is not suitable for all companies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
TRADITIONAL SECURITISATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Securitisation in South Africa is not regulated in a single Act, but it is important to 
take cognisance of aspects from many statutes when structuring the scheme. In this 
chapter I consider various statutory provisions. The provisions mentioned in    
Chapter 2 where they are of specific importance to the general form and function of a 
securitisation scheme are not repeated here. I consider the implications of the 
Insolvency Act1 on securitisation in Chapter 8, as well as those provisions of the 
Companies Act2 that relate to the insolvency of the originator. 
 I do not think it is necessary to regulate securitisation extensively. In its 
investigation of the possible role that securitisation may play in advancing the micro-
financing industry, the Task Group of the Policy Board for Financial Services and 
Regulation made the following statement, with which I agree:3 
 
Securitisation represents an advanced form of self-regulation, in that the structures typically build 
in significant checks and balances, which are intended to eliminate any undue influence from any 
particular party to the transaction (my emphasis).  
 
Especially the trustee for debenture-holders and the rating agency involved in the 
scheme have important monitoring functions,4 which decreases the need for extensive 
statutory regulation.5 
6.2 REGULATORY HISTORY OF SECURITISATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
A securitisation scheme must comply with the provisions of Securitisation Notice, 
2008,6 if an SPV intends to offer securities to the public. Securitisation Notice, 2008 
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exempts a securitisation scheme from falling under the definition of conducting the 
business of a bank, subject to compliance with its provisions. 
 Securitisation Notice, 2008 is the fourth of its kind and goes further than its 
predecessors in allowing securitisation in keeping with international practice, as well 
as complying with the recommendations of the revised Framework on International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards published by the 
International Basel Committee.7 I shall also discuss the three notices that preceded it, 
as well as Commercial Paper Notice, 1994.8  
 The common denominator in all these notices is that they exclude the activities of a 
securitisation scheme from falling under the definition of ‗the business of a bank‘ as 
set out in section 1 of the Banks Act.9 
6.2.1 Securitisation Notice, 1992 
Securitisation Notice, 199210 was the first to exclude securitisation activities from 
falling under the definition of ‗the business of a bank‘.11 However, it precluded 
companies other than banks from engaging in securitisation.12 This resulted from fears 
about disintermediation. 
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 Disintermediation is a process by which banks do not perform their traditional 
lending function, but rather act as intermediaries between borrowers and lenders 
through brokerage and underwriting activities.13 Banks are traditionally intermediaries 
in that they take deposits from the general public, which they then use to grant loans 
to the general public. During disintermediation borrowers and lenders approach each 
other directly and banks play a secondary role. 
 In terms of Securitisation Notice, 1992, income generated by the collection of the 
transferred claims could only be used by the SPV for redemption of the securities 
issued, the acquisition of further assets and the maintenance of the capital value of the 
assets held by the SPV.14 
 The notice further contained restrictions on the utilisation of excess cash flow from 
the transferred claims.15 These funds had to be kept as reserves for the protection of 
the holders of the securities.16 In the event of the SPV‘s winding-up or dissolution, the 
funds could be paid to the originator, the shareholders of the SPV or to the holders of 
the securities. 
 An originator, its subsidiaries and fellow subsidiaries were prohibited from holding 
any shares in the SPV and of controlling the SPV either directly or indirectly.17 No 
director of an originator, or its subsidiaries, was allowed to serve on the board of the 
                                                 
13
 Itzikowitz & Malan 1996 SA Merc LJ at 176. Section 78(1)(g) of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 describes 
the following as an ‗undesirable practice‘: ―A bank shall not, for the purpose of effecting a money 
lending transaction directly between a lender and a borrower, perform any act in the capacity of an 
agent except where the funds to be lent in terms of the money lending transaction are entrusted by 
the lender to the bank subject to a written contract of agency in which, in addition to any other terms 
thereof, at least the following matters shall be recorded: (i) Confirmation by the lender that the bank 
acts as the agent of the lender; (ii) that the lender assumes, except so far as the lender may in law 
have a right of recovery against the bank, all risks connected with the placing by the bank of funds 
entrusted to it by the lender, as well as the responsibility to ensure that the bank executes the 
lender‘s instructions as recorded in the written contract of agency; and (iii) that no express or 
implied guarantee regarding the payment of any amount of money owing by one person to another 
in pursuance of the relevant money lending transaction is furnished by the bank.‖ For an interesting 
perspective on the history of intermediation see Charles P Kindleberger The World Economy and 
National Finance in Historical Perspective (1995) at 131 et seq, entitled ―Intermediation, 
Disintermediation, and Direct Trading‖. 
14
 Schedule, par 3(c). 
15
 Schedule, par 3(g)(i) and (ii). 
16
 See par 2.5 for a discussion of a reserve account as a credit enhancement. 
17
 Schedule, par 3(d)(i) and (ii). 
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SPV.18 The name of the SPV could not contain any reference to the name of an 
originator or its subsidiaries, nor could the name imply any association with them.19 
 The originator was allowed to act as servicer.20 However, further participation of 
the originator was limited. The notice prohibited an originator, which was always a 
bank, from providing liquidity support to the securitisation scheme.21 The originator 
could not underwrite or guarantee the issue of securities by the SPV.22 Third party 
credit enhancement23 at market prices and subordinated long term loans to the SPV by 
the originator were allowed.24 
 The notice aimed at ensuring that the sale of the assets to the SPV would divest the 
originator of all risks associated with the assets.25 Any recourse by the SPV against 
the originator for loss sustained from the transferred claim was excluded.26 However, 
the originator was allowed to replace one claim with another, as long as this was not 
due to the non-performance of the original claim.27 
 If any of these requirements were not met by the originator bank, the bank would 
have to reflect the transferred assets on its balance sheet,28 which would lead to higher 
capital adequacy requirements.29 The SPV would further not be exempted in terms of 
the notice, which meant that it would be regulated as a bank. 
6.2.2 Commercial Paper Notice, 1994 
In terms of Commercial Paper Notice, 199430 the acceptance of money from the 
general public against the issue of commercial paper in accordance with the 
                                                 
18
 Schedule, par 3(e). 
19
 Schedule, par 3(f). 
20
 See par 2.7. 
21
 Schedule, par 3(h)(i) and (ii). See par 2.5 for a discussion of liquidity support.  
22
 Schedule, par 3(h)(iv). 
23
 See par 2.5. 
24
 Itzikowitz & Malan 1996 SA Merc LJ at 179. 
25
 Schedule, par 4(a). 
26




 Schedule, par 5. 
29
 See Itzikowitz & Malan 1996 SA Merc LJ at 182 and 186–188. See generally Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision Asset Securitisation: Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord 
(2001). 
30
 GN 2172, GG 16167 (14 December 1994). 
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provisions of the notice will not be an activity that falls under the definition of ‗the 
business of a bank‘.31 Issues of commercial paper by securitisation schemes have been 
regulated in Securitisation Notice since 2001, but the provisions of Commercial Paper 
Notice still applies to other issues of commercial paper. 
 In terms of the Notice ‗commercial paper‘ means:32 
 
(a) Any written acknowledgement of debt irrespective of whether the maturity thereof is fixed or 
based on a notice period, and irrespective of whether the rate at which interest is payable in 
respect of the debt in question is a fixed or floating rate; and 
(b) Debentures or any interest-bearing written acknowledgment of debt issued for a fixed term in 
accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973), 
 
but does not include bankers‘ acceptances 
 
The Notice prescribes the following:33 
 Commercial paper may only be issued or transferred in denominations equal to or 
greater than R1 million.34 This is the first of two requirements that, before 
Securitisation Notice, 2004, effectively restricted securitisation in South Africa to 
originators with large enterprises. Smaller issues of commercial paper could not 
be made in compliance with the Notice. It further means that if the commercial 
paper is not listed, mostly institutional or professional investors will be able to 
invest. 
 Commercial paper may only be issued by a listed company, or by a company that 
for at least the past 18 months had net assets exceeding R100 million, as certified 
by its auditors and reflected in its financial statements, or by any other juristic 
person so authorised in writing by the Registrar of Banks.35 When they were still 
applicable to securitisation schemes, these requirements further restricted 
securitisation to originators with large enterprises. 
o These first two restrictions do not apply if the securities are listed on a 
recognised financial exchange, or are endorsed by a bank, or are issued for 
longer than five years, or are issued or backed by Central Government.36 
                                                 
31
 Schedule, par 2. 
32
 Schedule, par 1. 
33
 In the context of securitisation, the issuer will be the SPV. This should be read into the requirements. 
34
 Schedule, par 3(1)(a). 
35
 Schedule, par 3(1)(b). 
36
 Schedule, par 3(1)(b)(iii)(A)–(E). 
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 The ultimate borrower of the money obtained through the issue of commercial 
paper may only be the issuer, or a wholly owned subsidiary of the issuer, or the 
holding company of the issuer, or a company whose board of directors is 
controlled by and customarily acts in accordance with the directions or 
instructions of the issuer.37 Since the originator could be construed as the ultimate 
borrower, and would not ordinarily be the holding company of the SPV, this 
provision was a possible obstacle to securitisation. 
 The funds raised through the issue of commercial paper may only be used for the 
ultimate borrower‘s operating capital. It may not be applied, directly or indirectly, 
for the granting of money loans or credit, excluding credit for a sale of goods, to 
the general public.38 
 The notice sets out the minimum disclosure requirements to be included in a 
placing document or prospectus relating to the issue of the commercial paper.39 
These requirements aim to aid a potential investor in assessing the risk of 
investing in the issued commercial paper. The issuer must declare that it is a going 
concern and can in all circumstances be reasonably expected to meet its 
commitments.40 Any material adverse change in the issuer‘s financial position 
since the date of its last audited financial statements must be declared.41 The 
issuer‘s auditor must certify that the issue complies in all respects with the 
provisions of the notice. 
6.2.3 Securitisation Notice, 2001 
By the late 1990s the South African Reserve Bank realised that it had to expand its 
regulations on securitisation in order to bring them in line with the more or less 
standardised approach followed by the Group of Ten.42 Securitisation Notice, 2001 
followed.43 
                                                 
37
 Schedule, par 3(2). 
38
 Schedule, par 3(4). 
39
 Schedule, par 3(5). 
40
 Thereby reflecting the adequacy of its liquidity and solvency. If a securitisation is properly 
structured, the SPV should have no liquidity or solvency inadequacies. 
41
 The issuer‘s last audited financial statements must accompany the issue. 
42
 Also referred to as the ‗G10‘ these are 11 industrialised countries that co-operate on monetary, 
financial and economic matters. The participating countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. See 
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 The first important difference between Securitisation Notice, 2001 and its 
predecessor is that it allowed non-banking institutions to engage in securitisation, 
while being exempt from complying with the Banks Act.44 However, more stringent 
rules applied to banks that engaged in securitisation activities.45 
 An institution other than one within a banking group could engage in a 
securitisation scheme and be exempted from falling under the meaning of ‗the 
business of a bank‘, provided that the conditions of the notice were met and that the 
SPV only engaged in activities related to the securitisation scheme.46 Most of these 
provisions were taken over in Securitisation Notice, 2004 as far as they related to 
traditional securitisation. 
 The notice required that the transfer of the assets to the SPV would divest the 
originator of all rights and obligations originating from the transactions that gave rise 
to the assets (claims).47 However, the originator was allowed to act in a secondary 
role.48 The notice contained no restrictions on the secondary roles that an originator 
may engage in when the originator does not fall within a banking group. 
 The prohibition of recourse against the originator for non-performing transferred 
assets as set out in Securitisation Notice, 1992, was retained,49 as were the provisions 
that allowed warranties with regard to matters that do not relate to the future 
                                                                                                                                            
the Bank for International Settlements‘ discussion at www.bis.org/publ/g10.htm (accessed 17 
September 2007).  
43
 GN 1375, GG 22948 (13 December 2001), Notice on Banks Act 94 of 1990 – ―Designation of an 
Activity not Falling within the Meaning of ‗The Business of a Bank‘ (Securitisation Schemes)‖, 
hereinafter referred to as ‗Securitisation Notice, 2001‘. On Securitisation Notice, 2001 with regard 
to the position relating to banks see Jonathan GF Walsh & Edward Sunderland ―New South African 
Securitisation Guidelines Herald Active Securitisation Market for South Africa‖ (2002) 17 JIBL 133 
et seq. 
44
 94 of 1990. In its definition of ‗originator‘ in the Schedule, par 1, Securitisation Notice, 2001 does 
not restrict its meaning to deposit-taking institutions as was the case with Securitisation Notice, 
1992. See n 12 above. Likewise, the definition of ‗securitisation scheme‘ (Schedule, par 1) focuses 
on the process after transfer of the assets and simply refers to an ‗originator‘. 
45
 Especially when banks engage in secondary roles. See the Schedule, pars 4–10. 
46
 The conditions of Securitisation Notice, 2001 relevant to institutions not falling within a banking-
group were set out in the Schedule, pars 3 and 11–13. 
47
 Schedule, par 3(a). 
48
 Idem. ‗Secondary role‘ is defined in par 1 as ―a credit-enhancement facility, a provider of a liquidity 
facility, an underwriter, a purchaser of senior commercial paper, a servicing agent or a counter party 
to a transaction included in the trading book of a bank.‖ See also n 56 below. 
49
 Schedule, par 3(b). See par 6.2.1. 
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creditworthiness of the debtor or about matters that fall outside the control of the 
originator.50 
 There were no express restrictions on the use of the proceeds collected from the 
transferred assets after their transfer as was the case with Securitisation Notice, 
1992.51 Nor were there express restrictions on the use of excess money collected from 
the transferred assets. However, such restrictions must be contained in the constitutive 
documents of the SPV in order for it to obtain a favourable credit rating.52 
 Contrary to the 1992 notice, Securitisation Notice, 2001 allowed the originator to 
hold up to 50 percent of the nominal value of the share capital issued by the SPV.53 
The originator was allowed to hold even more shares, as long as the voting rights 
attached to the shares were restricted so that the originator could not decisively 
influence the outcome of the voting at the general meeting of the SPV.54 The latter 
provision was ambiguous, since a shareholding of up to 50 per cent, which carries full 
voting rights, will in any case often influence the decisions at a general meeting 
decisively.  
The board of directors of the SPV had to be independent of the originator, but if 
there were more than three members on the board, the originator was allowed to 
appoint one director.55 
 The notice extended the ability of banks, also when a bank was an originator, to act 
in a credit enhancement capacity during securitisation. However, this was subject to 
some qualifications, which mostly aimed to keep the credit enhancement at arm‘s 
length.56 
                                                 
50
 Schedule, par 3(c)(i) and (ii). 
51
 See par 6.2.1 above. 
52
 See par 2.3.3.  
53
 Schedule, par 3(j)(i) 
54
 Schedule, par 3(j)(i)(aa). 
55
 Schedule, par 3(k)(i). 
56
 Schedule, par 4. The qualifications were as follows: there could be no recourse to the bank apart 
from the fixed contractual obligations; the SPV must have retained the right to change credit 
enhancers; the credit enhancement must be clearly and separately documented from the other 
functions of the participating bank; the continued role of the banks must be disclosed in the 
prospectus or placing documents; if the bank is also the originator, it can only enter into credit 
enhancement agreements at the beginning of the scheme. 
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 Securitisation Notice, 2001 contained conditions for the issue of commercial paper 
by an SPV during a securitisation scheme,57 which replaced the conditions of 
Commercial Paper Notice, 1994. These conditions have remained unchanged in 
Securitisation Notice, 2004 as well as in Securitisation Notice, 2008. These conditions 
are as follows: 
 Commercial paper issued during securitisation can only be issued or transferred in 
minimum denominations equal to or greater than an initial principal value of      
R1 million.58 
o This restriction does not apply if the commercial paper is listed on a recognised 
financial exchange, is endorsed by a bank, is issued for a period longer than 
five years, or is backed by an explicit national Government guarantee.  
 Commercial paper issued during securitisation may only be issued by a juristic 
person authorised by the Registrar of Banks in writing and subject to the 
conditions of the notice and any other conditions that the Registrar may 
determine.59 
 Specific information must be included in the placing document or disclosure 
document accompanying the issue of the commercial paper.60 As with other 
documents of this sort,61 the aim is to provide investors with enough information 
so that they may ascertain the nature of their financial and commercial risk in the 
investment. Of specific importance is the requirement that the transferred assets 
must be described. The auditor of the SPV must confirm that the issue of the 
commercial paper pursuant to a securitisation complies in all respects with the 
provisions of the notice. 
 
The provisions listed above differed from Commercial Paper Notice, 1994 in two 
respects. First, they enabled smaller originators to enter a securitisation scheme 
through the issue of commercial paper. Second, they removed the restrictions on the 
utilisation of the funds obtained from the issue of commercial paper by the ultimate 
                                                 
57
 Schedule, par 11. 
58
 Schedule, par 11(a)(i). 
59
 Schedule, par 11(a)(ii). 
60
 Schedule, par 11(b). The Registrar may prescribe additional disclosure requirements in respect of 
securitisation schemes. See the Schedule, par 12(b). 
61
 See ss 145, 146, 148 and Schedule 3 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
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borrower during a securitisation scheme. The ultimate borrower in securitisation 
could be seen as the originator. This would contravene some of the provisions of 
Commercial Paper Notice, 1994.62 
 Chapter VIII of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 would apply to SPVs that did not 
comply with the provisions of the notice.63  
6.2.4 Securitisation Notice, 2004 
Securitisation Notice, 200464 did not differ much from its predecessor regarding 
traditional securitisation schemes. It drew a specific distinction between when an 
institution within a banking group acts as an originator and when an institution other 
than within a banking group acts in that role. The main contribution of Securitisation 
Notice, 2004 was to regulate synthetic securitisation schemes.65 
 The notice provided that the acceptance by an SPV of money from the general 
public against the issue of commercial paper66 in respect of a traditional securitisation 
scheme was not an activity that falls within the meaning of ‗the business of a bank‘,67 
as long as the scheme complied with the relevant provisions of the notice.68 The 
exemption only applied if the SPV engaged in no other transactions than those 
relating to the securitisation.69 
 The transfer of the assets to the SPV had to divest the originator and all its 
associated companies70 of all rights and obligations originating from the transactions 
that gave rise to the transferred claims.71 All risks associated with the claims also had 
                                                 
62
 See further The Task Group of the Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation Access to 
Finance at 165. 
63
 Schedule, par 13(b). See par 6.3 below. 
64
 GN R681, GG 26415 (4 June 2004) Notice on Banks Act 94 of 1990 – ―Designation of an Activity 
not Falling within the Meaning of ‗The Business of a Bank‘ (Securitisation Schemes)‖, hereinafter 
referred to as ‗Securitisation Notice, 2004‘. 
65
 See ch 1 for a definition of synthetic securitisation. Synthetic securitisation falls outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
66
 For purposes of Securitisation Notice, 2004, the definition of ‗commercial paper‘ in Commercial 
Paper Notice, 1994 is extended to include the issue of preference shares. See Schedule, par 1. This is 
retained in Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 1. See further the discussion below. 
67
 Schedule, par 2(1). 
68
 For institutions that fall outside banking groups, the relevant provisions of the Schedule were pars 4 
and 13–16. Par 4(1) was descriptive and had no binding effect. 
69
 Schedule, par 2(1)(c). 
70
 ‗Associated company‘ means a subsidiary or fellow subsidiary of the institution. See Schedule, par 1. 
71
 Schedule, par 4(2)(a). See also Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 4(2)(a). 
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to be transferred. The SPV must have had no right of recourse against the originator in 
respect of costs, expenses or losses incurred in connection with any of the transferred 
claims.72 However, the originator was allowed to make warranties with regard to the 
transferred claims, as long as those warranties did not relate to the future 
creditworthiness of the originator, or to matters that fell outside the control of the 
originator.73 
There were no restrictions on institutions that were not banks to act in secondary 
roles.74 ‗Secondary roles‘ was defined as credit enhancement facilities,75 liquidity 
facilities,76 underwriting,77 purchasing senior commercial paper,78 and acting as 
servicer79 or as counterparty to a transaction included in the trading book of a bank. If 
the originator entered into a swap agreement with the SPV in which the originator 
would bear losses in respect of the transferred assets, the provisions relating to credit 
enhancement in paragraph 6 were applicable.80 However, these credit enhancement 
provisions were only applicable to banks. Furthermore, paragraph 2, which set out the 
paragraphs of the Schedule that non-banking institutions had to comply with in terms 
of the notice, made no mention of compliance with paragraph 6. In my opinion the 
provision on swaps was not intended to cover non-banking institutions and it ought to 
be amended accordingly.81 
                                                 
72
 Schedule, par 4(2)(b). See also Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 4(2)(c). See further the 
discussion in par 7.4.2. 
73
 Schedule, par 2(2)(c)(i) and (ii). See also Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, pars 4(2)(d)(i) and 
(ii). 
74
 This position remains unchanged in Securitisation Notice, 2008. 
75




 ‗Underwriting‘ in terms of the notice means exposure that includes all underwriting commitments, 
whether in writing or verbally, including all note-issue facilities and revolving underwriting 
facilities in respect of which contingent risks arise from the bank‘s role as underwriter of such 
issues, guaranteeing to provide funds when other parties refused to do so. See Schedule, par 1. The 
definition was probably meant to include non-banks, even though it only refers to banks. 
78
 ‗Senior commercial paper‘ means commercial paper issued in terms of a traditional securitisation 
scheme, the purchase of which commercial paper does not constitute providing a first-loss or 
second-loss credit enhancement facility. See Schedule, par 1. In other words, the originator is 
allowed to purchase commercial paper issued by the SPV, as long as it is not subordinated. See par 
2.5. 
79
 See par 2.7. 
80
 Schedule, par 6. 
81
 These provisions were retained unchanged in Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, pars 4(2)(n) and 
6.  
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If the originator, or one of its associated companies, acted as a servicer, it had to be 
under no obligation to remit funds to the SPV before it had received payment from the 
debtor of the transferred claim.82  
In the choice of the claims to be transferred to the SPV, the parties must have 
ensured that the transfer would not result in a breach of the terms of the transaction 
that gave rise to the claim.83 The type of restriction that comes to mind is an 
agreement prohibiting the transfer of a claim between the originator and the debtor of 
the claim.84 Even if the restriction is such that the claim may be transferred with the 
consent of the debtor, it can severely hamper the securitisation process, especially if 
the restriction was a standard term of the loan agreements that gave rise to the claims 
that the originator wants to transfer. It will further mean that the originator will have 
to give notice of the securitisation of the claims, which may lead to uncertainty and 
concern among debtors. Large companies should therefore consider not including 
such restrictions in their standardised contracts, even if they are not planning a 
securitisation in the immediate future.85 
In terms of the agreement between the originator and the SPV, any amendment of 
the terms of the agreements that gave rise to the transferred claims would only affect 
the SPV and not the originator.86 
The ambiguous provisions regarding the shareholding of an originator in an SPV in 
Securitisation Notice, 2001 were amended. Securitisation Notice, 2004 only allowed 
                                                 
82
 Schedule, par 4(2)(d). See also Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 4(2)(f). 
83
 Schedule, par 4(2)(e). See also Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 4(2)(g). 
84
 Also referred to as a pactum de non cedendo. See Scott Cession at 205 et seq; PM Nienaber 
―Cession‖ in WA Joubert et al The Law of South Africa Vol 2 Part 2 2 ed (2003) at 28. A pactum de 
non cedendo is valid and binding if it can be shown to serve a useful purpose to the debtor. See 
Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mines Estates Ltd 1920 AD 600 at 615. The agreement will also be valid if 
it was part and parcel of the agreement that created the right. See Trust Bank of Africa v Standard 
Bank of SA 1968 (3) SA 166 (A) at 189F. For criticism of the current approach, see Scott Cession at 
213–214. She distinguishes between the creation of a pactum de non cedendo for existing rights as 
opposed to the position where the restriction is part of the agreement that gave rise to the right from 
the start. In the former case, she argues that a debtor must show that he has an interest in the 
restriction. Otherwise the restriction will be contrary to the principle in Roman-Dutch law of 
property that res in commercio should not be withdrawn from commercial dealings without good 
reason. A cession despite a valid pactum de non cedendo in such circumstances will only lead to a 
claim for damages against the cedent and will not affect the validity of the cession against the 
cessionary. If the pactum de non cedendo formed part of the agreement creating the right, the 
principle of freedom of contract will lead to the validity of the restriction. Any attempted cession 
will be void. Nothing will be transferred to the cessionary, since the right was created as an 
intransferable right. I agree with Scott‘s view.  
85
 I shall consider the cession of the claims to the SPV in detail in ch 7.  
86
 Schedule, par 4(2)(g). See also Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 4(2)(j). 
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an originator directly or indirectly to hold up to 20 per cent of the shareholding in the 
SPV, as opposed to the previous 50 per cent.87 In addition, the originator must not 
have had the right to determine the outcome of the voting at a general meeting of the 
SPV.88 The provisions for representation of the originator on the board of directors of 
the SPV remained unchanged in all four Securitisation Notices.89 
The provisions for special treatment of commercial paper issued by an SPV during 
a securitisation scheme were retained in Securitisation Notice, 2004.90 Accordingly, 
Commercial Paper Notice, 1994 did not apply to an issue of commercial paper by an 
SPV during a securitisation scheme, provided that the issue complied with the 
provisions of the notice.  
The disclosure requirements were further extended and included a statement to 
investors that their investment did not represent deposits in a bank, that the 
instruments were subject to investment risk and that the originator and its associated 
companies did not guarantee the capital value or the performance of the instruments 
issued by the SPV.91 Credit enhancement facilities and liquidity facilities had to be 
disclosed.92 There had to be an express statement that the board of directors of the 
SPV were independent of the originator.93 
Chapter VIII of the Banks Act94 applied to an SPV that implemented a 
securitisation scheme which did not comply with the notice.95 
6.2.5 Securitisation Notice, 2008  
On 1 January 2008 Securitisation Notice, 2004 was repealed in its entirety and 
replaced by Securitisation Notice, 2008.96 However, the new Securitisation Notice 
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 Schedule, par 4(l)(i)(aa). See also Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 4(2)(p)(i)(A). 
88
 Schedule, par 4(l)(i)(bb). See also Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 4(2)(p)(i)(B). 
89
 It is provided for in Securitisation Notice, 2004 in the Schedule, par 4(m). See also Securitisation 
Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 4(2)(q). 
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 See pars 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. 
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 Schedule, par 15(1)(a). See also Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 16(2)(a)(x). 
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 Schedule, par 15(2)(viii) and (ix). See also Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 16(2)(a)(viii) 
and (ix). 
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 Schedule, par 15(2)(xi). See also Securitisation Notice, 2008, Schedule, par 16(2)(a)(xi). 
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 94 of 1990. 
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 Schedule, par 16(1)(c). 
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 GN 2, GG 30628 (1 January 2008) Notice on Banks Act 94 of 1990 – Designation of an Activity not 
Falling within the Meaning of ‗The Business of a Bank‘ (Securitisation Schemes). 
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does not materially alter the previous position as set out in Securitisation Notice, 
2004. For the most part it adds certain provisions on matters that were not previously 
addressed. Securitisation Notice, 2008 accompanies the Banks Amendment Act 20 of 
2007, which also commenced on 1 January 2008.97 
 In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, I indicated the relevant paragraph 
numbers of Securitisation Notice, 2008 in my discussion of Securitisation Notice, 
2004, where the provisions of the latter have been retained unchanged. In this section 
I shall only pay attention to the additions in the new notice. 
 As with its predecessors, the notice provides that the acceptance by an SPV of 
money from the general public against the issue of commercial paper in respect of a 
traditional securitisation scheme is not an activity that falls within the meaning of ‗the 
business of a bank‘,98 as long as the scheme complies with the relevant provisions of 
the Notice.99 This exemption will only apply if the SPV engages in no other 
transactions than those relating to the securitisation.100 
 As was the case in the previous two notices, the provisions of Securitisation 
Notice, 2008 that deal with asset-backed issues of commercial paper supersedes the 
provisions of Commercial Paper Notice, 1994. However, the provisions set out in 
Securitisation Notice, 2001 remain unchanged.101 
 As in the previous notice, it is a requirement that the transfer of the assets to the 
SPV must divest the originator of all rights and obligations connected with the 
underlying claims and that all risks in connection with the assets are transferred to the 
SPV. However, Securitisation Notice, 2008 elaborates on this by prohibiting the 
originator and its associated companies from having the right to impose restrictive 
conditions on the ability of investors in the SPV to pledge or exchange the securities 
issued by the SPV.102 It is unclear why the need for this paragraph was felt, since it is 
generally not the practice for such conditions to be imposed. 
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 See par 6.3.1 below. 
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 Schedule, par 2(1). 
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 For institutions that fall outside banking groups, the relevant provisions of the Schedule are pars 4 
and 14–16. Par 4(1) is descriptive and has no binding effect. 
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 Schedule, par 2(1)(c). 
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 See par 6.2.3. 
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 For the first time Securitisation Notice carries a paragraph devoted solely to the 
aspect of continued control of the assets by the originator and its impact on 
insolvency-remoteness.103 The transferor may not maintain any effective or indirect 
control over the assets after transfer to the SPV. The assets and the benefits flowing 
from those assets must be transferred to the SPV in such a manner that it is beyond 
the reach of the transferor (originator) even in the event of its insolvency. The 
transferor is deemed to have maintained effective control over the transferred assets 
when the transferor is able to repurchase the assets from the SPV in order to realise 
their benefits or if it is obliged to retain the risk relating to the transferred assets.104 
The continued servicing of the assets by the transferor is expressly excluded as a form 
of indirect control of the assets.105 
 Securitisation Notice, 2008 expressly states that the commercial paper issued by 
the SPV shall not constitute a direct or an indirect obligation on the originator and that 
the investors in the securities shall only have a claim against the SPV, which claim is 
secured by the assets transferred to the SPV.106 
 There is a new provision in the notice that prohibits three kinds of clauses in 
securitisation agreements. First, the originator is prohibited from undertaking 
systematically to alter the quality of the underlying exposures so that the pool of 
asset‘s weighted average credit quality is improved.107 Second, when the originator 
acts as a credit enhancer of the scheme, it is not allowed after the inception of the 
scheme to increase its exposure in terms of the credit enhancement.108 Lastly, there 
may not be a clause in the agreements providing that the yield payable to the parties 
involved in the scheme, such as the investors and third party credit enhancers, will be 
increased if the credit quality of the assets in the pool deteriorates.109  
 The new provisions of Securitisation Notice, 2008 seem to indicate that there is an 
increased awareness on the part of regulators that continued control by the originator 
of the assets after transfer to the SPV may pose problems to the integrity of the 
                                                 
103
 Schedule, par 4(2)(b). 
104
 Schedule, par 4(2)(b)(ii)(A) and (B). 
105
 Schedule, par 4(2)(b)(iii). 
106
 Schedule, par 4(2)(e). 
107
 Schedule, par 4(2)(o)(i). 
108
 Schedule, par 4(2)(o)(ii). 
109
 Schedule, par 4(2)(o)(iii). 
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
274 
scheme. Most of the provisions aim to ensure that the originator‘s role after the 
transfer is limited and well described, so that the originator cannot increase its 
involvement if the transferred assets do not perform as expected. 
 For the first time the Notice makes provision for the validity of a ‗clean-up call‘. A 
‗clean-up call‘ is defined in relation to a traditional securitisation scheme as an option 
to call or repay the commercial paper issued in terms of the securitisation scheme 
before all the underlying assets have been repaid. Alternatively, it can mean an option 
for the repurchase of the remaining assets once the pool balance or outstanding 
securities have fallen below a specified level.110 Paragraph 11 deals with the 
circumstances in which an originator need not maintain capital in respect of a clean-
up call contained in a securitisation agreement. Paragraph 11 is phrased widely, not 
mentioning banks or institutions within a banking group expressly. However, from the 
content of the paragraph, coupled with the fact that paragraph 11 is not mentioned in 
paragraph 2(1)(b) as one with which an institution outside a banking group must 
comply, I submit that these provisions are only applicable to banks. In essence, they 
provide that the clean-up call must at all times remain in the discretion of the 
originator and is not mandatory. It must not aim to bear any losses that would 
ordinarily be carried by credit enhancers or by the investors, and it must not be 
exercisable unless the outstanding amount of the original underlying portfolio of 
commercial paper issued is equal to or less than 10 per cent of the original amount.  
 Chapter VIII of the Banks Act111 applies to an SPV that does not comply with the 
provisions of Securitisation Notice, 2008.112 If the originator is a bank, non-
compliance by that bank with the provisions of Securitisation Notice shall not 
necessarily mean that the SPV is also in non-compliance with the provisions of the 
notice. In other words, the originator and the SPV will be assessed independently to 
determine whether there was compliance with the provisions of the Notice. 
6.3 BANKS ACT 94 OF 1990 
Chapter VIII of the Banks Act regulates the control of certain activities of persons not 
registered in terms of the Act.113 The activities of an SPV that issues securities to the 
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public will fall within the meaning of ‗the business of a bank‘ if they do not comply 
with Securitisation Notice, 2008. Therefore, the SPV will either have to register as a 
bank in terms of the Banks Act, or comply with the provisions of the Notice. Failing 
both, the Registrar of Banks has extensive powers and may apply to the High Court 
for an order to prohibit the continuation of activities contrary to the provisions of the 
Act and the Notice.114 Alternatively, the Registrar may apply to the High Court for an 
order to prohibit the SPV from disposing or otherwise dealing with any of its assets 
while the contravention is being investigated.115 The Registrar may require the SPV to 
supply such documents and information in writing relating to its affairs as specified 
and available to the SPV.116 
 If the Registrar is satisfied that the SPV carried on the business of a bank without 
being registered as a bank by contravening Securitisation Notice, 2008, the Registrar 
may direct the SPV to return any money received from the public through the issue of 
securities that has not yet been repaid, including interest and any other amounts 
owing.117 Such repayment is subject to the provisions of section 84 of the Act. The 
Registrar may set requirements with regard to such payments and may impose time 
limits.118  
 When repayment is ordered in terms of section 83 of the Act, the SPV is not 
obliged to pay interest or any other amounts to its investors for the period after the 
repayment until the date when the claims of the issued securities would fall due.119 
This provision is peremptory and therefore any contrary agreement between the SPV 
and its investors, or in terms of the issue of the securities, will be subject to it.  
 The Registrar may appoint a person to manage and control repayment of the 
money in compliance with his directions.120 The powers conferred upon an inspector 
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in terms of sections 4 and 5 of the Inspection of Financial Institutions Act121 shall be 
applicable to such a manager.122  
The manager must probe the affairs of the SPV in order to ascertain the amount of 
money obtained in contravention of Securitisation Notice, 2008, the persons to whom 
the money is owed, where the money or the assets into which the money was 
converted is kept or can be located, as well as any other fact that will facilitate 
repayment of the money.123 He must take all steps necessary to expedite and ensure 
repayment of the money.124 He must further report any offence committed by the SPV 
that comes to his attention.125  
 After a copy of the letter of appointment of the manager has been served on the 
SPV, the SPV may not dispose of, or otherwise deal with, its assets, except with the 
written permission of the manager.126 In the context of securitisation, the manager will 
probably decide whether the servicing of the debts should continue unchanged or 
whether a new servicer should be appointed. 
 Refusal or failure to comply with a direction by the Registrar is an offence.127 The 
SPV will then be deemed unable to pay its debts or to have committed an act of 
insolvency.128 The Registrar may consequently apply for the winding-up of the SPV. 
 Both the SPV and the originator will be affected if section 83 is invoked by the 
Registrar. The SPV would have used the money raised from the issue of securities to 
pay for the transfer of the claims. As was explained above, the manager will have the 
authority to follow that money up in the hands of the originator and to reclaim it in 
order to repay the investors. 
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 It is obvious that the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Act were not primarily 
designed to deal with the failure of a securitisation scheme to comply with the 
provisions of Securitisation Notice, 2008. These provisions aim to reverse 
transactions that contravene the Act. However, a securitisation scheme is so complex 
and there are so many role-players that it would be impossible to reverse it truly. 
Furthermore, the reputational cost to the originator in the event of such action by the 
Registrar will be extensive. 
 To date there has been no case where a securitisation scheme has been overturned 
by means of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Banks Act 94 of 1990. However, 
these provisions are drastic and emphasise the need for careful structuring of a 
securitisation scheme so as to comply with Securitisation Notice, 2008. 
6.3.1 Banks Amendment Act 20 of 2007 
The Banks Amendment Act 20 of 2007 became operational on 1 January 2008. The 
Act mainly contains amendments necessitated by the revised Framework on 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards published 
by the International Basel Committee.129 
 The Act defines a ‗traditional securitisation scheme‘ with reference to the 
definition contained in Securitisation Notice, 2004, now repealed by Securitisation 
Notice, 2008. The definition remains unchanged in the new Notice. 
 The Act contains amendments to section 84 of the Banks Act,130 which deals with 
the appointment of a manager by the Registrar to manage the affairs of an 
institution.131 Experience has taught that once a manager is appointed under the 
provisions of section 84, the institution is invariably liquidated. Such a liquidation 
makes the efforts by the manager or inspector to reverse the illegal transactions 
worthless, and the higher fees charged by the appointed liquidator of the insolvent 
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estate of the institution are to the detriment of the investors of such a scheme.132 The 
amendment gives the Registrar the power to intervene. 
 As soon as practicable after his appointment, the manager must report to the 
Registrar whether the SPV is solvent, and if he finds that the SPV is insolvent, he 
must state whether it is a technical or a legal insolvency.133 If the SPV is solvent, 
repayment of the investors will commence as set out in section 84. 
If the report finds that the SPV is insolvent, the Registrar may apply for the 
winding-up of the SPV and he will have the right to oppose any application for the 
winding-up of the SPV by another person.134 If the application for winding-up is 
successful, the Master must appoint the liquidator recommended by the Registrar,135 
subject to section 370 of the Companies Act.136 This section implies that the wishes of 
the Registrar in the appointment of the liquidator will take precedence over the wishes 
of the trustee for debenture-holders and over other creditors of the SPV. The Registrar 
has the same rights as a creditor in the insolvency and winding-up of a company.137 
The manager must recover and take control of all the assets of the SPV, subject to 
the direction of the Registrar,138 regardless of whether the manager‘s report found the 
SPV to be solvent or insolvent. Since the assets of an SPV are claims, the manager 
will have to give notice to the debtors that the claims have been ceded to him by 
operation of law, with instructions on the person or institution appointed by him to 
collect payment of the claims. The manager will have to decide whether the original 
servicer will be retained or whether it is prudent to appoint another servicer in the 
particular circumstances.139  
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On the appointment of the manager, all legal action against the SPV will be stayed 
and no person will be able to institute or proceed with legal action against the SPV 
without leave of a competent court.140 Any application for leave to institute or proceed 
with legal action must also be served on the Registrar. The stay of legal proceedings 
will also follow regardless of the outcome of the report by the manager on the SPV‘s 
solvency. 
It is clear that the ability of the trustee for debenture-holders to institute 
proceedings, including an application for the winding-up of the SPV, is curtailed by 
these provisions. However, it is possible that the Registrar may find that the trustee is 
a suitable person to act as the manager of the SPV under these circumstances. It is 
further possible that the trustee and the Registrar may agree as to whom should be 
appointed as the liquidator, should the SPV be liquidated. Both these situations are 
preferable above bringing a third party into the management of the scheme. It might 
be advisable to include in any future amendments to Securitisation Notice a proviso to 
paragraph 17(2) of the Schedule, which reads: 
 
(a) If a trustee for debenture-holders was appointed under the scheme, the Registrar shall 
consult the trustee before he takes any action in terms of Chapter VIII. 
6.4 NATIONAL CREDIT ACT 34 OF 2005 
The South African Department of Trade and Industry devised a legislative framework 
to address consumer protection issues, which resulted in the National Credit Act 34 of 
2005141 and the draft Consumer Protection Bill, 2006.142 The National Credit Regulator 
(NCR) has the power to enforce the National Credit Act143 and to oversee the 
development of the South African credit market in a manner that is consistent with the 
purposes of the Act.144  
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The provisions of the National Credit Act are important when discussing 
securitisation, because the debtors of the claims transferred to an SPV will often fall 
under the definition of ‗consumer‘ in respect of a credit agreement to which the Act 
applies.145 
 In my opinion, adequate consumer protection and responsible lending practices are 
key factors in ensuring the long-term viability of securitisation as a financing method. 
The SPV is dependent on the income from the transferred claims to service payments 
on its issued securities and the other expenses associated with the scheme. If the 
debtors of those claims were misled about the extent of their obligations in terms of 
the agreement, or if they were granted credit when they could not afford it, they might 
not be able to subsequently perform in terms of the agreement. Isolated instances of 
unfair consumer practices might not pose a problem to a securitisation scheme. 
However, if these practices are widespread the quality of the debtor base that must 
support the securitisation scheme might become poor.146 This could, in turn, be an 
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obstacle in obtaining the rating that the scheme aims for and will definitely increase 
the costs of credit enhancement. 
 The three key purposes of the Act that will influence lending practices, and by 
implication securitisation, are 
1 promoting responsibility in the credit market by147 
 encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-indebtedness and 
fulfillment of financial obligations by consumers; and 
 discouraging reckless credit granting by credit providers and contractual default 
by consumers; 
2 promoting equity in the credit market by balancing the respective rights and 
responsibilities of credit providers and consumers;148 
3 addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, and providing 
mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of satisfaction 
by consumers of all responsible financial obligations.149 
6.4.1 Over-indebtedness and reckless credit 
The concepts of over-indebtedness and reckless credit go hand in hand in the context 
of the National Credit Act.  
A consumer is over-indebted if at the time that the determination is made the 
preponderance of available information shows that the consumer will not be able to 
satisfy in a timely manner all his obligations under all the credit agreements to which 
he is a party.150 The consumer‘s financial means, prospects and obligations must be 
taken into account,151 as well as his history of debt repayment.152 
                                                                                                                                            
commissions on the number and size of the loans that they can sell. This creates an incentive to 
deceive consumers about the terms of their credit agreements. Originators sell the loans through 
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lender offers other borrowers. 
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The Act makes it compulsory for a credit provider to take reasonable steps to 
assess a prospective consumer‘s general understanding and appreciation of the risks, 
and the costs of the proposed agreement, as well as of the consumer‘s rights and 
duties under the agreement.153 There must also be an assessment of the prospective 
consumer‘s debt-repayment history under other credit agreements and of the 
consumer‘s existing financial means, prospects and obligations.154  
Evidently this assessment is dependent on adequate and truthful disclosure by the 
prospective consumer. It is therefore a complete defence to an allegation that a credit 
agreement was reckless if the credit provider can show that the consumer failed to 
fully and truthfully answer any requests for information made during the assessment 
and the court or tribunal finds that the failure to do so materially affected the ability of 
the credit provider to make a proper assessment.155 In other words, the consequence of 
a failure by a consumer to make a full and truthful disclosure is that he will not be 
protected under the reckless credit provisions in the Act. The application forms of 
most large credit providers now carry a notice to the consumer to this effect before the 
assessment section. 
The credit agreement will immediately be reckless in terms of the Act if this 
assessment is not carried out.156 If the assessment was carried out and the credit 
provider extended credit to the consumer when the information available to the credit 
provider showed that the consumer did not generally understand or appreciate the 
risks, costs or obligations under the agreement, or if the information showed that 
entering into the agreement would make the consumer over-indebted, the credit 
agreement will be reckless.157 The position of the consumer at the time of entering into 
the agreement is relevant here and not his position at the time of the determination.158 
If the court finds that a credit agreement is reckless because the credit providers 
did not make the required assessment of the prospective consumer or because the 
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consumer did not understand the risks, costs or obligations flowing from the 
agreement, the court may make one of two possible orders. First, the court may order 
that all or a part of the consumer‘s rights or duties under the agreement must be set 
aside in a manner that the court determines just and reasonable. Alternatively, the 
court may order that the force and effect of the agreement be suspended. 159 
If the court finds that a credit agreement is reckless because it left the consumer 
over-indebted after entering into the agreement, the court must first consider whether 
the consumer is in fact over-indebted at the time of the proceedings.160 Should the 
court find that the consumer is over-indebted it may suspend the force and effect of 
the credit agreement until a date determined by it.161 The court may further order that 
any other credit agreements of the consumer must be restructured.162 The consumer‘s 
current means and the expected date by which the consumer will have satisfied the 
outstanding obligations under a credit agreement are factors that will influence the 
court‘s order.163 
There is therefore a very real possibility that the court may suspend the credit 
agreement if it makes a finding that credit was extended recklessly. During the 
suspension period the consumer is not required to make any payment under the 
agreement,164 nor is the credit provider allowed to charge any interest, fee or any other 
charges under the agreement.165 Despite any law to the contrary, the credit provider‘s 
rights under the agreement and in terms of any law in respect of the agreement are 
unenforceable.166  
If such a claim was part of a securitisation scheme, there will be no income 
forthcoming from that claim until the suspension ends. Of course, if only a few claims 
transferred to the SPV become non-performing, for whatever reason, the scheme will 
not be dramatically affected. Such non-performance is already catered for by way of 
the credit enhancements built into the scheme. However, if there is large scale non-
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adherence to the provisions of the Act that leads to many suspensions, the scheme 
may be adversely affected.  
Whereas ‗reckless credit‘ refers to a particular credit agreement, ‗over-
indebtedness‘ refers to the consumer‘s overall ability to fulfil his obligations in a 
timely manner. There are three available ways in which a consumer can be declared 
over-indebted: the consumer can approach a debt counsellor to review his debt 
situation,167 or if this failed, he can approach the court directly for an order to be 
declared over-indebted, or it may be that the over-indebtedness of the consumer is 
alleged in court while a reckless credit agreement is under consideration.  
Usually, the consumer will visit a debt counsellor first. The debt counsellor will 
evaluate information received from the consumer and from the credit providers that 
extended credit to the consumer to decide whether the consumer is over-indebted.  
If the consumer is not over-indebted, but experiences problems satisfying all his 
obligations in a timely manner, the debt counsellor can recommend that the consumer 
and the credit providers enter into a voluntary debt rearrangement.168 If the debt 
counsellor finds that the consumer is over-indebted, he may issue a proposal 
recommending that the court declare one or more of the credit agreements reckless 
and/or that one or more of the consumer‘s obligations be rearranged.169 Such a 
rearrangement can take four possible forms:170 
1 The period of the agreement can be extended, thereby reducing the amount 
payable in each instalment.  
2 Payments can be postponed for a specified period. 
3 The period of the agreement can be extended and the payments due can be 
postponed for a specified period. 
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4 The consumer‘s obligations under the credit agreement could be recalculated 
because of contraventions of Parts A and B of Chapter 5, or Part A of Chapter 6 of 
the Act.171 
 
The second manner in which a consumer can be declared over-indebted is by 
approaching the court directly. This will follow when the debt counsellor did not find 
the consumer to be over-indebted. The consumer may then apply for leave to 
approach the court directly. After considering the matter, the court may declare a 
particular credit agreement reckless and/or order the re-arrangement of the 
consumer‘s obligations in the manner set out above.172 
A consumer can, in the third instance, be declared over-indebted when his over-
indebtedness is alleged during proceedings where a specific credit agreement is being 
considered. In such an event, the court may refer the matter to a debt counsellor who 
will proceed in the manner described above.173 Otherwise, the court may declare the 
consumer over-indebted without intervention of a debt counsellor and make an order 
to declare a credit agreement reckless or to re-arrange the consumer‘s obligations.174 
During the review of the consumer‘s debts by a debt counsellor or by the court the 
consumer is not allowed to incur any further charges under existing credit agreements 
or to enter into any new credit agreements.175 If a consumer applies for, or enters into, 
a credit agreement in contravention of this prohibition, the protection of the Act will 
not be available to the consumer in respect of that agreement.176 A credit agreement 
entered into while the consumer was subject to a debt rearrangement might be 
declared wholly or partially reckless, regardless of whether the normal test for 
reckless credit in the Act applies to that agreement.177  
In conclusion, it appears that securitisation can only be adversely affected by the 
provisions of the Act on reckless credit and over-indebtedness provisions if 
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originators are lax in the manner in which they extend credit. Guarding against over-
indebtedness might actually be beneficial to securitisation in the long run, because 
default patterns of debtors may become more predictable as a result. The Act requires 
lenders to be vigilant in their assessment of borrowers‘ ability to meet their 
commitments in terms of the credit agreements they enter. This should provide 
lenders with a better chance of judging the risk they take in extending credit to the 
particular borrower. It also enhances the chances that the borrower will be able to 
fulfill his duties through the course of the credit agreement. The certainty with which 
a securitisation transaction is structured, especially when it comes to the amount of 
credit enhancement necessary to support the risk of default on the transferred claims, 
is increased when reliable data is available on the creditworthiness of the debtors. 
6.4.2 Unlawful credit agreements 
It is unlawful in terms of the Act for a credit provider to make an offer for credit to a 
consumer and to state that the offer will become binding unless the consumer declines 
it specifically.178 It is further unlawful for a credit provider to extend credit, make it 
available or to offer credit when the credit provider is subject to a notice by the 
National Credit Regulator to stop such functions pending further action.179 
Agreements entered into under these circumstances are unlawful credit agreements.180 
If the credit provider enters into a supplementary agreement that will have the same 
effect as an unlawful credit agreement, the supplementary credit agreement will also 
be unlawful. 181 
 An unlawful credit agreement is void from the date on which it was entered into.182 
All money paid by the consumer to the credit provider in terms of such an agreement 
must be refunded to the consumer with interest.183 All rights of the credit provider in 
terms of the agreement to recover money from the consumer are either cancelled or 
forfeited to the State, depending on the court‘s finding of whether cancellation would 
                                                 
178
 Section 74(1). 
179
 Section 89(2)(e). 
180
 Section 89. 
181
 Section 91(a). On unlawful credit agreements generally, see Otto NCA Explained at 42 et seq. 
182
 Section 89(5)(a); Jordaan Credit Law at 64; Otto NCA Explained at 42–43. 
183
 Section 89(5)(b). 
CHAPTER 6 REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRADITIONAL SECURITISATIONS 
287 
unjustly enrich the consumer.184 These consequences will definitely deter credit 
providers from engaging in the prohibited practices. 
 The Act further sets out certain provisions in credit agreements that will be 
considered unlawful.185 The gist of these provisions is that the credit agreement may 
not circumvent the Act in any manner. An unlawful provision in a credit agreement 
will be severed from the rest of the agreement if possible, or if not possible, the whole 
agreement may be declared unlawful.186 
 The consequences of a finding that a credit agreement is unlawful are dire. 
However, the typical credit provider that enters a securitisation scheme as originator 
will have ample resources at its disposal to ensure that it offers and extends credit in 
the prescribed manner. I therefore do not foresee that these provisions will have a 
significant impact on securitisation. Furthermore, defects in the lending practices of 
the originator will hopefully be recognised by the rating agency involved in the 
structuring of the scheme. These considerations therefore introduces additional factors 
that rating agencies must keep in mind during their assessment. 
6.4.3 Registration as credit provider 
The National Credit Regulator confirmed in a telephonic interview187 that after 
extensive consultation with interested parties all potential difficulties surrounding 
compliance with the requirements of the Act in the context of securitisation schemes 
have been settled. Essentially the National Credit Regulator is satisfied as long as the 
transaction agreements clearly stipulate which parties to the scheme will register as 
credit providers. 
 However, deciding who ought to register as credit providers is easier said than 
done. One must remember that in terms of Securitisation Notice, 2008, all rights and 
obligations of the originator must be transferred to the SPV. It follows that the 
relevant relationship that one looks at to decide whether a party is a credit provider is 
that between the current legal holder of the claim and the debtor of the claim. In other 
words, if the originator was a credit provider who had to register as such, which is 
mostly the case, and it transfers the claim to the SPV by way of cession, or by cession 
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and delegation, the SPV will step in the shoes of the original credit provider and will 
have to register as a credit provider. 
 A ‗credit provider‘ in respect of a credit agreement to which the Act applies,188 is 
defined in the Act as189 
 
(a) the party who supplies goods or services under a discount transaction, incidental credit 
agreement or instalment agreement; 
(b)  the party who advances money or credit under a pawn transaction; 
(c)  the party who extends credit under a credit facility; 
(d)  the mortgagee under a mortgage agreement; 
(e)  the lender under a secured loan; 
(f)  the lessor under a lease; 
(g)  the party to whom an assurance or promise is made under a credit guarantee; 
(h) the party who advances money or credit to another under any other credit agreement; or 
(i) any other person who acquires the rights of a credit provider under a credit agreement after it 
has been entered into 
 
From this definition it is apparent that the SPV will need to register as a credit 
provider. This is because the originator would usually be a credit provider in terms of 
(a) to (h) of the definition and the SPV acquires the rights of the credit provider after 
it has been entered into, which falls under (i) of the definition. 
 What is less clear is whether the trustee for debenture-holders or the security 
SPV190 will also need to register as a credit provider. Since non-compliance with the 
registration requirement will leave the underlying credit agreements to be classified as 
unlawful agreements and void in terms of section 89,191 it is safest simply to register 
the trustee for debenture-holders or security SPV as a credit provider.192 
 From a theoretical point of view it is only necessary for the trustee for debenture-
holders or security SPV to immediately register as a credit provider if the securities 
issued by the SPV are secured by way of fiduciary security cession. In this form of 
security the claims will be ceded to the trustee for debenture-holders or security SPV, 
who then acquires the rights of a credit provider as defined in (i) above. The SPV 
does not retain these rights when this form of security is used, but only has a 
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reversionary interest that the remaining claims will be receded to it after it had 
complied with its obligations in terms of the issued securities. 
 If a pledge of claims is used as a form of security, the duty to register as a credit 
provider will only arise after the default of the SPV. During a pledge of claims the 
power to realise the claim is transferred to the pledgee, but this power may only be 
exercised by the pledgee after default by the pledgor. The claim itself remains in the 
estate of the pledgor. The pledgee will, in my opinion, not acquire the rights of a 
credit provider as set out in (i) above before it is entitled to realise the claims in terms 
of the pledge. Furthermore, if the securitisation scheme goes as planned this power 
will not become effective at all, which would make the registration of the trustee or 
security SPV as credit provider superfluous. 
 If a general notarial bond is used as security, the trustee or security SPV will only 
acquire the rights of a credit provider after perfection of the bond, which in the case of 
claims will be after notice is given to debtors. Until then the SPV will continue to 
collect the claims for its own account through its appointed servicer. The trustee or 
security SPV will not have acquired the rights of a credit provider as stipulated in the 
Act. 
6.5 COMPANIES ACT 61 OF 1973 
The Companies Act 61 of 1973 applies to an originator and an SPV if they are 
companies, except for provisions in the Act that are only applicable to specific types 
of companies. Here the focus is on aspects of the Act that might be overlooked during 
securitisation.193 Provisions in the Act that relate to the limitation of the capacity of 
the SPV to engage in activities other than those associated with the securitisation 
scheme and the limitation of the powers of the directors of the company to engage in 
such activities, were discussed in Chapter 2 and are not repeated here.194 The 
provisions of the Act that deal with the issue of debentures were considered in detail 
in Chapter 5 and are also not repeated in this chapter.195 
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6.5.1 Provisions of Companies Act 61 of 1973 that are important for originator 
In modern companies there is usually a clear separation of powers between the 
management of the company and its membership.196 The board of directors is usually 
given the power in the articles of association of the company to manage the company 
and to take the day to day decisions in the running of its business. The members, as 
represented in the general meeting, have a supervisory role in that they can remove 
the directors if they are not satisfied with the manner in which the company is run.197 
They do not have the power to intervene in decisions that fall within the scope of the 
powers of the board of directors.198 
 The decision of a company to transfer some of its assets under a securitisation 
scheme is a business decision, which will fall under the authority of the board of 
directors of the originator. However, the directors do not want to send a confusing 
message about the prospects of the company to the greater investor public. 
Consequently it will be prudent for the board of directors to provide enough 
information to its members about the proposed scheme as is necessary to guard the 
company against speculation and negative sentiment. It must be remembered that 
while the investors in the securities issued by the SPV will usually be sophisticated, 
the same is not necessarily true of the investors in the originator. Securitisation is a 
relatively new financing form in South Africa and will be new to many of the 
originator‘s investors.199 
6.5.1.1 Disposal of undertaking or greater part of assets of company 
The approval of the general meeting is necessary if the transfer of the assets to the 
SPV will constitute a disposal of the undertaking of the originator or a disposal of the 
greater part of the assets of the originator.200 ‗Dispose‘ has its ordinary meaning of ―to 
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part with‖ or ―to get rid of‖. Only a disposal that permanently deprives a company of 
its ownership of the assets falls within the ambit of this section.201 It is the aim of 
traditional securitisation to permanently divest the originator of its rights to the 
transferred assets.  
The approval of the general meeting must be obtained before implementation of 
the disposal, not necessarily before the agreement to dispose is entered into. If the 
agreement to dispose was entered into without the approval of the shareholders it is 
not void, because the shareholders may still ratify the agreement to dispose.202 
However, such an agreement is voidable; otherwise the purchaser has an action for 
damages against the company which will leave the shareholders with no option but to 
ratify.203 
Some securitisations may fall under the ambit of section 228, as there is no bar in 
theory to the type of asset that may be used in securitisation, nor to the size or extent 
of the assets that may be transferred by the originator to the SPV. 
 Previously an ordinary resolution by the general meeting was adequate to approve 
such a disposal. This gave rise to certain problems. An ordinary resolution by the 
general meeting of a company is not filed with the Registrar of Companies. A 
purchaser of assets in contravention of section 228 could argue that he assumed that 
the company obtained the required permission to dispose of the assets and rely on the 
Turquand rule to keep the company from denying the disposition.204 
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 In view of these concerns, section 228 was amended. A special resolution by the 
general meeting of the company is now required to consent to the disposal of the 
undertaking or of the greater part of the assets of the company.205 A special resolution 
must be registered with the Registrar of Companies to take effect and therefore 
provides third parties with notice of the consent, or the lack thereof.206 The Turquand 
rule will be of no further use to a third party, because the compliance of the 
requirement of consent will be easily ascertainable from the public documents. The 
general meeting must consider the specific transaction and cannot give a blanket 
approval.207 The value of the assets or the undertaking, and the value of the disposed 
part, must be determined with reference to the fair value of the assets as indicated by 
the financial reporting standards.208 
 If the securitisation scheme is a disposal in terms of section 228, it will be an 
affected transaction in terms of section 440A(2)(c). 
6.5.1.2 Affected transactions 
An ‗affected transaction‘ means any transaction (including a transaction which forms 
part of a series of transactions) or scheme, whatever form it may take, which will vest 
control in a person, or persons acting in concert, that did not have control before the 
scheme was implemented, or consolidating such control, or which will make a person 
the sole holder of all the securities of the company or of all the securities of a 
particular class.209 ‗Control‘ is further defined in the Act as holding the specified 
percentage or more of the voting rights at meetings of the company. The specified 
percentage is currently set at 35 per cent or more of the voting rights in a company. 210 
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The implementation of a traditional securitisation scheme will not be an affected 
transaction in terms of the Companies Act, unless it is a disposal as contemplated in 
section 228. 
 If the scheme entails such a disposal, the Securities Regulation Panel on Take-
Overs and Mergers will regulate the scheme in such a manner as it deems necessary 
and appropriate.211 Rule 29(d) of the Securities Regulation Code on Take-Overs and 
Mergers grants the Panel the right in its sole and absolute discretion to direct any 
shareholder that he may not vote at the meeting where the disposal is to be considered 
and that his votes may not be exercised in whole or in part. The Panel will give such 
an instruction if the vote of that shareholder will result in an inequity to any other 
shareholder due to a direct or indirect conflict of interest. Although Rule 29 does not 
limit its application and may be applied to other persons, the shareholder in question 
will usually be the person who offered to purchase the assets or the undertaking of the 
company. The idea behind the provision is that minority shareholders would be 
afforded the opportunity to stop the disposal or have some influence on the terms of 
the disposal.212 
 The inclusion of a disposal under section 228 in the definition of an ‗affected 
transaction‘ is inconsistent with the rest of the definition and the general functions of 
the Securities Regulation Panel.213 The Panel usually considers a transaction where 
there is an acquisition or a consolidation of control in the company, and which has 
bearing on the securities issued by the company. 
 Luiz214 argues that a company that intends to dispose of substantially all of its 
assets or undertaking will not comply with the definition of ‗offeree company‘ in the 
Code. Section B of the Code defines ‗offeree company‘ as ―any company the 
securities or part of the securities of which are or are to be the subject of any affected 
transaction or proposed affected transaction‖. No securities of the company are the 
subject of a disposal in terms of section 228. This creates uncertainty over the 
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applicability of the Code to such transactions, because the Code only applies to 
companies that fall under the definition of ‗offeree company‘.215  
 It appears as if a disposal in terms of section 228 was included in the definition of 
‗affected transaction‘ as an afterthought. The processes envisaged by the Code are not 
suitable to investigate or regulate such a disposal. I therefore agree with Luiz that it 
would be more suitable to amend section 228 to include protection for minority 
shareholders than to try to fit disposals in with affected transactions.216 
6.5.1.3 Conflicts of interest 
Securitisation Notice, 2008 restricts the originator in the number of shares it may hold 
in the SPV and in the power it may have in the voting of the general meeting of the 
SPV. However, the notice is silent on the ability of directors of the originator to be 
members of the SPV. Consequently, it is possible for a director of the originator to be 
a controlling member of the SPV. It is further possible for a director to have interests 
in the third parties involved in the scheme, such as the servicer, trustee or one of the 
credit enhancers. In some cases where securitisation was associated with fraud lax 
controls over conflicts of interest were one of the elements identified as leading to 
abuse.217 
 A director must disclose any material interest that he directly or indirectly has in a 
proposed contract by the company, or in which he becomes materially interested after 
the contract was entered into.218 The interest and its full particulars must be disclosed. 
The contract or proposed contract must be of significance to the business of the 
company and must be entered into in pursuance of a resolution taken by the board of 
directors or by an authorised director.219 A securitisation scheme will always qualify 
as significant to the business of the company and will be initiated by resolutions of the 
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board of directors of the originator. Failure by a director to disclose such an interest in 
a contract is an offence.220  
 A resolution by the board of directors to whom the appropriate disclosures of 
conflicts of interest were not made is invalid.221 If the articles of association of the 
company do not contain a clause that allows directors to enter into contracts with the 
company, a so-called exclusion clause, the approval by the general meeting for such 
actions must be obtained additionally before the transaction may go ahead.222 
Otherwise the transaction is voidable at the option of the company.223 
 The company must keep a register of declarations of interests in contracts.224 The 
company‘s auditor must verify the register‘s content.225 
 The board of directors of the originator must be vigilant when it comes to 
identifying a conflict of interests during a securitisation scheme. The structure of the 
scheme may be very complicated, which can aid a corrupt director to mislead others 
about his indirect involvement.  
6.5.1.4 Company secretary 
A public company having a share capital must appoint a company secretary.226 One of 
the duties imposed on a company secretary is to advise the directors on the law and 
legislation relevant to, or affecting, the company.227 This will include all law and 
legislation relating to the company‘s role during a securitisation of its assets. Whereas 
specialist advice is usually gathered for the structuring of the scheme, all matters 
concerning the internal approval of such a scheme by the originator in terms of the 
Companies Act will form part of this duty. The company secretary of the originator 
must therefore ensure that all requirements regarding resolutions by the board of 
                                                 
220
 Section 234 (4). 
221
 Section 236. 
222
 See Cilliers et al Corporate Law at 156–157; Meskin et al Henochsberg at 447–448; Blackman et al 
Commentary at pars 8-327 to 8-328 and 8-330. 
223
 The disclosure requirements for directors‘ conflicting interests are set out in cl 75 of the Companies 
Bill 61 of 2008. They do not materially differ from the process discussed here. 
224
 Section 240(1). 
225
 Section 241. 
226
 Section 268A. See also Cilliers et al Corporate Law at 167–169; Meskin et al Henochsberg at 516; 
Blackman et al Commentary at par 9A-1. 
227
 Section 268G(b). 
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
296 
directors, approval of the general meeting, if applicable, and disclosures of the 
securitisation in the financial statements of the company have been adhered to. 
6.5.1.5 Auditor 
Section 275A(1) and (2), as inserted by the Corporate Laws Amendment Act 24 of 
2006, prohibits the auditor of a widely-held company228 to provide that company with 
non-audit services as specified in the Regulatory Board for Auditors‘ Code for 
Professional Conduct. This must be kept in mind if the same auditing firm is 
approached to provide advisory services during the structuring phase of a 
securitisation scheme. 
 In terms of section 300A(2), as inserted by the Corporate Laws Amendment Act 24 
of 2006, the auditor must attend every annual general meeting of a widely-held 
company where the financial statements of the company will be considered and 
agreed to, so that he may respond to questions relating to the audit of the financial 
statements.229 After the implementation of a securitisation scheme, the auditor must be 
prepared also to respond to questions regarding the effect of the securitisation on the 
financial statements of the originator, since this would fall under the audit.  
6.5.2 Provisions of Companies Act 61 of 1973 important for SPV 
The memorandum and articles of association of the SPV must limit the capacity and 
powers of the SPV so that the SPV may only engage in activities related to the 
securitisation scheme. The following considerations flowing from the Companies Act 
are also important for the SPV. 
6.5.2.1 Disclosure requirements 
Any offers for subscription for shares in a company to the public must be 
accompanied by a prospectus that complies with the requirements of the Act.230 The 
prospectus must be registered in the Companies Registration Office. Any director or 
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officer of a company who knowingly contravenes this provision is guilty of an 
offence.231 ‗Share‘ for the purposes of an offer of shares includes a debenture,232 as 
well as any form of commercial paper issued by the SPV.233 
 However, there are instances when a prospectus is not required,234 some of which 
could be applicable to the issue of commercial paper by the SPV. In these instances 
the offers are not regarded as offers to the public in terms of the Act. 
 A prospectus is not required if an offer for subscription is made to typical 
institutional investors, as listed in the Act.235 Should the SPV decide to issue the 
securities through private placement to entities listed in the Act, a prospectus will not 
be necessary. A restriction in the offer for the securities to persons, so that each 
person must subscribe to securities to the value of R100 000 or more, will also render 
a prospectus unnecessary.236 The offer must be made to the offeree as principal and 
not as an agent on behalf of the public. The idea behind this exclusion is that large 
sophisticated investors do not need the protection afforded by a prospectus.237 
 Barring the availability of one of these exceptions, a prospectus will have to 
accompany the offer for subscription in the commercial paper or other securities 
issued by the SPV. The matters that must be disclosed in a prospectus are set out in 
Part I and II of Schedule 3 of the Act.238 Furthermore, the disclosure requirements of 
Securitisation Notice, 2008 must also be included in the prospectus.239 
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6.5.2.2 Auditor 
The appointment of the auditor of a company is regulated by Chapter X of the Act.240 
The auditor of a company must report to its members on the matters prescribed in the 
Act and carry out all duties imposed on him by the Act or by the law.241 The 
certification by the auditor that the SPV has complied with the requirements of 
Securitisation Notice, 2008 will be one of the duties imposed on him by another 
statute.242 
6.6 COMPANIES BILL 61 OF 2008 
The Department of Trade and Industry published the Draft Companies Bill on            
5 February 2007 for public comment. The Companies Bill was published in           
June 2008.243 The new Companies Act is scheduled to be implemented on 1 January 
2010. Cognisant of the fact that my discussion falls in a transitional phase between the 
old and the new Companies Act, I shall discuss amendments brought about by the 
proposed legislation that will influence the structure and implementation of a 
securitisation scheme. 
6.6.1 Memorandum of Incorporation 
At present a company is incorporated with two constitutive documents, namely (1) the 
memorandum of association and (2) the articles of association. The memorandum of 
association is the founding document of a company and forms the basis for its whole 
corporate structure.244 The requirements for the memorandum of association of a 
company are currently set out in section 52 of the Companies Act. It must contain, 
among other things, the purpose for which the company is formed, describing the 
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main object of the company and the general nature of the main business of the 
company. It must further state the share capital of the company and the number of 
shares that each subscriber will take up. The memorandum may also contain special 
conditions and may set requirements additional to those prescribed in the Act for the 
alteration of the memorandum.245  
As discussed above, the memorandum of association of an SPV will limit its 
capacity to transactions concerned with the securitisation scheme and matters 
incidental thereto.246 Such a limitation of the capacity of the SPV is also a requirement 
of Securitisation Notice, 2008247 and is important for rating agencies when they 
consider the rating of the securities issued by the SPV.248 
The articles of association play a subordinate role to the memorandum and are 
mainly concerned with the internal management and administration of the company. 
Matters that are typically governed by the articles are the rights, powers and duties of 
the members and the directors.249 The Companies Act does not prescribe what the 
contents of the articles must be and so they may be drafted according to the needs of 
the company, as long as they are not in conflict with the general law or with 
provisions of the Companies Act.250 
The articles of association of an SPV will typically deny powers to its directors to 
engage in any transaction not concerned with the securitisation scheme.251 
The Companies Bill 61 of 2008 introduces one constitutive document for the 
incorporation of a company, namely a memorandum of incorporation.252 However, the 
memorandum of incorporation may permit the board of directors to publish rules for 
the governance of the company.253 These rules must also be filed with the Registrar of 
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Companies.254 Any rule that is inconsistent with the Act or with the memorandum of 
incorporation will be void to the extent of the inconsistency.255 In effect, such a 
company will still be governed by two documents, namely a founding document in 
the form of the memorandum of incorporation and the rules drawn up by the board of 
directors. 
A notice of incorporation, together with a copy of the memorandum of 
incorporation, must be filed with the Registrar.256 However, the filing of the 
memorandum of incorporation becomes less important, because the Bill diminishes 
the role of the doctrine of constructive notice and the ultra vires doctrine. This is 
discussed below. 
6.6.2 Ultra vires doctrine and doctrine of constructive notice 
The Draft Companies Bill, 2007 provided that a company would have the legal 
powers and capacity of an individual, except to the extent that a juristic person is 
incapable of exercising any such powers, or having such capacity.257 This would have 
abolished the ultra vires doctrine with regard to companies regulated by the Act.258 
The Companies Bill 61 of 2008 does not go quite as far, but provides specifically that 
the capacity of a company may be limited in its memorandum of incorporation.259 
The main objects of a company are currently set out in its memorandum of 
association. Since the memorandum of association and the articles of association of a 
company are filed with the Registrar of Companies and are open for public inspection, 
third parties are deemed to be fully aware of their contents.260 Consequently, third 
parties cannot assert that they were unaware that a company acted outside its capacity, 
or that they were unaware of an express limitation on the authority of the directors of 
the company. This is referred to as the doctrine of constructive notice.  
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However, the Bill provides that a person is not deemed to have notice or 
knowledge of the contents of any document relating to a company merely because the 
document has been filed or is accessible for inspection at an office of the company.261 
This limits the doctrine of constructive notice in regard to companies. However, the 
doctrine is not totally abolished, because clause 19(5)(a) provides that if the notice of 
incorporation drew attention to a specific provision of the memorandum of 
incorporation that is applicable to that company, or that may not be amended,262 a 
person must be regarded as having received notice of such a provision. 
 The ultra vires doctrine was developed by analogy of a company created by a 
special Act of Parliament.263 Such a company only exists for the purpose for which it 
is brought into existence by that Act and only has the powers to perform acts related 
to that purpose. So too, companies created by general enabling legislation, such as the 
Companies Act, must exist only for the purpose stated in its memorandum of 
association and only have the powers to act in matters concerning that purpose. The 
memorandum and articles further constitute a contract between the company and its 
members and between the members inter se, so that a member could compel a 
company to stay within its stated objects.264 
 In terms of the common law, transactions ultra vires the company were void and 
each party was obliged to restore to the other anything he received in the course of 
such a transaction.265 The general meeting could not ratify such an ‗act‘.  
The effects of the ultra vires doctrine have already been curtailed considerably by 
the Companies Act. Section 36 provides that no act of a company shall be void by 
reason only of the fact that the company did not have the capacity to enter into the 
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transaction or because the directors did not have the authority to enter into the 
transaction based on a lack of capacity by the company.266 
 I submit that the Companies Bill leaves enough flexibility for the inclusion of 
restrictions in the memorandum of incorporation of an SPV to limit its capacity and 
the powers of its directors to act outside such capacity. 
 The memorandum of incorporation of a company and its rules, if adopted, will still 
be binding between the company and its shareholders and between the shareholders 
inter se.267 The Bill retains a provision that an act of a company will not be void solely 
because the company did not have the capacity to act, or because the directors did not 
have the authority to act solely because the company itself did not have the capacity 
or power to act.268  
The shareholders and directors of the company must guard against contravention of 
a limitation of the capacity of the company. Shareholders or directors of the company 
may take proceedings to restrain the company or the directors from doing anything 
inconsistent with any limitation, restriction or qualification contained in the 
memorandum of incorporation.269 Such proceedings will be without prejudice to the 
rights to damages by a third party who obtained those rights in good faith and who did 
not have actual knowledge of the limitation in the powers and capacity of the 
company.270  
Clause 20(2) gives shareholders the power to ratify an action by a company that is 
inconsistent with a limitation, restriction or qualification in the purposes, powers or 
activities of the company. Such ratification must be in the form of a special 
resolution,271 and the action may not be in contravention of another provision of the 
Bill.272  
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Market forces will also urge shareholders and directors of an SPV to uphold the 
limitations on the powers and capacity of an SPV. Rating of the securities issued by 
the SPV will continue throughout the existence of the scheme.273 A contravention of 
the terms of the memorandum of incorporation will reflect negatively on the 
insolvency insulation of the SPV and may lead to a downgrade in the rating.274  
Ratification by shareholders of a breach of the limitation on the powers and 
capacity of the SPV will further be a contravention of paragraph 2(1)(c) of the 
Schedule to Securitisation Notice, 2008, which provides that the SPV may not engage 
in any other activity than those associated with the securitisation scheme. The 
provision for non-compliance with the Notice will then take effect.275 
6.6.3 Separation of Powers 
The articles of association of a company may currently provide that the management 
of a company will vest with the board of directors and the shareholders will not be 
able to interfere with this function.276 The Companies Bill makes this situation 
applicable to all companies, unless specifically limited in the memorandum of 
incorporation of the company, or in the Bill.277 The decision to engage in a 
securitisation scheme will therefore fall under the authority of the board of directors 
of the originator, unless such authority is limited in the memorandum of 
incorporation. 
6.6.4 Affected Transactions 
The definition of an ‗affected transaction‘ in the Bill includes a transaction or series of 
transactions amounting to the disposal of all or the greater part of the assets or 
undertaking of a regulated company.278 The Takeover Regulation Panel will have to 
regulate and approve such a transaction,279 unless the Panel has granted an exemption 
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from approval of that transaction.280 The Panel may exempt a person from the 
Takeover Regulations if there is no reasonable potential for the affected transaction to 
prejudice the interests of any existing shareholder, or if the cost of compliance is 
disproportionate to the value of the affected transaction, or if doing so is otherwise 
reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances.281 
As in the current Act,282 a special resolution is required for the disposal of all or the 
greater part of the assets or undertaking of a company.283 However, a court must 
sanction the resolution if the holders of at least 15 per cent of the shares that were 
voted on the resolution voted against its adoption and any shareholder who voted 
against the resolution seeks a review of the transaction from the company.284 The 
company must then seek court approval or treat the resolution as a nullity.285 The court 
will grant such leave only if it is satisfied that the applicant is acting in good faith, 
appears prepared to sustain proceedings and has alleged facts which, if true, would 
support the setting aside of the resolution.286 The court will set aside the resolution if it 
is satisfied that the resolution is manifestly unfair to any class of shareholders, or that 
the vote was materially tainted by a conflict of interest, inadequate disclosure, or a 
failure to comply with the Act,287 with the memorandum of incorporation or any 
applicable rules of the company, or if there was another significant and material 
irregularity.288 
A shareholder who is not in favour of the resolution may give the company notice 
in writing of his objection.289 If the resolution was carried and the shareholder voted 
his shares against the adoption of the resolution, the company must purchase such a 
shareholder‘s shares at a fair market value when called upon by the shareholder to do 
so.290  
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These provisions effectively leave the protection of minority shareholders, where a 
disposal of the assets or undertaking of a company is proposed, to the court. It 
remains unclear why these provisions are included in the sphere of the Securities 
Regulations.291  
That part of the undertaking or assets of the company that is to be disposed of must 
be assigned its fair market value as at the date of the proposal of the resolution. It will 
depend on the circumstances whether a proposed securitisation scheme will constitute 
the disposal of substantially all of the assets of the company. If a particular 
securitisation transaction constitutes such a disposal, the protection of shareholders in 
these circumstances is, in my opinion, warranted. However, I submit that the 
comments of Luiz,292 namely that the protection of minority shareholders under these 
circumstances ought not to be regulated by the provisions relating to take-overs and 
mergers, still apply. The same result could be achieved by not placing such 
transactions under the auspices of the Panel, but only to require the court‘s sanction. 
6.7 SECURITIES SERVICES ACT 36 OF 2004 
The Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 provides for the regulation and control of 
securities exchanges and securities trading, central securities depositories and the 
custody and administration of securities, the prohibition of insider trading and the 
licensing of clearing houses. This Act is applicable to a securitisation scheme when 
the SPV wants to trade its securities on a securities exchange and if it uses a central 
securities depository in the administration of uncertificated securities. 
 The Act obliges exchanges to issue listing requirements to regulate the 
requirements that issuers must comply with in order to list their securities on that 
exchange.293 The exchange must further issue rules that must at least contain rules on 
the matters listed in section 18 of the Act. The matters listed in section 18 mostly 
relate to the regulation of authorised users of the exchange, in other words, 
stockbrokers. However, the rules usually also include provisions on the listing, trading 
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and settlement of securities listed on the exchange.294 These listing requirements and 
the rules of the securities exchange where the SPV intends to list its securities must 
also be kept in mind during the structuring of the securitisation scheme. 
6.8 COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES CONTROL ACT 
45 OF 2002 
The Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 regulates and controls the 
establishment and administration of collective investment schemes. In a typical 
collective investment scheme investors contribute money in exchange for 
participatory interests in the scheme. The money is used by the manager of the 
scheme to buy and sell assets in order to maximise profits. These assets are often 
securities or immovable property. The custodian of the scheme administers the trade 
in the participatory interests, for instance by recording ownership of the participatory 











Figure 7: Simplified collective investment scheme 
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Scott296 is of the opinion that a securitisation scheme may qualify as a collective 
investment scheme and that this Act therefore applies. I agree with this view, as will 
become clear from the discussion that follows. 
 Schemes that fall under the ambit of the Act fall under the supervision of the 
Financial Services Board.297 The executive officer and deputy executive officer of the 
Financial Services Board are the Registrar and Deputy Registrar of collective 
investment schemes respectively. According to the Financial Services Board a 
securitisation does not qualify as a collective investment scheme.298 In their opinion 
the only relevance that securitisation may have in connection with a collective 
investment scheme is that, depending on the structure of the securities created by the 
SPV, such securities may qualify as an investment that may be included in the 
portfolio of a collective investment scheme.299 
 In my opinion, it is clear from a reading of the Act and its regulations that they 
were not meant for application to securitisation schemes. The structures created by the 
Act are aimed at safeguarding the interests of investors where the managers of the 
scheme buys and sells securities or property on a regular basis. Whereas the SPV 
issues securities to fund the acquisition of assets from the originator, the manager of a 
collective investment scheme needs capital of its own in order to initiate the 
scheme.300 The minimum capital requirements of the managers of collective 
investment schemes are prescribed.301  
The custodian of the scheme must maintain capital and reserves of not less than 
R10 million.302 The duties of the custodian differ from those of a trustee for investors 
during securitisation. The custodian is directly responsible for the administration of 
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the trade in participatory interests in the collective investment scheme.303 The 
custodian is obliged to follow the instructions of the manager, unless they are 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or with the deed.304 It follows that the 
custodian does not truly function independently from the manager, although it has 
certain supervisory functions with regard to the manager.305  
Most importantly, the custodian does not hold the assets as security for the 
participations of the investors. Rather, it appears to me that the custodian becomes the 
owner of the assets and that the rights of the investors are those of beneficiaries in a 
trust.306 The custodian indemnifies both the manager and the investors against any loss 
or damage to money or assets in its custody caused by the custodian‘s wilful or 
negligent act or omission.307 This explains the high capital maintenance requirements 
set for custodians. 
However, neither the denial by the Financial Services Board that the Act is 
applicable, nor the differences in structure between securitisation schemes and the 
structures provided for in the Act as set out above necessarily mean that a 
securitisation scheme cannot be construed as a collective investment scheme.  
Securitisation schemes are not specifically excluded from the operation of the Act. 
The definition of ‗collective investment scheme‘ provided in the Act is so wide that it 
could include a securitisation scheme. It reads as follows:308  
 
[A] scheme, in whatever form, including an open-ended investment company, in pursuance of 
which members of the public are invited or permitted to invest money or other assets in a portfolio, 
and in terms of which –  
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(a) two or more investors contribute money or other assets to hold a participatory interest in a 
portfolio of the scheme through shares, units or any other form of participatory interest; and 
(b) the investors share the risk and the benefit of investment in proportion to their participatory 
interest in a portfolio of a scheme or on any other basis determined in the deed, 




A securitisation scheme where the SPV issues securities by way of private placements 
will not fall under this definition, because it would not be an invitation made to the 
general public.  
 The trustee for debenture-holders is discussed in Chapter 6.310 There I concluded 
that the agency construction for the debenture trust is not workable or in the best 
interests of the investors. The trust construction is preferable. I further showed that a 
debenture trust could be a true trust, as long as the investors transfer their claims to 
the trustee. 
I mentioned above that the custodian in a collective investment scheme is in the 
position of a trustee and the owner of the assets held in custody. For a securitisation 
scheme to be construed as a collective investment scheme, there must be a true trust in 
the sense that the trustee (or custodian) must become the owner, or the legal holder, of 
the assets of the SPV and of the money contributed by the investors. This will be the 
case if the true trust construction of the debenture trust is used in the scheme, coupled 
with a fiduciary security cession of the assets of the SPV. The investors will then be 
beneficiaries under a trust arrangement, with a participatory interest in the income 
generated by the assets. This, in my opinion, could fall under the definition of a 
collective investment scheme.311 
In the United States of America and in England the possible application to 
securitisation schemes of the regulatory framework for collective investment schemes 
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is acknowledged.312 Compliance with these regulations is costly and time consuming. 
Consequently, SPVs, and in some cases also the originators, usually apply for 
exemption from compliance with these provisions. Alternatively, they structure the 
scheme in such a manner that it will fall under one of the exemptions of the applicable 
legislation and therefore will not be construed as a collective investment scheme. 
It is in the best interest of the securitisation scheme and of the investors in the 
scheme to have certainty about the applicability of the Collective Investment Schemes 
Control Act. In my opinion, the best solution would be for the Registrar of Collective 
Investment Schemes to issue an exemption by way of notice to exclude securitisation 
schemes from the ambit of the Act.313 For the time being, section 22 provides that the 
Registrar may exempt a particular manager or a category of persons from any 
provisions of the Act on such conditions and to such an extent as he may determine. 
SPV‘s could apply for such an exemption. This might be time-consuming, but at least 
there will be certainty about whether the restrictions contained in the Act are 
applicable to the scheme. There will also be certainty about whether the Trust 
Property Control Act314 is applicable to the scheme, because if the scheme is found to 
be a collective investment scheme the application of that Act is specifically 
excluded.315 
6.9 DEBT COLLECTORS ACT 114 OF 1998 
The Debt Collectors Act 114 of 1998 establishes the Council for Debt Collectors, 
which has the object to exercise control over the occupation of debt collector.316 A 
‗debt collector‘ is defined in section 1 of the Act as:  
 
(a)  a person, other than an attorney or his or her employee or a party to a factoring arrangement, 
who for reward collects debts owed to another on the latter‘s behalf; 
(b)  a person who, other than a party to a factoring arrangement, in the course of his or her 
regular business, for reward takes over the debt referred to in paragraph (a) in order to 
collect them for his or her own benefit; 
                                                 
312
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313
 In terms of s 5(b) of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002.  See par 4.3.1.1 for 
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 57 of 1988. 
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(c)  a person who, as an agent or employee of a person referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) or as an 
agent of an attorney, collects the debts on behalf of such a person or attorney, excluding an 
employee whose duties are purely administrative, clerical or otherwise subservient to the 
actual occupation of debt collector. 
 
Factoring arrangements are excluded from the definition of ‗debt collector‘, but this is 
so far the only exclusion. The Regulations relating to Debt Collectors, 2003317 do not 
exclude any other class of debt collector, although the Act does make provision for 
such exclusion, if necessary.318 It follows that the servicer of the claims during a 
securitisation scheme will resort under the definition of ‗debt collector‘ in terms of the 
Act and will need to register as such.319 
 The Act disqualifies persons who have been convicted of offences involving 
violence, dishonesty, extortion or intimidation from registration as a debt collector.320 
Other disqualifications relate to previous improper conduct in terms of section 15 of 
the Act, if the person is of unsound mind, minors and unrehabilitated insolvents. The 
directors and officers, or members in the case of close corporations, of juristic persons 
who register as debt collectors must also qualify and be registered in terms of the Act. 
There is a small registration and annual fee payable to the Council.321 None of these 
requirements is onerous and I submit that servicers will easily comply with them. 
 The main task of the Council is to draw up and publish in the Government Gazette 
a code of conduct for debt collectors, which is binding on all debt collectors in terms 
of the Act.322 The Code of Conduct was published on 16 May 2003.323 Apart from the 
Code, section 15 of the Act sets out further conduct by debt collectors that will be 
considered improper. In essence all of these provisions entail that debt collectors must 
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not conduct themselves in a manner that is tantamount to harassment, threats of 
violence and other specified intimidating behaviour.  
 Debt collectors are further restricted in the amounts that they recover from the 
debtor to the capital amount of the debt and interest due and payable, as well as 
necessary expenses and fees.324 
 In my opinion, the most important provisions of the Act for purposes of this 
discussion are contained in section 20. Section 20(1) provides that a debt collector 
must open and maintain a separate trust account at a bank into which money collected 
on behalf of any person must be deposited as soon as possible after receipt thereof. 
Such money must then be paid to the person on whose behalf it was collected within a 
reasonable or agreed time.325 The section further requires the debt collector to keep 
proper accounting records of all money received, held or paid by him on behalf of 
another person326 and the debt collector must account to that person at least once a 
month.327 The accounting records must be audited,328 as well as the trust account.329 
 Finally, and most importantly, section 20(7) of the Act provides that no amount 
standing to the credit of such a trust account shall form part of the assets of the debt 
collector and may not be attached by the creditors of the debt collector. I discuss the 
various forms that the agreement between the servicer and the SPV can take in 
chapter 7. Regardless of the form that the parties decide on, section 20(7) of the Act 
provides a measure of protection for the SPV and its investors. This is especially true 
where the parties decide that the claims will be ceded to the servicer for collecting 
purposes. Until such time as the claims are collected, the claims will form part of the 
estate of the servicer. However, the moment that the claims are collected and paid into 
the trust account, the money so collected will no longer form part of the estate of the 
servicer.330 
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6.10 CONCLUSION 
There is no consolidated statutory regulation of securitisation in South Africa. This 
may prove beneficial for innovation in securitisation, since consolidated legislation 
might not be able to foresee all aspects of such innovation and might be a bar to it. 
Another reason why consolidated legislation might not be necessary is that a 
securitisation scheme already contains various measures to reduce risk to investors 
and to monitor the servicing of the assets of the SPV. In other words, securitisation is 
self-regulatory. 
 The single most important regulation pertaining to securitisation in South Africa is 
Securitisation Notice, 2008.331 Though only relevant where the SPV intends to issue 
securities to the general public, it provides important guidance to securitisation 
schemes in general. Since SPVs that comply with its provisions will not be subject to 
the more stringent regulation applicable to banks, Securitisation Notice, 2008 
provides an indication of what the Legislature regards as best practice.  
 An SPV that does not comply with the provisions of Securitisation Notice, 2008 
when it issues securities to the general public, will fall under the provisions of 
Chapter VIII of the Banks Act.332 These provisions essentially aim to reverse the 
transactions that occurred while the transgressing institution was not registered as a 
bank. The Registrar of Banks can appoint a manager to oversee this process and 
extensive powers are given to the manager in this respect.  
Both the SPV and the originator will be affected if such a manager is appointed. 
The SPV would have used the money raised from the issue of securities to pay for the 
transfer of the claims. The manager will have the authority to follow that money to the 
originator and to reclaim it in order to repay the investors. It is doubtful whether it 
will be possible to reverse a securitisation scheme without loss to the investors in the 
scheme. Furthermore, the originator will suffer severe reputational loss under these 
circumstances. 
The Banks Amendment Act333 amends Chapter VIII, dealing with the management 
of an institution that did not comply with the exemption notice.334 In future the 
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manager must report on the solvency of the scheme on his appointment. The Registrar 
is given extensive powers under the Act to prevent the onset of liquidation 
proceedings and to stay all legal action against the institution under management. 
When the institution is an SPV under a securitisation scheme, it will in my opinion be 
in the best interests of the investors in the scheme if the Registrar consults with the 
trustee for debenture-holders before taking action in terms of Chapter VIII. I 
recommend that a future amendment of Securitisation Notice should provide for such 
consultation to take place. I am also of the opinion that the trustee may be the proper 
person to appoint as manager when the provisions of Chapter VIII take effect. 
I considered those provisions of the National Credit Act335 that might be of 
importance to securitisation.336 In my opinion, proper consumer protection measures 
will aid securitisation in the long run, because the default patterns of debtors may 
become more predictable. Better predictability of such default patterns will in turn 
enhance the efficiency of the structuring of the securitisation scheme. Rating agencies 
will take special note of the provisions of the Act when they rate the quality of the 
claims ceded to the SPV. 
Certain provisions of the Companies Act337 are of specific importance before and 
during a securitisation scheme.338 It must be determined whether a particular 
securitisation will constitute the disposal of the whole or a substantial part of the 
assets or the undertaking of the originator.339 If so, a special resolution by the 
members of the originator will be necessary to effect the scheme. The scheme will 
then also be an affected transaction that will fall under the supervision of the 
Securities Regulation Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers.340 Conflicts of interest may 
arise where a director of the originator has interests in the SPV or in one of the other 
parties involved in the scheme.341 The board of directors of the originator must be 
careful in this regard. Securitisation also places added duties on the shoulders of the 
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originator‘s company secretary, if appointed, and on the auditor of the originator and 
SPV. The SPV must issue a prospectus if its securities will be offered to the public. 
I considered the provisions of the Companies Bill342 that are, in my opinion, 
relevant to securitisation.343 At present the memorandum of association of an SPV 
limits its capacity to transactions concerned with the securitisation scheme and 
matters incidental thereto.344 Such a limitation of the capacity of the SPV is also a 
requirement of Securitisation Notice, 2008345 and is important for rating agencies 
when they consider the rating of the securities issued by the SPV.346 I concluded that 
the Companies Bill leaves enough flexibility for the inclusion of restrictions in the 
memorandum of incorporation of an SPV to limit its capacity and the powers of its 
directors to act outside such capacity. The potential for a downgraded rating and non-
compliance with Securitisation Notice, 2008 will urge shareholders and directors of 
an SPV to uphold the limitations on the powers and capacity of an SPV.  
The Bill still defines the disposal of the whole or a substantial part of the assets of 
a company as an affected transaction.347 It further provides shareholder protection by 
requiring court sanction if more than 15 per cent of shareholders voted against the 
disposal and any shareholder who voted against the resolution applies for the court‘s 
review of the transaction. There is also a procedure in the Bill whereby a shareholder 
who was against the adoption of the resolution, may notify the company of his 
objection so that the company can purchase his shares at a fair market value. These 
provisions effectively leave the protection of minority shareholders, where a disposal 
of the assets or undertaking of a company is proposed, in the hands of the court. It 
remains unclear, as is the case under the current inclusion of section 228 transactions 
under the definition of an affected transaction, why these provisions are included in 
the sphere of the Securities Regulations.348  
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The Securities Services Act349 will be applicable to a securitisation scheme when 
the SPV wants to trade its securities on a securities exchange and if it uses a central 
securities depository in the administration of uncertificated securities.350 
I considered whether a securitisation scheme could be construed to be a collective 
investment scheme within the meaning of the Collective Investment Schemes Control 
Act.351 In my opinion, it is possible that a particular securitisation scheme could also 
fall within the definition of a collective investment scheme. I therefore recommend 
that the Registrar of Collective Investment Schemes creates certainty by specifically 
exempting securitisation schemes from the provisions of the Act. Until then it is 
advisable for SPV‘s to apply for exemption in terms of the Act. 
Finally, I came to the conclusion that the servicer during a securitisation scheme 
will have to register as a debt collector in terms of the Debt Collectors Act.352 Most 
importantly, the Act provides that amounts collected by a debt collector and deposited 
in the separate trust account it must maintain for such purposes, do not form part of 
his estate and cannot be attached by his creditors. This provides a measure of 
protection to the SPV and to its investors. 
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CHAPTER 7  
TRANSFER OF CLAIMS AND „TRUE SALE‟ 
REQUIREMENT 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
It should be clear from the discussion so far that the transfer of the assets to the SPV 
should be done in such a manner that the assets will from a legal point of view, 
permanently be removed from the estate of the originator and vest in the estate of the 
SPV. The advantages associated with this form of financing are dependent on a ‗true 
sale‘. In this chapter I consider the form and requirements of the agreements between 
the originator and the SPV for these agreements to comply with the ‗true sale‘ 
requirement. I also consider the nature of the agreement between the SPV and the 
servicer to the securitisation scheme, because in many cases the originator continues 
to act as the servicer. This may have implications when a court considers whether the 
original transaction was one of sale or of loan. 
7.2 AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ORIGINATOR AND SPV 
In this section I consider the nature of the agreement between the originator and the 
SPV.1  At least two agreements must be distinguished between the originator and the 
SPV,2 namely an obligationary agreement, in terms of which rights and obligations 
are created between the parties, and a transfer agreement,3 by which the claims are 
transferred. However, the two agreements are not necessarily separated in time. The 
transfer agreement may be incorporated into the obligationary agreement. 
For purposes of this section I assume that the sale of the claims by the originator to 
the SPV is not a simulated transaction4 and that the true intention of the parties to the 
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 I do not discuss individual clauses of the agreement between the parties. In terms of Securitisation 
Notice, 2008 (GN 2, GG 30628 (1 January 2008) Notice on Banks Act 94 of 1990 – Designation of 
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contract is to enter into a contract of sale. A contract of sale is the obligationary 
agreement.5  
7.2.1 Obligationary agreement: contract of sale 
The terms of a contract may be classified as essentialia, naturalia or incidentalia.6 
Essentialia are those terms that are essential for the existence of a specific type of 
contract or for it to be classified as a contract of a specific type. Naturalia are terms 
that are not essential to the nature of a specific type of contract, but ipso iure flow 
from it. Such terms are included and understood to be part of that type of contract, 
unless specifically excluded through express agreement between the parties. 
Incidentalia do not flow from a specific type of contract ipso iure, but may be 
included by express agreement between the parties. 
 These concepts are especially important for the classification of contracts.  The 
contract that gives rise to the obligation of the originator to transfer the claims to the 
SPV must take the form of a contract of sale. It is therefore important to ascertain 
what the essentialia, or essential elements, of a contract of sale are.  
A contract of sale is a mutual agreement whereby one person, the seller, undertakes 
to deliver to another person, the purchaser, a thing and whereby the other person 
agrees to pay a sum of money in exchange.7 The following are regarded as essentialia 
of a contract of sale:8 
 There must be agreement on the thing to be sold. 
 The agreement must determine a purchase price.9 
 
The purchase price is given in return for undisturbed possession of the asset 
purchased. The intention must be to provide to the purchaser on a permanent basis all 
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 Although the term ‗obligatory agreement‘ is the one usually employed by the Courts, I agree with 
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the entitlements that are associated with the kind of asset sold. For historical reasons, 
South African law does not require transfer of ownership of a thing as an essential 
requirement for a contract of sale. It is a naturalia of a contract of sale that the seller 
will transfer ownership if he has it or can obtain it, failing which, to warrant against 
eviction.10 However, Joubert11 indicates that when the object of the sale is a claim, a 
term requiring the cession of the claim is an essential element of the contract. 
The originator and the SPV will draft their obligationary agreement in the form of 
a contract of sale, making sure that it contains all the essential elements. 
7.2.2 Transfer agreement 
Typically, the obligationary agreement is the justa causa for the transfer agreement. 
The usual relationship between the transfer agreement and the obligationary 
agreement was stated as follows in Johnson v Incorporated General Insurance Ltd:12 
 
Cession can be seen as an act of transfer to transfer a claim (translatio juris). This happens by 
means of a transfer agreement between the cedent and the cessionary derived from a justa causa 
from which the intention of the cedent to transfer the claim to the cessionary (animus transferendi) 
and the intention of the cessionary to become the legal holder of the claim (animus acquirendi) is 
shown or can be derived. The transfer agreement may coincide or be preceded by a justa causa, 
which could be an obligatory agreement such as a contract of sale, a barter, a donation, a settlement, 
or even a payment (solutio) (my translation). 
 
The transfer of the claims from the originator to the SPV can either take the form of 
delegation or of cession. I submit that delegation is the agreement implied by 
Securitisation Notice, 2008: 13  
 
The transfer of the assets to or acquisition of assets by a special-purpose institution shall totally 
divest the transferring institution and all its associated companies and, when the transferring 
institution is a bank, divest any other institution within the banking group of which such a bank is a 
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member, of all rights and obligations
14
 originating from the underlying transactions and all risks in 
connection with the assets transferred or acquired (my emphasis). 
 
However, I shall explore both delegation and cession, because for the reasons set out 
below I am of the opinion that, generally, cession lends itself much better to the 
objectives and structure of a traditional securitisation scheme. 
7.2.2.1 Delegation 
Delegation is a form of novation whereby one party is completely substituted for 
another. As such, it requires the full co-operation and consent of the original debtor 
and creditor and the third party that will substitute one of the parties to the original 
agreement.15  
Often legal documentation and even judgments use the term ‗assignment‘ to refer 
to an agreement to transfer both rights and obligations.16 Two recent Supreme Court 
of Appeal decisions used the term ‗assignment‘ to denote a complete substitution of 
one party to an agreement for another party.17 Christie18 argues that what is meant by 
‗assignment‘ in these instances is really a delegation and that the use of the term 
‗assignment‘ by draftsmen has led to some confusion about the intention of the 
parties. Such confusion is aggravated by the fact that ‗assignment‘ in English law 
refers to a transfer of rights only.19 Here I shall use the term ‗delegation‘. 
 Delegation differs from cession in that during delegation the previous claim is 
terminated and a new claim is created in its stead. During cession the claim is 
transferred and continues to exist unchanged. Since the original claim ceases to exist 
in a delegation, its accessory security rights will also be terminated. New security 
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McFarlane Law of Contract at 5. From the perspective of the creditor the obligation is a right to 
claim performance. From the perspective of the debtor the obligation is a duty to perform. It is 
therefore more correct to refer to ‗claims‘ and ‗duties‘ and I shall use the term ‗duty‘. 
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rights will have to be negotiated as part of the delegation in order for the new party to 
gain secured claims.20 
As indicated above, the requirement of Securitisation Notice, 2008 that both rights 
and obligations must be transferred necessitates that delegation must be the method of 
transfer of the claims to the SPV. In my opinion, this is a major flaw in the Notice, 
which should be removed. 
I consider it unwise for the SPV to acquire duties. First, it will mean that the debtor 
must not only be informed of the transfer, but must also give his consent for the 
replacement of his debtor with another party. If the original agreement was in writing 
and contained a standard non-variation clause, the written agreement will have to be 
substituted for a new one. This has administrative, time-delay and cost implications. 
Second, the SPV may be unable to fulfil these duties in terms of the limitations stated 
in its objects clause. Lastly, the SPV is not supposed to engage in business outside of 
the securitisation scheme in order to minimise the risk of its insolvency. 
Securitisation Notice, 2008 further foresees the possibility of securitising an 
‗undrawn commitment‘ to lend money to a borrower.21 In such a case the only 
possibilities for the transfer of the undrawn commitment allowed by Securitisation 
Notice are novation, assignment or any other means specified in writing by the 
Registrar. I submit that ‗assignment‘ carries the meaning set out above and should 
really read ‗delegation‘. 
I suspect that the reason why Securitisation Notice, 2008 places such emphasis on 
a severance of ties between the debtor and the originator is that it fears that an 
ongoing business relationship between the debtor and the originator might lead to a 
conclusion that the transaction was not a true sale. In reality most originators want to 
continue their business relationship with the debtor. Even if the duties arising from 
agreements with the debtors are transferred to the SPV as foreseen by the Notice, the 
SPV will not be in a position to actively participate in the fulfilment of those duties. 
An SPV has, per definition, only a limited main objective, namely to raise money 
from the public, backed by the assets transferred to it by the originator. It does not 
have capital available to meet lending obligations of the sort that Securitisation Notice 
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foresees, nor does it maintain the personnel to administer and manage an ongoing 
business relationship with a debtor.22 The transfer of these duties to the SPV will 
further mean that it incurs liability for duties apart from its duties towards the 
investors, which defeats the objective of an insolvency-remote SPV. 
In my opinion, the inclusion of a transfer of duties in Securitisation Notice, 2008, 
might, rather than safeguard against a finding of a non-true sale, have the opposite 
result. Suppose the SPV raises the additional capital required to function as a lender 
and service the duties of undrawn commitments as foreseen by the Notice. The SPV 
will not have staff or the administration to manage these new loans and will most 
likely allow the originator, whether it is the servicer or not, to manage this 
relationship on its behalf. The retention of servicing rights by an originator is 
expressly excluded as a form of indirect control over the assets by Securitisation 
Notice, 2008.23 ‗Servicing agent‘ is defined in the Notice as ―an institution that acts as 
servicing agent in relation to the collection of the amounts due in terms of a 
traditional or synthetic securitisation scheme‖.24 I submit that this definition only 
covers the collection of amounts due and does not make provision for the 
administration of ongoing lending activities.  
In actual fact Securitisation Notice, 2008 contradicts itself by expecting, on the one 
hand, that all rights and duties be transferred to the SPV and, on the other hand, 
forcing the SPV by implication to leave the management and administration of those 
rights and duties with the originator. A further contradictory provision of 
Securitisation Notice is the following:25 
 
The agreement between the institution transferring the assets in terms of a traditional securitisation 
scheme and the special-purpose institution shall be such that, in the event of the terms of an 
underlying transaction being amended, the special-purpose institution, and not the transferring 
institution, or any of the transferring institution‘s associated companies or, when the transferring 
institution is a bank, any other institution within the banking group of which such a bank is a 
member will be subject to the terms so amended. 
 
This paragraph assumes delegation. The amendment of the underlying agreement to 
the effect that the SPV, and not the originator, is bound assumes that the debtor 
consented to a substitution of lenders. Second, although it does not expressly state 
                                                 
22
 See also my comments on the transfer of a covering bond in par 7.2.3.1. 
23
 Schedule, par 4(2)(b)(iii). 
24
 Schedule, par 1. 
25
 Schedule, par 4(2)(j). 
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this, the paragraph suggests that the debtor will continue to deal with the originator. If 
this was not the case and the debtor dealt directly with the SPV, the amendment of the 
underlying transaction would be a new agreement between the debtor and the SPV 
and the paragraph would become superfluous. It seems then that the paragraph 
foresees that the debtor will amend the terms of the underlying agreement through 
negotiation with the originator, but that the SPV will be bound by the terms of the 
varied agreement. 
 I submit that this paragraph grants the originator blanket consent to act on behalf of 
the SPV in the variation of the terms of the underlying transaction. Despite the efforts 
of Securitisation Notice, 2008, to separate the corporate governance of the SPV from 
the control of the originator,26 this paragraph allows that acts by the originator will 
bind the SPV. This paragraph also foresees the transfer of rights and duties that flows 
from the business relationship between the debtor and the originator. 
In my opinion, the peremptory language used in Securitisation Notice, 2008 to 
imply that the transfer of the assets must be in the form of a delegation is unfortunate. 
It ought to be possible for an originator to transfer the claims arising from the 
underlying transactions, but to remain liable for any outstanding duties, and to still 
qualify for the exemption provided for by the Notice.27 The current wording of the 
Notice suggests that cession alone will only be acceptable for the transfer of the assets 
to the SPV when there are no longer any duties owing to the debtor. This will be the 
case where the originator and the debtor‘s business relationship have come to an end. 
This does not serve the purposes of the originator, who wants to acquire financing 
whilst maintaining a business relationship with its borrowers.28 
An example of the problems that may arise by transferring duties as prescribed by 
Securitisation Notice, 2008 is the securitisation of equipment leases. One may 
distinguish between two forms of lease agreements. First, ‗finance lease‘ refers to a 
transaction where the lessor leases equipment to the lessee, but where substantially all 
of the risks of the ownership of the equipment are transferred to the lessee regardless 
of whether the lessee will become the owner of the equipment after expiry of the lease 
                                                 
26
 See pars 6.2.3, 6.2.4 and 6.2.5. 
27
 See par 6.2.5. 
28
 See in this regard my comments on the securitisation of covering bonds in par 7.2.3.1. 
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term.29 Second, under an ‗operating lease‘, the lessee is only liable for payment of the 
periodic lease payments and there is no substantial transfer of the risk and rewards of 
ownership from the lessor. The lessee under an operating lease will usually not bear 
the risk of maintenance of the leased equipment.30 There may further be an obligation 
on the lessor to replace equipment that becomes outdated or which cannot be repaired. 
At present, duties such as the continued maintenance of the equipment under 
operating leases will have to be delegated to the SPV when the lease agreements are 
securitised. These may be very onerous duties for which the SPV is not suited.  It 
would have been preferable to leave these duties with the originator and to only 
transfer the claims under the lease agreements to the SPV. 
7.2.2.2 Cession 
Cession is an act of transfer whereby a creditor (the cedent) transfers his claim against 
his debtor to a third person (the cessionary) in such a way that the cessionary becomes 
the creditor of the debtor.31 
 There must be a valid transfer agreement between the cedent and the cessionary for 
the cession to take effect. In other words, the cedent must have the intention to 
transfer the claim to the cessionary and the cessionary must have the intention to 
receive the claim.32 
7.2.2.2.1 Delivery of  document 
Before the judgment of the Appellate Division in Botha v Fick33 there was uncertainty 
whether a claim evidenced in a written document could only be ceded if the document 
was also delivered to the cessionary. Some courts argued that such delivery was a 
requirement, which developed through the incorporation into our law of the English 
law doctrine of all effort.34 The doctrine of all effort states that the cedent must do 
                                                 
29
 See Van der Merwe et al Business Administration (2008) at 20-8. 
30
 Of course, one must have regard to the terms of the specific lease. According to Van der Merwe et al 
Business Administration at 20-10 lower priced equipment operating leases may require maintenance 
by the lessee.  
31
 Scott Cession at 1; Johnson v Incorporated General Insurance Ltd 1983 (1) 318 (A) at 331G–H. 
32
 Scott Cession at 24–25; Nienaber in Joubert et al LAWSA at 19–20. 
33
 1995 (2) 750 (A). 
34
 Smith v Farrelly‟s Trustee 1904 TS 949 at 956; Jeffrey v Pollak and Freemantle 1938 AD 1 at 22, 
24; Labuschange v Denny 1963 (3) SA 538 (A) at 543H–544B; Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard 
Bank of SA Ltd 1968 (3) SA 166 (A) at 712D–173D, 185A–D; Roman Catholic Church (Klerksdorp 
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everything in his power to divest himself of his right. The inclusion of this doctrine 
into South African law as a requirement for cession has been criticised by Scott35 as 
based on confusion with the requirement of a deed of cession in Roman-Dutch law.  
 Botha v Fick brought an end to this uncertainty.36 The Appellate Division held that 
delivery of the document was not a requirement for the cession of a claim37 and that 
the doctrine of all effort did not find application where the document only evidenced a 
claim.38 
 However, if the assets transferred during a securitisation transaction take the form 
of commercial paper, shares or other securities, it remains prudent, in my opinion, that 
the originator must ensure that certificates relating to those securities, as well as the 
transfer documents as required by the Companies Act39 and by the articles of 
association of the issuer, are delivered to the SPV.40 The obligationary agreement 
should specifically provide for the transfer of the securities into the name of the SPV. 
In an article criticising the decision in Botha v Fick, Kritzinger41 raises the valid 
argument that the Court failed to distinguish between the transfer in ownership of the 
shares and the right to be registered as a member of the company.42 The author argues 
that since registration as a member of the company is necessary before a purchaser of 
shares can enforce his rights against third parties, especially the issuer, the purchaser 
                                                                                                                                            
Diosece) v Southern Life Association Ltd 1992 (2) SA 807 (A) at 813C–D. See further Scott Cession 
at 27–39; AN Oelofse ―Lewering van die Dokument waaruit die Reg Blyk as Geldigheidsvereiste vir 
Sessie‖ 1990 (53) THRHR at 61 et seq. In Labuschange the Court held at 544A–B that the rule only 
has application where there is more than one cessionary who claim to be the rightful holder of the 
claim. The delivery of the document was, according to this decision, not a requirement for the 
validity of the cession between the cedent and the cessionary. However, this case concerned 
delegation. The claim is extinguished through delegation, and the delivery of the document is 
therefore not at issue (at 544C–E). The comments about delivery of the document were obiter. 
35
 Scott Cession at 27 and 40–43; Susan Scott ―Delivery of Document as Validity Requirement for 
Cession‖ 1995 TSAR at 760. 
36
 For a discussion and criticism of this case, see Scott 1995 TSAR at 760; Scott 1998 THRHR at 92–96; 
Konrad M Kritzinger ―Share Transfer by Mere Consensus?‖ (1995) 122 SALJ at 389. See also 
Nienaber in Joubert et al LAWSA at 25. 
37
 At 765E and 776D. 
38
 At 776J–777D. 
39
 61 of 1973. 
40
 Section 42 of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 provides for the transfer of uncertificated 
securities by means of an entry in the central securities account or the securities account of the 
transferor and transferee. See also Scott 1995 TSAR at 762. 
41
 Kritzinger 1995 SALJ at 393–395. 
42
 Oelofse 1990 THRHR at 70 is of the opinion that this confusion lies at the heart of many of the 
contradictory decisions of the courts prior to Botha v Fick. 
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will not completely step into the shoes of the seller until such registration has 
occurred.43 In other words, the cession will not be complete until registration of the 
purchaser as the member of the issuer. 
While I agree that the company need only take cognisance of the members as 
reflected on its register of members,44 I do not agree with Kritzinger that failure to 
register as a member will effectively mean that the purchaser cannot enforce his rights 
in the shares against the execution creditors of the seller or his trustee in insolvency. It 
should be noted, however, that Kritzinger‘s article appeared before section 140A of 
the Companies Act was introduced. This section requires a person who is registered as 
the holder of securities, but who is, in fact, not the beneficial owner of the securities 
registered in his name, to disclose every three months who the beneficial holders of 
the securities are.45 The company must keep a list of these beneficial holders, which is 
open for inspection by the public just like the register of members.46 
If the seller and the purchaser therefore agree that the former will remain registered 
as the member of the company, the seller will have to make these declarations and 
third parties will be privy to this information. 
I further disagree with Kritzinger‘s47 opinion that the court does not have the 
discretion to order the rectification of the register where the proper formalities for 
such registration have not been complied with. One should distinguish between the 
formalities required by the Companies Act and the articles of association of the 
company for the transfer of securities,48 and the entitlement of the purchaser of those 
securities to have his name entered into the relevant register. Where the parties agreed 
that the purchaser will be registered as a member of the company, but the necessary 
transfer documents were not delivered to the purchaser or the purchaser has lost them, 
the court, in my opinion, is empowered by section 115(3) to order rectification of the 
                                                 
43
 Kritzinger 1995 SALJ at 394–395. The author is of the opinion that the beneficial owner of shares is 
more akin to the beneficiary of a trust than to a cessionary, but does not take into account that South 
African law does not acknowledge constructive trusts. 
44
 Section 103(3) of the Companies Act 61 of 1971. 
45
 Section 140A(3). 
46
 Section 140A(8). 
47
 Kritzinger 1995 SALJ at 399. 
48
 See ss 105, 128 and 133–140. 
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register.49 The court can order specific performance of the contract between the 
parties. To further require that the formalities of the Companies Act and the articles of 
association need still be complied with before registration could be affected is absurd 
and could not have been the intention of the legislature. 
It is possible during a securitisation of securities that the originator could remain 
the nominee of the SPV on the register of the issuer of the transferred securities. The 
originator would then have to make the disclosures as envisioned by section 140A. 
The agreement between the originator and the SPV should then clearly indicate that 
the originator is acting as the SPV‘s agent when exercising any membership or other 
rights conferred by the transferred securities. 
However, I prefer that all formalities for the transfer of the securities should be 
complied with, in order to avoid any semblance of involvement by the originator in 
the rights conferred by the securities.50  
7.2.2.2.2 Valid causa 
A valid causa is a requirement for the validity of a cession.51 In the case of a 
securitisation, the contract of sale will be the causa for the cession of the claims. 
However, South African law adheres to an abstract system for the transfer of 
ownership52 and Scott is of the opinion that the abstract system is also preferable for 
the transfer of personal rights.53 In an abstract system the right passes to the estate of 
                                                 
49
 The relevant part of the section reads as follows: ―On any application under this section the Court 
may decide any question relating to the title of any person who is a party to the application to have 
his name entered into or omitted from the register, … and generally may decide any question 
necessary or expedient to be decided for the rectification of the register.‖ 
50
 Stamp duty will be payable in terms of s 23 of the Stamp Duties Act 77 of 1968. See also s 133(4) of 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
51
 Johnson v Incorporated General Insurance Ltd 1983 (1) 318 (A) at 331G–H, cited with approval in 
Botha v Fick 1995 (2) SA 750 (A) at 762B–C. 
52
 See ch 5 n 155. 
53
 Scott Cession at 84–85. Inter partes it does not make much of a difference whether the abstract or the 
causal system of transfer applies. If the right is transferred regardless of the validity of the 
obligationary agreement, the cedent will claim the right back in terms of unjust enrichment. If the 
right is only transferred when there is a valid obligationary agreement, the right will still be in the 
estate of the cedent when it becomes clear that there was no causa. The choice of system of transfer 
is really only important for the protection of third parties, including the debtor. In the abstract 
system the claim will fall in the estate of the cessionary in the event of his insolvency, regardless of 
the invalidity of the obligationary agreement. A bona fide third person can only acquire a right from 
someone who is the legal holder of that right, which implies that such persons are protected through 
the application of the abstract system. Also, in the causal system a debtor will have to enquire into 
the validity of the obligationary agreement if he wants to make payment to the cessionary after 
receiving notice of the cession. Otherwise, the cedent may claim performance from the debtor when 
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
328 
the cessionary regardless of the validity of the underlying causa (obligationary 
agreement). 
 In the context of securitisation the abstract system benefits third parties involved in 
the scheme, especially the investors who rely on the claims as security for their 
investment. If the claims were not transferred to the SPV, no valid security would 
have been created in favour of the investors.54 Owing to the operation of the abstract 
system of the transfer of rights, the invalidity of the contract of sale will not affect the 
transfer of the claims to the SPV. Should the SPV be declared insolvent, the investors 
will have secured claims against the insolvent estate, whereas the originator will have 
a concurrent claim against the insolvent estate based on unjust enrichment.  
7.2.2.2.3 Role of notice to debtor 
A claim is dualistic in nature in that it relates both to the law of property and to the 
law of obligations.55 The claim forms part of the estate of its holder and it is also 
aimed at performance by the debtor. Accordingly, cession leads to a shifting of the 
claims from the estate of the cedent to the estate of the cessionary, which relates to the 
law of property. It also causes a substitution of creditors, which relates to the law of 
obligations. However, South African courts are not always careful to note this 
distinction.56 This dual nature of cession is important when one considers whether 
notice to the debtor is a requirement for a valid cession.57 
 A cession is complete inter partes without notice to the debtor.58 In other words, 
the transfer of the assets from the estate of the cedent to that of the cessionary is 
affected by the agreement between them without the need to notify the debtor. 
                                                                                                                                            
it emerges that there was no valid obligationary agreement. This substantially burdens the position 
of the debtor. See also Scott 1998 THRHR at 98–102; DSP Cronjé ―Die Saaklike Ooreenkoms by 
die Eiendomsoordrag van Roerende Sake‖ 1978 (41) THRHR at 243; Schutte 2008 TSAR at 66; 
Nienaber in Joubert et al LAWSA at 21; Badenhorst et al Silberberg at 78–79. 
54
 In terms of the rule nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet, D 50 17 54, a 
person cannot transfer more rights than he himself has. 
55
 Scott Cession at 101–104; Susan Scott ―Die Rol van Kennis van Sessie aan die Skuldenaar‖ (2007) 
TSAR at 819; Scott 1997 THRHR at 641; Scott 1998 THRHR at 102–106; Nienaber in Joubert et al 
LAWSA at 9. 
56
 See for instance Rothschild v Lowndes 1908 TS 493 at 499; Katz v Katzenellenbogen 1955 (3) SA 
188 (T) at 190H–191B; Brook v Jones 1964 (1) SA 765 (N) at 766H–767A; Scott Cession at 109–
110. 
57
 For an in depth discussion of the role of notice to debtors during cession, see Scott Cession at 92 et 
seq. 
58
 Scott 2007 TSAR at 820. See also Nienaber in Joubert et al LAWSA at 5. 
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However, before the debtor receives notice of the cession from the cedent59 the debtor 
is discharged by payment to the cedent.60  
 If the originator continues to act as servicer for the SPV the lack of notice to the 
debtors of the securitisation does not pose any real problems as far as discharge 
goes.61 The debtors will continue to pay the originator, now in its capacity as servicer. 
However, if a third party is brought in to act as servicer for the SPV, debtors should 
be notified of the cession and to whom they should make payment. In the absence of 
such notice, the debtors could continue to discharge their debts by payment to the 
originator. However, in practice the introduction of a third party servicer will usually 
result in the need to inform the debtors that they must in future pay another party, 
which might as well include notice of the cession. 
7.2.2.2.4 Set-off 
A debtor can raise set-off62 against a cessionary if set-off could have operated against 
the cedent before notice of the cession was given.63 This means that the debtor can 
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 Notice must come from the cedent, because it is the only reliable confirmation to the debtor of the 
cession. Otherwise the debtor will need to verify every notification of a cession. See Scott Cession at 
107–108; Scott 1998 THRHR at 97 and 104. 
60
 Courts usually rely on Voet Commentarius 18 4 15: ―Nay indeed it is obvious from the passage next 
cited next below (D II 15, 17) that if the debtor was not unaware of the sale and cession, but all the 
same notice had not yet been given him by the cessionary, he does not indeed make an effective 
compromise with the cedent. But no reason of law forbids him to make payment in good faith to the 
cedent and thus to be released. He certainly pays the person to whom he was under obligation. So 
long as no notice at all has taken place, the act of a third party cannot stand in his way. The 
cessionary ought to put it down to himself if he is in loss because of his neglect or delay in giving 
notice.‖ See also Illings (Acceptance) v Ensor NO 1982 (1) SA 570 (A) at 578F. The Courts 
provided two possible reasons why a debtor will receive discharge by payment to the cedent when 
he has not received notice of the cession, namely estoppel (Katz v Katzenellenbogen 1955 (3) SA 
188 (T) at 191B) and good faith. Scott 2007 TSAR at 820–822 prefers the approach based on good 
faith as held in Brook v Jones 1964 (1) SA 765 (N) at 767D–F. A debtor makes payment to a cedent 
in good faith if he is under the impression that he must pay that person, whilst having reasonable 
grounds for such a belief. The debtor does not receive discharge because of the absence of formal 
notice, but because he was not aware of the cession. See further Nienaber in Joubert et al LAWSA at 
38–39. 
61
 For the position relating to set-off, see below. 
62
 The requirements for set-off is that the claims must be reciprocal and that both claims must be liquid 
and due. See Richter v Riverside Estates (Pty) Ltd 1946 OPD 209 at 224. 
63
 Voet Commentarius 16 2 4: ―Set-off can take place also against cessionaries who sue on a ceded 
action, not only in respect of what they themselves owe in their own names to him against whom 
they are proceeding on the action ceded, but also in regard to what the cedent himself owes them on 
his side, provided that he owed it before the cession, and thus set-off could have been raised against 
him. Since the debt disappeared ipso jure according to what was said above up to a corresponding 
amount on both sides at the very moment at which something started to be due on both sides, the 
action against the debtor could not have been ceded except as regarded the share which remained to 
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continue to set-off any claims he has against the originator that comply with the 
requirements of set-off until he receives notice of the cession. 
 The potential of set-off does not bar the use of a claim during securitisation, but the 
risk of set-off must be considered when provision is made in the scheme for credit 
enhancement.64 
7.2.2.2.5 Defences 
Generally, all real defences that were available to the debtor against the cedent are 
also available against the cessionary.65 The non-payment of claims due to the 
successful reliance on defences by debtors will be taken into account during the 
assessment of the quality of the assets to be transferred to the SPV by the rating 
agency and in deciding on the credit enhancements that must be included in the 
structure of the scheme. If these measures are in place as they should be, possible 
defences of debtors should not be a major obstacle to the success of a securitisation 
scheme. 
7.2.2.2.6 Case for codification 
Scott66 has argued that the South African law of cession is in need of statutory 
intervention to clarify certain aspects, such as the role of notice to the debtor, the 
possible need for a formal deed of cession and the effect of the absence of a valid 
causa for the cession.  
Her argument rests on two pillars. First, she argues that modern law of cession 
developed from nineteenth-century German law and that the earlier Roman-Dutch 
authorities therefore do not provide authority for the modern law of cession.67 Second, 
for various reasons over time South African courts have delivered such conflicting 
                                                                                                                                            
be collected after the debits and credits had been merged and so wiped out.‖ See also Scott Cession 
at 115; Nienaber in Joubert et al LAWSA at 44–45. 
64
 See par 2.5. 
65
 London & South African Bank v The Official Liquidator of the Natal Investment Co 1871 NLR 1 at 
3; Biggs v Molefe 1910 CPD 242 at 251; Walker v Syfret NO 1911 AD 141 at 162; Van Zyl v Credit 
Corporation of SA Ltd 1960 (4) SA 582 (A) at 588F–H; Nienaber in Joubert et al LAWSA at 41–42. 
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 Scott 1997 THRHR at 179; 1997 THRHR at 434; 1997 THRHR at 633; 1998 THRHR at 88. See also 
the comment of Olivier JA in First National Bank of South Africa v Lynn 1996 (2) SA 339 (A) at 
360E. 
67
 Scott 1997 THRHR at 634–636. 
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decisions on the contentious issues of cession, that they can no longer on their own 
bring cession in line with the needs of commerce.68 
I do not intend to consider in depth whether such intervention is necessary, except 
to mention that any future legislation dealing particularly with cession would need to 
take cognisance of the issues surrounding securitisation. For instance, the scale on 
which claims are ceded during the securitisation process is so great that it makes 
suggestions such as itemised deeds of transfer impractical.69 
7.2.3 Transfer of security rights 
A real security right is dependent on the principal debt for which it was created. This 
is referred to as the accessory nature of real security rights and the principle has long 
been accepted as part of South African law.70 
 I have on another occasion researched the accessory nature of security rights in 
South African law.71 I will therefore only summarise my previous conclusions and 
apply them to the position during securitisation. 
 In South African law a real security right is dependent on a principal debt for its 
existence. In other words, a real security right cannot be created if the claim it secures 
is not yet in existence and it cannot continue to exist after the claim has ceased to 
exist.72  
The exception to this rule is a covering bond that complies with section 51 of the 
Deeds Registries Act.73 In terms of this section a mortgage bond or a notarial bond 
registered to secure a future debt will only give its holder a preference or priority if 
the bond specifically stipulates that it is intended to secure future debts generally or a 
particular future debt, and if there is an amount stipulated in the bond above which 
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 Scott 1997 THRHR at 637–639. 
69
 See Scott 1998 THRHR at 96–97. I agree with Scott that the very formal requirements for the transfer 
of land as opposed to the lack of formalities for the transfer of claims do not make sense in the 
context of the modern commercial world. I further agree that a deed of transfer could create greater 
certainty about whether a cession was intended.  
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 Kilburn v Estate Kilburn 1931 AD 501 at 506: ―It is therefore clear that by our law there must be a 
legal or natural obligation to which the hypothecation is accessory. If there is no obligation whatever 
there can be no hypothecation giving rise to a substantive claim.‖ This principle was subsequently 
affirmed in Thienhaus v Metje & Ziegler Ltd 1965 (3) SA 25 (A) at 32F–G.  
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 Natania Strydom Die Aksessoriteitsbeginsel in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (2000 dissertation University 
of Johannesburg). 
72
 Strydom Die Aksessoriteitsbeginsel at 53 et seq and the authority cited there. 
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 47 of 1937. 
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future debts shall not be secured by the bond. Since there is a continuous possibility of 
future claims, the bond in terms of section 51 will continue to exist even when the 
balance on a particular moment is zero. 
The accessory nature of a real security right does not mean that it will necessarily 
follow the principal debt when the latter is ceded.74 In South African law there must 
be a separate transfer of the real security right to the cessionary of the principal debt. 
A valid transfer can only be affected through a new real agreement75 and by giving 
proper publicity to the transfer.76 The requirement of a new real agreement implies 
that the security grantor must cooperate for the transfer to take effect. The original 
holder of the security will not be entitled to transfer the real security rights without the 
co-operation of the security grantor.77  
Provision is made in the Deeds Registries Act for the registration of a transfer of 
mortgages and bonds,78 which provides a transfer with proper publicity. Specific 
provision is also made for the registration of a cession of covering bonds.79 When the 
requirements of the Deeds Registries Act for the transfer of mortgages and bonds are 
met, the transfer will not affect the priority of the security taker. The same result is not 
possible for a transfer of a pledge, where the new pledgee will only have priority from 
the time that the requirements of the transfer of the pledge are met.80  
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 In the Netherlands the security right will follow the claim ipso iure. See Strydom Die 
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When the principal debt is ceded without the requirements for the transfer of the 
security right being met, the security right will cease to exist.81 This is because a 
security right cannot continue to exist without the claim it aims to secure. 
Furthermore, if the claim ceases to exist, so will the security right.  
Delegation is a form of novation. Novation brings an end to a claim and the claim 
is replaced with a new claim. During delegation the security rights that secured the 
original claim will cease to exist together with the claim. A new security right must be 
created with the creation of the new claim. 
As was discussed above,82 Securitisation Notice, 2008 implies delegation as the 
form of transfer of assets to the SPV. When the assets are claims secured by accessory 
security rights, both the claims and the security rights will cease to exist after the 
delegation. It must therefore be concluded that all accessory security rights held by 
the originator before transfer of the claims to the SPV cease to exist on transfer. 
Unless specified otherwise, my comments below apply to the situation where the 
claims are transferred to the SPV by means of cession.  
It is important to remember the requirements for the transfer of the real security 
rights during the securitisation of mortgage bonds or claims secured by notarial bond. 
Today most standardised mortgage agreements already contain a clause whereby the 
mortgagor consents to the transfer of the mortgage. While it may be argued that the 
mortgagor could change his mind before the transfer, in my opinion South African 
courts will keep the mortgagor to his expression of will in the written 
documentation.83 If the claims are ceded to the SPV, such consent should suffice. The 
originator will further have to comply with the registration requirements of the Deeds 
Registries Act to publicise the cession of the mortgage bonds.  
If the claims and the duties owing to the debtor are delegated to the SPV, the 
debtor will have to consent to the creation of a new security right. Whether such 
consent was given in the original agreement will be a matter of interpretation of the 
agreement. However, since the previous security right is terminated, the new 
mortgage or special notarial bond should be registered again, and not ceded. This 
influences the priority that the security provides its holder, because priority is 
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determined according to the date of registration of the mortgage or special notarial 
bond. This is another reason why delegation should not be the method by which the 
assets are transferred to the SPV. It should be possible to only cede the claims, so that 
the accessory security rights may continue to exist and may be transferred to the SPV 
without losing their priority. 
This would be the situation during a securitisation where a fixed amount is secured 
by mortgage or notarial bond. However, the transferability of the accessory rights 
becomes more complicated when the claims under a covering bond are transferred.84  
7.2.3.1 Covering bonds 
A covering bond secures the balance of the claims that flow from, and the payments 
made during, an ongoing business relationship between the creditor and the debtor.85 
The bond is not affected by a zero balance at any given time, because the contract 
between the debtor and creditor still has the possibility of creating new claims. 
 If the contract between the creditor and the debtor is terminated the bond will 
change from a covering bond to a fixed bond, securing the claim that reflects the 
balance at the moment of termination of the contract. The cession of this claim with 
its accessory bond will be executed in the manner explained above and poses few 
problems. It is further possible that the rights and duties of the contract that gave rise 
to the business relationship between the original creditor and debtor are transferred. 
The covering bond can be transferred to the cessionary in terms of section 52 of the 
Deeds Registries Act, retaining priority at the date of registration of the bond. This 
also does not pose a problem generally, but does in the case of securitisation, as I shall 
explain below. 
 However, most credit institutions will not want to end the business relationships 
with their clients after the securitisation. What they want to do is to cede the balance 
at a particular moment to the SPV, while retaining the possibility of future advances 
to the debtor by keeping the contract with the client. The credit institution will want to 
retain the bond to secure future claims against the debtor. The bond cannot be split to 
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cover claims owed to two creditors, as this is prohibited by section 50(5) of the Deeds 
Registries Act.86 It would in effect be an illegal participation bond.87  
 The only way in which it could be made possible for the mortgage to split, so that 
the mortgage could secure the fixed claim that is ceded to the SPV as well as future 
advances by the originator, is through legislation. However, even if the division of the 
bond is enabled by legislation, for instance through an amendment to the Deeds 
Registries Act, the ongoing relationship between the originator and the debtor leaves 
certain questions. Where the originator acts as servicer, it will have to be determined 
whether payments made by the debtor will serve first as payment of the transferred 
claims or as payment of debts owed to the originator. Furthermore, the fixed amount 
transferred to the SPV will have to be subtracted from the maximum amount that the 
bond will cover; otherwise it will mean that the originator could again advance money 
to the debtor up to the maximum amount. The total amount owing will then be the 
ceiling amount plus the fixed amount transferred to the SPV, which will mean that the 
bond is not adequate to secure the full amount outstanding. 
 All of this could, of course, be addressed through careful planning. What is more 
problematic is whether the splitting of the bond in favour of two creditors should be 
allowed, or disallowed, based on policy considerations. The encumberment of the 
property of the debtor in favour of two creditors where there was previously only one, 
increases the burden of the debtor.88 Even if the debtor consented in the original bond 
agreement to the transfer of the bond, the debtor probably did not foresee that such a 
transfer could be only partial and that the bond could be split in favour of more than 
one security holder. 
The registration of the transfer of the covering bond envisaged in section 52 seems 
to me to indicate a transfer of both rights and duties, since it makes provision for 
future advances. The SPV, however, does not have the capacity or the capital to 
conduct the business of a credit provider.89 
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 The originator could transfer the covering bond to the SPV and cede the claims 
that arise under its business relationship with the debtor to the SPV as they arise. In 
other words, the claims as they arise are ceded to the SPV, but the originator remains 
liable for the duties under the original agreement with the debtor. Under such an 
arrangement the originator should be aware that it no longer has secured claims 
against the debtors whose covering bonds were ceded. Since it sells those claims to 
the SPV, the risk it takes by transferring the bond is small.90 More problematic is the 
fact that Securitisation Notice, 2008 does not make provision for the transfer of only 
the claims, but requires that the duties towards the debtors must also be transferred to 
the SPV.91 This arrangement is therefore not currently allowed in South African law.92 
 I submit that Securitisation Notice, 2008 ought to be amended so that it is not 
necessary for the obligations towards the debtor to also be transferred. The 
arrangement set out above will then be possible. However, I am not sure that the 
banking industry will be keen to part with the covering bonds in their favour, even if 
the securitisation process means that they carry less risk in terms of their relationship 
with the debtors. 
7.2.3.2 Sureties93 
In Pizani v First Consolidated Holdings (Pty) Ltd94 the Appellate Division held that 
the cessionary of a claim that is secured by way of surety steps into the shoes of the 
cedent, also with regards to the suretyship. In other words, it is not necessary to enter 
into a separate agreement to cede the claims in terms of the suretyship. The suretyship 
follows the claim automatically. 
 If the agreement of suretyship contained a pactum de non cedendo the right against 
the surety will not pass to the cessionary. When the claim is ceded to the SPV, the 
suretyship will cease to exist.95 
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 However, as is the case with accessory real security rights, the suretyship will 
come to an end when the claim ceases to exist. The same criticism that applies to the 
effect of delegation on accessory real security rights therefore applies to suretyship. 
7.2.3.3 Security by way of cession in securitatem debiti 
Fiduciary security cession of claims is a non-accessory form of security. If the 
principal debt is ceded to the SPV, the originator will still be the legal holder of the 
claims that act as security. There will have to be an agreement to cede the claims that 
serve as security between the originator and the SPV. The permission of the debtor is 
not necessary to effect such a cession. It is also not necessary to inform the security 
grantor, because the claims were transferred to the originator, who is entitled to 
transfer the claims again. The security grantor only retains a reversionary interest in 
the claims.96  
 The position differs where the transferred claims are secured by way of a pledge of 
claims. During a pledge of claims the claims remain in the estate of the pledgor and 
the pledgee is therefore not entitled to cede the claims. The security by way of a 
pledge of claims will not automatically follow the principal debt into the hands of the 
cessionary. The SPV will have to enter into a new agreement with the pledgor if it 
wants to obtain the claims as security. However, it is possible for the pledgor to 
consent to the transfer of the security in the original agreement to pledge. 
 Furthermore, by analogy to a pledge of things a pledge of claims is an accessory 
form of security. This means that the security right will cease to exist when the 
principal debt is terminated. The effect of delegation on a pledge of claims will 
therefore be the same as in the case of mortgage, notarial bond and suretyship. 
 If the debtors of the claims used as security were informed of the original security 
cession, and the originator is not acting as servicer of the securitisation scheme, it will 
be necessary to inform the debtors to make payment to the actual servicer. Otherwise 
there is the risk that the debtors could continue to validly pay the originator.97 
7.2.3.4 Instalment sale agreements 
In terms of an instalment sale agreement the purchaser agrees with the seller to pay 
for the purchased thing in instalments over a determined period. The seller retains 
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ownership of the thing until full payment is received.98 Vehicle financing agreements 
in South Africa are often instalment sale agreements. 
 The retention of ownership as security for the claim of the seller is not an 
accessory form of security. In other words, it is possible for the seller to cede his 
rights to receive payment to a third party, whilst retaining ownership in the sold 
things. The ownership will not fall away, as is the case when the principal debt of an 
accessory security right ceases to exist. Delegation therefore does not bring the 
seller‘s ownership to an end. However, usually the cessionary will want the security 
provided by the retention of ownership. 
 The cedent and the cessionary will have to enter into a new agreement to transfer 
the ownership in the thing to the cessionary. Ownership will not follow the claim 
automatically. All the requirements for the transfer of a real right, in this case 
ownership, will have to be complied with.99 Of specific importance is the requirement 
that the thing must be delivered to the new owner. Most instalment sale agreements 
contain a clause to the effect that the purchaser will hold the sold item on behalf of the 
seller‘s cessionaries. It is my opinion that the purchaser will be held to such 
consent.100  
 However, there is a potential problem if the purchaser sells the thing and gives up 
control in favour of the new purchaser.101 The new purchaser will not have entered 
into any agreement to hold the thing on behalf of the original owner and his 
cessionaries. There is case law to the effect that under these circumstances the original 
owner will not succeed in transferring ownership, because he will not be able to 
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deliver the thing to the other party.102 Under these circumstances it will not be possible 
for the SPV to gain ownership in the sold items. The SPV will take the claims against 
the purchasers without any security. 
  If ownership is transferred to the SPV, the SPV must accept the duty to transfer 
ownership to the purchaser by way of traditio brevi manu once full payment is 
received. The purchaser will have to consent to the transfer of such a duty,103 but such 
consent can be given in the original instalment sale agreement. Furthermore, the real 
agreement reached when the thing is delivered to the purchaser is enough to let 
ownership pass to the purchaser on fulfilment of the condition that full payment must 
be received.104 It is not necessary to enter into a new real agreement at the time when 
the final instalment is paid, nor is it necessary that a second form of delivery should 
take place at that time.105 This is the case even when the instalment sale agreement is 
transferred.106 The duty passed to the SPV to transfer ownership is therefore 
negligible.  
7.2.4 Transfer of future claims 
In a securitisation of future claims the SPV issues securities supported by the 
likelihood that claims will be generated by the originator, whereafter the claims are 
ceded to the SPV.107 
 At present the leading case in South African law on the cession of future rights is 
First National Bank of SA Ltd v Lynn NO.108 The facts of this case were briefly as 
follows. In 1984 the cedent, hereinafter referred to as the contractor, ceded to FNB  
 
all our title and interest in and to all and any moneys and amounts which may now be or which may 
hereafter become due and owing to us by any person whomsoever as security for the fulfilment of 
all obligations undertaken by us to the bank ... 
 
At issue was retention money owed to the contractor. The engineer, in terms of the 
construction contract between the contractor and the employer, issued a certificate of 
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completion on 27 August 1990. However, the payment of the retention money was 
subject to the completion of maintenance, which was only completed on                   
26 August 1991. The contractor was placed in provisional liquidation on                   
10 June 1991. At issue was whether the bank or the liquidators of the contractors were 
entitled to the payment of the retention money. 
 The minority judgment delivered by Joubert JA, Nestadt JA concurring, held that 
the claim to the retention money was a future right, which would only become a 
vested right on completion of the maintenance contract. Joubert JA accepts the 
construction of De Wet and Van Wyk109 that although one may validly bind oneself to 
transfer a future claim when it comes into existence, it is not possible to enter into a 
transfer agreement before the claim comes into existence.110 In terms of this 
interpretation, the contractor would have had to enter into a fresh transfer agreement 
when the claim came into existence. The agreement entered into in 1984 was not 
enough to affect the cession of the claim. The claim only came into existence after the 
date of the provisional liquidation order, which meant that the transfer agreement 
could not be entered into by the contractor. The retention money would then fall 
outside the security of the bank.111 
 The majority decision of the Court held that the right to the retention money 
became vested on the issuance of the certificate of completion on 27 August 1990, 
subject to the condition that the maintenance work will be carried out.112 In their view, 
the claim was therefore vested before the date of the provisional liquidation. It is 
unclear from the judgment of Van den Heever JA, Van Coller AJA concurring, 
whether the Court considered the 1984 agreement enough to effect the cession of the 
claim when it came into existence, or whether the Court was of the opinion that the 
contractor entered into a valid transfer agreement after 27 August 1990. Van den 
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Heever JA comes to the conclusion that the personal right was transferred to the bank 
before the liquidation113 without dealing expressly with this question. 
In this respect the judgment of Olivier JA is much clearer. The Court sets out two 
approaches to the possibility of a cession of future rights. According to the first 
approach,114 parties may agree that they will transfer a future right when it comes into 
existence, but they cannot transfer the right before it is created. In other words, they 
would have to enter into the transfer agreement115 after the right has come into 
existence.116 It is not possible to enter into such an agreement beforehand, because 
there is no common law authority for the cession of a spes.117 
In terms of the second approach, it is accepted that a future right cannot be 
transferred, nor can a spes in terms of the common law, but that as part of the legal 
and commercial reality in the country the transfer in anticipando of a spes is 
recognised.118 Olivier JA lists a long line of cases in the Local and Provincial 
Divisions,119 as well as in the Appellate Division,120 that acknowledges the cession of 
future rights. The Appellate Division, now the Supreme Court of Appeal, will not 
easily depart from previous decisions which have been acted upon for some time. 121 
He mentions specifically that the cession of book debts and factoring are dependant 
on the cedability of future rights.122 Olivier JA prefers this second approach:123 
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The position, in my view, then is that it has been accepted in commerce and by the Courts of our 
country for more than a century that future rights can be ceded and transferred in anticipando. The 
decisions of our Courts have thus been regarded for a very long period of time as being correct. 
Clearly these decisions have been acted upon and served as the basis for the general and well-
known practice of taking security in the form of the cession of book debts (including future debts), 
cession of existing and future rights in securitatem debiti and factoring of existing and future rights. 
In these circumstances I am not inclined to hold that these decisions are wrong. 
 
The Court then held that the right to claim payment of the retention money was 
transferred to the bank when it came into being on 27 August 1990.124 The possibility 
of a cession of future rights in anticipando is therefore acknowledged by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. 
 The Court does not attempt to provide an explanation of how and why such a 
cession would be possible. I submit that the exposition by Scott125 of why the transfer 
of a future claim is possible, and the transfer of a future corporeal thing is not, makes 
sense. A corporeal thing can only be transferred after delivery, which is not possible 
before the thing is created. The method of transferring a future right facilitates the 
transfer of such rights in aniticipando, because the transfer is done through an 
agreement. Scott then argues that if this agreement is the sole requirement for the 
cession, it is regarded as a completed juristic act and it cannot be dissolved 
unilaterally by one of the parties. The parties are bound by their expressions of will. 
Since this construction of a cession of future rights was advanced by Scott, the 
Appellate Division, as it was then, confirmed in Botha v Fick that the agreement was 
the sole requirement for the transfer of the right during cession and that delivery of 
the document is not a substantive requirement.126 In so doing the only obstacle to the 
applicability of Scott‘s construction was removed. However, this construction has not 
yet been expressly approved by the Supreme Court of Appeal.127  
The difference between Scott‘s view and that of De Wet and Van Wyk set out 
above, is that in terms of the latter‘s view it is possible for the cedent to change his 
mind before the creation of the right. This is not possible in terms of Scott‘s 
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construction, since the parties are bound by their expressions of will.128 This 
distinction is crucial to commercial practice in general, but to securitisation in 
particular, since the financier, and in this case the SPV, will want the certainty that the 
transfer of the claims will take place when they are created. From this perspective 
Scott‘s construction is therefore also to be favoured. 
The Court in First National Bank of South Africa v Lynn is not clear on whether on 
materialisation the ceded right forms part of the estate of the cedent before transfer, or 
whether the claim is transferred to the estate of the cessionary directly. If the claim 
materialises in the estate of the cedent even for a moment during his insolvency, the 
claim will not be transferred to the cessionary, but will form part of the cedent‘s 
insolvent estate.129 This was not relevant to the particular case, because the cession 
was one in securitatem debiti. The Court used the pledge of claims construction of 
cession in securitatem debiti to hold that although the claim was still part of the estate 
of the cedent, the bank was a secured creditor of the insolvent estate.130  
For the claims to materialise in the estate of the cessionary, it must be possible to 
transfer an expectation (spes) of the materialisation of the right. There is no authority 
in South African law that a mere spes can be transferred131 and this was confirmed in 
the First National Bank of South Africa v Lynn decision. Joubert‘s argument in favour 
of the adoption of such a possibility therefore seems not be in favour with South 
African courts.132 This means that the claim will materialise in the estate of the cedent 
and will not pass if the cedent was in insolvent liquidation at that time. 
I do not believe that securitisation will benefit much from the acceptance of the 
transferability of a spes. Where future claims are securitised the possibility of the non-
materialisation of the future claims will be accounted for by the rating agencies and in 
the interest charged on the securities issued by the SPV. It must be accepted that the 
securitisation of such claims will carry more risk than would the securitisation of 
existing claims. In the event of the insolvency of the originator, the claims will not 
pass. The credit enhancements built into the securitisation scheme will take effect and 
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the SPV will have a concurrent claim against the estate of the originator for the 
unperformed part of the transfer agreement.133 
It is still uncertain whether the moment of transfer from an insolvency law point of 
view would be the date of the original cession agreement, or the date of the coming 
into being of the claim.134 These dates become important when the transfer of the 
claims to the SPV is attacked as a voidable disposition by the liquidators of the 
originator.135  
7.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPV AND SERVICER 
Securitisation Notice, 2008 defines ‗servicing agent‘ as an ―institution that acts as 
servicing agent in relation to the collection of the amounts due in terms of a 
traditional or synthetic securitisation scheme‖.136 The Notice further states that the 
retention of the servicing rights by the institution that transferred the assets to the 
special-purpose institution shall not constitute indirect control of the assets 
transferred.137 In American law continued control by the originator over the 
transferred assets is an important factor when considering the true nature of the 
transaction between the originator and the SPV.138  
 However, Securitisation Notice, 2008 does not provide any further guidance on the 
relationship between the SPV and servicer. Although it uses the word ‗agent‘, the 
Notice does not elaborate enough on the relationship between the SPV and the 
servicer to come to a definite conclusion that their relationship is exclusively one of 
agency. The legal relationship between the servicer and the SPV becomes especially 
important when the debtor is in default and the servicer wants to institute legal action 
against the debtor.  
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The nature of the relationship is determined with reference to the terms of the 
agreement between the servicer and the SPV. Depending on the terms of the 
agreement, the servicer may enforce the claims as representative of the SPV in the 
name of the SPV, or in its own name as cessionary for collecting purposes.139 I shall 
also consider whether it is possible for the servicer to collect the claims in its own 
name, whilst acting as an agent for the SPV. 140 
Before discussing these concepts in turn, it must be mentioned that payment by the 
debtor can only be made to the creditor or to the creditor‘s duly authorised 
representative. Payment is a legal act in terms of which the debtor discharges his 
obligation towards the creditor. It consists of the handing over of money together with 
an agreement to extinguish the debt.141 
Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of ‗mandate‘ and 
‗agency‘. Mandate is a form of contract whereby the mandatary is obliged to carry out 
certain instructions on behalf of the mandator.142 It is usual, but not necessary, that the 
mandatary is also an agent of the mandator. An agent is entitled, on behalf of his 
principal, to enter into, vary, or terminate a specified contractual relationship or 
contractual obligations of a specified class, or contracts generally. The obligations and 
contracts will be those of the principal and not those of the agent.143 
Silke144 draws attention to a further distinction between mandate and agency, 
namely that mandate mainly concerns the relationship between the mandator and the 
mandatary, whereas agency implies that a contractual relationship will be created 
between the principal and a third party with the agent as the intermediary. 
In all three instances discussed below, the SPV (mandator) will enter into a 
contract of mandate with the servicer (mandatary) in terms of which the servicer will 
                                                 
139
 See Scott 2002 SA Merc LJ at 497. 
140
 Referred to in German law as Einziehungsermächtigung and in Dutch law as lasthebber ter incasso. 
See Scott 2002 SA Merc LJ at 497. 
141
 See Scott 2002 SA Merc LJ at 496. 
142
 DJ Joubert & DH van Zyl ―Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio‖ in WA Joubert et al The Law of South 
Africa Vol 17 (1999) at 3; Kerr Agency at 12. See also Susan Scott ―Regsfigure, Regsdogmatiek, 
Regsgeskiedenis, Regsvergelyking en die Bedoeling van Regsubjekte‖ in Eric Dirix, Walter Pintens, 
Patrick Senaeve & Sophie Stijns Liber Amicorum Jacques Herbots (2002) at 359; Joubert 
Kredietfaktorering at 388–400. 
143
 Kerr Agency at 4. 
144
 Jonathan M Silke De Villiers & MacIntosh: The Law of Agency in South Africa 3 ed (1981)  at 10–
11.  
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
346 
be obliged to collect the debts due to the SPV.145 In terms of section 20(7) of the    
Debt Collectors Act,146 money collected by a debt collector and deposited in a separate 
trust account with a bank, as required by the Act, does not form part of the assets of 
the debt collector.147 Regardless then of the form of the agreement between the SPV 
and the servicer, there is a measure of protection provided by the Act after the claims 
have been collected. However, the claims will form part of the assets of the servicer 
before collection, if the claims were ceded to the servicer for collecting purposes. If 
the servicer is declared insolvent after cession but before collection of these claims, 
the claims will form part of its estate and the SPV will only have a concurrent claim 
against the insolvent estate for the proceeds of the claim. 
7.3.1 Servicer as representative of SPV 
The agreement between the SPV and the servicer may provide that the servicer acts as 
an agent or representative of the SPV as principal. It acts in the name and on behalf of 
the principal and obtains no interest in the claims themselves.148 There must be close 
co-operation between the representative and the principal for this arrangement to 
work efficiently.149 
In the context of securitisation the debtor will usually not be notified that the claim 
against him has been transferred to the SPV. For purposes of extra-judicial debt 
collection, the SPV will grant the servicer the authority to collect the debts from the 
debtor. The servicer must account to the SPV for the money collected. Payment to the 
servicer as the duly authorised representative of the SPV will extinguish the debt 
owed by the debtor. Such payment terminates the debtor‘s obligation towards the 
SPV. 
 If the debt cannot be enforced extra-judicially and legal action must be instituted 
against the debtor, the servicer will have to institute proceedings on behalf of the SPV 
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as its principal.150 The servicer is not the legal holder of the claims against the debtor 
and therefore has no standing on its own to institute proceedings. However, in Hippo 
Quarries (TVL) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley the Supreme Court of Appeal has expressed an 
obiter opinion that a mandate to collect claims on behalf of a principal and cession of 
the claims for collecting purposes may overlap and co-exist.151 It will depend on the 
terms of the agreement between the SPV and the servicer whether such a cession was 
intended.152 
7.3.2 Servicer as mandatary in rem suam of SPV 
Initially, it was not possible in Roman law to cede a claim. However, the same result 
was achieved by giving a mandate to a person to institute proceedings as 
representative of a mandator to collect the mandator‘s claim from the debtor. The 
parties could further agree that the mandatary would collect the claim for his own 
benefit, in which case the mandatary was a procurator in rem suam. Roman law 
afforded the procurator several advantages, one of which was that the mandate to 
collect the claim did not lapse on the death of the mandator and could not be revoked 
by the mandator. It was also not possible for the debtor to pay the mandator after the 
debtor received notice of the mandate. Modern law of cession developed from the 
practice of the procuratio in rem suam.153 
 Most commentators of South African law of agency agree that an agreement 
whereby the mandatary receives payment from the debtor and may keep the proceeds 
for himself usually amounts to a cession of the claims and therefore falls outside the 
sphere of the principles of agency.154  If the agreement between the parties does not 
amount to a cession of the claims, there is no reason why the consequences of the 
procuratio in rem suam, such as irrevocability, should follow automatically.155 
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 Scott156 argues that the procuratio in rem suam could still be used in South African 
law to achieve a similar result to the German institution of 
Einziehungsermächtigung.157 In her opinion, this could especially be useful during 
fiduciary security cessions where no notice is given to the debtor of the cession. The 
cedent collects the claims, keeps the proceeds and cedes other claims to the cessionary 
in the collected claims‘ place. Since the cedent keeps the proceeds for himself he has 
an interest in the collection of the claims, even though the claims were ceded to the 
cessionary. 
 Under the circumstances set out above the cedent will collect the claims in his own 
interest. This interest will probably be enough to lead to a presumption of 
irrevocability inter partes of the mandate to collect, whereas some authors158 are of the 
opinion that mere compensation for collection received by the cedent will not be a 
sufficient interest to lead to irrevocability of the mandate. 
                                                 
156
 In Dirix et al Liber Amicorum at 359–361. 
157
 German law acknowledges the possibility of a mandator to instruct the mandatary to collect a claim 
in the name of the mandatary, while the claim itself remains in the estate of the mandator. 
Einziehungsermächtigung is not specifically provided for in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, but 
evolved in legal practice and gained recognition by the German courts over time. 
Einziehungsermächtigung has become especially important for the proper functioning of fiduciary 
security cessions. During fiduciary security cessions the debtors are usually not informed of the 
cession, but continue to pay the cedent as if he were the holder of the claims. In reality, the claims 
were ceded to the cessionary and are no longer part of the estate of the cedent. However, the 
cessionary grants the cedent the power to collect the claims in his own name as if he were still the 
legal holder of the claims. The agreement between the cedent and the cessionary will determine 
what must happen to the proceeds, but often the cedent will keep the proceeds and replace the 
collected claim with another claim. If the debtor finds out about the cession, the cedent can continue 
with the proceedings through the procedural remedy of gewillkürte Prozeβstandschaft. In terms of 
this remedy it is possible for the legal holder of the claim to empower the mandatary to collect in his 
own name, but in the interests of the mandator, as longs as the mandatary has an interest in the 
outcome of the proceedings. See in general Scott in Dirix et al Liber Amicorum at 351 et seq; Scott 
2002 SA Merc LJ at 498–501; Malan Collective Securities Depositories at 205–206; Joubert 
Kredietfaktorering at 286–287. 
158
 Joubert Verteenwoordigingsreg at 137: ―Dit is duidelik dat nie elke finansiële belang van die 
gevolmagtigde by die uitvoering van die volmag as sodanig [onherroeplik] beskou kan word nie; die 
geleentheid om vergoeding te verdien, is byvoorbeeld geen sodanige belang nie.‖ [It is clear that not 
every financial interest of the agent in the exercise of the authority should be considered as such 
[irrevocable]; the opportunity to earn compensation is for example not such an interest.]; Silke 
Agency at 619–620: ―… for any authority to be irrevocable, the authorized act must be one 
essentially, and not incidentally, for the benefit of the agent, so that ‗he can treat the transaction as 
his own, he shall be the dominating power, and anything requiring to be done in the matter shall be 
by his direction‘ (Van Niekerk v Van Noorden 17 SC 63 at 66) ... the mere fact that one result of the 
granting of the mandate is that it, incidentally, gives the agent the chance of earning commission 
does not render it a mandate coupled with an interest ... and hence such mandate is not irrevocable.‖ 
CHAPTER 7 TRANSFER OF CLAIMS AND THE „TRUE SALE‟ REQUIREMENT 
349 
If the cedent can collect the claims judicially in his own name, he would do so as 
an agent for an undisclosed principal.159 This would mean that the doctrine of the 
undisclosed principal is extended to procedural law. 
 The general rule in South African law is that an agent cannot sue personally for a 
debt due to his principal.160 Exceptions are where161 
 the contract purports to be a contract personally with the agent; 
 the agent is the only known or ostensible principal; 
 by the usage of trade or in the general course of business the agent is authorised to 
act as owner or as principal contracting party, although his character as agent is 
known; 
 the agent has a special interest in the property, the subject matter of the contract, 
whether he professed at the time of concluding the contract to act as agent or not; 
and/or 
 the contract contains a special stipulation that the agent may sue personally to 
enforce the contract. 
 
Most of these exceptions rest on the premise that the agent entered into the contract 
giving rise to the claims that he now wants to enforce on behalf of the principal.162 If 
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the agent incurs liability on the contract, as is the case when he acts for an undisclosed 
principal,163 he can usually also sue on the contract.164 For many debt collectors this 
will not be true. They will be instructed to collect the debts after the debts have come 
into existence. However, the premise is true of the cedent who is given a mandate by 
the cessionary to collect the debts on the cessionary‘s behalf. Until the debtor is 
informed of the cession, the only person the debtor knows to be his creditor is the 
cedent. The cession will be valid even if the debtor is not informed.165 This is also true 
for fiduciary security cessions.166 
The majority of South African case law refuses to allow an agent to institute 
proceedings in his own name. In Clark v Van Rensburg167 the Court accepted the 
possibility for a cedent to continue with an action in his own name but as the agent for 
the cessionary as undisclosed principal. The Court held that:168  
 
Such a course is perfectly proper. It does not run counter to public interest and cannot prejudice the 
applicant in his capacity as contingent debtor of the cedent. He simply continues to deal with the 
cedent as his opponent and to look to his credit, such as it is, for any judgment or order for costs 
which may be granted to him by the Court. If the cessionaries are prepared to run the risk involved 
in such a course they should in my opinion not be obliged to disclose their existence to the debtor. 
 
The Court held that it made no difference whether the cession took place before or 
after litis contestatio.169 In Waikiwi Shipping Co Ltd v Thomas Barlow and Sons 
(Natal) Ltd170 the Appellate Division, as it was then, held that a plaintiff could not 
transfer a right to prosecute action after litis contestatio, unless the Court sanctioned 
the transfer by a substitution of plaintiffs. If no application was made for substitution, 
the cedent remained the proper plaintiff and the cession only took effect between the 
cedent and the cessionary after the outcome of the litigation.171 In an obiter dictum the 
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Court expressed its doubt about the soundness of the extension of the doctrine of the 
undisclosed principal in contract law to procedural law, as was done in Clark v Van 
Rensburg.172 
 Kotsopoulos v Bilardi173 concerned the cession of certain claims to the plaintiff in 
settlement of the cedent‘s indebtedness. The cession agreement provided that Walter 
Goldberg Trust Ltd was to be appointed the plaintiff‘s agent ―irrevocably and in rem 
suam‖ to collect and distribute the money owing in terms of the ceded claims.174 The 
plaintiff claimed the money owing in terms of the ceded claim. The defendant‘s 
second exception was on the basis that only Walter Goldberg Trust Ltd had locus 
standi to sue on the ceded claim.175 
The Court held that a mandate to receive money from a debtor of the principal is 
only irrevocable in the sense that the agent may sue the principal for damages if the 
mandate is revoked.176 If the mandate was not coupled with a cession of the right, the 
principal could revoke it and sue for the amount owing.177 However, in the Court‘s 
opinion the facts under consideration amounted not only to a mandate to collect the 
money owing, but also to a cession by the plaintiff of the claims to Walter Goldberg 
Trust Ltd. Consequently, only Walter Goldberg Trust Ltd could sue and the exception 
was upheld.178 
The Kotsopolous decision briefly referred to the possibility that in certain 
circumstances a cedent may enforce the ceded action in his own name, but as agent on 
behalf of the cessionary.179 However, since the case was not decided on this basis the 
comment is only obiter and therefore not clear authority for the acceptance of the 
principle that an agent could sue in his own name. 
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 In Sentrakoop Handelaars Bpk v Lourens180 the Court did not follow the Clark 
decision, holding that an agent could only sue on behalf of an undisclosed principal if 
the agent also contracted on behalf of the undisclosed principal.181 The Court held that 
it was undesirable for an agent to sue in his own name on behalf of a principal.182 The 
only reason the Court advanced for such undesirability was that it could create 
confusion as to who is responsible for costs.183 However, as was referred to in the 
Clark decision quoted above, the cedent will be responsible for the costs and this 
should really not be a problem.184 
 Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v Eli Lilly (SA) (Pty) Ltd (FBC Holdings (Pty) 
Ltd, Third Party)185 followed the reasoning in Sentrakoop and rejected the Clarke 
decision.186 The Court consequently held that a plaintiff who ceded his claim before 
instituting action could not sue in his own name as agent for the cessionary.187 
 In Myburgh v Walters NO188 the Court indicated that it preferred the Sentrakoop 
and Eli Lilly decisions to the decision in Clarke.189 However, the Myburgh case was 
decided with reference to the wording of section 32(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act,190 
which only grants a creditor of an insolvent debtor the right to take proceedings in the 
name of the trustee if the latter fails to do so. On this basis the Court held that the 
person who instituted the proceedings must have a claim against the insolvent estate. 
In this case, it was not alleged that the agent was the holder of the claim. In fact, the 
claim vested in the trustee of the agent‘s insolvent estate and the agent therefore could 
not institute proceedings on the basis of section 32(1)(b).191 
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 Grinrod (Pty) Ltd v Seaman192 followed the decision in Eli Lilly and held that after 
cession the cessionary is obliged to take steps to substitute itself as the new party to 
the litigation. The cedent cannot continue the case on the cessionary‘s behalf.193 
 From these cases it is clear that South African courts are generally sceptical about 
the possibility of an agent instituting proceedings in his own name on behalf of an 
undisclosed principal. Furthermore, the courts are not too keen on the extension of the 
doctrine of the undisclosed principal to other areas of the law. In Cullinan v 
Noordkaaplandse Aartappelkernmoerkwekers Koöperasie Bpk194 the Appellate 
Division held that because the doctrine of the undisclosed principal is of questionable 
validity in South African law, its application should not be extended.195  
7.3.2.1 Application to relationship between servicer and SPV 
As South African law currently stands the courts are not in favour of allowing an 
agent to institute proceedings in his own name by extending the doctrine of the 
undisclosed principal to procedural law.196 Even if in future the Supreme Court of 
Appeal holds that a procuratio in rem suam could still have application in our law 
beside the cession of a claim, it is doubtful whether the earning of a fee or 
commission would be a large enough interest to qualify the servicer as a procurator.197 
 I therefore submit that the servicer will have to take a cession of the claims for 
collecting purposes if it is to institute legal proceedings in its own name. 
7.3.3 Servicer as cessionary for collecting purposes 
A claim can be ceded for purposes of collection.198 The cession is coupled with a 
fiduciary agreement199 that the cessionary, who will collect payment in his own name, 
                                                 
192
 1998 (2) SA 355 (C). 
193
 At 354D–G. 
194
 1972 (1) SA 761 (A) at 770D–F. See also De Wet & Wanda in Joubert et al LAWSA at par 223. 
195
 This view is shared by Van Heerden 1995 SALJ at 382. For a summary of the main points of 
criticism against the doctrine in South African law, see Van der Horst Undisclosed Principal at 107–
114; De Wet & Wanda in Joubert et al LAWSA at par 223. 
196
 See also Susan Scott ―Object of Cession‖ 2000 TSAR at 777. 
197
 See n 158. 
198
 Hippo Quarries (TVL) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley 1992 (1) SA 867 (A) at 875G; Scott 2002 SA Merc LJ at 
501–503; Malan Collective Securities Depositories at 204–205. After the decision in Skjelbreds 
Rederi A/S v Hartless (Pty) Ltd 1982 (2) SA 710 (A) some feared that cessions for collecting 
purposes would always be considered simulated (see David Dyzenhaus ―Peregrines go Home‖ 
(1982) 99 SALJ at 540 and Nereus Joubert ―Plus Valet Quod Agitur Quam Quod Simulate 
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
354 
will account to the cedent for the proceeds so collected.200 The cessionary claims as 
creditor of the claim and locus standi is therefore not at issue.  
 After the cession of the claim to the servicer, it is the creditor of the debtor. The 
legal position between the cessionary and the debtor is determined by the law of 
cession.201 The mandate between the servicer and the SPV, in terms of which the 
servicer must account to the SPV for the proceeds collected, is of no concern to third 
parties. The claim will no longer form part of the SPV‘s estate. If the debtor has a 
claim against the servicer, the claim can be set-off against the claim payable in terms 
of the ceded debt. 
 The validity of a cession for collecting purposes has not often been considered by 
South African courts.202 However, at least one decision of the Appellate Division, as it 
was then, held that a cession effected so that the cessionary could collect the debt for 
the ultimate benefit of the cedent, is valid. In Hippo Quarries (TVL) (Pty) Ltd v 
Eardley203 the defendant entered into a suretyship agreement with the plaintiff. Owing 
to an administrative error, a fellow-subsidiary of the plaintiff was the creditor of the 
claim that was to be secured by the suretyship. It was then agreed that the claim 
would be ceded to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff would proceed with recovering 
the debt from the defendant in terms of the suretyship agreement. The plaintiff would 
then account to the cedent for the money collected. The defendant argued that this 
transaction was simulated and that it was not the true intention between the parties to 
cede the claim. 
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 The Court rejected an argument by the defendant that the cession should be held to 
be invalid because the plaintiff did not gain any direct benefit from it.204 The 
defendant based this argument on a passage from Kotsopoulos v Bilardi.205 The Court 
held that the dictum referred to by the defendant meant that the transaction would not 
be a cession if, according to its tenor, the right which the agent was to enforce did not 
vest in him. The cession was not assailable simply because the ultimate benefit will 
go to the cedent.206 
 The Court then considered whether the fact that the cession had the effect of 
converting an unsecured claim into a secured claim would, in the light of the decision 
in Skjelbreds Rederi A/S v Hartless (Pty) Ltd,207 lead to a conclusion of simulation. 
The Court held that the matter in Hippo Quarries was distinguishable from that in 
Skjelbreds Rederi. In the latter case the aim was to circumvent a legal impediment or 
disability, namely to enable a peregrinus to attach the property of another peregrinus 
ad fundandam jurisidictionem when he is not entitled by law to do so.208 In Hippo 
Quarries the impediment was one of fact rather than law, namely that the claim did 
not vest in the same person in whose favour the suretyship was granted. 
 The Court concluded its enquiry into the question of simulation with the following 
remarks:209 
 
To cede the claim because the cessionary, for whatever legitimate reason, was better poised to 
collect it than the cedent was not intrinsically wrong. Motive and purpose differ from intention. If 
the purpose of the parties is unlawful, immoral or against public policy, the transaction will be 
ineffectual even if the intention to cede is genuine. That is a principle of law. Conversely, if their 
intention to cede is not genuine because the real purpose of the parties is something other than 
cession, their ostensible transaction will likewise be ineffectual. That is because the law disregards 
simulation. But where, as here, the purpose is legitimate and the intention is genuine, such 
intention, all other things being equal, will be implemented. 
 
I discuss simulated transactions in South African law in more detail in the next 
section. However, for determining the legal relationship between the servicer and the 
SPV two principles can be drawn from the Hippo Quarries decision. First, this 
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decision is authority that collection will be a valid causa for the cession of a claim in 
South African law.210 Second, as long as the transaction reflects the true intention 
between the parties and does not aim to achieve a goal to which there is a legal bar, 
the court will give effect to the agreement and will not hold it to be a simulated act. 
 Where a person other than the originator acts as servicer to the securitisation 
scheme, the cession of the claims will always be a new cession unrelated to the initial 
cession of the claims from the originator to the SPV. Where the originator continues 
to act as servicer the claims can fall back to the originator by way of the fulfillment of 
the resolutive condition that the debtor defaults. Alternatively, the claims may be 
transferred by way of a new cession that bears no relation to the initial cession of the 
claims by the originator to the SPV. I submit that, bearing in mind the possibility of a 
future attack of the transaction as a simulation, it is preferable to formulate the cession 
as a new cession rather than as a resolutive condition in the sales agreement. 
 The resolutive condition in the original contract of sale will be to the effect that on 
default by the debtor that leads to the necessity of litigation to enforce the claim, the 
contract will be cancelled in respect of those individual claims by virtue of mutual 
agreement between the parties. This was referred to in Johnson v Incorporated 
General Insurance Ltd211 as a resolutive agreement. There must also be a transfer 
agreement, which may be included in the resolutive agreement.212 
 In my opinion, there are two reasons why such a resolutive condition should be 
avoided. First, I submit that it might not comply with paragraph 4(2)(b)(ii) of 
Securitisation Notice, 2008, which prohibits any obligation on the side of the 
originator to retain the risk associated with the transferred assets. The resolutive 
condition will emanate from the original contract of sale and will essentially be an 
agreement to cancel on non-performance. This will in my opinion amount to an 
assumption of risk by the originator. Second, the assumption of risk may point 
towards a simulated intention between the parties.213 
 I therefore prefer that the cession to the servicer for collecting purposes must be 
contained in the servicing agreement. The agreement will be to the effect that under 
                                                 
210
 For a more detailed discussion of this requirement in the context of collection of claims, see Scott 
2002 SA Merc LJ at 503 et seq, and for cession generally, see Scott Cession at 79 et seq and 264. 
211
 1983 (1) 318 (A) at 332F–333A. 
212
 See Scott Cession at 54–57. 
213
 See the discussion below. 
CHAPTER 7 TRANSFER OF CLAIMS AND THE „TRUE SALE‟ REQUIREMENT 
357 
appropriate circumstances the servicer will inform the SPV of the need to institute 
legal action against the debtor. The service agreement will be the obligationary 
agreement. The service agreement may also contain the transfer agreement. The SPV 
must then see to it that the claims in question are ceded to the servicer for the purpose 
of collection. This could entail the co-operation of the trustee for debenture-holders, 
or the security SPV, if the claims were ceded by way of a fiduciary security cession in 
favour of the investors in the SPV. It is very important that the legal holder of the 
claim acts as the cedent, otherwise the claims cannot be validly ceded and the servicer 
will not have locus standi to institute the proceedings. 
7.4 SIMULATED TRANSACTIONS 
One form of contract can achieve more than one economic result.214 The economic 
result that an originator wants to achieve by means of a securitisation scheme is 
financing. The securitisation scheme effects this financing by way of a sales 
transaction of assets of the originator to the SPV. The scheme depends on the validity 
of this sale agreement and the transfer of the assets to the SPV. A ‗true sale‘ legally 
removes the assets from the estate of the originator. These assets are insulated from 
the risk of a downturn in the business prospects of the originator and from the 
originator‘s insolvency. The insulation from the originator leads to a better credit 
rating than what a direct issue of securities by the originator could achieve. The 
higher rating leads to better interest rates. If it is successfully argued before a court 
that the transaction between the originator and the SPV was not a sale but rather a 
secured loan, the insulation from the originator will be lost and with it all the benefits 
of securitisation. 
 Certainly, the more traditional form of contract by which financing is obtained is 
one of loan. The question is to what extent the law allows parties to choose the form 
of contract that they want to use to achieve a specific lawful result.215 
 Generally, the characterisation of a contract is determined by whether a contract 
contains the essential elements of that particular contract.216 The essential elements do 
not include the typical economic object of such contracts. It is therefore possible to 
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achieve more than one economic object with a particular contract and the same 
economic object by more than one form of contract.217 
 The parties involved in a securitisation scheme make no secret of the fact that they 
wish to put the transferred assets beyond the reach of the creditors of the originator. If 
the transaction between the originator and the SPV was one of loan and the assets 
served as security for that loan, the assets would remain in the estate of the originator 
if they were given in pledge. By selling and transferring the assets to the SPV the 
assets are permanently removed from the estate of the originator. 
 English courts give effect to the written contract between the parties, regardless of 
the economic outcome of the transaction. Most English authors agree that the risk of 
recharacterisation in English law is therefore very small.218 The risk of 
recharacterisation is greater in the United States of America, because the 
characterisation of transactions is governed by state law where courts make such 
determinations by means of their equitable powers. Predominantly, courts make use 
of a scoring technique to determine whether a transaction is a sale or a loan. In other 
words, they look at how many attributes of a sale the transaction shows and compare 
that to the number of attributes of a loan the transaction shows to come to a 
conclusion.219  
 Despite concerns over recharacterisation in the United States of America, no 
securitisation transaction has yet been recharacterised and authors make use of case 
law relating to factoring to gauge the risk of recharacterisation for securitisation. The 
comparison with factoring makes sense, since factoring shares with securitisation the 
main ingredients of a possible recharacterisation:220 both have financing as an 
economic objective and both are formulated as sale agreements when the more 
traditional transaction to achieve the financing goal would be a loan transaction. As in 
the United States of America, there has not yet been any recharacterisation of a 
securitisation transaction in South Africa. 
 The discussion below focuses on the approach of South African courts towards 
finding that a contract was simulated and then recharacterising the contract as the one 
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which, in the court‘s opinion, was truly intended by the parties to the agreement. I pay 
specific attention to the risk of recharacterisation of factoring agreements. 
7.4.1 Simulated transactions in South African law 
A simulated or disguised transaction was described as follows in Commissioner of 
Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson, Ltd:221 
 
In essence it [a disguised transaction] is a dishonest transaction: dishonest, in as much as the parties 
to it do not really intend it to have, inter partes, the legal effect which its terms convey to the 
outside world. The purpose of the disguise is to deceive by concealing what is the real agreement or 
transaction between the parties … before the Court can find that a transaction is in fraudem legis in 
the above sense,
222
 it must be satisfied that there is some unexpressed agreement or tacit 
understanding between the parties. If this were not so, it could not find that the ostensible 
agreement is a pretence. The blurring of this distinction between an honest transaction devised to 
avoid the provisions of a statute and a transaction falling within the prohibitory or taxing provisions 
of a statute but disguised to make it appear as if it does not, gives rise to much of the confusion 
which sometimes appears to accompany attempts to apply the maxim quoted above.  
 
The overriding principle is therefore that the true intention of the parties must be 
determined.223 This implies that the court will not hold a contract to be simulated if the 
contract contains clauses not typically associated with that particular kind of contract, 
as long as the parties intended it to have those consequences. However, as Joubert 
correctly points out,224 in practice it may become difficult to distinguish between the 
two instances set out by the Court in the dictum above. The courts tend to construe 
irregular clauses as showing simulation, especially if there is a sentiment that the 
transaction ought not to be allowed due to policy considerations.225 Ultimately South 
African courts, just like the courts in the United States of America, tend to determine 
the true nature of a transaction by means of a ‗checklist‘. 
 Joubert suggests that the determination of whether a court should allow the 
avoidance of certain legal consequences by shaping a transaction in another legal 
form should be done in stages. First, the court should determine whether the 
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transaction is lawful (geoorloofd), which incorporates concepts such as boni mores 
and the public interest.226 Separately from this enquiry, the court should determine 
whether the contract between the parties complies with the essential elements of the 
contract that it purports to be.227 If it does, the court should ask whether it is possible 
to reconcile the extraordinary elements of the contract with the essential elements. If 
this is possible, Joubert argues that the enquiry should stop there.228 It should no 
longer be possible to argue that the extraordinary terms or objective of the contract 
shows that the parties did not intend to enter into the contract it purports to be. 
If the court finds that the parties really intended a loan agreement rather than a 
sale, the contract will be regarded as a loan in terms of the maxim plus valet quod 
agitur quam qoud simulate concipitur.229 The following factors have been considered 
by the South African courts to be indicative of an intention to enter into a loan rather 
than a sale:230 
 The wording of the written agreement will not be conclusive as to the intention of 
the parties, but terminology in the agreement that is more indicative of a loan 
agreement than of a sale will be taken into account.231 
 Some decisions took into account the objective of the transaction as an indication 
of simulation.232 However, the majority of decisions held that this was only one 
factor to consider,233 or even that it ought not to be considered at all.234 
 Several factual circumstances before and after the contract was entered into may 
show possible simulation. Examples of such circumstances include the continued 
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collection of claims by the cedent,235 the fact that a seller of a promissory note was 
held liable for the default of the drawer and that the buyer therefore did not 
assume any risk236 and the fact that a buyer did not intend to make use of the 
purchased thing.237 Reflecting the transaction as a sale in the seller‘s financial 
records will not lead to a conclusion that the parties intended a sale.238 However, if 
the transaction is reflected as a loan in the seller‘s financial records it will be an 
indication of simulation.239 
 When certain terms are found in a contract and those terms are usually not 
associated with that kind of contract, it is seen as a factor that points towards 
simulation.240 The following terms are considered suspicious by South African 
courts when they appear in sale contracts:241 
o Although there is no legal requirement that the purchase price must be 
determined in a specific manner,242 the purchase price is usually determined 
with reference to the market value of the sold asset. When the purchase price 
is determined with reference to other factors, such as the financing 
requirements of the seller, this may be seen as a factor that could indicate 
simulation.243 
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o Limitations on the buyer‘s entitlement to make use of and enjoy the 
purchased asset, or to dispose of it, are suspicious.244 Such limitations are 
associated with pledge as a form of security, rather than with a sale. 
o Terms that allow the seller to repurchase the asset in specified circumstances 
are regarded as suspicious, especially if there are other factors present that 
are also suspicious.245 Usually, an asset given in pledge must be returned to 
the pledgor after he has paid the secured debt. 
o It is considered suspicious in a purchase of claims when the seller guarantees 
that the debtor will perform.246 This is only the case when the buyer looks 
primarily to the seller for performance on the claims and not, firstly, to the 
debtors.247 Joubert248 warns that factoring with recourse, coupled with the 
continued collecting of the claims by the seller, could lead to the 
recharacterisation of the transaction as a loan. Although the author does not 
specifically state in which capacity such collection by the seller must take 
place for suspicion to follow, I assume that it would be in the form of a 
resolutive condition in the sale agreement or a cession for collecting 
purposes. If the seller collects as an agent for the buyer, it is essentially still 
the buyer who enforces that claim as principal. 
7.4.2 Application to securitisation 
A creditor, or the originator‘s liquidator, may attempt to convince a court that the 
contract between the originator and the SPV was not a sale of claims, but a loan with 
the claims as security objects. The essential elements of a contract of sale were set out 
above.249 The essential elements of a contract of loan are the following:250 
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 The lender must give control of the asset and its use and enjoyment to the 
borrower. 
 The borrower must undertake to give the same asset or similar assets back to the 
lender. ‗Similar assets‘ in the context of money-lending will refer to legal tender 
as defined in the South African Reserve Bank Act.251 Claims and promissory notes 
are not legal tender in terms of this definition. If the contract stipulates that in 
return for the money lending the lender must accept claims or promissory notes, 
this will prima facie not constitute a contract of loan but rather a contract of 
sale.252 
 The borrower must be granted some time to use and enjoy the borrowed asset 
before being obliged to return it to the lender. 
 
If the contract between the originator and the SPV was one of loan, it will be a 
money-lending transaction. The SPV will be the lender and the originator will be the 
borrower. On a first reading it seems as if the second of the essential elements of a 
loan contract will not be met during a typical securitisation transaction, because the 
originator and the SPV will agree from the start that the SPV will receive claims in 
return for money. However, this distinction is illusory. 
 Claims are turned into money the moment that the debtor performs in terms of the 
underlying agreement. If the originator continues to serve as servicer during a 
securitisation transaction, the originator will continually transfer the money received 
from the debtors to the SPV. Depending on the construction of their servicing 
agreement, the servicer/originator may also be the legal holder of the claims when 
they are ceded to it for purposes of judicial collection. This whole situation is 
aggravated if the servicer/originator undertakes to replace non-performing claims with 
similar claims, thereby undertaking the risk of non-performance of the claims. This 
creates the impression that the SPV is not truly exercising any of its entitlements to 
the claims, but only becomes involved after it has received the proceeds of the claims. 
                                                                                                                                            
250
 Joubert Kredietfaktorering at 353–355. On the contract of loan in general, see DJ Joubert & JJ 
Henning ―Loan‖ in WA Joubert et al The Law of South Africa Vol 15 Part 2 2 ed (2008) at 172 et 
seq. 
251
 90 of 1989, s 17: gold coins and notes of the South African Reserve Bank up to any amount, coins 
of one rand or higher up to fifty rand, coins of ten cents up to and including fifty cents up to five 
rand, and coins of five cents or less up to fifty cents. See also Christie & McFarlane Law of Contract 
at 412; Kerr Contract at 523. 
252
 Joubert Kredietfaktorering at 355. 
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
364 
 Securitisation Notice, 2008 states that a bank or an institution within a banking 
group may replace at its own discretion one asset transferred in terms of a traditional 
securitisation scheme, with another one of equivalent credit quality.253 The 
replacement of non-performing assets is specifically excluded from this provision. 
The Notice is silent on originators that are not banks and it therefore seems at first 
glance that they are free to arrange the replacement of assets as they please, without 
fear of non-compliance with the Notice. 
 One should further consider paragraph 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Notice, which provides 
that an originator shall be deemed to have maintained effective control over the 
transferred assets if the originator can repurchase the assets from the SPV in order to 
realise their benefits or is obliged to retain the risk relating to the transferred assets. 
This is a prohibited practice in terms of the Notice. The Notice draws a distinction 
between the repurchase of assets and the replacement of assets in that it allows the 
replacement of assets in certain circumstances. An originator is not allowed to take an 
asset back in return for a money payment, but may swap a previously transferred asset 
for another one of equal credit quality. 
 I submit that the provision relating to the repurchase of assets in the end amounts 
to the ability of the originator to assume the risk associated with the transferred asset, 
without that ability amounting to a duty. The first and second parts of paragraph 
4(2)(b)(ii) therefore basically state the same rule. This rule is that an originator will be 
deemed to have maintained control over the transferred assets if it can, or is obliged, 
to assume the risk associated with the transferred asset. 
 Paragraph 4(2)(b)(ii) is binding on both bank and non-bank originators.254 I 
therefore submit that although there is nothing in the Notice to prohibit a non-bank 
originator to replace a non-performing asset with another asset, such a provision in the 
obligationary agreement will amount to an ability or duty on the side of the originator 
to assume the risk associated with the asset. This will lead to a presumption that the 
originator has maintained control over the asset or assets, which is prohibited.   
 Control has been held to be an important indicator of a simulated transaction in the 
United States of America.255 Risk assumption and control are also seen by Joubert256 as 
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major risks for the characterisation of factoring transactions as loan agreements rather 
than contracts of sale. I therefore submit that such provisions possibly could be 
considered by the courts as showing an intention between the parties that the 
originator should retain the risk and control over the assets when the debtors do not 
perform. Such a consequence is more akin to a loan agreement than one of sale and 
may be one of the factors that could sway a court to hold that a securitisation 
transaction was simulated. 
 However, in general, I submit that the risk of recharacterisation of a securitisation 
transaction, when measured against the factors that have emerged from case law on 
simulation, is limited:257 
 The parties to the securitisation scheme truly intend to conclude a contract of sale 
and do their utmost to ensure that consequence. It is the only means by which they 
can achieve their ultimate economic objective,258 namely to gain financing at a 
better interest rate than the originator could obtain without the insulation of the 
assets from its enterprise. 
 Owing to the limiting provisions of Securitisation Notice, 2008, traditional 
securitisation schemes in South Africa are prohibited from making use of 
repurchase agreements during the transaction. As explained above,259 I am of the 
opinion that this also applies to the replacement of non-performing claims by non-
bank originators. Therefore the similarity that some previously recharacterised 
transactions showed with pledge does not apply to traditional securitisation 
transactions. 
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 Securitisation does not have the effect of converting a previously unsecured debt 
into a secured debt, thereby affecting the interests of other creditors. It can 
therefore be distinguished from cases such as Zandberg v Van Zyl260 and Vasco 
Dry Cleaners v Twycross.261 
 In most of the case law that allowed for the recharacterisation of the assets 
transferred in terms of the purported sale, the assets were movable corporeals and 
not claims. Furthermore, the seller mostly remained in control of the transferred 
assets.262 The policy consideration behind finding such transactions simulated, lies 
in the lack of publicity of the transfer of ownership in terms of the sale. It is 
argued that the creditors of the purported seller are potentially prejudiced, because 
they have no way of knowing that the assets no longer fall in the estate of the 
seller when they extend credit to him. I submit that the same argument cannot be 
made out in the case of securitisation. First, the estate of the originator is not 
impoverished by the sale of the assets to the SPV. The originator is paid for the 
transfer of the claims to the SPV, so that one asset (the claim) is simply replaced 
by another (money). Second, in South African law there is no physical manner, 
comparable to delivery or registration of corporeal things, in which to publicise 
the transfer of claims to third parties. It is therefore doubtful whether the transfer 
of claims during securitisation could be questioned on this basis. 
 The SPV becomes the legal holder of the claims without restriction. Cession for 
collecting purposes ought not to be drafted as a resolutive condition in the contract 
of sale, but must be formulated and administered within the service agreement 
between the SPV and servicer, and possibly the security SPV. As such, it should 
stand apart from the original transfer of the claims and should not be a factor 
during a consideration of the characterisation. 
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 The SPV intends to become owner and to make use of the transferred claims by 
using them as security for the issuing of debt securities. The SPV may even 
transfer the claims to the security SPV if it decides to make use of a fiduciary 
security cession. It can therefore not be said that the SPV does not intend to make 
use of the transferred claims. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
There are two necessary agreements between the originator and the SPV to transfer 
the claims to the SPV. The first is an obligationary agreement in the form of a 
contract of sale.263 The second is the transfer agreement. The contract of sale provides 
the justa causa for the transfer agreement.264 Owing to the operation of the abstract 
system of the transfer of rights in South African law, the invalidity of the contract of 
sale will not affect the transfer of the claims to the SPV. Should the SPV be declared 
insolvent under such circumstances, the investors will have secured claims against the 
insolvent estate of the SPV, whereas the originator will have a concurrent claim 
against the insolvent estate based on unjust enrichment. 
 The transfer agreement between the originator and the SPV can either take the 
form of delegation or of cession. Although delegation is the form implied by 
Securitisation Notice, 2008,265 I submit that cession lends itself much better to the 
objectives of a traditional securitisation scheme. 
 The reasons why I prefer cession to delegation are the following:266 
 The debtor must not only be informed of the transfer during delegation, but must 
also give his consent for the substitution of his debtor for another party. If the 
original agreement was in writing and contained a standard non-variation clause, 
the written agreement will have to be substituted for a new one. This has 
administrative, time-delay and cost implications.  
 Delegation is a form of novation, which means that the original claims are 
terminated and replaced by the new agreement. Owing to the accessory nature of 
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real security rights and suretyship, these rights will terminate along with the 
claims. 
 The SPV may be unable to perform the duties transferred to it, because of the 
limitations stated in its objects clause.  
 The duties transferred to the SPV may render the SPV vulnerable to insolvency, 
because it is not supposed to engage in business outside of the securitisation 
scheme. An example is the securitisation of operating leases of equipment. Such 
leases usually entail that the lessor, which will be the SPV after transfer, remains 
responsible for maintenance of the equipment. 
 The use of covering bonds during securitisation sheds particular light on the 
problems associated with the transfer of duties to the SPV.267 I conclude that the 
requirements of the Deeds Registries Act268 and Securitisation Notice, 2008 lead to 
the situation that both the rights and duties between the originator and the debtor 
will have to be transferred to the SPV to register a valid cession of the covering 
bond. The SPV will usually not meet the capital requirements of a credit provider. 
Ideally, it should be possible for the originator to remain responsible for the duties 
towards the debtor and to only cede the claims against the debtor to the SPV. 
 
The peremptory language used in Securitisation Notice, 2008 to require that both 
rights and duties must be transferred to the SPV, thereby implying that the transfer of 
the assets must be in the form of delegation, is unfortunate. It ought to be possible for 
an originator to transfer the claims arising from the underlying transactions, but to 
remain liable for any outstanding duties, and to still qualify for the exemption 
provided for by the Notice. The current wording of the Notice suggests that cession 
alone will only be acceptable for the transfer of the assets to the SPV when the 
originator owes no further duties to the debtor. This does not serve the aims of the 
originator, who wants to acquire financing whilst maintaining a business relationship 
with its debtors. 
 There are few obstacles in the South African law of cession to its use during 
securitisation. However, if ever the legislature decides to codify the law of cession 
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due consideration should be given to the use of cession to transfer claims during 
securitisation. 
Cession is effected in South African law through agreement alone. Delivery of the 
document that evidences a claim is not a requirement for the cession of such a 
claim.269 This is the case also if the transferred assets are securities. The parties to a 
transfer of securities can agree that the seller will remain the registered holder of the 
securities. In such a case the seller must inform the company every three months of 
the persons on behalf of whom he holds securities.270 The beneficial owners of 
securities are also listed in a register, which is open for public inspection. It cannot be 
argued that third parties are harmed by non-registration of the interests of a beneficial 
owner. If the parties agree that the purchaser must be registered as holder of the 
securities, but for whatever reason the formalities for such registration have not been 
complied with, the court in my opinion has the discretion in terms of section 115(3) of 
the Companies Act271 to order the rectification of the register. 
 Notice to the debtor is not a requirement for cession in South African law, but 
before the debtor receives notice he may discharge his duty by payment to the 
cedent.272 This must be kept in mind if the originator does not act as servicer after the 
securitisation. 
 The potential of set-off of the claims of the debtor against the transferred claims,273 
as well as possible defences that the debtor may raise,274 must be kept in mind during 
the structuring phase of the securitisation scheme. Appropriate credit enhancement 
must be put in place to address the possibility of set-off and defences. 
 Since delegation is implied by Securitisation Notice, 2008 as the transfer 
agreement, it must be concluded that all accessory security rights held by the 
originator before transfer of the claims to the SPV cease to exist on transfer. I briefly 
considered the requirements for the transfer of security rights when the claims they 
secure are transferred to the SPV by means of cession. Provided that the requirements 
for the transfer of real rights are met, the transfer of mortgages and special notarial 
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bonds that secure the transferred claims ought not to pose major problems during 
securitisation.275 Suretyship follows the transferred claim automatically, unless 
specifically excluded.276 Consent of the pledgor is required for a transfer of claims 
given in a pledge of claims.277 However, the consequences of a transfer of covering 
bonds, where the originator continues its relationship with the debtors, are less 
certain.278 
 The registration of the transfer of the covering bond envisaged in section 52 seems 
to me to indicate a transfer of claims and duties, since it makes provision for future 
advances. As was set out in the list above, the SPV is not suited for the performance 
of duties outside the securitisation scheme. The splitting of the covering bond in 
favour of two creditors is not allowed by the Deeds Registries Act279 and, in my 
opinion, it should not be allowed for policy reasons. A splitting will increase the 
burden of the debtor, which he would not have foreseen if he consented to a transfer 
of the bond in the original agreement. 
 The solution to the problems surrounding covering bonds is that Securitisation 
Notice, 2008, should be amended so that it is possible to only cede claims to the SPV 
and not the duties that arise under an agreement. In such an event the originator could 
continue its relationship with its client. One of two options could then be employed 
with regard to the covering bond. The covering bond could remain with the originator 
and the claims as they result from the credit relationship could be ceded to the SPV. 
These claims will then be unsecured after transfer to the SPV. Otherwise, the 
originator could transfer the covering bond to the SPV and cede the claims to the SPV 
as they arise. The originator will no longer be secured by the bond, but the risk 
associated with the claims against the debtor is substantially less due to the 
securitisation. The bond itself will still cover the claims it was intended for up to the 
maximum as stated in terms of the requirements of the Deed Registries Act.280 
 For the transfer of non-accessory forms of security, such as fiduciary security 
cession of claims and retention of ownership in instalment sale agreements, a separate 
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agreement to transfer the security to the SPV is also needed. In such cases the 
originator will be entitled to transfer.281  
 The transfer of future claims is possible in South African law, but the basis of the 
recognition of such a possibility has not yet been set out by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.282 I agree with Scott‘s argument that the distinction lies in the fact that claims 
are not material and that their transfer is affected by agreement alone. Such an 
agreement is regarded as a completed juristic act and it cannot be dissolved 
unilaterally by one of the parties. The parties are bound by their expressions of will. 
 It remains unclear in South African law whether future claims first materialise in 
the estate of the cedent or whether they materialise in the estate of the cessionary 
directly. If the claims materialise in the estate of the cedent first, they will not pass to 
the cessionary if the cedent is insolvent at that stage. I argued that this should not pose 
too much of a problem to securitisation in South Africa, since the securitisation of 
future claims will always be more risky. The scheme will therefore make provision in 
its structure for the fact that the financial soundness of the originator still has some 
influence on the stability of the scheme. 
 I considered the relationship between the SPV and the servicer in depth.283 The 
SPV (mandator) will enter into a contract of mandate with the servicer (mandatary) in 
terms of which the servicer will be obliged to collect the debts due to the SPV. The 
agreement between the SPV and the servicer will determine whether this mandate will 
result in agency, a mandate in rem suam or a cession for collecting purposes.  
 If the servicer acts as an agent of the SPV, it can collect claims on behalf of the 
SPV extra-judicially without informing the debtor of the cession of the claims. 
However, when the claims are collected judicially the originator will have to act on 
behalf of the SPV as its agent; otherwise the SPV will have no standing.284  
 I considered whether it is possible for the servicer to institute proceedings in his 
own name on behalf of the SPV. The servicer will then act on behalf of an 
undisclosed principal.285 This will only be possible where the servicer was the 
originator of the scheme, because the doctrine only has application where the debtor 
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contracted with the agent only and was unaware of the principal. If the servicer is a 
third party, the debtor will of necessity be informed of the securitisation and of his 
new creditor. 
 A review of case law shows that South African courts are generally opposed to the 
possibility of allowing an agent to sue in his own name. The courts are also opposed 
to extending the doctrine of the undisclosed principal to other areas of the law, such as 
procedural law. It is therefore safer to cede the claims to the servicer for collecting 
purposes, if the servicer is to collect the claims in its own name. 
 If the servicer is not the originator of the scheme, the cession for collecting 
purposes is a new cession unrelated to the initial transfer of the claims to the SPV.286 
If the servicer was also the originator of the scheme, there are two possibilities. First, 
the cession could flow from a resolutive condition in the transfer agreement to the 
effect that on default by the debtor the transfer will be ineffective in respect of those 
individual claims by virtue of mutual agreement between the parties. Alternatively, 
the cession can be in terms of a clause in the servicing agreement to the effect that the 
claims will be ceded to the servicer when it needs to collect the claims judicially.
 There are two reasons why I am not in favour of a resolutive condition to provide 
the servicer with locus standi to collect the claims. It might not comply with 
paragraph 4(2)(b)(ii) of Securitisation Notice, 2008, which prohibits any duty on the 
side of the originator to retain the risk associated with the transferred assets. Second, 
the assumption of risk by the originator that acts as servicer creates the impression 
that the transfer of the claims was not in execution of a true sale. 
 Where the cession is a fresh cession for collecting purposes, the agreement to cede 
will be contained in the servicing agreement. The agreeement will provide that under 
appropriate circumstances the servicer will inform the SPV of the need to institute 
legal action against the debtor, after which the SPV will cede the claims to the 
servicer for collecting purposes. The servicing agreement will be the obligationary 
agreement and the causa of the cession will be to collect the debt. The same 
agreement may contain the transfer agreement. The co-operation of the security SPV 
will be necessary to cede the claims to the servicer where the claims were given as 
security to the security SPV by way of a fiduciary security cession. 
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 After an analysis of the position in South African law on simulated transactions,287 
I conclude that the risk of recharacterisation of the transfer of the assets to the SPV as 
a loan is small.288 The following factors lead me to this conclusion: 
 The parties to the securitisation scheme truly intend to conclude a contract of sale 
and do their utmost to ensure that consequence. It is the only means by which they 
can achieve their ultimate economic objective, namely to gain financing at a better 
interest rate than the originator could obtain without the insulation of the assets 
from its enterprise. 
 Owing to the limiting provisions of Securitisation Notice, 2008, traditional 
securitisation schemes in South Africa are prohibited from making use of 
repurchase agreements during the transaction. Bank originators may not replace 
non-performing assets with other similar, but performing assets. I am of the 
opinion that this also applies to the replacement of non-performing claims by non-
bank originators, because it would mean that they retain some of the risk 
associated with the asset.  
 Securitisation does not have the effect of converting a previously unsecured debt 
into a secured debt.  
 In most of the case law that allowed for the recharacterisation of the assets 
transferred in terms of a purported sale, the assets were movable corporeals and 
not claims. Furthermore, the seller mostly remained in control of the transferred 
assets. The policy consideration behind finding such transactions simulated, lies in 
the lack of publicity of the transfer of ownership in terms of the sale. It is argued 
that the creditors of the purported seller are potentially prejudiced, because they 
have no way of knowing that the assets no longer fall in the estate of the seller 
when they extend credit to him. I conclude that the same argument cannot be 
raised in the case of securitisation. The originator is not impoverished by the sale 
of the assets to the SPV. The originator is paid for the transfer of the claims to the 
SPV, so that one asset (the claim) is replaced by another (money). Furthermore, 
claims are transferred by agreement alone and not publicised by delivery as is the 
case with corporeal movable property. 
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 The SPV becomes the legal holder of the claims (owner) without restriction. As 
explained above, cession for collecting purposes to the originator/servicer should 
be provided for in the servicing agreement and not through a resolutive condition 
in the contract of sale. 
 The SPV as owner intends to make use of the transferred claims by using them as 
security for the issuing of debt securities. The SPV may even transfer the claims 
to the security SPV if it decides to make use of fiduciary security cession. It can 
therefore not be said that the SPV does not intend to make use of the transferred 
claims. 
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CHAPTER 8  
INSOLVENCY LAW CONSIDERATIONS IN 
SECURITISATION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Insolvency legislation and the ability of the securitisation scheme to withstand the 
insolvency of the originator and other participants in the scheme are key 
considerations in the rating of a securitisation scheme.1 They also influence the 
structuring of the scheme. In a study carried out by Standard & Poor‘s the following 
aspects of the insolvency legislation and practice of countries were identified as 
important to determine the credit rating of a securitisation scheme:2 
 The availability of assets across the corporate group to secured creditors. In other 
words, whether there are restrictions on the granting of security by a holding 
company to its subsidiaries, by subsidiaries to the holding company and by fellow 
subsidiaries to one another. Of specific importance here is whether related 
companies may provide guarantees as credit enhancements and this aspect falls 
outside the scope of this study. 
 The process of creating security over assets of a company. This includes whether 
it is possible to create security over most of the company‘s assets, the process of 
perfection of security, the cost and effectiveness of the perfection process and 
preference periods specified in insolvency legislation to set aside security.3 
 The extent to which secured creditors can commence and/or control insolvency 
proceedings. 
 The strength of the protection available to secured creditors when they exercise 
their security rights. This includes enquiries into the permitted realisation routes 
and how long it takes to realise assets. 
 
Securitisation Notice, 2008 defines ‗insolvency-remote‘ in respect of an SPV as that 
the assets of that SPV shall not be subject to any claim by an institution transferring 
assets in terms of a traditional securitisation scheme to the SPV as a result of the 
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transferring institution‘s insolvency.4 In other words, an SPV is insolvency-remote 
from its originator when the assets transferred to the SPV from the originator cannot 
be reclaimed in any manner from the SPV should the originator subsequently go into 
insolvent liquidation. 
 The rest of Securitisation Notice, 2008 does not mention insolvency-remoteness 
specifically, but I submit that the concept of insolvency-remoteness is so closely 
linked with the requirement of a true sale of the assets to the SPV that the inclusion of 
its definition in the Notice is necessary and helpful. The difficulty in distinguishing 
between the concepts of a true sale and insolvency-remoteness is illustrated in 
paragraph 4(2)(b) of the Notice. Paragraph 4(2) generally deals with the limitation of 
the originator‘s association with the transferred assets in order to comply with the true 
sale requirement.5 However, subparagraph (b) extends to insolvency-remoteness, 
where it states that 
 
… the assets shall be legally isolated from the institution that transferred the assets in such a way 
that the assets and the benefits that relate to the assets shall be placed beyond the reach of the 
institution that transferred the assets, and its creditors, even in the event of bankruptcy or 
liquidation …  
 
The Notice obliges banks and institutions within a banking group to obtain an opinion 
from an independent qualified legal counsel that the true sale requirements of the 
Notice, as well as insolvency-remoteness as defined in the quoted paragraph, have 
been met. This requirement is peremptory, which means that failure to obtain such an 
opinion will be non-compliance with the Notice and the consequences that go with 
such non-compliance will follow.6 Independent legal opinion on the true sale 
requirement and insolvency-remoteness is not a requirement for non-bank originators, 
but is advisable. It will show the intent on the part of the originator and SPV to 
comply with the requirements of the Notice. 
 The provisions of Chapter VIII of the Banks Act7 as discussed in paragraph 6.3.1 
must be kept in mind during the course of this chapter. If the SPV did not comply 
with the provisions of Securitisation Notice, 2008, and becomes subject to       
                                                 
4
 GN 2, GG 30628 (1 January 2008) Notice on Banks Act 94 of 1990 – Designation of an Activity not 
Falling within the Meaning of ‗The Business of a Bank‘ (Securitisation Schemes), Schedule, par 1. 
5
 The provisions of Securitisation Notice, 2008, that deal with the true sale requirement are discussed in 
ch 7.  
6
 See par 6.3. 
7
 94 of 1990. 
CHAPTER 8 INSOLVENCY LAW CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITISATIONS 
377 
Chapter VIII, the Registrar of Banks is granted certain special powers. He may 
oppose any application for the winding-up of the SPV by the SPV or by any other 
person. He may further apply for the winding-up of the SPV and if the application is 
successful, the Master must appoint the liquidator preferred by the Registrar. 
 If the liquidator of an insolvent originator is successful in impeaching the transfer 
of the assets to the SPV, the SPV will have failed to comply with the true sale and 
insolvency-remoteness requirements of the Notice. As a result, the above-mentioned 
provisions of Chapter VIII will take effect. In other words, the insolvency of the 
originator is not supposed to have any effect on the position of the SPV. However, in 
the unlikely event that the insolvency of the originator does affect the SPV, as set out 
below, the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Banks Act will take effect. 
 It is important to note that the insolvency-remoteness of the SPV does not mean 
that the SPV is insolvency-proof.8 Even when all the considerations discussed in this 
chapter are addressed, there may be isolated cases where the transfer of the assets can 
be avoided by the liquidator of an insolvent originator. Also, while every effort is 
made during the structuring of a securitisation scheme to ensure that the SPV itself 
bears little risk of insolvency,9 extreme situations of default on the principal debts as a 
result of an economic slump cannot be prevented by the structuring of the scheme and 
may lead to the SPV‘s inability to meet its duties in terms of the issued securities. 
The first possible method, by which the transfer of the assets to the SPV may be 
disputed, is by way of a claim by the liquidator of the insolvent originator that the 
transfer of the assets was not a true sale, but, in fact, amounted only to a secured loan. 
The possibility that the transaction could be held to be a simulated transaction in 
South African law was discussed in the previous chapter.  
 The possible risks that insolvency law may hold for the avoidance of the transfer of 
the assets to the SPV are still untested by South African courts. I therefore rely on 
precedent not discussing securitisation particularly, but stating wider principles of the 
application of the provisions of the Insolvency Act.10 
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 The discussion in this chapter is not intended to reflect an in-depth study of 
insolvency law. Rather, the general principles of the law of insolvency are stated and 
applied to the position during securitisation.  
8.2 IMPEACHABLE TRANSACTIONS IN TERMS OF 
INSOLVENCY ACT 
Section 339 of the Companies Act11 provides that in the winding-up of a company 
unable to pay its debts, the provisions of the law relating to insolvency shall, as far as 
they are applicable, be applied to companies in respect of any matter not specifically 
provided for in the Companies Act. Section 340(1) of the Companies Act 
unequivocally states that the provisions of the law of insolvency relating to voidable 
and undue dispositions are also applicable to companies.12 In the rest of this 
discussion I assume that the insolvent originator is a company and I refer throughout 
to its ‗liquidator‘, even though the Insolvency Act refers to a ‗trustee‘.13 
The provisions of the Insolvency Act14 relating to impeachable transactions may 
become relevant in the event of the originator‘s insolvency. The liquidator of the 
originator could decide to set aside the sale of the assets to the SPV in order to 
increase the amount available to the creditors of the originator. In this paragraph I 
consider the chances of success of such an application. 
 When the court sets aside a disposition in terms of one of the sections discussed 
below, the trustee or liquidator is entitled to recover any property alienated in terms of 
the disposition. If the reversal of the transaction is no longer possible, the liquidator 
may claim the value of the property at the date of the disposition or at the date of the 
court order, whichever is highest.15 
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company, be set aside in the event of the company being wound up and unable to pay all its debts, 
and the provisions of the law relating to insolvency shall mutatis mutandis be applied to any such 
disposition.‖ 
13
 On impeachable transactions during the winding-up of companies in general, see PM Meskin, B 
Galgut, PAM Magid, JA Kunst, A Boraine & DA Burdette Insolvency Law and its Operation in 
Winding-Up (2007) at par 5.31.1. 
14
 In this chapter all references to ‗the Act‘ refers to the Insolvency Act. 
15
 Section 32(3). See also Robert Sharrock, Kathleen van der Linde & Alastair Smith Hockly‟s 
Insolvency Law 8 ed (2006) at 139; Bertelsmann et al Mars at 289–290; Meskin et al Insolvency 
Law at par 5.31.16. For a discussion of the underlying principles of impeachable transactions, see 
André Boraine & Ben Swart ―Die Onderliggende Beginsels van die Insolvensiereg en Vernietigbare 
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8.2.1 Dispositions without value 
Section 26 sets out the circumstances when a disposition without value by an 
insolvent debtor may be set aside by a court. Section 26(1) states that every 
disposition of property not made for value may be set aside by the court if such 
disposition left the insolvent debtor in a position where its liabilities exceeded its 
assets. If the disposition occurred within two years before the liquidation of the 
debtor,16 the onus of proving the solvency of the debtor after the disposition lies with 
the person who received the assets.17 If the disposition was made more than two years 
before the liquidation of the debtor, the onus lies with the liquidator to prove that the 
debtor was insolvent after the disposition.18 For purposes of this thesis, the debtor is 
the insolvent originator. If at any time after the disposition the liabilities of the debtor 
exceeded its assets by less than the value of the property disposed of, the disposition 
may only be set aside to the extent of such an excess.19 
8.2.1.1 Meaning of ‗disposition‘ 
‗Disposition‘ is defined in section 2 of the Act as 
                                                                                                                                            
Regshandelinge (Deel 2)‖ 1996 Obiter 213. The authors distinguish between provisions that have as 
a basis fraudulent conveyance and those based on preference. The former provisions are also 
available to creditors of the debtor while he is solvent and are aimed at dispositions made with the 
intention to hinder, delay or defraud the creditors of the debtor. The latter is strictly aimed at the 
collective procedure after the sequestration or liquidation of the debtor. Here the aim is to achieve 
equality between the creditors of the insolvent debtor by reversing certain transactions that fell 
within a specified time period before the sequestration or liquidation of the debtor. The authors‘ 
arguments rely solely on authority from American law and they do not give any indication why they 
consider this legal system‘s classification as relevant to a classification in the South African legal 
system. 
16
 In terms of s 340(2) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, the event that shall correspond with the 
sequestration order in the case of an individual shall be: ―(a) in the case of a winding-up by the 
Court, the presentation of the application, unless that winding-up has superseded a voluntary 
winding-up, when it shall be the registration in terms of section 200 of the special resolution to wind 
up the company; (b) in the case of a voluntary winding-up, the registration in terms of section 200 of 
the special resolution to wind-up the company; (c) in the case of a winding-up of any company 
unable to pay its debts by the Court superseding a judicial management order, the presentation of the 
application to the Court in terms of section 433(l) or 440.‖ Section 433(l) and 440 relates to the 
cancellation of the judicial management order.  
17
 Section 26(1)(b). 
18
 Section 26(1)(a).  
19
 Section 26(1). Meskin et al Insolvency Law at par 5.31.3 argue that it could not have been the 
intention of the legislature that the court should take account of any and all fluctuations in the 
balance sheet of the debtor in the time between the disposition and the date of winding-up. In their 
opinion the value of the assets must be ascertained on the date of the disposition and the difference 
between the assets and liabilities of the debtor must be determined on the date of the winding-up. In 
other words, if the property was worth R100 000 and the liabilities of the debtor exceeded its assets 
by only R40 000, the disposition is protected up to an amount of R60 000. 
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… any transfer or abandonment of rights to property and includes a sale, lease, mortgage, pledge, 
delivery, payment, release, compromise, donation or any contract therefore, but does not include a 
disposition in compliance with an order of the court …20 
 
The transactions listed in the definition do not form a closed list.21 In essence, a 
disposition will include any act by which an insolvent debtor parts with an asset in his 
estate.22 This includes a cession of claims and their accessory security rights23 and the 
sale of claims in terms of an instalment sale transaction.24 In the absence of cession, 
an instruction by an insolvent debtor to his debtor to pay a due amount directly to one 
of his creditors will constitute a disposition.25 If a loan is made to the insolvent debtor, 
but paid into the account of a third party in settlement of a debt rather than into the 
account of the debtor, this will amount to a disposition.26 
 The meaning of ‗disposition‘ is relevant also to the application of sections 29 
(voidable preferences) and 30 (undue preferences) and will be referred to again when 
I discuss those sections. The sale of assets of the originator to the SPV in terms of a 
traditional securitisation scheme will constitute a disposition in terms of the definition 
in section 2 and the case law referred to above. 
                                                 
20
 The lumping together of so many diverging concepts in this definition was severely criticised by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Cooper NNO v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd 2000 (3) SA 1009 (SCA) 
at 1016F–H and 1017B. The Court described the definition as ―inept in the extreme‖. 
21
 For instance, a contract of suretyship has been held to be a disposition even though it is not 
specifically listed. See Langeberg Koöperasie Bpk v Inverdoorn Farming and Trading Company Ltd 
1965 (2) SA 597 (A). See Sharrock et al Hockly‟s at 127–128 for further examples. 
22
 Bertelsmann et al Mars at 250; Meskin et al Henochsberg at 671–672; Meskin et al Insolvency Law 
at par 5.31.2. 
23
 Dreyer‟s Trustee v Hanekom 1919 CPD 196 at 202. See also Klukowski‟s Trustee v Hesselman 1923 
SWA 16 at 18. Where the disposition takes the form of a cession the date of the disposition is the 
date of the cession and not the date when the debtor finally makes the payment due in terms of the 
transferred claim. See also Sackstein NO v Van der Westhuizen 1996 (2) SA 431 (O) at 436F. 
24
 Estate Sham v Young 1936 AD 231. In this case the lessee had the right to buy the asset by paying 
the remainder of the purchase price. The lessee sold this right to a third party. The Court held that 
the trustee could only claim back compensation for the rights sold, and not the asset itself (at 240).  I 
submit that the same reasoning will apply when a hire purchaser sells his rights in terms of a hire 
purchase agreement to a third party. 
25
 Michalow NO v Premier Milling Co Ltd 1960 (2) SA 59 (W) (in the context of a voidable preference 
in terms of s 29); Standard Finance Corporation of South Africa Ltd (In Liquidation) v Greenstein 
1964 (3) SA 573 (A) (in the context of an undue preference in terms of s 30). 
26
 Van Zyl NO v Turner NO 1998 (2) SA 236 (C) (in the context of s 29). 
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8.2.1.2 Meaning of ‗value‘ 
Contrary to the position in English law, where dispositions not for value are expressly 
described either as gifts or as transactions at an undervalue,27 section 26 does not 
further describe a disposition ‗not made for value‘. South African courts have held 
that ‗value‘ does not carry any technical connotation and simply means value in the 
ordinary sense of the word,28 meaning ―a disposition for which no benefit or value is 
or has been received or promised as a quid pro quo‖.29 An ascertainable commercial 
advantage will suffice.30 The benefit received by the debtor need not be a monetary or 
tangible consideration, but whether it represents ‗value‘ must be decided by reference 
to all the circumstances under which the transaction was concluded.31 Payment of a 
lawful debt is not a disposition without value, because the debtor receives a discharge 
of his liability in return for the payment.32 
Smith33 argues that the factor that distinguishes section 26 from the other 
provisions relating to impeachable transactions is that in this case there was no 
obligation on the part of the debtor to make a disposition. If she is correct, the sale of 
the assets to the SPV, even if at a severely discounted price, would not be avoidable 
under this section. The reason would be that the disposition was in terms of an 
agreement of sale between the originator and the SPV. However, Smith34 later states 
that the sale of assets for entirely inadequate consideration would be a disposition not 
for value. This position is supported by case law. In Terblanche NO v Baxtrans CC 
the Court held that the payment of an illusory or nominal value, even in fulfilment of 
an obligation, would not be considered value in terms of section 26.35 It therefore 
                                                 
27
 See par 3.3.3.1. 
28
 Estate Wege v Strauss 1932 AD 76 at 82. The Court further held, with reference to the English 
Bankruptcy Act, that ‗value‘ does not have the same meaning as ‗valuable consideration‘ in that 
Act.  
29
 Estate Jager v Whittaker 1944 AD 246 at 250. 
30
 Terblanche NO v Baxtrans CC 1998 (3) SA 912 (C) at 915G. See further Meskin et al Henochsberg 
at 672–673; Meskin et al Insolvency Law at par 5.31.3. 
31
 Goode, Durant and Murray Ltd v Hewitt and Cornell NNO 1961 (4) SA 286 (N) at 291F–G, 
followed in Swanee‟s Boerdery (Edms) Bpk (In Liquidation) v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1986 (2) SA 
850 (A) at 860E–F. See also Bertelsmann et al Mars at 254; Sharrock et al Hockly‟s at 130. 
32
 Estate Jager v Whittaker 1944 AD 246 at 250; Bertelsmann et al Mars at 255; Meskin et al 
Insolvency Law at par 5.31.3. 
33
 Catherine Smith The Law of Insolvency 3 ed (1988) at 121. 
34
 Insolvency at 123. 
35
 Terblanche NO v Baxtrans CC 1998 (3) SA 912 (C) at 917C–H. 
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appears that the distinguishing factor is not the lack of an obligation to pay, but rather 
the lack of value. 
One must ask whether a disposition that was not without value, but was made for a 
value less than adequate to compensate for the benefit received by the transferee, 
would fall under the provisions of section 26. The matter was left open in Estate 
Jager v Whittaker.36 In Swanee‟s Boerdery (Edms) Bpk (In Liq) v Trust Bank the 
Appelate Division, as it then was, rejected the notion that ‗value‘ also includes the 
concepts of ‗adequate value‘ or ‗just and valuable consideration‘.37 In its application 
of the law to the facts of this case the Court also did not consider the adequacy of the 
benefit received from the suretyships granted by the liquidated company, but only 
whether they resulted in any benefit or hope of a benefit taking into account all the 
circumstances of the case.38 
In Terblanche NO v Baxtrans CC the Court held that inadequacy of value given in 
return for a disposition would rather make a transaction subject to sections 29 or 30 of 
the Act, because39 
 
Inadequate value by its nature results in preferring a creditor and proof of inadequate value is 
evidential material to be weighed in assessing preference as also collusion and fraud and in 
deciding whether a disposition was in the ordinary course of business (s 29). 
 
The Court further held that section 26 may apply where some value was given, but 
that value was only nominal or illusory, and the Court rejected an argument raised by 
the liquidator that inadequacy of value is always prima facie evidence of no value.40  
 To summarise, I submit that on the current state of authority section 26 only 
applies to transactions where there was no value given in return for the disposition, or 
where the value given is proven to be nominal or illusory. Inadequacy of value can 
only be a factor to consider when relying on sections 29 or 30 of the Act.41 This leads 
to the conclusion that section 26 will not be available to a liquidator of an insolvent 
originator who wants to avoid the sale of the assets to the SPV. The SPV will always 
                                                 
36
 Estate Jager v Whittaker 1944 AD 246 at 251. 
37
 Swanee‟s Boerdery (Edms) Bpk (In Liquidation) v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1986 (2) SA 850 (A) at 
860E–F. 
38
 At 860H–862E. See also Langeberg Koöperasie Bpk v Inverdoorn Farming and Trading Company 
Ltd 1965 (2) SA 597 (A) at 604H–605A; Cronje NO v De Paiva [1997] 2 All SA 80 (B) at 86H. 
39
 Terblanche NO v Baxtrans CC 1998 (3) SA 912 (C) at 917E. 
40
 At 917F. 
41
 This view is supported by Meskin et al Insolvency Law at par 5.31.3. 
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pay for the transfer and there are other benefits to securitisation that will also be 
considered valuable by courts, such as an increase in liquidity.42 The only issue that 
might arise is whether the consideration given in return for the disposition was 
adequate in terms of sections 29 or 30. 
8.2.2 Voidable preferences 
In terms of section 29(1) of the Act, every disposition made by a debtor not more than 
six months before the sequestration of his estate, which has the effect of preferring 
one of his creditors above another, may be set aside by the court, if immediately after 
making such a disposition the liabilities of the debtor exceeded his assets. The creditor 
who received the disposition can avoid the impeachment of the disposition by proving 
that the disposition was made in the ordinary course of business and that it was not 
intended thereby to prefer one creditor over another.43 
 The first aspect that the liquidator will have to prove is that the disposition was 
made less than six months before the liquidation of the originator. I submit that the 
insolvency of the originator should rarely occur so soon after the securitisation 
transaction, as the affairs of the originator come under scrutiny from rating agencies, 
lawyers who provide legal opinions to the rating agencies on the insolvency-
remoteness of the originator and, if applicable, the securities exchange where the debt 
securities are to be listed. However, for the purposes of this discussion I shall explore 
the position should the originator be declared insolvent shortly after the securitisation 
transaction. 
 As I indicate above,44 the transfer of the assets from the originator to the SPV will 
be a disposition in terms of the definition in the Act. The liquidator should not have 
difficulty in proving this requirement. 
 It is essential for a successful application in terms of this section that the person 
who directly or indirectly benefited from the disposition was an existing creditor of 
the insolvent debtor.45 In other words, the debtor must have been under some form of 
                                                 
42
 See par 2.2 for the advantages of securitisation. 
43
 Section 29(1). For a discussion of the section generally, see Smith Insolvency at 125 et seq; Meskin 
et al Insolvency Law at par 5.31.6. 
44
 See par 8.2.1.1. 
45
 Estate Kotze v Vlok 1923 CPD 200 at 202–203; Caldwell‟s Trustee v Western Assurance Company 
1918 WLD 146 at 155; Estate Hunt v De Villiers 1940 CPD 79 at 90; Coetzer v Coetzer 1975 (3) SA 
931 (E) at 934E. See also Bertelsmann et al Mars at 261. 
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duty to dispose of the property to the creditor. A donation will not be a disposition 
that could fall under the ambit of section 29. It is the opinion of most commentators 
on English law that where payment and disposition in return for the payment occur 
simultaneously, the transferee will not be considered a creditor in terms of section 239 
of the Insolvency Act 1986,46 which corresponds with section 29 of the South African 
Insolvency Act. I submit that there is no authority in South African law to this effect. 
During securitisation there will be an agreement between the originator and the SPV 
in terms of which the originator has a duty to dispose of the assets in favour of the 
SPV. The SPV will have been a creditor of the originator, even if only for a short 
while. 
 The liquidator need only prove that the disposition had the effect of preferring one 
creditor above the others. This is an objective test: there is no need for the liquidator 
to show that the debtor intended to prefer the creditor.47 The court will decide whether 
the disposition had the effect of allowing one creditor to be paid proportionately more 
than the other creditors or being paid in advance of the other creditors.48 
 Lastly, the liquidator must prove that the liabilities of the debtor, fairly estimated, 
exceeded his assets fairly valued. This is also an objective test.49 
8.2.2.1 Defence available to person who received disposition 
Once the liquidator has proved all of the above aspects, the person who received the 
disposition may still avoid impeachment of the transaction by proving that the 
disposition50 
 was made in the ordinary course of business, and 
 was not intended to prefer one creditor over another. 
8.2.2.1.1 Ordinary course of business 
The test of whether the transaction was in the ordinary course of business is an 
objective one.51 The court will consider, having regard to the terms of the transaction 
                                                 
46
 See par 3.3.3.2. 
47
 Simon NO v Coetzee [2007] 2 All SA 110 (T) at 114I; Bertelsmann et al Mars at 262; Sharrock et al 
Hockly‟s at 132; Meskin et al Insolvency Law at par 5.31.6.1. 
48
 Simon NO v Coetzee [2007] 2 All SA 110 (T) at 114I. See also Sharrock et al Hockly‟s at 132. 
49
 Bertelsmann et al Mars at 262; Sharrock et al Hockly‟s at 132; Meskin et al Insolvency Law at par 
5.31.6.2. 
50
 Section 29(1). 
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and the circumstances under which it was entered into, whether the transaction was 
one which ordinary business people would enter into in solvent circumstances.52 This 
criterion must be satisfied without taking into account the solvency of the debtor or 
aspects that might show the intention to prefer.53   
The court will deal with each case as it arises and according to its special 
circumstances.54 In the case of a recognised special type of business the customs and 
rules of the type of business are relevant.55 
I submit that it cannot be said that securitisation per se is a transaction that falls 
outside the ordinary course of business of companies. Although it has not had a long 
history in South Africa, it is now a well-established method of raising finance on the 
capital markets.  
The terms and circumstances of the securitisation will have to be evaluated to 
determine whether they were out of the ordinary. It may be that a sale of assets to the 
SPV at a substantially discounted price, or where a substantial part of the payment for 
the transaction was deferred, may lead to a conclusion that the transaction was out of 
the ordinary.56 However, the scheme as a whole will have to be considered in order to 
determine whether the discount or deferred payment could have a well-motivated 
ordinary business purpose. 
                                                                                                                                            
51
 Bertelsmann et al Mars at 262; Sharrock et al Hockly‟s at 132; Meskin et al Insolvency Law at par 
5.31.6.3. 
52
 Estate Van Schalkwyk v Hayman & Lessem 1947 (2) SA 1035 (C) at 1044; Hendriks NO v 
Swanepoel 1962 (4) SA 338 (A) at 342F and 345A; Joosab v Ensor NO 1966 (1) SA 319 (AD) at 
326E; S v Schwartz 1972 (2) SA 295 (C) at 304C; Paterson NO v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1979 (4) 
SA 992 (A) at 997A–D; Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Bpk v De Goede 1997 (4) SA 66 
(SCA) at 77I–J; Van Zyl NO v Turner NO 1998 (2) SA 236 (C) at 245E. See also Smith Insolvency 
at 128; Bertelsmann et al Mars at 262; Sharrock et al Hockly‟s at 132. 
53
 Pretorius‟ Trustee v Van Blommenstein 1949 (1) SA 267 (O) at 273–274; Hendriks NO v Swanepoel 
1962 (4) SA 338 (A) at 342G. 
54
 Van Zyl NO v Turner NO 1998 (2) SA 236 (C) at 245C–D. In Estate Van Schalkwyk v Hayman & 
Lessem 1947 (2) SA 1035 (C) the insolvent obtained permission from his bondholders to sell certain 
mineral rights on condition that money received from that transaction would be paid to them. He did 
not pay them the money after receiving it, but paid other creditors. The Court considered this to be 
beyond the ordinary course of business (at 1048). See also Bertelsmann et al Mars at 263. 
55
 In Hendriks NO v Swanepoel 1962 (4) SA 338 (A) at 343G–344D the Court considered the usual 
practices applied by sheep farmers as a ‗special kind of business‘. The majority decision, however, 
held that sheep farming is not a special kind of business and that the actions of the parties had to be 
considered with reference to the practices of normal solvent business persons (at 345H–346A). See 
further Bertelsmann et al Mars at 263; Smith Insolvency at 129; Sharrock et al Hockly‟s at 133; 
Meskin et al Insolvency Law at par 5.31.6.3. 
56
 In Terblanche NO v Baxtrans CC 1998 (3) SA 912 (C) at 917E the Court held that a disposition at an 
undervalue has evidentiary value in determining whether a transaction was in the ordinary course of 
business. 
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It should also be remembered that securitisation is still developing, with a lot of 
innovation in the types of assets securitised and in the structure of the schemes. Just 
because a particular securitisation transaction was not structured exactly like any 
other transaction before it, does not mean that it was not concluded in the ordinary 
course of business. 
8.2.2.1.2 Intention to prefer 
The person to whom a disposition was made can avoid impeachment of the 
transaction by proving that the disposition was not made with the intention to prefer. 
In order to establish an intention to prefer, there must have been an intention on the 
debtor‘s part to disturb what would be the proper distribution of his assets in 
insolvency.57 
The Act does not require that the debtor must have contemplated his liquidation at 
the time of the disposition, but it cannot be contended that the debtor intended to 
prefer one creditor over the others without proof that he foresaw his liquidation.58 
What must be proved is that the debtor knew that his liquidation is ―substantially 
inevitable‖.59 However, even if he did foresee the possibility of his liquidation that 
does not necessarily mean that he had the intention to prefer the creditor in making 
the disposition. Other factors may show that this was not the overriding intention.60 
In the context of section 29(1) ‗intention to prefer‘ means the dominant motive or 
primary object to prefer.61 It implies that the debtor must have acted out of his free 
                                                 
57
 Smith v Carpenter 1869 Buch 206 at 215; Slater‟s Trustee v Smith 5 (1885) EDC 9 at 16–17; 
Bertelsmann et al Mars at 266; Sharrock et al Hockly‟s at 134. 
58
 Fearnley‟s Trustee v Netherlands Bank 1904 TS 424 at 429–430: ―But in order to prove an intention 
to prefer, it appears to me that it is necessary to prove that there was contemplation of insolvency, 
for I do not see how a man can be held to have intended to prefer one creditor before his other 
creditors unless he had insolvency in contemplation at the time, since no question of preference can 
arise until he contemplates insolvency.‖ See also Malherbe‟s Trustee v Dinner 1922 OPD 18 at 24–
25; Van Eeden‟s Trustee v Pelunski & Mervis 1922 OPD 144 at 148; Featherstone‟s Estate v Elliot 
Bros 1922 EDL 233 at 241–242; Myburgh, Krone & Co Ltd v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1924 CPD 
122 at 141; Pretorius NO v Stock Owners‟ Co-operative Co Ltd 1959 (4) SA 462 (A) at 472E–F; 
Venter v Volkskas Ltd 1973 (3) SA 175 (T) at 179E; S v Ostilly 1977 (4) SA 699 (D) at 731G–H; Du 
Plessis NO v Oosthuizen 1999 (2) SA 191 (O) at 212G; Fourie NO v Edeling NO [2005] 4 All SA 
393 (SCA) at 399I–400B; Bertelsmann et al Mars at 267; Smith Insolvency at 133; Sharrock et al 
Hockly‟s at 134; Meskin et al Insolvency Law at par 5.31.6.4. 
59
 Pretorius NO v Stock Owners‟ Co-operative Co Ltd 1959 (4) SA 462 (A) at 472H–473A. 
60
 Cooper NNO v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd 2000 (3) SA 1009 (SCA) at 1029H–1030B. 
61
 S v Ostilly 1977 (4) SA 699 (D) at 731B; Van Zyl NO v Turner NO 1998 (2) SA 236 (C) at 244G; 
Cooper NNO v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd 2000 (3) SA 1009 (SCA) at 1026G; Smith Insolvency 
at 134. 
CHAPTER 8 INSOLVENCY LAW CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITISATIONS 
387 
will. If the disposition was primarily intended to stave off criminal prosecution, the 
Court has held that there was no intention to prefer.62  
Another important consideration will be whether the creditor‘s claim existed 
before the disposition. The object of a voidable preference is not to obtain credit or 
raise money from an outside source, but to provide an existing creditor with an 
advantage in respect of an existing debt.63 
The test to determine whether the debtor had the requisite intention is subjective.64 
The court will take into account all possible reasons for the disposition and will then 
come to a conclusion on the intention of the debtor on a preponderance of 
probability.65 There must have been a real intention to prefer one creditor. It is not 
enough to show that the debtor did not consider the fact that the disposition will prefer 
one creditor above the others.66 It is also insufficient to show that the debtor should 
have known that the effect of the disposition would be to prefer a specific creditor.67 
There must have been an actual intention to prefer. 
I submit that the primary objective with securitisation will seldom be to prefer one 
creditor over the others in the event of the originator‘s insolvency. The usual objective 
when an originator enters into such a scheme is to obtain financing. Consequently, it 
is my opinion that an attempt by a liquidator to rely on section 29 to impeach the sale 
of assets by an originator to an SPV will fail, except under the most extraordinary 
circumstances. 
                                                 
62
 Van Zyl NO v Turner NO 1998 (2) SA 236 (C) at 244H–245A; Cooper NNO v Merchant Trade 
Finance Ltd 2000 (3) SA 1009 (SCA) at 1030H; Smith Insolvency at 135. 
63
 Malherbe‟s Trustee v Dinner 1922 OPD 18 at 25; Van Eeden‟s Trustee v Pelunski & Mervis  1922 
OPD 144 at 148; Bertelsmann et al Mars at 272. 
64
 Cooper NNO v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd 2000 (3) SA 1009 (SCA) at 1026H–1027A; 
Bertelsmann et al Mars at 267; Smith Insolvency at 132. In their discussion of the Cooper decision, 
Burdette & Boraine  2000 Obiter at 488–489 advocate an amendment of s 29 to do away with the 
subjective element. This is the approach in American law, where preference law is based on an 
objective determination of the financial position of the debtor and the effect of the preference on the 
other creditors. See par 4.3.2.3.2. 
65
 Cooper NNO v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd 2000 (3) SA 1009 (SCA) at 1027F; Bertelsmann et al 
Mars at 270; Smith Insolvency at 134; Sharrock et al Hockly‟s at 135. 
66
 Cooper NNO v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd 2000 (3) SA 1009 (SCA) at 1029C–D. 
67
 Pretorius‟ Trustee v Van Blommenstein 1949 (1) SA 267 (O) at 270; Du Plessis NO v Oosthuizen 
1999 (2) SA 191 (O) at 212I; Bertelsmann et al Mars at 269; Meskin et al Insolvency Law at         
par 5.31.6.4. 
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8.2.3 Undue preferences 
In terms of section 30(1), a court may set aside a disposition of the debtor‘s property, 
when it was made at a time when the debtor‘s liabilities exceeded his assets and if the 
disposition was made with the intention to prefer one of his creditors above the others. 
 One difference between this section and section 29 is that the onus of proving that 
the disposition was made with the intent to prefer lies with the liquidator.68 It is not 
sufficient to show that the disposition had the effect of preferring a specific creditor, 
as is required in terms of section 29.69 The substantive requirements of proving such 
intent are the same as those discussed above regarding section 29.70 Any disposition 
may be set aside, regardless of the time that lapsed between the disposition and the 
order for liquidation.71 Furthermore, if the liquidator can prove the requirements of the 
section, the court must set aside the disposition. There are no defences available to the 
person who benefited from the disposition.72 
 I already mentioned in my discussion of section 29 that it is most unlikely that the 
originator will be insolvent after the transfer of the assets to the SPV.73 However, even 
if the liquidator could prove that the originator was insolvent at the time of the sale of 
the assets to the SPV, I submit that it would be difficult to prove that the disposition 
was made with the ―dominant motive or primary object‖74 of preferring the SPV to the 
other creditors of the originator. Securitisation is primarily a method of financing. It 
requires extensive planning and the involvement of several outside parties. Some of 
these parties, such as rating agencies or proposed trustees for debenture-holders, will 
object if they suspect that the originator‘s intention with the transaction is not 
financing. I therefore do not see that an application in terms of section 30 will be a 
viable option to impeach the sale of the assets to the SPV.  
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8.2.4 Collusive dispositions 
Where a debtor before being liquidated has disposed of some of its property in 
collusion with another person, which had the effect of prejudicing its creditors or 
preferring one creditor over others, the court may set aside the disposition after 
liquidation.75 Any person who was a party to such collusive dealings is liable to the 
insolvent estate for any loss caused to the estate and for any penalty fee ordered by the 
court, which amount may not exceed the amount by which he benefited from the 
transaction.76 If such a person is also a creditor of the estate he shall forfeit his claim 
against the estate.77 The onus of proving that these requirements are met lies with the 
liquidator.78 The onus is discharged on a preponderance of probability. 
 ‗Collusion‘ in the context of section 31 means an agreement which has a fraudulent 
purpose and not merely an agreement which has the effect of preferring one creditor 
above the others.79 The party with whom the debtor colluded need not be a creditor of 
the debtor, but can be any person. However, there must be proof that two minds were 
concurring to defraud the estate,80 or that the debtor was conniving with another 
person to do some act knowing that it was unlawful or dishonest and with the object 
of fraud or deceit.81 The liquidator must prove that at the time of the disposition the 
defendant was aware that the disposition would have the effect of prejudicing the 
creditors of the debtor or preferring one creditor over the others. There is a 
presumption that the defendant was aware of such harm if he knew at the time of the 
disposition that the financial position of the debtor was ―hopeless‖.82 Disguising the 
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true nature of a transaction so that creditors will be prejudiced in the event of the 
debtor‘s insolvency has been held to be a collusive dealing.83 
 In my analysis of American law I set out the arguments of various authors for and 
against the proposition that securitisation is to the detriment of the unsecured creditors 
of the originator.84 From this analysis it emerged that there will only truly be an 
answer to this proposition when empirical research is undertaken on the effect of the 
securitisation on the unsecured creditors of the originator in the event of his 
subsequent insolvency. 
 However, I submit that even if it is proved that securitisation is harmful to the 
unsecured creditors of the originator, most securitisation transactions are not 
undertaken with the fraudulent intent required for an impeachment in terms of   
section 31. Most securitisation transactions aim to benefit the estate of the originator 
by providing it with liquidity.85 Even if the managers of the originators then utilise the 
funds obtained from the securitisation transaction for illegal or wasteful purposes it 
does not necessarily show that the various parties involved in the securitisation 
scheme shared their fraudulent motives. 
 It is conceivable that a securitisation transaction could be set up in order to 
prejudice the creditors of the originator, especially if the managers or owners want to 
squander the cash injection. It is also possible that reputable institutions may be 
willing to assist in the structuring of the scheme. Involvement in the structuring of 
securitisation schemes is lucrative. This includes rating agencies, who base their 
opinions on the quality of the transferred assets and on the structure of the scheme.86 
They have no interest in the motives behind the transaction.  
I submit that if a liquidator can prove that one or more of the parties involved in 
the securitisation scheme were part of any collusion to prejudice the creditors of the 
originator, this section is the most appropriate under which to proceed to set aside the 
transfer of the assets to the SPV, as well as to penalise those who benefited from the 
transaction. It is unnecessary under this section to show that the person involved in 
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the collusion was a creditor of the debtor. Many of the parties involved in a 
securitisation scheme, such as the credit enhancers and rating agencies, will be 
creditors of the SPV rather than of the originator, and will therefore be immune from 
action in terms of the other sections of the Act. The court may further order penalty 
sums against those involved in the collusive dealings. 
 If fraud was the main motive behind the securitisation scheme, the party most 
likely to be a defendant in the proceedings will be the SPV. Under such circumstances 
the directors of the SPV will probably have colluded with the originator. The transfer 
of the assets to the SPV will be set aside and the SPV will lose all claims against the 
insolvent estate of the originator.  
The investors in the SPV will have to rely on section 33(2) of the Act to protect 
their interests.87 How a court will manage not to affect the interests of the investors 
despite setting aside the disposition is open to speculation as there is no precedent to 
give us guidance in this regard. It is clear that the SPV will be insolvent after the 
setting aside of the disposition. In my opinion, there are two options to protect the 
interests of the investors of the SPV. First, the court can refuse to set aside the 
disposition, because it will inevitably lead to the prejudice of the rights of the 
investors. Second, the court could order that the SPV be liquidated first. However, the 
latter option will to my mind still affect the rights of the investors, who depended on 
the insolvency-remoteness of the SPV from the originator and might not receive the 
full amount due to them. 
 No section of the business community is completely safe from the effects of fraud. 
Securitisation is no exception, but I submit that the involvement of so many parties in 
a conventional securitisation scheme leads to self-regulation and that makes the use of 
this form of financing an unlikely vehicle to commit fraud. 
8.2.5 Indemnity to creditors and rights of third parties 
A person who, on receipt of the impeachable disposition in terms of section 26, 29, 30 
or 31 parted with property or security, or lost any right he held against another person, 
while acting in good faith, is not obliged to return the property to the liquidator before 
the latter has indemnified him for parting with such property or security, or the loss of 
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such a right.88 The onus of pleading and proving the requirements of this section lies 
with the creditor. The purpose of this provision is that when a disposition is set aside, 
both the parties must be restored to the position before the disposition.89 The property 
or security parted with, or the right lost, must have been in exchange for the 
impeached disposition.  
The good faith required in terms of the subsection will be determined by looking at 
the whole of the operation or transaction that gave rise to the disposition and not only 
with reference to the recipient‘s conduct when he parted with the property, security or 
right.90 The recipient will have to show that he did not mean to prejudice the other 
creditors of the debtor or to be preferred above them when he entered into the 
transaction. The recipient of a disposition set aside due to collusive dealings will 
therefore not be able to rely on this provision.91 
 In the event of a successful application by the liquidator of an originator to set 
aside the sale of the assets to the SPV, the SPV will be able to rely on this indemnity. 
The transaction may still be set aside, but the liquidator will not be able to insist on 
compliance with the court‘s order for impeachment before he has delivered the 
indemnity to the creditor. The indemnity will be for the amount paid by the SPV as 
purchase price for the transferred assets. Indemnity can be avoided if there are reasons 
to believe that the SPV was aware of the originator‘s insolvency at the time of the 
disposition and therefore did not act in good faith. The onus of proving that it acted in 
good faith lies with the SPV. I therefore recommend that the SPV should obtain a 
statement by the auditors of the originator or at least by the originator itself, to the 
effect that the originator is solvent at the time of the securitisation transaction and that 
the transaction will further not leave the originator insolvent. 
 An impeachment of a transaction as described in the previous paragraphs may not 
affect the rights of third persons, such as the investors in the securitisation scheme, 
who received property from a person other than the insolvent person, and who acted 
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in good faith and for value.92 ‗Good faith‘ refers to the absence of an intention to 
prejudice creditors or to be preferred above the other creditors of the debtor. There is 
some authority for the view that this provision does not only protect persons who 
became the owners of the disposed property, but also persons who acquired real rights 
over such property, such as security rights.93 
 The SPV will not be able to benefit from this provision, because it acquired the 
property from the insolvent person‘s estate. However, the investors in the SPV will 
have acquired security rights over the assets transferred to the SPV. In my view, 
regardless of the form of security chosen to protect the rights of the investors, this 
section can be used to avoid the impeachment of the disposition. The investors in the 
SPV would have parted with their money to purchase securities issued by it. In return 
they would have received securities, which are secured by the assets transferred to the 
SPV by the originator. Under normal circumstances these investors would have acted 
in good faith. 
 I therefore submit that even if the liquidator impeaches the disposition of the 
transferred assets to the SPV, the court can be asked not to impeach the transaction 
because it would prejudice the rights of these third parties. 
8.3 TRANSFER OF BUSINESS BY TRADER 
Section 34 provides that a trader who in terms of a contract transfers any business 
belonging to him, or the goodwill of such a business, or any goods or property 
forming part thereof, must publish a notice of the intended transfer in the Government 
Gazette and in two issues of an English and two issues of an Afrikaans newspaper 
circulating in the district where the business is carried on, within not less than 30 days 
and not more than 60 days before the date of the transfer. If this notice is not given in 
the prescribed manner the transfer is void against the creditors of the trader for a 
period of six months after the transfer, as well as against the trustee or liquidator of 
the trader‘s estate if the estate is sequestrated or liquidated within the six month 
period. The trader will only be exempt from this requirement if such transfers are in 
the ordinary course of that business or if the transfer was carried out for securing the 
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payment of a debt.94 The provisions of section 34 are applicable to the transfer of its 
business by a company.95 
 After such a notice has been given, every liquidated liability of the trader in 
connection with the business, which would become due at some future date, will fall 
due immediately if the creditor demands payment of the debt. The trader would then 
have to pay such a creditor, provided that the amount of his liability must be reduced 
at a rate of eight per cent per annum over the period between the date when the 
payment is made and the future date on which it should have become payable.96  
The section therefore not only provides for the publication of the transfer, but also 
provides an opportunity for a creditor of the trader to opt out of his relationship with 
the trader. The creditors of the trader are granted this opportunity regardless of the 
reason for the transfer. Even if the transfer has a legitimate business purpose and the 
trader is not experiencing any financial difficulties, it may seem to third parties that 
the trader is in financial difficulty when creditors start to demand payment. 
Such suspicions are supported by the purpose behind this section, namely to 
prevent traders in financial difficulties from disposing of their businesses to third 
parties who are not liable for the business debts, without due advertisement to all 
creditors of the business.97 However, financial difficulty is not a prerequisite for the 
applicability of the section. It applies to all traders who are about to sell a part of their 
businesses. 
Owing to the possible negative signalling that publication of the notice gives to 
third parties, most businesses prefer not to publish the required notice. Originators 
during securitisation transactions would likewise prefer not to publish the transfer of 
assets to the SPV in the manner prescribed in section 34. 
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I submit that it will be possible for most originators to avoid publication of a notice 
in terms of section 34, because most originators do not fall under the definition of 
‗trader‘ in terms of the Act. In terms of section 2 of the Act ‗trader‘ is defined as  
 
any person who carries on any trade, business, industry or undertaking in which property is sold, or 
is bought, exchanged or manufactured for purpose of sale or exchange, or in which building 
operations of whatever nature are performed, or an object whereof is public entertainment, or who 
carries on the business of an hotel keeper or boarding-house keeper, or who acts as a broker or 
agent of any person in the sale or purchaser of any property or in the letting or hiring of immovable 
property; and any person shall be deemed to be a trader for the purpose of this Act … unless it is 
proved that he is not a trader as hereinbefore defined. 
 
In McCarthy Ltd v Gore NO the Supreme Court of Appeal held that this definition is 
meant to create a closed list of categories under which a business must fall before it 
will be required to publish the notice in terms of section 34.98 It is therefore not any 
trade, business, industry or undertaking that falls under the definition, but only those 
engaged in the categories of operations listed in the definition.  
The definition is further limited by looking at the nature of the undertaking that 
will lead to the transfer and determining whether such an undertaking is part of the 
core business of the company or incidental thereto. If the undertaking is not part of its 
core activities the business will not be a trader for the purposes of section 34. For 
instance, in the McCarthy Ltd decision the core business of the transferor was that of a 
transport haulier conveying goods on a long-haul basis. The Court held that the 
occasional factoring of book debts and selling of part of its fleet was incidental to its 
core business and did not qualify the business as a trader in terms of section 34.99 
 I submit that based on the definition of ‗trader‘, read with the restrictive 
interpretation by the Supreme Court of Appeal of that definition, most financial 
institutions that engage in securitisation in South Africa will not fall under the 
definition. Commercial banks and asset-financing institutions are not in the business 
of buying and selling property, nor do their businesses fall under one of the other 
categories set out in the definition. 
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 The issue becomes more problematic when the originator would usually resort 
under the definition of ‗trader‘ and now wants to engage in a securitisation 
transaction. For instance, the originator is a furniture retailer who extends credit as a 
normal part of its business. It now wants to securitise a portion of its claims. One 
needs to determine whether the claims will be ―property forming part of the trader‘s 
business‖ for purposes of section 34. 
 The definition of ‗property‘ in section 2 of the Act does not shed much light on this 
question. It defines ‗property‘ as ―movable or immovable property wherever situate 
within the Republic and includes contingent interests in property‖. ‗Movable 
property‘ is further defined as ―every kind of property and every right or interest 
which is not immovable property.‖ In terms of these definitions a claim will be 
property for purposes of the Act. 
 However, section 34 also requires such property to form part of the trader‘s 
business before its transfer will be subject to the notice requirements of the section. 
The interpretation of ‗forming part of‘ was considered by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Kelvin Park Properties CC v Paterson NO.100 The Court warned against 
formulating a test for the interpretation of this phrase too broadly and indicated that 
each matter had to be considered according to the facts of the particular case.101 
 There is no guidance from case law on whether the securitisation of claims 
resulting from the business of a retailer will form part of the business of the retailer. I 
am of the opinion that the courts will probably consider the claims as forming part of 
the retailer‘s business. The transfer of the claims from the originator to the SPV will 
therefore prima facie have to comply with the notice requirements of section 34. The 
only possible way in which to avoid the giving of such notice will be to convince the 
court that securitisation is part of the ordinary course of business of that retailer. 
 Whether a transaction was in the ordinary course of business is an objective test, in 
other words, whether it is a transaction in which solvent businessmen would 
ordinarily engage.102 The court will further consider the normal business practices of 
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the particular business of the trader in question to decide whether the transaction falls 
within the exception.103 The fact that the disposition of the property was advantageous 
to the business, or even that a price was paid for the items in excess of their market 
value, will not lead to a conclusion that the transaction was in the ordinary course of 
that business.104 In other words, proof that a securitisation transaction was 
advantageous to the business of the trader will not lead to the conclusion that the 
transaction was in the ordinary course of the business of that trader. It has also been 
held that the fact that the transaction was undertaken openly and honestly does not 
necessarily support a finding that it was in the ordinary course of the business of the 
trader.105 
 I do not believe that securitisation as a means of financing by the retail industry has 
yet reached the level of acceptance in South Africa necessary to be able to use this 
exception to section 34. A court might find that securitisation falls in the ordinary 
course of a retailer‘s business after it has successfully organised one or more past 
securitisations. However, for a first-time securitisation I believe that the originator, if 
it falls within the definition of trader generally, will have to comply with the notice 
requirements of section 34. 
8.4 DISPOSITIONS VOIDABLE AT COMMON LAW: ACTIO 
PAULIANA 
The discussion in the previous paragraph sets out the provisions in terms of the 
Insolvency Act by which the disposition of assets by an originator to an SPV in terms 
of a securitisation transaction may possibly be set aside. There is a further possible 
action in terms of the common law by which the liquidator of the originator may 
attempt avoidance of the disposition of the assets to the SPV, namely the actio 
Pauliana.106 
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 The actio Pauliana is available when a debtor has entered into a transaction in 
fraud of and to the actual detriment of his creditors. The transaction can then be set 
aside by the court and the property disposed of can be recovered.107 It is not essential 
that the estate of the debtor must be under liquidation.108  
 ‗Fraud‘ when used in connection with the actio Pauliana does not necessarily refer 
to fraud in the criminal sense of the word, but means that the object of the transaction 
was to provide a specific creditor with an unfair advantage, which constitutes a fraud 
upon other creditors.109 The intention to defraud its creditors could be only that of the 
debtor, or the intention may be shared by the recipient of the disposition.110 In the 
former case the disposition can only be set aside with the actio Pauliana if the 
recipient received the disposition gratuitously and even then only to the extent that he 
was enriched by the acquisition.111  
Since the transfer of the assets from the originator to the SPV will always be for 
value, the actio Pauliana will only be available if it can be proved that the SPV acted 
in collusion with the originator in the transfer of the assets. It may also be pleaded as 
an alternative to section 31 of the Insolvency Act.112 Since section 31 offers the 
additional remedy of a penalty fee,113 the liquidator will usually proceed on the basis 
of that section before resorting to the actio Pauliana, which only provides for the 
restitution of the alienated property.114 
 If the action is successful and the property must be restored to the insolvent estate, 
the purchaser, if party to the fraud, is not entitled to restitution of the purchase price 
paid by him if the money is no longer in the estate of the debtor.115 
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8.5 CONCLUSION 
In the absence of fraud, there is virtually no risk that the liquidator of an insolvent 
originator will be able to impeach the transfer of the assets from the originator to the 
SPV successfully. This is the position notwithstanding the fact that the transfer itself 
will be a ‗disposition‘ in terms of section 2 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
If the transfer of the assets to the SPV is impeached by any of the methods 
discussed in this chapter, the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Banks Act 94 of 1991 
become applicable. This conclusion is based on the requirement of Securitisation 
Notice, 2008 that the sale of the assets from the originator to the SPV must withstand 
legal scrutiny, also in the case of the originator‘s subsequent insolvency. 
 Section 26 of the Insolvency Act is only available if no value was received for the 
disposition.116 During a securitisation transaction the transfer of the assets will always 
be accompanied by payment by the SPV. Furthermore, financing by means of 
securitisation provides certain benefits that can also be regarded as value for purposes 
of this section.117 Arguments that the payment or other benefits received in return for 
the transfer of the assets to the SPV are inadequate, do not properly resort under 
section 26, but must be raised in connection with a voidable preference in terms of 
section 29 or an undue preference in terms of section 30. 
 It is a requirement of section 29 that the debtor must have been insolvent 
immediately after the disposition and of section 30 that the debtor was insolvent at the 
time of the disposition. I indicated that it is most unlikely that an insolvent originator 
will be able to enter into a securitisation transaction. The affairs of the originator are 
scrutinised by rating agencies, lawyers who provide legal opinions to the rating 
agencies on the insolvency-remoteness of the originator and, if applicable, the 
securities exchange where the debt securities are to be listed.  
 However, even in the unlikely event that the originator is found to have been 
insolvent at the time of the transfer of the assets to the SPV, I argued that the chances 
for success under section 29 and 30 are limited. The SPV will be a creditor of the 
originator for purposes of section 29 and the transfer will have the effect of preferring 
the SPV to other creditors, which means that the liquidator will have satisfied the 
                                                 
116
 Paragraph 8.2.1. 
117
 See par 2.2. 
ASPECTS OF TRADITIONAL SECURITISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
400 
prima facie onus of proof required by the section.118 However, section 29 provides a 
defence to the creditor, namely that the transaction was in the ordinary course of the 
business of the debtor and that there was no intention to prefer. I pointed out that this 
defence will be available to the SPV in most cases. 
 Although only in use for 20 years, securitisation is now an established form of 
financing.119 It cannot be contended that securitisation per se is extraordinary, 
although the terms of each transaction will have to be evaluated to determine whether 
a particular transaction fell outside the parameters of the ordinary course of business 
of the debtor. It must further be remembered that one securitisation scheme will often 
not be identical in its structure to others. 
 The evaluation of the requirements of the ―intention to prefer‖ in terms of     
section 29 showed that the motivation of an originator to enter into a securitisation 
scheme will seldom amount to a primary or dominant intention to prefer the SPV to 
its other creditors.120 The primary intention behind most securitisation schemes, which 
are scrutinised by various role-players other than the originator, is financing and the 
benefits that arise from this particular method of financing. 
 For the same reason, I do not envisage that a liquidator will be able to rely 
successfully on the provisions of section 30. This section does not carry the time 
restriction of six months that section 29 sets, but the onus of proving that the 
disposition was made with the intention to prefer a specific creditor lies with the 
liquidator. As I indicated above, most securitisation transactions are not entered into 
with an intention to prefer. 
 If it is possible to prove fraud or collusion between the originator, the SPV and 
possibly other role-players in the securitisation transaction, section 31 might be 
available to impeach the disposition,121 or alternatively, the common law actio 
Pauliana.122 
 The actio Pauliana will only be an option if it is possible to prove that the SPV 
colluded in defrauding the creditors of the originator, which in this context means that 
the object of the disposition was to give a particular creditor an unfair advantage 
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above the other creditors of the debtor. I explain above that proof of such intent in the 
context of securitisation is unlikely. However, since a successful application in terms 
of the actio Pauliana will not be subject to section 33(2) of the Act, it is uncertain 
what the effect of this order will be in regard to the rights of third parties, especially 
the investors of the SPV.  
Section 33(2) of the Act provides that an order in terms of section 26, 29, 30 or 31 
may not affect the rights of third parties who received property in good faith and for 
value.123 I argue that the investors in the SPV will resort under this category of 
persons. The courts will have difficulty in making any order for impeachment of a 
disposition that will not have the effect of prejudicing the rights of the investors. I 
therefore conclude that even when there is proof of fraud or collusion it will be 
difficult to obtain an order for impeachment. 
 I considered the possible applicability of the notice requirements of section 34 to a 
securitisation transaction.124 I came to the conclusion that many originators will not 
qualify as ‗traders‘ in terms of this section and will therefore not have to comply with 
this requirement. However, if an originator is a trader in terms of its normal business 
operations I submit that claims resulting from these trading activities will resort under 
the business of the trader. The transfer of these claims in terms of a securitisation 
transaction will consequently be a transfer of part of the businesses of that trader.  
The notice requirement of section 34 will only be avoided if the trader can prove 
that it is part of its ordinary course of business to transfer assets by way of 
securitisation. I cannot foresee that many traders will be successful with such an 
argument. Consequently, securitisations undertaken by originators that qualify as 
―traders‖ in terms of the section 34 should comply with the notice requirements of 
that section. This unfortunately implies that every liquidated liability of the trader in 
connection with the business, which would become due at some future date, will fall 
due immediately if the creditor demands payment of the debt. 
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CHAPTER 9  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this thesis I considered aspects of traditional securitisation in South African law. 
The thesis can be divided into three main sections, namely (1) the structure of a 
traditional securitisation scheme, (2) the regulatory aspects relevant to traditional 
securitisation in South African law, and (3) the true sale requirement and insolvency-
remoteness. I also considered each of these aspects in American law and in English 
law. Although the structures of securitisation schemes are based on those used in 
these two jurisdictions, I showed that the law with regard to the transfer of assets to 
the SPV as well as the law of security in South Africa differ from the law in these 
jurisdictions. Such differences must be borne in mind when securitisation schemes are 
structured in South Africa. In this chapter I summarise my conclusions on each of 
these main sections with recommendations immediately following. 
9.1 STRUCTURE OF SECURITISATION SCHEME 
Traditional securitisation is the pooling of a homogeneous group of income-producing 
assets, the sale of these assets by the original holder (originator) to an insolvency-
remote third party (a special purpose vehicle or SPV) and the issue by the special 
purpose vehicle of marketable securities (commercial paper or other debt instruments) 
to finance the purchase of the assets.1 The transferred assets provide the cash flow to 
service the obligations under the issued securities. The transferred assets, which I 
assumed in this discussion to be claims, are collected by a servicer at a fee. This 
function is often retained by the originator. The transferred assets further serve as 
security for the obligations of the SPV towards its investors. Usually a trustee for 
debenture-holders or a security SPV holds this security on behalf of the investors. The 
transferred assets and the structure of the securitisation scheme are rated by a rating 
agency at a fee. Depending on the rating that the originator aims to achieve, the rating 
agency may recommend certain credit enhancements. These credit enhancements may 
be internal, that is, from the originator, or external from third parties. The structure of 
the scheme aims to reduce as far as possible the risk of default of the SPV on its 
duties towards the investors.  
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The advantages that securitisation offers in comparison to other forms of financing 
depend mainly on two aspects,2 namely 
1 Checks and balances built into the structuring of the scheme in order to ensure that 
investors are protected. These checks and balances include the limitation of the 
capacity and powers of the SPV, a rating of the securities by a reputable rating 
agency, credit enhancement and security in favour of a trustee for debenture-
holders or a security SPV. If executed with care, these checks and balances should 
be enough to protect the interests of investors without the need for substantial 
legislative regulation.3 
2 The sale of the assets to the SPV, so that the assets are permanently removed from 
the estate of the originator outside of the reach of its creditors or its liquidator.4 
9.1.1 Rating agencies 
The rating agency plays a particularly important role from the start of the transaction 
in evaluating every component and providing opinions on how to maximise the 
potential of the scheme to give optimal safeguards to the investors.5 At least one 
aspect of securitisation schemes in South Africa, namely the use of a security SPV 
rather than a trustee for debenture-holders, has been the result of the influence of 
rating agencies. Rating agencies are further important, because the investment 
mandates of most institutional investors require that they only invest in securities with 
a specific minimum rating. This means that the safety of the investment of the life 
savings of many ordinary people rests on the integrity of the rating provided by these 
agencies.  
I concluded that extensive regulation of rating agencies is not necessary. I believe 
that liability can follow in terms of the common law if rating agencies provide an 
inaccurate rating because of a negligent performance of their duties. However, I 
believe that South Africa can benefit from a system of certification of rating agencies 
to indicate the quality of the ratings of a particular agency.6 
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9.1.2 Security SPV 
In most respects the structure of a typical traditional securitisation scheme in South 
Africa is similar to the structure used in the United States of America and in England. 
However, the structure of the vehicle used to hold security on behalf of the investors 
in the scheme differs substantially from that used in other jurisdictions. Instead of 
making use of a typical trustee for debenture-holders, security is held on behalf of 
investors by a second company incorporated for this purpose, to which I refer as the 
security SPV.7 
 The use of a security SPV in South African securitisation schemes is a 
consequence of the insistence by rating agencies that transaction creditors involved in 
the securitisation scheme must agree not to institute applications for winding-up of the 
SPV before two years after the final claims of the investors have been paid. These 
non-petition clauses reduce the risk of the insolvency of the SPV. However, 
transaction creditors are not willing to enter into such agreements, unless the SPV 
grants security in their favour over the assets of the SPV.  
There is uncertainty in South African law about whether a debenture trust could 
provide security through the same trust to beneficiaries other than the debenture-
holders. This uncertainty is created by the fact that section 117 of the Companies Act8 
that provides for the trust for debenture-holders makes no mention of other creditors 
of the company. 
 I concluded that sections 117 to 121 of the Companies Act that deal with security 
for debentures are superfluous and only lead to uncertainty and inefficiency.9 The 
uncertainty lies in the fact that only debenture-holders are mentioned, when it ought to 
be possible to grant security in favour of a trustee for any creditor of a company. The 
inefficiency lies in the fact that neither the Deeds Registries Act10 nor the Trust 
Property Control Act11 makes any mention of the provisions of the Companies Act 
that deal with trusts for debenture-holders. 
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 The security SPV binds itself as guarantor for the duties of the issuer SPV towards 
its creditors. When the issuer SPV defaults in respect of its duties, the security SPV 
will be liable to fulfil those duties. The issuer SPV indemnifies the security SPV in 
the event that the guarantee becomes effective. The duties in terms of the indemnity 
are secured by a pledge of the shares in the issuer SPV in favour of the security SPV 
by the shareholders. The duties are further secured by way of a fiduciary security 
cession of the assets of the issuer SPV. The liability of the security SPV towards the 
creditors in terms of the guarantee is limited to the amount recovered from the issuer 
SPV in terms of the indemnity. 
When the guarantee is called up the security SPV becomes the debtor of the 
debenture-holders and the other transaction creditors. I have two concerns regarding 
the absence of a trustee for debenture-holders under these circumstances. First, the 
security SPV will have to call up its own guarantee, because it serves not only as 
guarantor but also as monitor of the issuer SPV. Second, after the security SPV 
becomes liable under the guarantee there will be no person to guard over the interests 
of the debenture-holders collectively. At this stage there will be no one to monitor the 
security SPV‘s obligations under the guarantee for the debenture-holders. 
I concluded that it would be beneficial to the interests of debenture-holders to 
make use of a trust for debenture-holders to represent their interests in a security SPV. 
The trustee for debenture-holders could then monitor the security SPV when the 
guarantee is called up. The trustee can institute proceedings on behalf of the 
debenture-holders before the guarantee is called up or when the true sale of the assets 
is argued before a court during the liquidation of the originator.  
9.1.3 Trust for debenture-holders 
I considered whether a trust for debenture-holders should take the form of agency,12 a 
bewind trust13 or a true trust.14 When considered against the benefits that one wants to 
gain by using a trust for debenture-holders,15 I concluded that the true trust 
construction of a trust for debenture-holders best achieves these benefits. 
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 If the debenture trust takes the form of an agency, it will not be possible to register 
security in favour of the ‗trustee‘, because section 54 of the Deeds Registries Act16 
prohibits the registration of security in the name of an agent.17 Consequently, the 
security will have to be registered in favour of the individual debenture-holders. 
Priority is determined by the date of registration in the case of mortgages and special 
notarial bonds. It will therefore be impossible to give the debenture-holders equal 
priority. Registration of security rights for potentially thousands of debenture-holders 
is impractical from a financial and administrative point of view. Registration in the 
names of the individual debenture-holders further implies that each transfer of the 
debenture would mean that the registered bond must be ceded. This may severely 
restrict the transferability of the debentures. The agency construction will therefore 
only work if there are relatively few debenture-holders who do not foresee the transfer 
of the debentures. This will obviously not be advantageous for a securitisation 
scheme.  
Under the trust construction of the debenture trust, compliance with the Trust 
Property Control Act18 is necessary. The applicability of the Act brings a measure of 
protection of the interests of the debenture-holders. The Act separates the trust 
property from the personal estate of the trustee. It also requires proper bookkeeping 
and requires that trust property be clearly registered as such. It makes the trustee 
accountable to the Master when called upon to do so. 
Owing to the accessory nature of most security rights, both the principal debt and 
the security rights must vest in the same person.19 This leads to the conclusion that 
under the trust construction of the debenture trust the principal debts and the security 
must either vest in the debenture-holders or in the trustee. The principal debt cannot 
vest in the debenture-holders but the security right in the trustee. 
I suggested that the trust for debenture-holders could take the form of a bewind 
trust if a second SPV is introduced into the structure. This second SPV will take up all 
the issued debentures and transfer them to the debenture-holders as beneficiaries 
under the trust. The principal debt and the security rights will vest in the debenture-
holders. However, control will vest in the trustee. I concluded that this structure is not 
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recommended, because as in the case of the agency construction, the security will 
have to be registered in the names of the individual debenture-holders. 
In the true trust construction of the trust for debenture-holders, the debenture-
holders cede their claims to the trustee as a condition of the debenture. The debenture-
holders themselves act as founders of the trust and serve as its beneficiaries. Security 
may be granted directly in favour of the trustee. Other transaction creditors could cede 
their claims to the trustee in a similar manner, in which case the trustee could hold the 
security in their favour also. Since the trustee holds the security on behalf of the 
debenture-holders as beneficiaries, there is no need to re-register the security when 
the debentures are sold. The new debenture-holder will simply become the new 
beneficiary under the trust. 
9.1.4 Form of security in favour of security SPV 
Security by means of claims can be created by way of a general notarial bond, a 
pledge of claims or a fiduciary security cession. 
There are several reasons why the general notarial bond is a weak form of 
security:20     
 An unperfected general notarial bond does not give its holder real security, but 
only a statutory preference on the insolvency of the debtor. 
 Before perfection the debtor may alienate the encumbered property, may create 
real security over those assets in priority to the general notarial bondholder and 
the debtor‘s creditors may attach the encumbered property.  
 The hypothecation of a shop is, in my opinion, a form of special notarial bond that 
cannot comply with the specificity requirements of the Security by Means of 
Movable Property Act.21 The decision of the Appellate Division in Cooper NO v 
Die Meester22 implies that the holder of such a bond does not enjoy a preference 
over the other creditors of the debtor. Security over the stock-in-trade cannot be 
created under the Security by Means of Movable Property Act, because of its 
fluctuating nature which means that it cannot be described in the manner required 
by the Act. Stock-in-trade will fall under a general notarial bond. I further 
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concluded that even if third parties had actual knowledge of a general notarial 
bond over the stock-in-trade, they would be able to assume that it was the 
intention of the parties to the security agreement that the stock-in-trade could be 
alienated.23 
 The perfection of general notarial bonds in terms of current South African law 
gives rise to unsatisfactory results:24 
o Only the first general notarial bondholder that perfects his security will have 
a secured claim against the estate of the debtor.  
o The other general notarial bondholders will always only be preferred over 
the unsecured creditors of the debtor‘s insolvent estate, because only one 
person can take physical control of a security object.  
o This is the position regardless of the fact that the other general notarial 
bonds might have been registered before the one that was perfected. 
o Bondholders cannot effectively strengthen their position by means of 
contractual clauses to prevent later security over the assets, because third 
parties are not deemed to be aware of such clauses. 
o It makes no difference whether the other bondholders were only fractionally 
later than the successful bondholder in their attempts to perfect.  
o If the provisional winding-up of the debtor followed an interim order for 
attachment in terms of a perfection clause, this alone will not be enough to 
keep the court from confirming the attachment order on the return date. 
 
I concluded that the legislature will have to reconsider the perfection of general 
notarial bonds in order to overcome the impossibility of more than one creditor to take 
control of the assets encumbered by a general notarial bond. 
A shortcoming in the Deed Registries Act25 is that its definition of ‗person‘ does 
not include a trust for the registration of interests in movable property.26 The 
implication of this is that the registration of notarial bonds, both special and general, 
in favour of a trustee is strictly speaking not possible in accordance with the Act. The 
fact that the Registrar of Deeds allows such registration in practice does not change 
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this position. One of the methods by which security over claims can be granted in 
South African law is through a general notarial bond. If the validity of the registration 
of general notarial bonds is in question, the use of general notarial bonds during 
securitisation will lead to a lower rating of the securities issued by the SPV. 
When considering which form of security to use, it is important to avoid any 
necessity of having to give notice to the debtors about the scheme. Notice may cause 
uncertainty and carries administrative and cost implications. The originator will often 
want to maintain a business relationship with its debtors and would not want the 
debtors to make payments to a third party. Since it is still uncertain in South African 
law whether notice to debtors is necessary to perfect a pledge of claims,27 a fiduciary 
security cession of claims is in my opinion the most certain security over claims and 
ought to receive better ratings from rating agencies.28 
9.2 REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRADITIONAL 
SECURITISATION 
There is no consolidated statutory regulation of securitisation in South Africa. This is 
also the case in the United States of America and in England. I do not believe that 
there should be such regulation, because securitisation as a form of financing is still 
evolving in many aspects, such as the types of assets used and the securities issued 
during the transaction. Extensive regulation might stifle such innovation. 
Furthermore, a securitisation scheme already contains various measures to reduce risk 
to investors and to monitor the servicing of the assets of the SPV. In other words, 
securitisation is self-regulatory. 
 However, there are several pieces of legislation that impact on securitisation: 
9.2.1 Securitisation Notice, 2008 
Securitisation Notice, 2008 is the most important regulation with regard to 
securitisation in South Africa.29 An SPV that issues securities to the public must 
comply with the Notice to be exempted from falling under the definition of ‗the 
business of a bank‘ in terms of the Banks Act.30 Although the Notice is only 
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applicable to SPVs that issue securities to the public, the Notice does provide 
guidance as to what the legislature regards as best practice and is therefore important 
when considering securitisation in general. 
 The current Securitisation Notice is the fourth of its kind. Initially only banks 
could act as originators of securitisation schemes.31 Furthermore, the provisions of 
Commercial Paper Notice, 1994 only exempted issues of commercial paper issued or 
transferred in denominations equal to or greater than R1 million and by a company 
that had net assets exceeding R100 million in the 18 months preceding the issue from 
falling under the definition of ‗the business of a bank‘.32 These restrictions did not 
apply if the securities were listed on a recognised financial exchange, or were 
endorsed by a bank, or were issued for longer than five years, or were issued or 
backed by Central Government. This meant that even if originators other than banks 
could use securitisation during this time, only large issues of securities by an SPV 
could qualify for exemption in terms of Commercial Paper Notice, 1994. 
 Securitisation Notice, 2001 was the first instrument that really opened the 
possibility to non-bank originators, as well as to smaller originators, to make use of 
securitisation.33 It further contained its own requirements for the issue of commercial 
paper by an SPV, which replaced the requirements of Commercial Paper Notice, 
1994. 
 Securitisation Notice, 2004 mainly introduced the regulation of synthetic 
securitisation schemes. It also improved a few ambiguous provisions of the previous 
Notice with regard to traditional securitisation. 
 Securitisation Notice, 2008 does not materially alter Securitisation Notice, 2004, 
but rather adds certain matters that were not addressed previously. The Notice 
contains a paragraph devoted solely to the aspect of continued control of the assets by 
the originator and its impact on insolvency-remoteness. The transferor may not 
maintain any effective or indirect control over the assets after transfer to the SPV. The 
assets and the benefits flowing from those assets must be transferred to the SPV in 
such a manner that they are beyond the reach of the transferor (originator) even in the 
event of its insolvency. The transferor is deemed to have maintained effective control 
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over the transferred assets when the transferor is able to repurchase the assets from the 
SPV in order to realise their benefits or if it is obligated to retain the risk relating to 
the transferred assets. The continued servicing of the assets by the transferor is 
expressly excluded as a form of indirect control of the assets.  
The new provisions of Securitisation Notice, 2008 seem to indicate that there is an 
increased awareness on the side of regulators that continued control by the originator 
of the assets after transfer to the SPV may pose problems to the insolvency-
remoteness of the scheme. Most of the provisions aim to ensure that the originator‘s 
role after the transfer is limited and well described, so that the originator cannot 
increase its involvement if the transferred assets do not perform as expected. 
However, the Notice is flawed in one material aspect. This flaw inadvertently 
negates the purpose of separation of the originator and the SPV. The Schedule to 
Securitisation Notice, paragraph 4(2)(a) contains the following provision: 
 
The transfer of the assets to or acquisition of assets by a special-purpose institution shall totally 
divest the transferring institution and all its associated companies and, when the transferring 
institution is a bank, divest any other institution within the banking group of which such a bank is a 
member, of all rights and obligations originating from the underlying transactions and all risks in 
connection with the assets transferred or acquired (my emphasis). 
 
The Notice further foresees the possibility of securitising an ―undrawn commitment‖ 
to lend money to a borrower.34 In such a case the only possibilities for the transfer of 
the undrawn commitment allowed by the Notice are novation, assignment or any 
other means specified in writing by the Registrar. 
 I concluded that these provisions of the Securitisation Notice, 2008, implies that 
the type of transfer agreement that will comply with the requirements of the 
exemption notice is delegation. However, in my opinion, delegation is not the most 
suited method by which to transfer the assets to the SPV.35 
Even if the duties arising out of agreements with the debtors are transferred to the 
SPV as foreseen by the Notice, the SPV will not be in a position to actively 
participate in the fulfilment of those duties. An SPV has, per definition, only a limited 
main objective, namely to raise money from the public, backed by the assets 
transferred to it by the originator. It does not have capital available to meet lending 
obligations of the type that Securitisation Notice foresees, nor does it maintain the 
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personnel to administer and manage an ongoing business relationship with a debtor. 
Nor will it suffice to use the originator/servicer to administer such a relationship, 
because the definition of ‗servicing agent‘ in the Notice only covers the collection of 
amounts due and does not make provision for the administration of ongoing lending 
activities. The retention of such functions by the originator would, in my opinion, 
amount to something more than the servicing of the amounts due. 
Paragraph 4(2)(j) of the Schedule of Securitisation Notice, 2008 is, in my opinion, 
contradictory when the objective of accomplishing a true sale is borne in mind: 
 
The agreement between the institution transferring the assets in terms of a traditional securitisation 
scheme and the special-purpose institution shall be such that, in the event of the terms of an 
underlying transaction being amended, the special-purpose institution, and not the transferring 
institution, or any of the transferring institution‘s associated companies or, when the transferring 
institution is a bank, any other institution within the banking group of which such a bank is a 
member will be subject to the terms so amended. 
 
Again this paragraph implies that the assets are transferred to the SPV by way of 
delegation. The amendment of the underlying agreement to the effect that the SPV 
and not the originator is bound, assumes that the debtor consented to a substitution of 
lenders. Furthermore, although it does not expressly state this, the paragraph suggests 
that the debtor will continue to deal with the originator. If this was not the case and 
the debtor dealt directly with the SPV, the amendment of the underlying transaction 
would be a new agreement between the debtor and the SPV and the paragraph would 
become superfluous. It seems then that the paragraph foresees that the debtor will 
amend the terms of the underlying agreement through negotiation with the originator, 
but that the SPV will be bound by the terms of the varied agreement. 
 I concluded that this paragraph grants the originator blanket consent to act on 
behalf of the SPV in the variation of the terms of the underlying transaction. Despite 
the efforts of Securitisation Notice to separate the corporate governance of the SPV 
from the control of the originator,36 this paragraph allows that acts by the originator 
will bind the SPV. I doubt whether this was the intention. 
9.2.2 Banks Act 94 of 1990 
An SPV that does not comply with the provisions of Securitisation Notice, 2008 when 
it issues securities to the general public, will fall under the provisions of Chapter VIII 
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of the Banks Act.37 These provisions essentially aim to reverse the transactions that 
occurred while the transgressing institution was not registered as a bank. The 
Registrar of Banks can appoint a manager to oversee this process and extensive 
powers are given to the manager in this respect.  
Both the SPV and the originator will be affected if such a manager is appointed. 
The SPV would have used the money raised from the issue of securities to pay for the 
transfer of the claims. The manager will have the authority to follow that money to the 
originator and to reclaim it in order to repay the investors. It is doubtful whether it 
will be possible to reverse a securitisation scheme without loss to the investors in the 
scheme. Also, the originator will suffer severe reputational loss under these 
circumstances. 
The Banks Amendment Act38 amended Chapter VIII, dealing with the management 
of an institution that did not comply with the exemption notice.39 In future the 
manager must report on the solvency of the scheme on his appointment. The Registrar 
is given extensive powers under the Act to prevent the commencement of liquidation 
proceedings and to stay all legal action against the institution under management. 
When the institution is an SPV under a securitisation scheme, it will, in my opinion, 
be in the best interests of the investors in the scheme if the Registrar consults with the 
trustee for debenture-holders before taking action in terms of Chapter VIII. The 
Registrar could further consider appointing the trustee as manager when the 
provisions of Chapter VIII take effect. 
9.2.3 National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
In my opinion, proper consumer protection measures will aid securitisation in the long 
run, because the default patterns of debtors may become more predictable.40 Better 
predictability of such default patterns will, in turn, enhance the efficiency of the 
structuring of the securitisation scheme. Rating agencies will take special note of the 
provisions of the Act when they rate the quality of the claims ceded to the SPV. 
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 The issuer SPV will need to register as a credit provider in terms of the Act, 
because it will acquire the rights of a credit provider.41 The originator will usually be a 
credit provider in terms of section 1 of the Act. 
 However, it is less clear whether the trustee for debenture-holders or the security 
SPV will also need to register as a credit provider. Since non-compliance with the 
registration requirement will leave the underlying credit agreements to be classified as 
unlawful agreements and void in terms of section 89, it is safest to register the trustee 
for debenture-holders or security SPV as a credit provider. 
From a theoretical point of view it is only necessary for the trustee for debenture-
holders or security SPV to immediately register as a credit provider if the securities 
issued by the SPV are secured by way of fiduciary security cession. In this form of 
security the claims will be ceded to the trustee for debenture-holders or security SPV, 
who then acquires the rights of a credit provider. The SPV does not retain these rights 
when this form of security is used, but only has a reversionary interest that the 
remaining claims will be receded to it after it had complied with its obligations in 
terms of the issued securities. 
 If a pledge of claims is used as a form of security, the duty to register as a credit 
provider will only arise after default of the SPV. During a pledge of claims the 
entitlement to realise the claim is transferred to the pledgee, but this entitlement may 
only be exercised by the pledgee after default by the pledgor. The claim itself remains 
in the estate of the pledgor. The pledgee will not acquire the rights of a credit provider 
before it is entitled to realise the claims in terms of the pledge. Furthermore, if the 
securitisation scheme goes as planned this entitlement will not become effective at all, 
which would make the registration of the trustee or security SPV as credit provider 
superfluous. 
 If a general notarial bond is used as security, the trustee or security SPV will only 
acquire the rights of a credit provider after perfection of the bond, which in the case of 
claims will be after notice is given to debtors. Until then the SPV will continue to 
collect the claims for its own account through its appointed servicer. The trustee or 
security SPV will not have acquired the rights of a credit provider as stipulated in the 
Act. 
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9.2.4 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
It must be determined whether a particular securitisation will constitute the disposal of 
the whole or a substantial part of the assets or the undertaking of the originator.42 If so, 
a special resolution by the members of the originator will be necessary to effect the 
scheme. The scheme will then also be an affected transaction that will fall under the 
supervision of the Securities Regulation Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers.43  
Conflicts of interest may arise where a director of the originator has interests in the 
SPV or in one of the other parties involved with the scheme.44 The board of directors 
of the originator must be careful in this regard.  
Securitisation also places added duties on the shoulders of the originator‘s 
company secretary,45 if appointed, and on the auditor of the originator and SPV.46 The 
SPV‘s auditor must certify that there has been compliance with the requirements of 
Securitisation Notice, 2008. 
The SPV must issue a prospectus if its securities will be offered to the public.47 
9.2.5 Companies Bill 61 of 2008 
The Companies Bill does away with the distinction between the memorandum and 
articles of association of a company. Instead, it prescribes one constitutive document, 
namely the memorandum of incorporation. At present the memorandum of 
association of an SPV limits its capacity to transactions concerned with the 
securitisation scheme and matters incidental thereto.48 Such a limitation of the 
capacity of the SPV is also a requirement of Securitisation Notice, 200849 and is 
important for rating agencies when they consider the rating of the securities issued by 
the SPV.50 I concluded that the Companies Bill leaves enough flexibility for the 
inclusion of restrictions in the memorandum of incorporation of an SPV to limit its 
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capacity and the powers of its directors to act outside such capacity.51 The potential 
for a downgraded rating and non-compliance with Securitisation Notice, 2008 will 
urge shareholders and directors of an SPV to uphold the limitations on the powers and 
capacity of the SPV.  
 The Bill still defines the disposal of the whole or a substantial part of the assets of 
a company as an affected transaction.52 It further provides shareholder protection by 
requiring court sanction if more than 15 per cent of shareholders voted against the 
disposal and any shareholder who voted against the resolution applies for the court‘s 
review of the transaction. There is also a procedure in the Bill whereby a shareholder 
who was against the adoption of the resolution, may notify the company of his 
objection so that the company can purchase his shares at a fair market value. These 
provisions effectively leave the protection of minority shareholders, where a disposal 
of the assets or undertaking of a company is proposed, in the hands of the court. It 
remains unclear, as is the case under the current inclusion of section 228 transactions 
under the definition of an affected transaction, why these provisions are included in 
the sphere of securities regulation. 
9.2.6 Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 
I considered whether a securitisation scheme could be construed to be a collective 
investment scheme within the meaning of the Collective Investment Schemes Control 
Act.53 Securitisation schemes are not specifically excluded from the operation of the 
Act. Furthermore, the definition of ‗collective investment scheme‘ provided in the Act 
is so wide that it could include a securitisation scheme. 
 In the United States of America and in England the possible application to 
securitisation schemes of the regulatory framework for collective investment schemes 
is acknowledged.54 Compliance with these regulations is costly and time consuming. 
Consequently SPVs, and in some cases also the originators, usually apply for 
exemption from compliance with these provisions. Alternatively, they structure the 
scheme in such a manner that it will fall under one of the exemptions of the applicable 
legislation and therefore will not be construed as a collective investment scheme. 
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 There are differences between a typical collective investment scheme and a typical 
securitisation scheme. The managers of a collective investment scheme buy and sell 
securities or property on a regular basis. Whereas the SPV issues securities to fund the 
acquisition of assets from the originator, the manager of a collective investment 
scheme needs capital of its own in order to initiate the scheme. There are minimum 
capital requirements for managers of collective investment schemes.  
The duties of the custodian of a collective investment scheme differ from those of 
a trustee for investors during securitisation. The custodian is directly responsible for 
the administration of the trade in participatory interests in the collective investment 
scheme. The custodian is obliged to follow the instructions of the manager, unless 
they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or with the trust deed. It follows 
that the custodian does not truly function independently from the manager, although it 
has certain supervisory functions with regard to the manager.  
Most importantly, the custodian does not hold the assets as security for the 
participations of the investors. Rather, the custodian becomes the owner of the assets 
and the rights of the investors are those of beneficiaries in a trust. The custodian 
indemnifies both the manager and the investors against any loss of money or damage 
to assets in its custody caused by its wilful or negligent act or omission, which 
explains the high capital maintenance requirements set for custodians. 
I concluded that there are situations where a securitisation could fall under the 
definition of a collective investment scheme. This will be the case where the SPV 
issues securities to the public and the trustee for debenture-holders falls under the true 
trust construction, coupled with a fiduciary security cession of the assets. The 
investors will then be beneficiaries under a trust arrangement, with a participatory 
interest in the income generated by the assets.  
9.2.7 Debt Collectors Act 114 of 1998 
I concluded that the servicer during a securitisation scheme will have to register as a 
debt collector in terms of the Debt Collectors Act.55 The Act provides that amounts 
collected by a debt collector and deposited in the separate trust account that it must 
maintain for such purposes, do not form part of his estate and cannot be attached by 
his creditors. This provides a measure of protection to the SPV and to its investors. 
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9.3 TRUE SALE REQUIREMENT AND INSOLVENCY-
REMOTENESS 
The structure of the securitisation scheme and legislation applicable specifically to 
securitisation schemes, such as Securitisation Notice, 2008, aim to support a finding 
of a true sale of the assets by the originator to the SPV. After the sale of the assets, the 
assets must not be available to the creditors of the originator or to its liquidator on its 
subsequent insolvent liquidation. 
9.3.1 Sale as obligationary agreement between originator and SPV 
The contract of sale provides the justa causa for the transfer agreement.56 Owing to 
the operation of the abstract system of the transfer of rights in South African law, the 
invalidity of the contract of sale will not affect the transfer of the claims to the SPV. 
Should the SPV be declared insolvent under such circumstances, the investors will 
have secured claims against the insolvent estate of the SPV, whereas the originator 
will have a concurrent claim for the value of the transferred assets based on unjust 
enrichment. 
9.3.2 Transfer agreement between originator and SPV 
The method of transfer currently implied by Securitisation Notice, 2008 is delegation. 
I concluded that cession lends itself much better to the objectives of a typical 
securitisation scheme. The reasons why I prefer cession to delegation are the 
following:57 
 The debtor must not only be informed of the transfer during delegation, but must 
also give his consent for the substitution of his debtor with another party. 
Typically, one does not want to inform the debtor of the securitisation, because 
this will be a huge administrative task and may lead to uncertainty and concern on 
the part of the debtor. If the original agreement was in writing and contained a 
standard non-variation clause, the written agreement will have to be substituted 
for a new one. This has administrative, time-delay and cost implications.  
 Delegation is a form of novation. Novation brings an end to a claim and the claim 
is replaced with a new one. During delegation the accessory security rights that 
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secured the original claim will cease to exist together with the claim. A new 
security right must be created with the creation of the new claim, for which the co-
operation of the security grantor will be necessary. The new security right‘s 
priority will be determined according to the time when all the requirements for the 
creation of the new security right were met, and not with reference to the priority 
of the previous security right. 
 The SPV may be unable to perform the duties transferred to it, because of the 
limitations stated in its objects clause.  
 The duties transferred to the SPV may render the SPV vulnerable to insolvency, 
because it is not supposed to engage in business outside of the securitisation 
scheme. An example is the securitisation of operating leases of equipment. Such 
leases usually entail that the lessor, which will be the SPV after transfer, remains 
responsible for maintenance of the equipment. 
 
Cession is effected in South African law by agreement alone. Notice to the debtor is 
not a requirement,58 nor is the delivery of the document that evidences the right.59 
9.3.3 Transfer of security rights 
It is essential for the transfer of all security rights with an accessory nature that the 
principal debt is transferred to the SPV by way of cession and not through delegation. 
Delegation is a form of novation which leads to the termination of the claim. 
Accessory security rights will cease to exist when delegation is used during 
securitisation. Since delegation is implied by Securitisation Notice, 2008, it must be 
concluded that all accessory security rights held by the originator before transfer of 
the claims to the SPV cease to exist on transfer. 
The SPV will have to enter into new agreements with the security grantors to 
obtain secured claims against the debtors. The priority of such security will not be 
determined with reference to the previous security, but will depend on the time of 
creation of the new security rights. The following comments assume that the claims 
are transferred to the SPV by means of cession. 
I considered the requirements for the transfer of security rights that secure the 
claims that are sold to the SPV.60 Suretyship follows the principal debt without the 
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need for a separate agreement to transfer the security, unless this possibility is 
expressly excluded. The originator will be entitled to transfer claims it holds in terms 
of fiduciary security cession to the SPV, unless restricted in the agreement creating 
the right. If the claims are secured by way of a pledge of claims, the consent of the 
pledgor is necessary, but such consent can be given in the original security agreement.  
In the case of real security rights, the transfer of the security to the SPV should not 
pose major difficulties to securitisation. The requirements for the transfer of such 
rights are a real agreement61 and publicity of the transfer by means of registration or 
delivery. The Deeds Registries Act62 makes provision for the registration of a transfer 
of mortgage bonds and notarial bonds. Consent for the transfer of the real security 
right can, in my opinion, be granted in the original security agreement, i.e. between 
the originator and the debtor. 
9.3.3.1 Transfer of covering bonds 
The current requirement of Securitisation Notice, 2008 that the transfer of the assets 
must divest the originator of both rights and obligations leads to specific difficulties 
for the transfer of covering bonds.63 
 If the contract by which future advances to the debtor were agreed is terminated on 
the transfer to the SPV, the bond will change from a covering bond to a bond for a 
fixed amount and the transfer should not pose any problems. 
 It is possible in terms of section 52 of the Deeds Registries Act64 to transfer a 
covering bond. However, section 52 foresees future advances by the cessionary of the 
principal debt, because the limit initially registered for the covering bond will 
continue to apply after the transfer of the bond. The SPV does not have the capacity 
or the capital to act as a credit provider in this manner.  
It will usually not be the intention that the business relationship between the 
originator and the debtor should come to an end after the securitisation. The originator 
wants to cede the balance at a particular moment to the SPV, while retaining the 
possibility of future advances to the debtor by keeping the contract with the client in 
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tact. The credit institution will want to retain the bond to secure future claims against 
the debtor. However, the bond cannot be split to cover claims owed to two creditors, 
as this is prohibited by section 50(5) of the Deeds Registries Act. It would in effect be 
an illegal participation bond.  
Furthermore, for policy reasons the legislative creation of the possibility of the 
splitting of a bond is not recommended. Even if the debtor consented in the original 
bond agreement to the transfer of the bond, the debtor probably did not foresee that 
such a transfer could be only partial and that the bond could be split in favour of more 
than one security holder. 
If it were possible to cede the claims only to the SPV as they arise, the following 
arrangement would be recommended: the originator transfers the covering bond to the 
SPV and cedes the claims that arise under its business relationship with the debtor to 
the SPV as they arise. In other words, the claims as they arise are ceded to the SPV, 
but the originator remains liable for the duties under the original agreement with the 
debtor. Under such an arrangement the originator should be aware that it no longer 
has secured claims against the debtors whose covering bonds were ceded. Since it 
sells those claims to the SPV, the risk it takes by transferring the bond is small. 
I concluded that such an arrangement is currently not allowed by Securitisation 
Notice, 2008. The principal debt comes to an end by virtue of the delegation 
agreement, which means that the accessory covering bond must also come to an end.  
9.3.3.2 Transfer of instalment sale agreements 
All the requirements for the transfer of a real right, in this case ownership, will have 
to be complied with.65 Of specific importance is the requirement that the thing must be 
delivered to the new owner. Most instalment sale agreements contain a clause to the 
effect that the purchaser will hold the sold item on behalf of the seller‘s cessionaries. 
It is my opinion that the purchaser will be held to such consent.  
 However, there is a potential problem if the purchaser sells the thing and gives up 
control in favour of the new purchaser. The new purchaser will not have entered into 
any agreement to hold the thing on behalf of the original owner and his cessionaries. 
There is case law to the effect that under these circumstances the original owner will 
not succeed in transferring ownership, because he will not be able to deliver the thing 
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to the other party. Under these circumstances it will not be possible for the SPV to 
gain ownership in the sold items. The SPV will take the claims against the purchasers 
without any security. 
  If ownership is transferred to the SPV, the SPV will have the duty to pass 
ownership to the purchaser once full payment is received, by way of traditio brevi 
manu. The purchaser will have to consent to the transfer of such a duty, but such 
consent can be given in the original instalment sale agreement. Furthermore, the real 
agreement reached when the thing is delivered to the purchaser is enough to let 
ownership pass to the purchaser on fulfilment of the condition that full payment must 
be received. It is not necessary to enter into a new real agreement at the time when the 
final instalment is paid, nor is it necessary that a second form of delivery should take 
place at that time. This is the case even when the original agreement is transferred. 
The duty of the SPV to transfer ownership is therefore negligible.  
9.3.4 Transfer of future claims 
The transfer of future claims is allowed in South African law.66 However, there are 
certain unanswered questions about such a transfer. For instance, it is still not settled 
whether the claims first materialise in the estate of the cedent or whether they 
materialise in the estate of the cessionary directly. If the claims materialise in the 
estate of the cedent first, they will not pass to the cessionary if the cedent is insolvent 
at that time. I argued that this should not pose too much of a problem to securitisation 
in South Africa, since the securitisation of future claims will always be more risky. 
The scheme will therefore in its structure cater for the fact that the financial soundness 
of the originator still has some influence on the stability of the scheme. 
9.3.5 Relationship between SPV and servicer 
The SPV (mandator) will enter into a contract of mandate with the servicer 
(mandatary) in terms of which the servicer will be obliged to collect the debts due to 
the SPV.67 The agreement between the SPV and the servicer will determine whether 
this mandate results in agency, a mandate in rem suam, or a cession for collecting 
purposes.  
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 If the servicer acts as an agent of the SPV it can collect claims on behalf of the 
SPV extra-judicially without informing the debtor of the cession of the claims. 
However, when the claims are collected judicially the originator will have to act on 
behalf of the SPV as its agent; otherwise the SPV will have no standing.68  
 I considered whether it is possible for the servicer to institute proceedings in his 
own name on behalf of the SPV. The servicer will then act on behalf of an 
undisclosed principal.69 This will only be a possibility in theory where the servicer 
was the originator of the scheme, because the doctrine only has application where the 
debtor contracted with the agent only and was unaware of the principal. If the servicer 
is a third party, the debtor will of necessity be informed of the securitisation and of his 
new creditor. 
 A review of the case law showed that South African courts are generally opposed 
to the possibility of allowing an agent to sue in his own name. The courts are also 
opposed to extending the doctrine of the undisclosed principal to other areas of the 
law, such as procedural law. It is therefore safer to cede the claims to the servicer for 
collecting purposes if the servicer is to collect the claims in its own name. 
 If the servicer is not the originator of the scheme, the cession for collecting 
purposes is a new cession unrelated to the initial transfer of the claims to the SPV.70 If 
the servicer was also the originator of the scheme, there are two possibilities. First, the 
cession could flow from a resolutive condition in the transfer agreement to the effect 
that on default by the debtor the agreement will be cancelled in respect of those 
individual claims by virtue of mutual agreement between the parties. Alternatively, 
the cession can be in terms of a clause in the servicing agreement to the effect that the 
claims will be ceded to the servicer when it needs to collect the claims judicially.  
I am not in favour of a resolutive condition to provide the servicer with locus 
standi to collect the claims. It will not comply with paragraph 4(2)(b)(ii) of 
Securitisation Notice, 2008, which prohibits any duty on the side of the originator to 
retain the risk associated with the transferred assets. The assumption of risk by the 
originator that acts as servicer creates the impression that the transfer of the claims 
was not a true sale. 
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 Where the cession is a fresh cession for collecting purposes, the agreement to cede 
must be contained in the servicing agreement. The clause must read that under 
appropriate circumstances the servicer will inform the SPV of the need to institute 
legal action against the debtor, after which the SPV will cede the claim to the servicer 
for collecting purposes. The servicing agreement will be the obligationary agreement 
and the causa for the cession will be to collect the debt. The same agreement may 
contain the transfer agreement. The co-operation of the security SPV will be 
necessary to cede the claims to the servicer where the claims were given as security to 
the security SPV by way of a fiduciary security cession. 
9.3.6 Simulated transactions 
I concluded that the risk of recharacterisation of the transfer of the assets to the SPV 
as a loan is small.71 The following considerations led me to this conclusion: 
 The parties to the securitisation scheme truly intend to conclude a contract of sale 
and do their utmost to ensure that consequence. It is the only means by which they 
can achieve their ultimate economic objective, namely to gain financing at a better 
interest rate than the originator could obtain without the insulation of the assets 
from its enterprise. 
 Owing to the limiting provisions of Securitisation Notice, 2008, traditional 
securitisation schemes in South Africa are prohibited from making use of 
repurchase agreements during the transaction. Bank originators may not replace 
non-performing assets with other similar, but performing assets. I am of the 
opinion that this also applies to the replacement of non-performing claims by non-
bank originators, because it would mean that they retain some of the risk 
associated with the asset.  
 Securitisation does not have the effect of converting a previously unsecured debt 
into a secured debt.  
 In most of the case law that allowed for the recharacterisation of the assets 
transferred in terms of a purported sale, the assets were movable corporeals and 
not claims. Furthermore, the seller mostly remained in control of the transferred 
assets. The policy consideration behind finding such transactions simulated, lies in 
the lack of publicity of the transfer of ownership in terms of the sale. It is argued 
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that the creditors of the purported seller are potentially prejudiced, because they 
have no way of knowing that the assets no longer fall in the estate of the seller 
when they extend credit to him. I concluded that the same argument cannot be 
made in the case of securitisation. The originator is not impoverished by the sale 
of the assets to the SPV. The originator is paid for the transfer of the claims to the 
SPV, so that one asset (the claim) is replaced by another (money). Furthermore, 
claims are transferred by agreement alone and not publicised by delivery as is the 
case with corporeal movable property. 
 The SPV becomes the legal holder (owner) of the claims without restriction. As 
explained above, cession for collecting purposes to the originator that will 
continue to act as servicer should be provided for in the servicing agreement and 
not through a resolutive condition in the transfer agreement. 
 The SPV intends to make use of the transferred claims by using them as security 
for the issuing of debt securities. The SPV may even transfer the claims to the 
security SPV if it decides to make use of fiduciary security cession. It can 
therefore not be said that the SPV does not intend to make use of the transferred 
claims. 
9.3.7 Impeachability of sale of assets on originator‟s insolvency 
The sale of the assets to the SPV will be a disposition in terms of the Insolvency Act.72 
Despite this, there is virtually no risk that the liquidator of an insolvent originator will 
be able to successfully impeach the transfer of the assets from the originator to the 
SPV in the absence of fraud. 
Section 26 of the Insolvency Act, which provides for the impeachment of 
dispositions without value, is only available if no value was given in return for the 
disposition.73 During a securitisation transaction the transfer of the assets will always 
be accompanied by payment, and financing by means of securitisation provides 
certain benefits that will also be regarded as value for purposes of this section. 
Arguments that the payment or other benefits received in return for the transfer of the 
assets to the SPV are inadequate, do not properly resort under section 26, but must be 
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raised in connection with a voidable preference in terms of section 2974 or an undue 
preference in terms of section 30.75 
 It is a requirement of section 29 that the debtor must have been insolvent 
immediately after the disposition and of section 30 that the debtor was insolvent at the 
time of the disposition. It is most unlikely that an insolvent originator will be able to 
enter into a securitisation transaction. The affairs of the originator are scrutinised by 
rating agencies, lawyers who provide legal opinions to the rating agencies on the 
insolvency-remoteness of the originator and, if applicable, the securities exchange 
where the debt securities are to be listed.  
 However, even in the unlikely event that the originator is found to have been 
insolvent at the time of the transfer of the assets to the SPV, the chances of success 
under section 29 and 30 are limited. The SPV will be a creditor of the originator for 
purposes of section 29 and the transfer will have the effect of preferring the SPV 
above other creditors, which means that the liquidator will have satisfied the prima 
facie onus of proof required by the section. However, section 29 provides a defence to 
the creditor, namely that the transaction was in the ordinary course of the business of 
the debtor and that there was no intention to prefer.76 This defence will usually be 
available to the SPV. 
 Securitisation is now an established form of financing. It cannot be contended that 
securitisation per se is extraordinary, although the terms of each transaction will have 
to be evaluated to determine whether a particular transaction fell outside the 
parameters of the ordinary course of business of the debtor. One securitisation scheme 
will often not be identical in its structure to others. 
 I evaluated the requirements of the ‗intention to prefer‘ in terms of section 29 and 
concluded that the motivation of an originator to enter into a securitisation scheme 
will seldom amount to a primary or dominant intention to prefer the SPV to its other 
creditors.77 The primary intention behind most securitisation schemes, which are 
scrutinised by several role-players apart from the originator, is financing and to obtain 
the benefits that arise from this particular method of financing. 
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 For the same reason, I do not foresee that a liquidator will be able to successfully 
rely on the provisions of section 30. This section does not carry the time restriction of 
six months that section 29 sets, but the liquidator must prove that the disposition was 
made with the intention to prefer a specific creditor. Most securitisation transactions 
are not entered into with such an intention. 
 If it is possible to prove fraud or collusion between the originator and the SPV, 
section 31 might be available to impeach the disposition,78 or alternatively, the 
common law actio Pauliana.79 The actio Pauliana will only be an option if it can be 
proven that the SPV colluded in defrauding the creditors of the originator, which in 
this context means that the object of the disposition was to give a particular creditor 
an unfair advantage above the other creditors of the debtor. As explained above, proof 
of such intent in the context of securitisation is unlikely. Since a successful 
application in terms of the actio Pauliana will not be subject to section 33(2) of the 
Act,80 it is uncertain what the effect of this order will be with regard to the rights of 
third parties, especially the investors of the SPV.  
9.3.8 Effect of impeachment on third parties 
Section 33(2) of the Insolvency Act81 provides that an order in terms of section 26, 29, 
30 or 31 may not affect the rights of third parties who received property in good faith 
and for value.82 The investors in the SPV will resort under this category of persons. 
The courts will have difficulty in making any order for impeachment of a disposition 
that will not result in prejudicing the rights of the investors. I therefore concluded that 
even when there is proof of fraud or collusion it will be difficult to obtain an order for 
impeachment of the sale of the assets to the SPV. 
9.3.9 Securitisation Notice and impeachment 
If the transfer of the assets to the SPV is impeached, the provisions of Chapter VIII of 
the Banks Act83 become applicable. I base this conclusion on the fact that it is a 
                                                 
78
 Paragraph 8.2.4. 
79
  Paragraph 8.4. 
80
 See par 9.3.8 below. 
81
 24 of 1936. 
82
 Paragraph 8.2.5. 
83
 94 of 1990. 
CHAPTER 9 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
429 
central requirement of Securitisation Notice, 2008 that the sale of the assets from the 
originator to the SPV will withstand legal scrutiny, also in the case of the originator‘s 
subsequent insolvency.  
9.3.10 Notice requirements in terms of section 34 of Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
I concluded that most originators will not qualify as ‗traders‘ in terms of this section 
and therefore need not comply with the requirements of section 34. However, if an 
originator is a trader in terms of its normal business operations, claims resulting from 
these trading activities will resort under the business of the trader. The transfer of 
these claims in terms of a securitisation transaction will consequently be a transfer of 
part of the businesses of that trader.  
The notice requirement of section 34 can only be avoided if the trader can prove 
that it is in the ordinary course of business to transfer assets by way of securitisation. I 
cannot foresee that many traders will be successful with such an argument. 
Consequently, securitisations undertaken by originators that qualify as ‗traders‘ in 
terms of the section 34 should comply with the notice requirements of that section. It 
unfortunately implies that every liquidated liability of the trader in connection with 
the business, which would become due at some future date, will fall due immediately 
if the creditor demands payment of the debt.  
9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations flow from the conclusions in this thesis: 
9.4.1 Rating agencies 
I recommend that a certification of particular rating agencies as institutions that 
conform to sound methodology in their rating process should be considered. Such a 
certification must not aim to prescribe the methods and procedures followed by rating 
agencies, but must evaluate the methods and procedures already in use against 
specified criteria. The publication of methods and procedures to an independent 
certification authority, which may be an exchange that regularly deals with debt 
instruments, for instance the Bond Exchange of South Africa, would also encourage 
rating agencies to keep to those procedures and not to deviate from them without 
proper cause. This will lead to greater investor confidence in the ratings provided by 
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less established rating agencies and will ensure that the big three rating agencies keep 
to their publicised procedures. 
9.4.2 Security SPV and trustee for debenture-holders 
The provisions regarding security granted to a trustee for debenture-holders must be 
removed from the Companies Act84 and should only be regulated by the Trust 
Property Control Act.85 Section 43 of the Companies Bill86 is not an improvement on 
the current position, because it still mentions the appointment of a trustee for 
debenture-holders without reference to the general applicability of the Trust Property 
Control Act. Section 43 therefore leaves the uncertainty about whether a trustee for 
debenture-holders could also hold security on behalf of persons other than the 
investors.  
 When use is made of a security SPV during securitisation, the interests of the 
investors should still be represented separately by a trustee for debenture-holders. 
9.4.3 Form of security in favour of security SPV 
The definition of ‗person‘ in the Deeds Registries Act87 must be amended so that 
security in movable property can vest in a trust. 
9.4.4 Perfection of general notarial bonds 
The current system of perfection of general notarial bonds is unsatisfactory. I suggest 
that a form of receivership of the movable property of a debtor, which is activated on 
an application by any general notarial bondholder to perfect his security, may address 
some of the problems regarding perfection. The receiver will take control of the assets 
and will manage the process on behalf of the general notarial bondholders. The 
receiver will owe the debtor the same duties as a pledgee. Secured status will then be 
granted to all general notarial bondholders on the appointment of the receiver and 
priority will be determined by the order of the registration of their bonds. All general 
notarial bonds must be granted the ability to be perfected in this manner and 
perfecting clauses should no longer be required. 
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 I submit that bondholders should not be allowed to alter their priority based solely 
on chance. If creditors are not satisfied with where they will lie in order of preference 
if the proposal above is implemented, they ought to refuse to extend credit. It will be 
unnecessary to include restrictive clauses to prevent the further extension of general 
notarial bonds over the assets, because such later bondholders will not be able to 
better their position in relation to the first bondholder by way of perfection. The 
position of the general notarial bondholders in relation to other secured creditors will 
remain unchanged, as will the entitlement of the debtor to grant further security over 
the encumbered assets. The order of priority must remain intact during the subsequent 
liquidation of the debtor. 
 I submit that such a system will lead to a far more satisfactory position for general 
notarial bondholders, although it will inevitably mean that there will be fewer assets 
available for distribution to preferent and unsecured creditors of the insolvent debtor. 
In the current system the amount that will be secured by a perfected general notarial 
bond will always be limited to one bondholder‘s claim. This concern can be addressed 
by capping the amount available for distribution to general notarial bondholders. In 
England in the event of the debtor‘s insolvency, a specified percentage of the amount 
available for distribution to the floating charge holders is kept back to be paid to 
unsecured creditors.88 
9.4.5 Securitisation Notice 
I recommend that it must be possible in terms of the Securitisation Exemption Notice 
to transfer assets from the originator to the SPV by way of cession only, leaving any 
remaining duties with the originator. To achieve this, paragraph 4(2)(a) of the 
Schedule should be amended to read as follows: 
 
The transfer of the assets to or acquisition of assets by a special-purpose institution 
shall totally divest the transferring institution and all its associated companies and, 
when the transferring institution is a bank, divest any other institution within the 
banking group of which such a bank is a member, of all rights and obligations 
originating from the underlying transactions and all risks in connection with the 
assets transferred.  
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No subsequent transactions by the SPV should bind the originator and no subsequent 
transactions by the originator should bind the SPV. Paragraph 4(2)(j) of the Schedule 
should be removed, because it creates the impression of continued involvement 
between the originator and the SPV. 
 I recommend that the Registrar of Banks should consult with the trustee for 
debenture-holders before taking action in terms of Chapter VIII of the Banks Act.89 
Paragraph 17(2) of the Schedule to Securitisation Notice, 2008 should be amended by 
adding the following: 
 
(b) If a trustee for debenture-holders was appointed under the scheme, the 
Registrar shall consult the trustee before he takes any action in terms of 
Chapter VIII. 
9.4.6 Exemption from the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 
2002 
The Registrar of Collective Investment Schemes should issue an exemption by way of 
notice to exclude securitisation schemes from the ambit of the Act. 
Until such an exemption is issued, I recommend that the SPV obtains an exemption 
in terms of section 22, which provides that the Registrar may exempt a particular 
manager or a category of persons from any provisions of the Act on such conditions 
and to such an extent as he may determine. This might be time-consuming, but at least 
there will be certainty about whether the restrictions contained in the Act are 
applicable to the scheme. There will also be certainty about whether the Trust 
Property Control Act90 is applicable to the scheme, because if the scheme is found to 
be a collective investment scheme, the application of that Act is specifically excluded 
and the provisions of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act91 apply. 
9.4.7 Transfer by way of cession 
As far as possible, the transfer of claims to the SPV should take the form of a cession 
of claims rather than of delegation. This is also essential if the SPV is to take transfer 
of accessory security rights of the transferred claims. 
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9.4.8 Relationship between SPV and servicer 
For purposes of extra-judicial debt collecting, the servicer should act as the SPV‘s 
agent. When the debt must be collected judicially, the servicer can either act as the 
SPV‘s agent, or take cession of the claims for collecting purposes after which it may 
claim in its own name. 
9.4.9 Solvency of originator on transfer of assets 
The SPV should obtain a statement by the auditors of the originator to the effect that 
the originator is solvent at the time of the securitisation transaction and that the 
transaction will not leave the originator insolvent. 
9.4.10 Section 34 of Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
The transfer of assets in the course of a traditional securitisation scheme should be 
excluded from the notice requirements of this section. 
9.5 FINAL REMARKS 
At the time of writing this conclusion it is apparent that the world economy is entering 
a recession. This will put strain on all debt capital markets, of which asset-backed 
securities form part. So far the insolvency-remoteness of SPVs has only been a point 
of discussion in academic circles, but it will probably soon be put to the test by 
liquidators in courts across the world. 
 The aim of this thesis is to recommend, from a legal point of view, the best 
practices in the structuring of the traditional securitisation scheme so that it can 
achieve the benefits of this form of financing. 
 However, behind the legal and economic issues surrounding securitisation stands a 
human aspect: large institutional investors usually invest in asset-backed securities. 
These institutional investors represent the interests of thousands of ordinary people, 
who rely on good returns on investment for their pensions and life insurance. The 
success, or failure, of traditional securitisation to withstand economic pressure, as 
well as the potential insolvency of its originator, has implications for all these people. 
 I am reminded of a piece of horticultural advice I received not long ago: I was told 
not to anchor a newly planted tree too tightly. Apparently, the stress of wind and the 
forced resistance that the tree must provide against it causes the tree to anchor itself 
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better. If one provides such anchorage artificially, the tree will fall over when the 
artificial supports are removed. 
 If securitisation is a tree, it grew tall in a very short time. If the stresses of the 
current economic conditions do not kill it, they are bound to make it stronger. 
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